



Zagreb - Cultural Kapital of Europe 3000

Is a collaboration platform created as a joint project of the **Center for Drama Art, Multimedia Institute, Platforma 9,81** and **What, How and for Whom**. The project takes place in the framework of **relations**. **Relations** is a project initiated by **Kulturstiftung des Bundes, Federal Cultural Foundation, Germany**. *Cultural Kapital* will foster those collaborations – both between the project initiators and the local and international initiatives – that will address changes in the social conditions of cultural production, develop the structural position of independent culture and question the dominant regimes of representing culture. Until the end of 2005, *Cultural Kapital* is planned to include conferences, art festivals, exhibitions, workshops, lectures, presentations, publications, media productions, etc. An important part of the project will be cultural policy activities directed towards reforming the institutional setting of independent culture - increasing its influence and strengthening its resources.

Zagreb - Kulturni kapital Evrope 3000

Je platforma za suradnju nastala kao zajednički projekt **Centra za dramsku umjetnost, Multimedijalnog instituta, Platforme 9,81** i udruge za vizualnu kulturu **Što, kako i za koga/WHW**. *Zagreb-Kulturni kapital Evrope 3000* se odvija u okviru projekta **relations**. Projekt **relations** inicirala je njemačka **Savezna zaklada za kulturu**. *Kulturni kapital* će razvijati one suradnje – kako među nositeljima tako s lokalnim i internacionalnim inicijativama – koje tematiziraju promjene društvenih uvjeta kulturne proizvodnje, razvijaju strukturni položaj nezavisne kulture i preispituju dominantne režime reprezentiranja kulture. Do kraja 2005. u sklopu *Kulturnog kapitala* planirane su konferencije, umjetnički festivali, izložbe, radionice, predavanja, predstavljanja, publikacije, medijske produkcije i dr. Važan dio projekta bit će aktivnosti iz kulturne politike usmjerene na reforme institucionalnog okvira nezavisne kulture - povećavanje njenog utjecaja i jačanje njenih resursa.



This project takes place in the framework of **relations**. **relations** is a project initiated by the German Federal Cultural Foundation



www.project-relations.de

U Frakciji br. 37/38 bavimo se retorikom kao umijećem uvjeravanja, retorikom kao umjetničko-političkom strategijom. Namjera nam je bila reaktivirati učinak retorike unutar suvremenih izvedbenih praksa, kao i njen značaj unutar teorijskih promišljanja koje interesira iskliznuće iz standardiziranih definicija. Retorika je ovdje pomaknuta iz govora u sve razine izvedbe te je sadržana kako u tekstu van scene, tako i u glasu rascijepljenom od tijela, ili pak u šutnji. Tekstovi u ovom broju Frakcije čine upravo to - otvaraju konotativni beskraj retorike prezentirajući je, u najširem smislu, kao izvjesni izvedbeni višak, ono što se ne nalazi u sadržaju, ono što ne zahtjeva istinu, ono što može bujati nad vlastitom prazninom, ono što svoju krajnju svrhu nalazi u zavođenju.

In Frakcija no. 37/38 we deal with rhetoric as an art of persuasion, rhetoric as an artistic and political strategy. Our intention was to reactivate the effect of rhetoric within the contemporary performing practice, and its importance within theoretical thought interested in the slipping away from standardized definitions. Rhetoric here is displaced from speech on all levels of performance, and is contained both in the off-stage text, as in the voice detached from the body, or in silence itself. The contributions to this issue of Frakcija open up a connotative immenseness of rhetoric by presenting, in the widest sense of the term, as a performative surplus of that which is not contained in the content, that which does not demand the truth, that which can flourish over its own emptiness, that which finds its final purpose in seduction.

Contents

ide novo

- 004 Romeo Castellucci
- 013 **group.jpg**
a project by Tim Etchells and Vlatka Horvat
- 018 **'AN ENCOUNTER IS PERHAPS'**
David Williams
- 036 **Face to Face**
Erden Kosova
- 038 **Oda Projesi – open file**
- 048 **Group *Jouissance*: Organization of Happiness and Exhaustion**
Bojana Kunst
- 059 Mass for election- day silence (time of action), dead body
behind the wall (location of action), & the hoofs in the throat (manner of
performance)?
Goran Petercol & (Ivana Sajko)
- 065 **Passing for something half-good else**
Mårten Spångberg
- 082 **COLLECT-IF**
Bojana Cvejić & Emil Hrvatin
- 096 **Sehen sie diese Gruppe? Das ist Subjekt!**
or Krvavac with Lacan
Nebojša Jovanović
- 108 **East Art Map**
a project by Irwin
- 113 **WALKING THEORY – TOGETHER**
A Few Notes on TkH's Theoretical Performances
Ana Vujanović
- 124 **Postgravitational Art**
Dragan Živadinov
- 126 **Solo for reading bodies.**
On Audience and Antonia Baehr's
and Henry Wilt's *Un après-midi*
featured by Petra Sabich

Sadržaj

- 006 Romeo Castellucci
- 019 **'SUSRET JE MOŽDA'**
David Williams
- 038 **Oda Projesi – *open file***
- 046 **Licem u lice**
Erden Kosova
- 053 **Skupna *Jouissance*: organizacija sreće i iscrpljenosti**
Bojana Kunst
- 063 Misa za predizbornu šutnju (vrijeme radnje), mrtvaca iza zida (mjesto radnje) i kopita u grlu (način izvedbe)?
Goran Petercol & (Ivana Sajko)
- 074 **Umjetnost koja se pravi da je nešto drugo, napola dobro**
Mårten Spångberg
- 090 **COLLECT-IF**
Bojana Cvejić & Emil Hrvatin
- 103 **Sehen sie diese Gruppe? Das ist Subjekt!, ili, Krvavac s Lacanom**
Nebojša Jovanović
- 119 **TEORIJA KOJA HODA – ZAJEDNO**
Nekoliko zabilješki o teorijskim performansima TkH-a
Ana Vujanović



Societas Raffaello Sanzio: *Julije Cezar*
(Courtesy of C. Castellucci)

1 Dio kazališnog programa *Cacofonia per una messa in scena*: Giulio Cesare [Kakofonija za postavu *Julija Cezara*], u Romeo Castellucci, Chiara Guidi, Claudia Castellucci, *Epopoea della polvere. Il teatro della Societas Raffaello Sanzio* 1992-1999, Ubulibri, Milano 2001.

2 Iz uvodnih zabilješki postave *Julija Cezara*, u Romeo Castellucci, Chiara Guidi, Claudia Castellucci, *Epopoea della polvere. Il teatro della Societas Raffaello Sanzio* 1992-1999, Ubulibri, Milano 2001.

Romeo Castellucci

Prevela s talijanskog Tihana Maravić

Imperij retorike¹

Puno prostraniji i izdržljiviji od bilo kojeg političkog imperija, imperij retorike je vladao Zapadom dva i pol milenija, od Gorgije do Napoleona III. Retorika je bilo jedino umijeće (zajedno sa gramatikom koja je nastala tek kasnije) kroz koju je naše društvo uvidjelo značaj jezika i njegove neograničeni vlasti. Ideologijama koje su se izmjenjivale nametnula se kao viša ideologija forme. Vlast se čini takvom samo tada kada je zaodjenuta snagom riječi. Retoričkom riječi. Šarm retorike: elefantjazični kvas prazne riječi. Uvjeravanje koje ne mari za predmet i koje kao jedini cilj ima svoj umjetnički dojam. Trčeći za umjetnošću vlast uvijek postaje retorična. Umjetnost kao nadzor, tamo gdje je forma grčkog amfiteatra postavljena iznad potpuno jednake forme senata. Završava li retorika tamo gdje počinje kazalište? Možda kazalište počinje tamo gdje počinje retorika. Činjenica je da, ne samo kazalište nastavlja retorički govor na formalnom planu (ili obrnuto), nego da je retorika u biti, stvarni i cjeloviti način razmatranja i manipuliranja kazališnom materijom.

Retorika prihvaća i otkriva izopačenost kazališta: promatra kazalište oporo i bez milosti; veliča njegovo pravo lice, lice pretvaranja i izopačenosti. Na ciničan način retorika sadrži teatralnost dvos-truko, upotrebljava je i objašnjava je. Ona ne priznaje kazališnu čistoću; prezire kazalište ili glumca u njihovoj samostalnosti i istovremeno ga prisajedinjuje sebi. Retorika istovremeno i prisvaja i odb-acuje kazališnu vještinu i na taj je se način paradoksalno, homeopatskim postupkom, oslobađa. Sa jedne strane ona je izrabljuje utoliko ukoliko joj je potrebna radi istinosti govora, a sa druge strane upire u nju prstom kako bi ukazala na njezinu lažnost, izopačenost i štetnost. Na taj se način dobiva savršen i svjesno kazališni, govor istinosti. Naprimjer, kazališni vrhunac Antonijevog govora je najd-jelotvornija i najjača točka *Julija Cezara* možda baš zato što je, ukratko, dobra inscenacija retorike. Osnovna tehnologija riječi primjenjene u Shakespeareovom *Juliju Cezaru* dovela me do retorike ciceronskog govornišva.

Retorika²

Retorika je konkretni i cjeloviti način razmatranja i manipuliranja kazališnom materijom. Retorika prihvaća i otkriva izopačenost kazališta. Dramsko središte *Julija Cezara* je Antonijev govor koji se ovdje otkriva kao dio glume i režije. Što u većoj mjeri riječ je prijetvorna (himbena) utoliko se pokazuje djelotvornijom. U Shakespeareovoj drami Antonijev je govor velika retorička amplifikacija uređena pomoću postupaka koji se zasnivaju na figurama ironije, litote, anafore, klimaksa, i pretericije, na-

bijeni jakim elementom neizvjesnosti koji se, sa postupcima kašnjenja, izljevaju u Cezarevo čitanje oporuke. U središtu Antonijevog retoričkog remek djela sadržano je izlaganje iskrvavljenog Cezarevog ogrtača. Umijeće retorike upravo ovdje postiže svoju najveću moć i okreće tok povijesti. Čini se kao da je Cezar uskrsnuo. Govor o vlasti postaje vlast. Cijela me ta priprema zanima više od samih sadržaja. Radi se o ustrojenim figurama. Brutovo ‘spartansko’ govorništvo protiv kazališnog i retoričkog govorništva Antonija.

Antonijev brižljivo izrađeni način izražavanja protiv Brutovog idealizma. Retoričko umijeće koje najvjerojatnije postiže vrhunac s Ciceronom, jednim od senatora u doba Cezara, pokazuje se kao antipjesnički svijet. Retoriku ne zanima tekst i pjesnička riječ kao stvaranje smisla. Njezina je namjera uvjeravanje i zbog toga se služi tehnikama lova. Ti si cilj retorike i netko je mislio na tebe. Pripremio je cijelu pozornicu kako bi stao pred tebe. Retorika te uzima pod svoje i čini od tebe “dramski lik”; retorički krvav šaptač, koji još krvari, pokreće glavu umjesto tebe; to je ogorčenost dijalektike koja te baca u kazalište. Potrebno je bez moralističkih sudova gledati na retoriku; na vrste postupaka kojima se služila svih ovih godina; potrebno je gledati na njeno prezreno kazalište kako bi se ukrala njena snaga, njena *hybris*, njena vragom opsjednuta teleologija, njeno prašnjavo ludilo, njena patvorena ljepota. Shvaćanje ove osobine – koje pripada naslijeđu isključivo zapadnjačkom – može ukloniti čistunstvo pjesnika i njihovu umišljenu pripadnost izabranoj eliti. I tako se još jednom daje prednost kazalištu, a ne prezrivoj i arogantnoj oholosti pjesništva. Izraz ‘pjesnički teatar’ zvuči kao ljupka laž. To je izraz bez hrabrosti i vatre. Bez pustolovine. Više volim da je na sceni prašnjavo i stara retorika nego profinjenosti sa vršaka vilica pjesnika. Kazalište retorike je lekcija koju treba naučiti; zanima me njena oštrina, sva odvratna liturgija glasa, kao zadivljujuća snaga koja sada puni praznu vazru mojeg kazališta koje odustaje, ovdje, od čistoće.


Izopačenost i retorika³

Krećem od činjenice da umjetnost nije čista. Nitko me neće nikada uspjeti uvjeriti u to da umjetnost oslobađa čovjeka. Soteriologija umjetnosti mi se čini jedna velika jeftina laž. Za mene umjetnost poprima, mora poprimiti, svoje vlastito stanje izopačenosti. Umjetnost je izopačena, ali ne upotrebljavam ovaj naziv tek tako u negativnom smislu, naprotiv sva njena ljepota upravo je u njenoj izopačenosti, u njenoj svjesnosti o izopačenosti. ‘Istinita’ riječ, pjesnička riječ, u kazalištu nema smisla. Nema smisla zato što su jezik i riječ uvijek izvan mene, one ne prijanjaju na moje tijelo. Govorenje nije sretno iskustvo, nije to nikad bilo. Riječi uvijek izražavaju odmak, hladnoću. Dok govorim, to nisam ja. To nije moje mjesto, ne poznajem ga. Dok govorim nisam tamo, poprimio sam jezik u njegovoj punokrvnosti, pretjeranom izobilju, dakle retorici. Retorika svjesno preuzima na sebe svoju izopačenost, i bez predrasuda se koristi sredstvom riječi, reformuliranošću jezika. Kao kada se oblači kostim: još se jednom radi o kazališnom elementu. Čak štoviše ona se naoružava, ona je naoružana riječ. Naoružana je sistemom. Postoje retoričke figure koje priliče vrlo određenim mecima, streljivu. *Julije Cezar* je razradio problem ovakvog rada na riječi i na naoružanoj riječi. Želio sam sukobiti retorički jezik, koji je dalek od našeg iskustva, sa stvarnošću i istinitošću tijela glumca. Svaki je glumac na pozornici nosač ovog proturječja, na sceni, u krvi i mesu, on fizički pati i podnosi težinu tuđih pogleda, jer uvjeravam vas da je tuđi pogled težak poput udara čekićem. Glumac se nalazi u situaciji da mora podnositi težinu scene, surovu stvarnost gledateljevog pogleda, dakle i vlastitu stvarnost; a istovremeno mora biti netko tko djeluje na izopačen način.

Slika koja može sažeti dvojnost toga stava je naprimjer glumac koji u svoju nosnicu stavlja endoskop i na taj način omogućuje putovanje u unutrašnjost mesa, unutar intimnosti koju inače nije moguće vidjeti. U ovom je razmišljanju prisutan i Stanislavski, i “unutarnji put” i “vanjski put” najvjerojatnije postaju parodija (znate da je podijelio glumčevo znanje i spoznaju na dva puta: put psihološkog iskustva unutarnje osjećajnosti i put vanjskih osobina).⁴ Na ovaj način unutarnji je put ostvaren doslovno tjelesno; put u unutarnjost glumca čini vidnima sluznice koje proizvode riječi. I to je skandal: uspjeti vidjeti gotovo pornografsko porijeklo riječi, kao da grlo glumca ima isti tip problematike sa kojom je suočen u odnosu na sram spram svojih genitalija. To je ujedno i simpatično i emblematično – zato što se radi o emblemu u retoričkom smislu, o figuri sa borama, o triku – vidjeti ženski spolni organ u grlu muškarca. To je i ironično – u odnosu na mušku, maskilističku napetost, izrazito seksualiziranu u cijelom *Juliju Cezaru* gdje su prisutni samo političari – vidjeti u grlu glavnog glumca ženski spolni organ, zato što glasne žice koje su prikazane, odmah vode, putem asocijacija ideja, do vagine. Vidi se kako glasne žice drhte u mišićnom grčenju – ono što kasnije, u nekom drugom trenutku smatramo govorom i rječju – prije svega je meso, grčenje mišića. Priča da je riječ dah je još jednom laž. Riječ ima istu sudbinu tijela, dakle prisutnost, ali i čudesnost mesa. Stoga vidite koliko je daleko knjiga! Jako je daleko, knjiga! Čim se podigne zastor, tradicionalna slika glumca, mislim na sliku fizičkog tijela viđenog izvana, biva preokrenuta kao čarapa: prva slika koju nam daje glumac je unutarnja, a ne vanjska. Staviti si endoskop u jednu nosnicu je retorička gesta, ali kao proturječje pokazuje stvarnost dirljiviju od mesa, i ipak ostaje retorička gesta.

³ Dio teksta *Il pellegrino della materia [Hodočasnik materije]*, u Romeo Castellucci, Chiara Guidi, Claudia Castellucci, *Epopea della polvere. Il teatro della Societas Raffaello Sanzio* 1992-1999, Ubulibri, Milano 2001.

⁴ Konstantin Stanislavski, *Rad glumca na sebi*, Cekade, Zagreb 1989.



Societas Raffaello Sanzio: *Julije Cezar*
(Courtesy of C. Castellucci)

- 1 Dio kazališnog programa *Cacofonia per una messa in scena*: Giulio Cesare, in Romeo Castellucci, Chiara Guidi, Claudia Castellucci, *Epopea della polvere. Il teatro della Societas Raffaello Sanzio* 1992-1999, Ubulibri, Milano 2001.
- 2 Iz uvodnih zabilješki postave Julija Cezara, u Romeo Castellucci, Chiara Guidi, Claudia Castellucci, *Epopea della polvere. Il teatro della Societas Raffaello Sanzio* 1992-1999, Ubulibri, Milano 2001.

Romeo Castellucci

Translated from Italian by Mihaela Perković

The rhetorical empire¹

More vast and tenacious than any political empire, the rhetorical empire has reigned in the West for two and a half millennia, from Gorgias to Napoleon III. Rhetoric has been the sole practice (together with grammar, born after it) with which our society recognized language and its sovereignty. It imposed itself above and beyond the ideologies that followed it, as if it were a superior ideology of form. Power appears as such only where it is cloaked in the power of the word. Of the rhetorical word. The fascination of rhetoric: the elephantine yeast of an empty word. The persuasion that, without regard for the object, it has one sole goal – its own artistic effect. Power is always rhetorical when it chases art. Art as control, where the form of the Greek amphitheatre has been usurped by that of the senate, which is entirely like it. Does rhetoric end where theatre begins? Perhaps theater begins where rhetoric begins. The fact is that not only does the theater continue the discourse of rhetoric (or vice versa) on a formal level, but also that rhetoric is, in essence, a concrete and complete way to consider and manipulate theatrical subject matters.

Rhetoric accepts and reveals the corruption of the theater: it regards the theater in an impious, rough way; it exalts the real face of the theater, which is, really, a fictitious one, a corrupt one. Cynically, rhetoric doubly encompasses theater, because it both employs and explains it. It disowns the purity of the theater, despises it and the actor in its autonomy while nevertheless encompassing it. Paradoxically, it is by a homeopathic process that rhetoric liberates itself from the theater, since the trick of the theater is appropriated and rejected at the same time; it is exploited because it is useful to the truth of the discourse, and yet pointed out as false, corrupt, harmful. A discourse of truth is born out of it, followed by a perfect and conscious theater; the oration of Antonio, for example, which is a theatrical peak, the most efficient and durable point of *Julius Caesar*. The very reason for this may be the fact that it is, in synthesis, a good *mise-en-scène* of rhetoric. The basic technology which is in the workings of Shakespeare's *Julius Caesar* has brought me to the rhetoric of the Ciceronian oratory.

Rhetoric²

Rhetoric is a concrete and complete way of considering and manipulating theatrical matter, accepting and revealing the corruption of the theater. The dramatic centre of *Julius Caesar* is Antonio's discourse which here reveals itself as a piece of acting and of direction. The more the word is fictitious (of fiction), the more efficient it is. In the play, Antonio's speech is a large rhetorical amplification, organized by means of procedures based on the figures of irony, of litotes, anaphora, climax and praeteritio, all burdened with a strong element of suspense, with delaying tactics that flow into the reading of the last will and testament of Caesar. In the center of Antonio's rhetoric masterpiece there is an ostentatious cloak bloodied by Caesar. It is here that the art of rhetoric reaches its maximum power, and the course of the story is turned here. It seems as if Caesar is resurrected. The discourse of power becomes power. I am interested more in the whole preparation of it than in the content. These are structured figures. The 'Spartan' oratory of Brutus vs. the theatrical and rhetorical oratory of Antonio.

The elaborate elocution of Antonio against the idealism of Brutus. The art of rhetoric, which probably reaches its peak in Cicero, one of the senators in the epoch of Caesar, seems like an antipoeitic world. Rhetoric is not interested in the text nor is it interested in the word of poetry as in the production of sense. It aims to convince and in order to achieve this, employs the techniques of the hunt. You are the aim of rhetoric and someone has thought of you. Someone has prepared an entire stage to stand in front of you. Rhetoric makes you a 'character', because it involves you; there's a stage whisper rhetorically bloodied, which is bleeding as well, and that is what moves your head in your stead; it is the exasperation of the dialectic that throws you into the theater. Rhetoric needs to be viewed without moralistic judgments as do the types of procedure to which it has taken recourse over the years. Its despised theater needs to be viewed in order to rob its power, its *hybris*, its possessed teleology, its dusty folly, its misbegotten beauty. Seizing this type of quality – a legacy exclusively western – can stop the purism of poets and their claimed superior choice. Once more, theater is preferred to poetic presumption. The expression 'poetic theater' is akin to the falsely gracious. It is an expression that lacks courage and fire. It is lacking in adventure. On stage, I prefer the dusty, old rhetoric to the subtlety of poets. Its theater is a lesson to be learned; a toughness that I am now interested in, its abominable liturgy of voice, as an awesome power that fills an empty vase of my theater that, here, renounces purity.

Corruption and Rhetoric³

I start from the fact that art is not pure. No one will ever succeed in convincing me that art sets people free. The soteriology of art seems a cheap lie to me. For me, art assumes, it must assume, its own condition of corruption. Art is corrupted. I do not use this term – corrupted – in just any old negative meaning. Moreover, the beauty of art consists of its corruption; it lies in its consciousness of corruption. The 'truthful' word, the poetic word does not make sense in the theater. It does not have sense because the language, the word, is always outside of myself; the adherence to my body does not exist any longer. It is not a happy experience, speaking, it never has been. Words always express a detachment, a certain coldness. While I speak, I am not me. It is not a place of mine, I am not familiar with it. I am not there when I speak; therefore, I have assumed the language in its plethora, in its overabundance and so in its rhetoric. Rhetoric takes its own corruption upon itself, consciously, and in a manner without prejudice, uses the means of the word, of the reformulation of a language. It as if it donned a costume: again, it is yet another theatrical element. Most of all, it arms itself, it is an armed word. Armed with a system. There are rhetoric figures which correspond to projectiles, to ammunition, very precise. *Julius Caesar* has unleashed the problem of this kind of work on word and on the armed word. But what I wanted was to put in contrast the rhetorical language, which is distant from our own experience, on the one hand, and the concreteness and truth of the body of an actor, on the other. Every actor on stage finds himself as the carrier of these contradictions, of being there, flesh and blood, suffering physically, enduring the weight of being watched by others. I assure you this weight is heavy, as heavy as a hammer blow. He finds himself having to endure the weight of the scene, of the hard concreteness of the spectators' eyes, and, therefore, of his reality. At the same time, he finds himself having to be someone who acts in a corrupt manner.

An image which can condense the duplicity of this department is, for example, when an actor, at the beginning, inserts an endoscope into his nostril and takes a journey into the flesh, into an intimacy which is impossible to see otherwise. Therefore, here there is also a Stanislavskian discourse and the "inner way" and the "outer way" (you know he has divided the actor's knowledge and conscience in two ways: one of interior emotional psychological experience and the other of exterior characters).⁴ Now the inner way is realized physically, literally: it is a voyage into the inside of the actor, therefore the mucous membrane that produces words is made visible. And this is the scandal: to go after an almost pornographic origin of words, as if the throat of an actor had the same kind of problem that he faces with regards to the shame connected with one's genitalia. This is both fine and emblematic – because it is an emblem in the rhetorical sense, that is, it is a figure with wrinkles, a trick – to see a feminine organ in the throat of a man. Therefore, it is also ironic – with regards to male, machoist tension, greatly sexualized in the entire *Julius Caesar* in which there are only politicians – to see in the throat of the first actor this element of the female genitalia, because the vocal cords that are shown, immediately reduce, as an association of ideas, to the vagina. And the vocal cords are seen palpitating while muscles contract – that which later, in another moment, we consider to be discourse and word – but prior to all that there is flesh, the muscle contraction. The story of a word which is a sigh is, yet again, a lie. Words have the same destiny as does the body, hence the presence and the wonder of the flesh. Therefore, you can see how distant the book is! It is very distant, the book. As the curtains open, the traditional image of the actor, which is that of a physical body seen externally, is turned inside out like a sock: the first image of the actor seen is an internal one, not external. Putting an endoscope into one's nostril is a rhetorical gesture, but, as a contradiction, it demonstrates a reality of the flesh which is more moving; it remains, however, a rhetorical gesture.

³ Dio teksta *Il pellegrino della materia*, in Romeo Castellucci, Chiara Guidi, Claudia Castellucci, *Epoepa della polvere. Il teatro della Societas* Raffaello Sanzio 1992-1999, Ubulibri, Milano 2001.

⁴ Cfr. Konstantin Stanislavsky, *An actor prepares*, Theatre Arts Book, 1948



Forced Entertainment: Quizoolal, photo © Hugo Glendinning

Performativna retorika (i) savremene izvedbe

(teze o performativnim troposima na toposima savremene izvedbe diskursa)

Ana Vujanović

Već ovako naslovljen i podnaslovljen, jasno, ovaj tekst nije *case study* retorike određene oblasti ili diskursa, već opšta teoretizacija ilokutornih moći troposa koji se smeštaju na opšte ili partikularne topose karakteristične za savremeni diskurs izvedbe, odnosno izvedbu diskursa. Cilj toga je da redefinišem retoriku kao antičku teoriju govornništva, kroz vizuru 20-ovekovne filozofsko-jezičke teorije performativa, da bih obe provukla kroz novije dekonstruktivističke procedure i, zatim, s njima došla na neizvesno ovde-i-sad polje diskursa, gde ne baratam jasno generisanim tezama već se suočavam sa materijalnošću govora koja uvodi govoreće telo u makro-društvene institucije. Ono mesto koje me u tom redefinisanim pojmu najviše zanima jeste mesto na kojem u samoj materijalnoj događajnosti i praksi diskursa padaju stare dihotomije forma-sadržaj, iskazivanje-iskaz, sintagma-paradigma, retorika-gramatika/logika.

Prvo, kratko objašnjenje pojmova s kojima radim; a radi toga da bi bilo jasno kako ih ovde postavljam i oko čega se problemi povezani s njima grade.

Performativ je pojam koji u analitičku filozofiju jezika uvodi John L. Austin, a dodatno sistematizuje John Searl.¹ Austin kreće od kritike normativnost konstativnih iskaza koji su dugo bili osnov filozofije i nauke; a prema kojoj su svi ostali iskazi koji ne slede model konstativa, koji nisu referencijalni i ne potpadaju pod kriterijum istinitosti, smatrani marginalnim i devijantnim pseudo-iskazima. Izučavajući svakodnevni jezik, Austin je uočio da se mnogi iskazi ne mogu semantički proveriti verifikacijom istinitosti i da im značenja ne zavise od referiranja nego od funkcije, načina i uslova iskazivanja u određenom kontekstu. Austin je iz njih izdvojio klasu iskaza koje je nazvao performativima. U slučaju njih, ne govori se o istinitosti ili neistinitosti iskaza nego o uspešnosti ili neuspešnosti iskazivanja. Od performativa se dakle ne očekuje prikazivanje, nego učinak: učinak u ponašanju unutar konkretne normirane društvene situacije. Performativi stoga nisu ni istiniti ni lažni, a da bi postigli učinak moraju biti izrečeni u skladu sa društvenim konvencijama i protokolima svog konteksta. Ono što je važno – a što je kasnije artikulisala Shoshana Felman² – je da je kod performativa upravo ilokutorna moć, ostvarena u dijaloškoj socijalnoj situaciji, ono što je njegovo značenje, a ne posledica značenja koje već immanentno postoji u iskazu u trenutku iskazivanja. Stoga značenje performativa, što je i Austin zaključio, ne sledi iz gramatičke strukture iskaza već je ostvareno ilokucijom. Za teorijsku psihoanalizu – kakva je ona što je, pomoću Austina i Lacana, razvija Felmanova figurom Don Juana – performativno značenje je smešteno u Drugom: subjekt se konstituiše kao subjekt govora na mestu Drugog, gde nužno žrtvuje slobodu simboličkoj mreži sveta u kom deluje. Zahvaljujući zatim i Derridinom dekonstruktivističkom čitanju performativa – kojim su kao nužni elementi uvedeni netotalitet konteksta i iretabilnost³ – da se zaključiti da performativomne govori govornik kao individua koja se izražava i izvodi svoj jedinstveni čin, nego institucija čije procedure govornik sledi i sprovodi, postajući subjektom.

Sada, *retorika*. Retorika je veoma stari pojam, koji se kroz zapadnu kulturu provlači više-manje aktivno od antičke grčke do danas. U početku se vezuje isključivo za govornništvo, najčešće političko, dok danas – kao uostalom i performativ – uveliko izlazi iz izvornog polja jezika i govora i ulazi u oblasti mas medija, poslovne komunikacije, umetnosti, popularne kulture, PR-a, javnih nastupa itd, koristeći nova sredstva: mas medijske ekrane, analogne i digitalne slike, zvuke, tela, glasove, pokrete, gestuse... Retorika je izumljena u Atini i grčkim gradovima, kao umetnost govora, kao tehnika ubeđivanja pred narodnom skupštinom, *demokracijom*, odnosno veština da se uveri *demos*. Zatim je, kao govornička veština usmerena na duševna stanja slušalaca, kritikovana i redefinisana od strane Aristotela, koji je dovodi u blisku vezu s dijalektikom, a obe suprotstavlja striktnoj demonstraciji, tj. apodiktičkim metodama izvođenja dokaza u nauci. Aristotel je, u svojoj *Retorici*, pokušao da sistematizuje metode uveravanja koje se tiču samih predmeta, pre svega tehničke metode baratanja retoričkom argumentacijom, i da time uspostavi retoriku kao teoriju pronalaženja uverljivog u bilo kojem slučaju.⁴ U njegove tehničke metode retorike spadaju: govornikov karakter (utemeljen u govoru, a ne preduveranju slušalaca), raspoloženja i osećanja slušalaca (koja pobuđuje govor), i sam govor (koji postiže uverljivost tako što iz uverljivih osobina predmeta izvodi dokaze o verodostojnosti svoje argumentacije). U Aristotelovoj *Retorici*, najviše pažnje je posvećeno samom govoru, čije su specifične metode dokazivanja: entimem (analogan dijalektičkom silogizmu) i paradigma-primer (analogna dijalektičkoj indukciji).

Osim postavljanja retorike kao veštine uveravanja, retorika se shvata i kao naučna analiza govornih i tekstualnih shema i troposa (figura), dok se u modernoj književnoj kritici ona često koristi za artikulaciju i ukazivanje na značaj nesistematizovanog bogatstva književnog jezika nasuprot šturom naučnom i filozofskom 'jeziku istine'. Ovo suprotstavljanje retoričkog diskursa natopljenog izmišljenim troposima i jasnog i čistog diskursa 'znanja i istine' prisutno je još od doba renesanse. Jedna vrsta rešenja, poznata i kao «smrt retorike», izvedena je uspostavljanjem retorike kao naučnog izučavanja shema i troposa u 19. veku. Dalje, tokom 20. veka, nastaju brojne nove retorike (najuticajnije: I. A. Richards, *Filozofija retorike* /1936/, Northrop Frye, *Anatomija kritike* /1957/, Paul de Man, *Semiotika i retorika* /1973/), koje su međusobno različite, ali često odbacuju prethodno određenje retorike kao suviše ograničeno i reduktivno, a ponekad i svedeno na analize shematiziranog beletrističkog stila.

1 Ostin, Dž. L., *Kako delovati rečima*, Matica srpska, Novi Sad, 1994; Searl, Džon, *Govorni činovi*, Nolit, Beograd, 1991.

2 Felman, Shoshana, *Skandal tijela u govoru; Don Juan s Austinom ili zavodjenje na dva jezika*, Naklada MD, Zagreb, 1984.

3 Derida, Žak, *Potpis, događaj, kontekst*, Delo, god., XXX, br. 6, Beograd, 1984, str. 7-36

4 Aristotel, *Izabrana dela I-X*, Retorika, Plato, Beograd, 2000, str. 37

Umeće uveravanja vs. / ili topološko smeštanje troposa

Ipak, ograničenost i reduktivnost mogu biti argumenti za jednu ishitrenu osudu retorike kao studije troposa, te ću se na njoj zadržati.

5 Vid. naročito de Man, Pol, *Semiologija i retorika*, u *Mehanizmi književne komunikacije (zbornik)*, Institut za književnost i umetnost, Beograd, 1983, str. 71-86

6 *Rhetorique et langages totalitaires*, vid. <http://147.91.230.48/ift/tizdanja/casopisi/ift/V/d03/document>

Sistematizacije i formalne analize troposa – naročito ako bi se prvo vratile analizama Paula de Mana⁵ a zatim uzele kao instrumentarij aktualnih «analiza diskursa» – na neki način mogu «spasiti» retoriku. Spasiti, jer se ona – (p)ostavljena kao veština uveravanja – uzima već skoro zdravo za gotovo kao pogrdan naziv za zamagljenost i zavodljivost diskursa kojim se manipuliše rasuđivanjem i emocijama, ili još češće samo emocijama, preskačući rasuđivanje. Nije li blizak tome bio stav i Rolanda Barthesa, kada je razvijajući retoriku slike (u *Književnost, mitologija, semiologija*), za primer uzeo baš reklamnu fotografiju fabrike Panzani? Odnosno, kada je na tom primeru ukazivao kako jedna leksija (slike) retorički pokreće različite leksike čiji su opšti uvek planovi ideološki, iz čega je usledilo da se «retorika pojavljuje kao označiteljska, posrednička strana ideologije»? I sam *call for papers* za ovaj broj Frakcije delom implicira takve kritičke statove o retorici, upravo je postavljajući kao «umijeće uveravanja, prenošenja emocija, te manipulacija putem istih », i vezujući je za Hitlerove govore-performanse, proizvodnju euforije na rok koncertima..., za «stanare kuće Big Brothera». Kad je 1992. u Beogradu francuski filozof Jean-Pierre Faye držao predavanje «Retorika i totalitarni jezici», retoriku je uveo rečima: «Retorika, 'velike cipele za male noge', prema Montanju. [...] Ona može postati lukavstvo *demagogosa*, demagoga koji pridobija demos, da bi mu nametnuo svoje gledište, u vidu tiranije: Pizistrat uspeva da uveri atinski narod da mu dodeli ličnu gardu, sa kojom se dokopava Akropolja gde živi na položaju kralja, basileusa isteranog iz Atine. [...] U totalnoj državi, retorika je poslužila da se ovlada državom: 'reč gradi most', reći će Hitler, ka ovome – ka totale *Führer-Staat*.»⁶ Pa već i u svakodnevnoj komunikaciji, kada želimo nečiji govor diskvalifikovati, možemo ga diskvalifikovati optužujući ga za retoričnost. Na naučnom, filozofskom ili teorijskom simpozijumu naročito. Kao i u intimnoj ljubavnoj situaciji.

Primeri ovakvih manipulativnih upotreba i shvatanja retorike ima svuda oko nas, pa se i čitavo aktuelno mas medijsko društvo može smatrati društvom u kojem je retorički diskurs dominantan. Pogledajmo samo, počev od šturih dnevnih vesti, preko živih prenosa 11. septembra, snimaka iz zalivskih ratova, Bushovih govora, sportskih i kulturalno-umetničkih manifestacija, nacionalističkih mitinga tokom ex-jugoslovenskih građanskih ratova, proslave ulaska novih članica u Evropsku uniju i Haškog tribunala, do reklamâ za proizvode svakodnevne upotrebe a i samih tih proizvoda, popularne zabave, aplikacija kulturalnih i umetničkih projekata kod fondacija, pa i same nauke i visoke tehnologije.... – gde je kraj liste? Dominatni retorički diskurs mas medijskog društva (*za/uvек*) izmiče istinu realnosti podmećući nam na mestu nje Baudrillardove trećestepene simulakrume, i monstruozno svakodnevno praktikuje nekadašnju Debordovu tezu-upozorenje: «U društvima gde vladaju moderni proizvodni odnosi, celokupni život se javlja kao neizmerno gomilanje spektakla. Sve što je bilo neposredno doživljavano, udaljilo se u sliku» (*Društvo spektakla*).

I, kad je tako, šta bih ja to onda htela spasiti vraćajući retoriku studijama troposa? Pa jedan pojam retorike koji nije ni pozitivan ni negativan već nužan za razumevanje bilo kojeg diskursa, jer čim otvorimo usta mi smo uvek-već subjekti rada troposa. Kojih, kako i na koje diskurzivne topose smeštenih radi svojih ilokutornih (a ne /samo/ perlokucijskih) moći, to su pitanja koja želim vratiti u opticaj, a koja određenje retorike kao umeća uveravanja unapred zatvara proglašavajući retoriku u jednom zahvatu performativnom taktikom manipulacije.

U mreži troposa, gde se to sakrila istina? Pardon, ...ko to traži istinu?

Svakako, studije troposa se danas mogu i moraju daleko maknuti od 19-ovekovne retorike, koja jeste bila reduktivna već i time što je uglavnom razlikovala samo dve osnovne figure: poređenje i metaforu. Do danas je postalo jasno da se diskurs sastoji od mnogo većeg broja troposa, pa se tokom 20. veka najčešće izdvajaju: alegorija, antifraza, hiperbola, ironija, metafora, metonimija, personifikacija, simbol, sinegdoha, onomatopeja, šizam (hijizam) itd. Jedna savremena *Handbook of Rhetorical Devices* namenjena tzv. kreativnom pisanju za različite upotrebe, razlikuje čak 60 troposa, sistematizovanih po funkcijama koje obavljaju kao retorički instrumenti.⁷ Kombinacije među njima su potencijalno toliko brojne, da je već to dovoljno da se može odbaciti nekadašnja kritika da su studije troposa reduktivističke za diskurs i njegovu retoričnost. Ostaje, svakako, pitanje kvalitativnih mogućnosti i uslovljenosti kombinovanja određenih troposa (recimo, metafore i metonimije), ali to bi morala biti tema za neki drugi tekst. Umesto toga, zadržaću se na lingvističkom, a zatim semiološkom i performativnom određenju pojma troposa.

7 Harris, Robert A, *Writing with Clarity and Style: A Guide to Rhetorical Devices for Contemporary Writers*, Pyrczak Publishing, Los Angeles, 2003; A Handbook of Rhetorical Devices (Version Date: April 6, 2005), Virtualsalt, <http://www.virtualsalt.com/evalu8it.htm>

Reč «trop» je izvedena iz grčkog termina *trepein*, što znači 'okrenuti', 'obrnuti'. Tako je trop okretaj u jeziku, okretaj samog jezika, dakle onaj element diskursa koji nadilazi njegovo 'idealno direktno' denotativno značenje, tj. primarnu vezu sa pojmom i referentom. Semiološki gledano, trop pripada

označiteljskom planu jezika i to onom meta-razinskom koji pokreće konotativna značenja diskursa. Odnosno, sa aspekta teorije performativa, diskurzivni trop je ono što izvodi govorni čin (čin iskazivanja: govorenja/pisanja ali i čitanja) koji nadilazi sam iskaz. Trop se dakle gradi uvek u protokolar-nom odnosu sa nekim drugim elementom jezika i diskursa, te se tradicionalno vezivao za "figu-rativni jezik", a za razliku od "normalnog jezika" koji je u odnosu pre svega sa pojmovima i vanjez-ičkim predmetima. Međutim, nakon poststrukturalističkih i dekonstruktivističkih teorija teksta, ovo označiteljsko ulančavanje se više ne smatra karakterističnim za neki poseban diskurs, već se sav govor može smatrati donekle "tropičnim". Još samo jedan korak dalje, sav govor se preko tropičnosti može smatrati i performativnim. To mislim naročito u smislu u kojem Judith Butler prelazi sa tran-zitivnosti reči stvar na proizvodnost reči—stvar objašnjavajući performativ.⁸ Bazično pitanje je ono koje postavlja Mladen Dolar: «Kako označitelj postaje čin? Pod kojim uslovima on prestaje da bude puki znak i počinje da ispoljava autoritet? Šta mu dodeljuje efikasnost i moć, šta mu omogućava da izvodi, 'performira', a ne da samo označava? Kako on postaje društvena veza?»⁹

Jer upravo je trop, taj označiteljski (i) odlažući element diskursa čija moć leži u njegovoj konvencion-alno regulisanoj iretabilnosti, ono što se aktivira kao ilokucija konkretnog iskazivanja koja će okretati i zavrtati iskaz (makar on bio i konstativan) u trenutku kada je uveden u socijalnu situaciju.

Onda je samo pitanje odluke, teorijske i političke pozicije, hoćemo li ili ne sada sav jezik proglasiti tropičnim ili ćemo nekim diskursima (kojima?) i dalje ostaviti mandat za direktan jezik istine. Drugim rečima, hoćemo li ili ne u nekim slučajevima zažmuriti na trop. Zašto, zarad same 'istine'? Ne žmu-rimo li već?... Ako je ovde pre svega reč o epistemologijama tropa i istine, pitanje je onda sasvim jednostavno: u kojem to konkretnom slučaju radimo?... U krevetu, pred slikama ratnih užasa, pri berzanskom izveštaju, u molitvi, gledajući Godarda ili Kiarostamija, londonski hard core performans, 'konceptualni ples' ili 'operacioni teatar' Orlan, učestvujući u političkim demonstracijama, prateći tel-evizijski *reality show*, obožavajući Mesiju, proučavajući istoriju, preslušavajući poruke na telefonskoj sekretarici, brinući se o genetičkim dostignućima i kloniranju, pišući teoriju...?

Stoga se jedna temeljno kritična analiza diskursa danas mora usmeriti na njegovu retoriku, ali na re-toriku kao topološko smeštanje, sapostavljanje i uodnošavanje figura u diskursu, o bilo kojem da je diskursu reč. Ona ne treba biti ograničavajuća, već obavezujuća. U tom smislu, ta analiza se mora odreći pozitivno (neutralno) konstativnog aspekta diskursa ukazujući na njegov izvedbeni aspekt. Odnosno, mora poreći njegovu komunikativnu funkciju usredsređujući se ne na njegovu perlokuciju već na njegovu ilokucijsku «eks-timnost», na materijalnu učinkovitost i prema diskursu u domenu jezika i prema telu koje ga izvodi i trpi, postajući telom ideologije i politike. Jer, od jednog do drugog slučaja, baveći se retorikom jedino treba neprestano ukazivati na one (naročito opšte) topose diskur-sa (one koje diskurs priziva kako bi izveo svoj tropološki okretaj jezika) koji služe kao nevidljiva potpo-ra, samorazumevajući i obavezujući osnov za njegovu ilokutornu učinkovitost.

U tom svetlu – a idući u tome, dakle, preko de Manovih određenja – retorika određenog diskursa se tek nakon, ili pre 'preko', topologije tropa može razmatrati kao manipulativna taktika. Manipulativ-na, u dva smisla, od kojih se oba moraju shvatiti nekvalifikovanim (kao dobra ili loša) *a priori*, kao pro-cedure radikalnog ukidanja suprotnosti spoljašnjosti i inutrašnjosti diskursa.

U jednom smislu, tropičnost iznudaže određeno rasuđivanje (rasuđivanje o istinitosti iz uverljivosti i mogućnosti) prikrivanjem toposa svoje protokolarne institucionalnosti, koji stoga ostaje previden. Recimo, figure binarnog para normalno-nenormalno na toposu heteronormativnosti, koja je meton-imična u svom stalnom klizanju od ekonomske regulacije ka psihičkom zdravlju, očuvanju nacije ili civilizacije, ljubavi, seksualnom užitku itd; ili podele sveta (umetnosti) na Zapadni i Istočni, Evro-američki i Drugi itd. na mestu Globalnog, gde radi sinegdoha Imperijalno regulisanog neo-liberalnog sveta (umetnosti) itd. U drugom smislu, retorika omogućuje performativnost diskursa i bez njegovog razumevanja, odnosno i u koliziji sa njegovim značenjem.. To se odnosi na svako preuzimanje mandata subjekta govora. Recimo, Srpska pravoslavna crkva je – za ateistu i prosečnog vernika – slabo razumljivim gusto metaforičnim i metonimičnim govorom srpske pravoslavne religije, polovi-nom 1990-ih godina proglasila zabranu pričešća za lekare i medicinske sestre koji su vršili abortuse, a koja je dakle bila učinkovita bez obzira na svoju razumljivost, pa čak i značenje. Ili, treba se prisetiti Chaplinove čuvene izvedbe 'velikog diktatora', čiji govor deluje na svojoj strukturalnoj topologiji kao (drugostepena) onomatopeja, a bez ikakve razumljivosti – budući da se čitav govor sastoji od sve-ga nekoliko nemačkih reči, dok su sve ostale izmišljene ali tako da u izvedbi podražavaju zvučanje nemačkog jezika.

U ovim mogućnostima manipulacije tropa i troposima se otkriva zastrašujuće/a materijalna strana diskursa, ona vanlingvistička koja ide preko njegove kognitivne, ali ponekad i perceptivne, dimen-zije. Materijalnost koja će telo diskursa biopolitički pozicionirati samom događajnošću diskursa, koja nikad ne započinje od nule već uvek-već od okretaja koji je omogućen u samom diskursu i prizvan iz njega.

8 "If a word in this sense might be said to 'do' a thing, then it appears that the word not only signifies a thing, but that this signification will also be an enactment of the thing. It seems here that the meaning of a performative act is to be found in this apparent coincidence of signifying and enacting.", Butler, Judith, "Burning Acts – Injurious Speech," u *Performativity and Performance*, Parker, Andrew & Sedgwick, Eve Kosofsky (eds), Routledge, New York-London, 1995, str. 198

9 Dolar, Mladen, *Glas, performans, politika*, Tkh, br. 5, Beograd, 2003.

8. ČIf a word in this sense might be said to 'do' thing, then it appears that the word not only signifies a thing, but that this signification will also be an enactment of the thing. It seems here that the meaning of a performative act is to be found in this apparent coincidence of signifying and enacting«, ČBurning Acts D Injurious Speech«, u *Performativity and Performance*, Parker, Andrew & Sedgwick, Eve Kosofsky (eds), Routledge, New York-London, 1995, str. 198



Forced Entertainment: Quizoola!, photo © Hugo Glendinning

Performative Rhetoric of/and Contemporary Performance

(Hypotheses on the Performative Tropes on the Topoi of Contemporary Discourse Performance)

Ana Vujanović

Translated from Serbian by Marina Miladinov

Both the title and the subtitle of this text imply that this is by no means *a case study* of the rhetoric of a particular field or discourse, but rather an essay in the general theory of the illocutory powers of tropes on the general or particular topoi characteristic of the contemporary discourse of performance, or rather discourse performance. The aim is to redefine rhetoric as an ancient theory of speech-making in view of 20th-century philosophical and linguistic theory of the performative in order to submit both to recent deconstructivist procedures and thus reach the precarious here-and-now field of discourse, where I will not be dealing with clearly engendered theses, but face the materiality of speech that introduces the speaking body into macro-social institutions. The place that interests me most in this redefined notion is the place in which old dichotomies fall in the very material eventfulness and discourse practice, dichotomies such as form-content, uttering-utterance, syntagm-paradigm, rhetoric-grammar/logic.

First of all, I will briefly explain the terms I will be using here in order to make clear my understanding of them and on what basis the problems related to them are constructed.

Performative is a term introduced into the analytical philosophy of language by John L. Austin and further systematised by John Searle.¹ Austin started with criticising the normativity of constative statements (or simply: utterances) which had formed the basis of philosophy and science for a long time; according to that normativity, all other utterances which did not follow the constative model, which were not referential, and not subjected to the criterion of truthfulness were considered marginal and deviant pseudo-utterances. By investigating ordinary language, Austin concluded that many utterances could not be semantically verified in terms of truthfulness and that their meanings did not depend on reference, but rather on the function, ways, and conditions of uttering in certain contexts. Austin then isolated a class of utterances that he called performatives. In the case of performatives, one does not speak of the truthfulness or untruthfulness of utterances, but rather of the successful or unsuccessful uttering. In other words, one does not expect the performatives to be descriptive, but rather effective: effective in behaviour within a concrete, standardized social situation. Therefore, performatives cannot be considered true or false, but in order to be effective, they must be uttered in accordance with social conventions and the protocols of their context. What is important here – and which was later articulated by Shoshana Felman² – is that in the case of the performative, its illocutory power – realized in a social situation of dialogue – is just what its meaning is, rather than the consequence of meaning, which is immanently present in the utterance in the moment of uttering. Thus, the meaning of performatives, as Austin also concluded, does not result from the grammatical structure of the utterance, but is realised in illocution. For theoretical psychoanalysis – as developed by Felman, with the help of Austin and Lacan, through the figure of Don Juan – the performative meaning is located in the Other: the subject is constituted as a subject of speech in place of the Other, where it necessarily sacrifices its freedom to the symbolic net of the world in which it operates. Owing also to Derrida's deconstructivist reading of the performative – which introduces the non-totality of the context and iterability³ as necessary elements – it can be concluded that performatives are not used by the speaker as an individual expressing himself or herself and performing his or her unique act, but as an institution, whose procedures the speaker follows and performs, becoming a subject in the process.

And now, *rhetoric*. This is a very old term, which has been present in Western culture, more or less actively, from ancient Greece to the present day. Initially, it was exclusively linked with public speaking, mostly political, whereas today – just as the performative, after all – it is largely abandoning the original field of language and speech and entering the sphere of mass media, business communication, art, popular culture, PR, public performances, etc., using new instruments: mass-media screens, analogue and digital images, sounds, bodies, voices, movements, gestures... Rhetoric was invented in Athens and other Greek cities as an art of speaking, as a technique of persuasion performed before the city council, the *demokratia*, the skill of convincing the *demoi*. Afterwards, Aristotle criticised and redefined it as an orator's skill aimed at influencing the mental state of its listeners, bringing it into close relationship with dialectics and contrasting both with strict demonstration or the apodictic methods of winning evidence in science. In his *Rhetoric*, he sought to systematize the methods of persuasion in their reference to topics, primarily the technical method of handling rhetoric argumentation, and establish rhetoric as the theory of finding the convincing in any given case, "the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion."⁴ His technical methods of rhetoric include: the character of the speaker (based on his/her speech, and not on the prejudice of the listeners), dispositions and emotions on the part of the listeners (as evoked by the speech), and the speech itself (which achieves credibility by taking the credible features of its topic and creating evidence about the veracity of its argument). In Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, most attention is paid to the speech itself and its specific methods of argumentation: the enthymeme (analogous to dialectic syllogism) and the paradigm-example (analogous to dialectic induction).

Besides being established as the skill of persuasion, rhetoric is also understood as the scientific analysis of spoken and written schemes and tropes (figures), whereas modern literary criticism frequently uses it for articulating and emphasizing the importance of the non-systematized richness of literary language as opposed to the scant "language of truth" in science and philosophy. This oppo-

¹ John L. Austin, *How to Do Things With Words*, Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press, 1962; John Searle, *Speech Acts. An Essay in the Philosophy of Language*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1969.

² Felman, Shoshana, *The Scandal of the Speaking Body. Don Juan with J. L. Austin, or Seduction in Two Languages*, Stanford (CA): Stanford University Press, 2002.

³ Jacques Derrida, *Signature, Event, Context*, Serbian trans. in Delo 30/6, Belgrade, 1984, p. 7-36.

⁴ Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, trans. by W. Rhys Roberts, Book I, 1356a.

sition between the rhetorical discourse, saturated with fleeting tropes, and the clear, pure discourse of “knowledge and truth” has been present since the Renaissance. One solution, also known as the “death of rhetoric,” was achieved in the 19th century by establishing rhetoric as the scientific investigation of schemes and tropes. In the 20th century, a number of new rhetorics were born (the most influential being those of: I. A. Richards, *Philosophy of Rhetoric* [1936], Northrop Frye, *Anatomy of Criticism* [1957], and Paul de Man, *Semiology and Rhetoric* [1973]). Though different from each other, they mostly reject the previous definition of rhetoric as too limited and reductive, sometimes downgraded to an analysis of the schematic, literary style.

Art of Persuasion vs./or Topological Placement of Tropes

Nevertheless the limitation and reductiveness can be arguments for a precipitate condemnation of rhetoric as the study of tropes, which I will therefore comment in some detail.

5 See especially *Semiology and Rhetoric*, in *Critical Theory Since 1965*, ed. by Hazard Adams and Leroy Searle, Tallahassee: Florida State University Press, 1986, pp. 222-230.

6 *Rhetorique et langages totalitaires*, see <http://147.91.230.48/ifdt/izdanja/casopisi/ifdt/V/d03/document>

Systematizations and formal analyses of tropes – especially if they go back to the analyses of Paul de Man⁵ and then adopt the current “analysis of discourse” as their instrumentary – might in a way “save” rhetoric. Save, because it is – left/established as the art of persuasion – taken for granted as a pejorative term denoting the vagueness and seductiveness of discourse, manipulated by both intellect and emotions, or even more frequently by emotions alone, omitting the intellect. Is it not rather close to the attitude of Roland Barthes, when he, in his elaboration on the rhetoric of images (in his book *Literature, Mythology, Semiology*), takes for an example precisely the commercial photograph of the Panzani factory? That is, when he uses that example in order to show that a single lexus (of image) rhetorically moves various lexics, the general plans of which are always ideological, from which it followed that “rhetoric appears as the signifying, mediating side of ideology”? Even the *call for papers* for this issue of *Frakcija* partly implies such critical attitudes on rhetoric by putting it as the “art of persuasion, of emotion transfer and manipulation through emotions”, by linking it to Hitler’s speeches-performances and engendering euphoria in rock-concerts..., down to the “inhabitants of the Big Brother house.” In 1992, when French philosopher Jean-Pierre Faye held a lecture in Belgrade entitled “Rhetoric and the Totalitarian Languages,” he introduced rhetoric by calling it “rhetoric, these ‘big shoes for small feet,’ according to Montaigne”. [...] It may become the cunning skill of *demagogos*, the demagogue winning over the *demos* in order to impose his own views in the form of tyranny: Pysistrates succeeded in persuading the citizens of Athens that they should assign him personal guards, with whom he conquered the Acropolis and lived there instead of the king, the exiled *basileus* of Athens. [...] In the totalitarian state, rhetoric served to dominate the state: “words build a bridge,” Hitler would say, a bridge to that – *der totale Führer-Staat*.“⁶ Even in everyday communication, when we wish to disqualify someone’s speech, we can do this by accusing him/her of rhetoricity. Especially if the occasion is a scientific, philosophical, or theoretical symposium. Or an intimate love situation.

Examples of such manipulative uses and notions of rhetoric are everywhere and the entire mass-media society of today can actually be considered a society wherein rhetorical discourse dominates. One should only look at all the scant news of the day, the live screenings of 9/11, photographs from the Gulf wars, the Bush speeches, sports and performances of art and culture, nationalist rallies during the wars in ex-Yugoslavia, the celebrations of the entry of new members into the European Union, and the Hague Tribunal, down to commercials for products of everyday use and the products themselves, popular entertainment, applications to various foundations for financing cultural and artistic projects, even the sciences and high technologies.... – where is the end of this list? The dominant rhetorical discourse of the mass-media society (*for/ever*) dodges the truth of reality, substituting it with Baudrillard’s third-grade simulacra and monstrously practicing, day after day, the old Debord’s thesis/warning: “In societies dominated by modern conditions of production, life is presented as an immense accumulation of spectacles. Everything that was directly lived has receded into a representation.” (*The Society of the Spectacle*)

Therefore, if things stand that way, what is it that I would like to save by bringing rhetoric back to the study of tropes? Well, a concept of rhetoric which is neither positive nor negative, but necessary if we wish to understand any discourse, for as soon as we open our mouths, we are always/already subjects of the operation of tropes. Which, how, based on what discursive topoi for their illocutory (and not /only/ perlocutory) powers, these are the questions that I wish to bring back into focus and which defining rhetoric as the art of persuasion shuts off in advance by proclaiming it in one stroke a performative tactic of manipulation.

In the network of tropes, where is the truth hidden? Pardon me ...who is looking for the truth?

To be sure, the study of tropes can and must detach itself completely from the 19th-century rhetoric, which was reductionist in the very fact that it mostly distinguished between two basic figures: the simile and the metaphor. It has since become clear that discourse consists of a much larger number of tropes, so that the 20th century mostly distinguished the following ones: allegory, antiphrase, hyperbole, irony, metaphor, metonymy, personification, symbol, synecdoche, onomatopoeia, schism (chiasmus), etc. A modern *Handbook of Rhetorical Devices*, intended for so-called creative writing for various purposes, distinguishes as many as 60 tropes, systematized according to the functions they perform as rhetorical instruments.⁷ Their combinations are potentially so numerous that this very fact suffices to discard the former criticism that the study of tropes is reductionist with respect to discourse and its rhetoricity. Naturally, there is still the question of qualitative possibilities and the conditions under which certain tropes are combined (let us say, metaphors and metonymies), but that should remain the topic of another text. Instead, I will remain at the linguistic, as well as semiotic and performative definition of trope.

The term “trope” comes from the Greek word *trepein*, which means “to turn”, “to twist”. Thus, the trope is a turn in the language, the turn of the very language, that is, an element of discourse which surpasses its “ideally direct,” denotative meaning, i.e. the primary connection with the concept and reference. From the semiological point of view, the trope belongs to the signifiers’s plane of language, the meta-level one, which is in charge of the connotative meanings of discourse. In other words, from the viewpoint of the theory of the performative, the discursive trope is that which is performed in the speech act (the act of uttering: speaking/writing, but also reading), but surpasses the utterance as such. The trope is therefore always constructed in the protocol relationship with another element of language and discourse; as a result, it used to be traditionally linked with “figurative language” as opposed to “normal language,” which was primarily related to terms and extralinguistic objects. However, following the post-structuralist and deconstructivist theories of the text, this concatenation of the signifiers is no longer considered characteristic for particular discourses; rather, the speech as a whole can be considered somewhat “tropic”. Just one more step and the whole speech can, since it is tropic, be also considered performative. I mean this particularly in the sense in which Judith Butler has passed from the word thing transitivity to a word-thing productivity relation when explaining the performative.⁸ The basic question that is asked by Mladen Dolar is: “How does the signifier become an act? Under which circumstances does it cease being a mere sign and begins showing authority? What gives it efficiency and power, what enables it to act, to ‘perform’ instead of only signifying? How does it become a social relation?”⁹

For it is that very trope, that signifying (and) postponing element of discourse that has power lying in its conventionally regulated iterability, which is activated as the illocution of concrete uttering, that will turn and twist the utterance (even if it be constative) the moment it is brought into a social situation.

Thus, it is only a question of decision, of theoretical and political position, whether we will now proclaim all language as being tropic or not, whether we will leave some discourses (and which) as mandatory for the direct language of truth. In other words, whether we will close our eyes at a trope in some cases or not. And why, for the sake of “truth” as such? Haven’t we closed our eyes already? ...If it is primarily a question of epistemologies of tropes and the truth here, then it is quite simple: in which concrete cases are we doing this? ...In our beds, before the images of war atrocities, at the stock-market report, in prayer, while watching Godard or Kiarostami, a hard core performance from London, a “conceptual dance” or Orlan’s “surgical theatre”, when participating in political demonstrations, watching a *reality show* on TV, adoring the Messiah, studying history, listening to the messages on our answering machine, worrying about achievements in genetics and cloning, writing theory...?

Therefore, an essentially critical analysis of discourse today must be directed at its rhetoric, but rhetoric as the topological placement, the juxtaposition and relating figures in the discourse, whatever discourse that may be. It should not be restrictive, but binding. In this respect, the analysis must renounce at the positively (neutrally) constative aspect of discourse, pointing to its performative aspect. In other words, it must deny its communicative function and concentrate not on its perlocution, but rather its illocutionary “ex-timacy”, its material effectiveness and towards the discourse in the sphere of language and the body which performs and bears it, becoming a part of ideology and politics. Because, from one case to another, when one deals with rhetoric, one should constantly indicate those (especially general) topoi of discourse (those evoked by the discourse in order to perform one’s topological turn of the language), which serve as the invisible support, the self-understanding and binding basis for its illocutionary efficiency.

⁷ Robert A. Harris, *Writing with Clarity and Style: A Guide to Rhetorical Devices for Contemporary Writers*, Los Angeles: Pyczak Publishing, 2003; *A Handbook of Rhetorical Devices* (Version Date: April 6, 2005), Virtualsalt, see <http://www.virtualsalt.com/evalu8it.htm>

⁸ “If a word in this sense might be said to ‘do’ a thing, then it appears that the word not only signifies a thing, but that this signification will also be an enactment of the thing. It seems here that the meaning of a performative act is to be found in this apparent coincidence of signifying and enacting.” Judith Butler, “Burning Acts – Injurious Speech,” in: *Performativity and Performance*, ed. by Parker, Andrew & Sedgwick, Eve Kosofsky, New York-London: Routledge, 1995, p. 198.

⁹ Mladen Dolar, *Glas, performans, politika* [Voice, performance, politics], Tkh 5, Belgrade, 2003.

In light of this – going, that is, through de Man's definitions – the rhetoric of a certain discourse is to be considered a manipulative tactic only after, or rather "beyond" the topology of trope. Manipulative in two senses, both of which must be understood as non-qualified (as good or bad) *a priori*, as the procedures of radical abolishment of the contradiction between the exteriority and the interiority of discourse.

In a sense, this tropicality enforces a sort of reasoning (reasoning on truthfulness from convincingness and possibility) by concealing the topos of its protocolary institutionality, which therefore remains unnoticed. For example, the figures of the binary pair normal-abnormal on the topos of hetero-normativity, which is metonymic in its permanent sliding from economic regulation towards mental health, protection of nation or civilization, love, sexual pleasure, etc.; or the classification of the (art)world into western and eastern, Euro-American and the Rest, etc. In place of the Global, where the synecdoche of the imperially regulated neo-liberal (art)world is active, etc. In another sense, rhetoric enables the performativity of discourse even without its understanding, and even in collision with its meaning. It refers to any appropriation of the mandate as a subject of speech. Let us take the example of the Serbian Orthodox Church in the mid-90s, proclaiming in the barely understandable – for an atheist, as well as for the average believer – densely metaphorical and metonymical speech of Serbian orthodox religion the prohibition on receiving the Eucharist for those physicians and nurses who had performed abortions, and which was efficient regardless of whether it was understandable or even meaningful. Or we can recall the famous Chaplin performance of the "great dictator," whose speech is efficient in its structural topology as (second-grade) onomatopoeia, even without any understanding – since the entire speech consists of only a few German words, while the rest are invented in such a way that their performance imitates the sound of the German language.

In these possibilities of manipulating the trope, as well as by the tropes themselves, one can discover a frightening(ly) material side of discourse, the extra-linguistic one, which goes beyond its cognitive, sometimes also its perceptive dimension. A materiality that will bio-politically position the body of the discourse through its very eventness, which never starts from zero, but always-already from the turn, which is made possible in the very discourse and evoked from it.



C. Chaplin: *Great Dictator* (1940)



A. Hitler



Despotski smijeh i fašistička zabrana smijeha

Veit Sprenger

Prevela s njemačkog Marina Miladinov

“Dakle, želiš grubost – upozorio sam te.
Naučit ću te ja pameti.
Dosta smijeha, zaboravi klauna.
Nisam ja vaš šaljivac niti meta vaše poruge,
vaš dežurni krivac ili otirač za noge.
Ja sam... užas i uništenje. Aaaaah!”
(Todd McFarlane – Spawn)

- 1 *The Great Dictator*. SAD, 1940.
Redatelj: Charles Chaplin.

Kada se govori o načinu na koji komedija tretira europski fašizam, Chaplinov *Veliki diktator* uvijek se navodi kao najbolji primjer za komičnu obradu te materije.¹ Taj je film standard prema kojemu se mora mjeriti svaki pristup dotičnoj građi, kao da je Chaplinu tu uspio genijalan trik istodobnog iskazivanja i ismijavanja zločina nacističke diktature. Pritom se previda činjenica da taj film upravo na kraju postaje izrazito višeznačan i složen, naime kada se mali frizer, kojega greškom postave za govornicu, doslovce mora govorom boriti za život. Govor koji drži vatrena je oda demokraciji, ali pritom se ne zaboravlja temeljna situacija: prvenstvena motivacija za izgovoreno nije političko uvjerenje, nego klasični komedijantski scenarij zabune, u kojem je protagonist prisiljen uskočiti u tuđu kožu i odigrati tuđu ulogu u svijetu kako bi spasio vlastitu golu egzistenciju. Kako će se govornik ispetljati iz te opasne situacije? Rješenje je iznenađujuće jednostavno: Führer koji je to postao protiv svoje volje drži govor koji po tonu, držanju i sadržaju niti najmanje ne liči na ono što bi tu izrekao pravi Führer – a ipak, masa i nakon takvog govora čini upravo ono što se od mase očekuje: kliče. Ono što se prikazuje u posljednjim kadrovima nije klicanje zajednice slobodnih pojedinaca, koja nakon dugog lutanja trlja oči od sna zaludenosti i odjednom spoznaje demokratsku viziju govornika kao bolji put. Ono što tu vidimo jest cinično ispunjenje retoričke dramaturgije. Ondje gore imamo demagoga koji pomahnitalo govori sve dok mu ne prepukne glas, a on, iscrpljen, ne završi govor, dok dolje imamo kolektiv koji odgovara glasnim odobravanjem. Svi drugi elementi govora u potpunosti su zamjenjivi. Ono što je bitno u tom završnom govoru upravo je ono što je bilo bitno i u čuvenim *grammelot* govorima na početku filma – tjelesna i glasovna prisutnost velikog solista. Konačni pogled u nebo, popraćen gudačima iz *Lohengrina*, nije apoteoza zdravog razuma, nego rezignirani uvid solo komičara, koji je shvatio da razlike ne leže u sredstvima, nego u njihovim kontekstima i konzekvencama. Tako ni sredstva predstave nisu sama po sebi totalitarna ili demokratska, nego je to samo društveno-politički kontekst u kojem se pojavljuju. Mogli bismo otići još dalje i reći da u jednostavnom teatralnom aranžmanu solističkog *entertainment*a već toliko toga ovisi o totalitarnom govorniku da despotski solist može uništiti vlastiti totalitarizam samo tako da uništi sam teatralni aranžman vlastite predstave – što i čini, uvijek iznova, u svakom njezinu nastavku.

- 2 Ovdje u američkom smislu, kao pojam iz svijeta *entertainment*a, u značenju građe, tematike, referencijalne točke neke solo sekvence.

- 3 Razlika je, kao prvo, u liku „koncentriranog spektakularnog“ nasuprot „difuznom spektakularnom“ (Guy Debord). Usp. o tome: Helga Finter, *Kunst des Lachens, Kunst des Lesens. Zum Theater in einer Gesellschaft des Spektakels*, u: Vittoria Borsò i Björn Goldammer (ur.), *Moderne(n) der Jahrhundertwenden*, Baden-Baden, 2000., str. 439–451. Valja, međutim, napomenuti da se u tom zbližavanju radi o temeljnim razlikama koje se bez njega ne bi mogle primijetiti. Slažem se s Finterovom u tome da je smijeh u *show*-spektaklu „revolt“ ili „oslobođenje“ (Jacques Lacan), dok je sam *show* proces koncentracije i oslikovljenja spektakularnog društva, samo što na njegovu kraju, za razliku od inscenacija fašizma, stoji oslobođenje od samih tih slika. Usp. Helga Finter, *ibidem*, str. 448 i dalje. Vidi također: *idem*, *Poesie, Komödie, Tragödie oder die Masken des Unmöglichen: Georges Bataille und das Theater des Buches*, u: Peter Wiechens i Andreas Hetzel (ur.), *Georges Bataille. Vorreden zur Überschreitung*, Würzburg, 1999., str. 259–273.

- 4 Victor Klemperer, LTI, Leipzig, 1975.

Sklonost despotskog solista k totalitarnoj retorici uvelike nadilazi puke parodijske replike i imitacijske točke. Ona ne samo da se odigrava na svim razinama govora, nego se tiče i izgradnje mita, kulta ličnosti, inscenacije vlastitog tijela, osobne privatnosti itd. Despot nije samo svjestan te problematične srodnosti, nego se njome poigrava, izlaže je i koristi za uspostavu i uništenje svojeg komičnog imperija. Ali ako stupim na taj nesiguran teritorij, onda se moja prividna bezbrižnost opravdava jedino stvarnom bezbrižnošću mojih protagonista u rukovanju odgovarajućim *materijalom*.² Prema mojem mišljenju, ne treba izostaviti analizu njihova pozivanja na globalno-političke, rasističke i totalitarne kontekste. Međutim, ona se ne smije svesti niti na neposredno paralelno uspoređivanje *entertainment*a i političke demagogije, nego je valja uvijek sagledati u kulturno-povijesnom odnosu prema ranim popularnim odjecima europskog fašizma u SAD-u, prije svega u stripovima sa super-junacima i *horror* književnosti četrdesetih i pedesetih godina 20. stoljeća, kao i u istodobnom razvoju preteča Late Night Showa, i također je shvatiti u tom kontekstu.³ Navedeni popularni oblici izražavanja čine spojnicu pomoću koje je moguće zajedno misliti o aspektima fašističke demagogije i strategijama despotskog *entertainment*a. Sljedeće ulomke, dakle, ne treba čitati kao kulturno pesimističan iskaz skeptičnosti, koji bi, mršteći se, ustvrdio neku formalnu – a time možda i sadržajnu – bliskost suvremenog *entertainment*a i totalitarizma. Naprotiv, oni su novi pokušaj da se despotska predstava smjesti u kulturno-povijesni kontekst, ali ovaj put obraćajući veću pozornost na Late Night Show i specifično političko okruženje u kojem je nastao, naime u Americi i to neposredno nakon rata, iz kojega je izniklo aluzivno i subverzivno ophođenje s fenomenom realno postojećeg fašizma. Činjenica da su novinari, literati i umjetnici iz raznih zemalja već u ono vrijeme promatrali Hitlera i Mussolinija, i kod kuće i u inozemstvu, kao potencijalno komične figure, nudi američkom *entertainmentu* pogodno tlo za napad. Međutim, taj napad na novu materiju ne ograničava se na tematsku obradu, već zahvaća, kao što ćemo vidjeti, daleko dublje u popularni arsenal likova te se odražava i izvan sadržaja govora, na retoriku tijela, vremena i teatarskog prostora.

Zašto su se ljudi tridesetih godina u inozemstvu smijali upravo ondje gdje je u fašističkoj Njemačkoj i Italiji mnoštvo oduševljeno klicalo? Teško je pretpostaviti tako specifično nacionalnu percepciju. Osim toga, i u samim zemljama pod fašističkom vlašću postojao je, dok je to još bilo moguće, unutrašnji egzil, svjesno odbijanje nametnutog komunikacijskog ugovora. Postoje vicevi od kojih neke navodi Victor Klemperer u svojoj studiji *Lingua Tertii Imperii*,⁴ u kojima se figure vođa prikazuju u komičnom svjetlu. Je li to ismijavanje vodstva ipak bilo više od pukog katarzičnog reagiranja kojim su se oslobađale nagomilane frustracije svakodnevice? Je li zamislivo da su u raznim popularnim obradama fašizma smijeh i kult zapravo dvije strane iste medalje? Zašto je Hitler, kao da je svjestan te činjenice, u svojim govorima uvijek iznova izričito zabranjivao smijeh tako što je onima koji se smijaju (bili oni „međunarodno Židovstvo“ ili europski susjedi) prijetio strašnom sudbinom? Pristup tim pitanjima od velike je važnosti za izučavanje despotske scenske figure i također doprinosi teoriji smijeha i komike. Usput je nužno ukazati na eksplicitne i implicitne dodirne točke između fašističke inscenacije i njezinih komično-despotskih odraza u zabavnim medijima iz tog vremena. U oba slučaja verbalno žrtvovanje, sudbonosno uskraćivanje i mehanizacija tijela javljaju se kao retoričke strategije.

U oba slučaja „Führer“ ili „Duce“, odnosno antijunak koji se na njih referira, ne inscenira se samo kao aktivni bukač, nego i kao gubavac koji je u savezništvu s gađenjem, raspadanjem i propadanjem.

U europskom fašizmu mjesto tog paradoksalnog razvoja nije masovna inscenacija kasnijih godina, nego prije govor u malom krugu ljudi, u pivnicama i stražnjim sobama, dakle rana faza nacizma, u kojoj još nije bilo arijsko-herojske estetike jedinstvenosti. Tu u prvom planu nije savršeni tijek govora, nego spontani učinak, huškanje i spuštanje slušateljstva te njegovo dovodenje u trans jedinstvenosti, što je uvijek povezano s patetičnim doživljajem svijesti o pripadnosti manjini. Tiha ozloglašenost, mogućnost otklizavanja u prljavštinu i kaos, elementi su koje je talijanski fašizam, još više od njemačkog, donio sa sobom u (vječito labilno) razdoblje procvata i koje preuzima današnja Nova desnica u Rusiji, Austriji i Francuskoj. Smijeh je obilježen kao „opasno balansiranje“ između odbojnosti i privlačnosti koje izaziva ambivalentnu „alergijsku“ reakciju.⁵ Možda je upravo ta ambivalentnost smijeha koju proizvode i fašizam i njegov odraz, komični despotizam, ono što je ondje zabranjeno ili barem nesigurno, dok je tu poželjno i oblikovno. Dok se u fašističkom diskursu dodir s heterogenim doživljava kao moćni „trenutak ludila“ u pseudo-religioznom posvećenju⁶, u labilnom carstvu scenskog despota dopušteno je pražnjenje kroz smijeh.

U ulomcima koja slijede rekonstruirat ćemo dramaturgiju imaginarnog *showa*, ali iz lagano promijenjenog kuta gledanja. Enklava pozornice ili studija otvara se, njezini rubovi se rastvaraju u smjeru društvene zajednice i svih njezinih područja života. *Show* odražava tu zajednicu, a odrazi koje stvara imaju konkretne posljedice po društveno okruženje. *Show* je sastavni dio društva spektakla. To su spektakli koji se međusobno komentiraju, anticipiraju i promišljaju, u kojima se umjetnost, politika i pučka kultura privremeno stapaju u konglomerat javne percepcije. Jedina je konstanta uvijek iznova prisutno kretanje prema sve većem neredu: od igre s jasnim pravilima prema samovoljnom kršenju tih pravila, prema isprva dosljednom i planiranom izrastanju despotske figure iz te igre, njezinu nezaustavljivom širenju, prisvajanju sustava i totalitarnoj kontroli, napuhavanju sve do iracionalnog, prikradanju dekadencije, sve do polaganog, ali nezaustavljivog obrata u patetičnu ili komičnu orgiju uništenja. David Mamet opisuje razvoj filma kao put u stanje najvećeg mogućeg reda.⁷ Polazeći od tog opisa, koji se – uz važnu iznimku *zombi*-filma, kao što ćemo vidjeti – pokazuje vrlo korisnim, mogli bismo opisati kretanje despotskog *showa* kao potpuno obrnuto: *show* se kreće od stanja reda prema stanju najvećeg mogućeg nereda, u kojem završava. U tom kretanju rani se Late Night služi i odgovarajućim spektakularnim strategijama i katastrofičnim scenarijima fašizma, iako s obrnutim predznakom, naime u *smijehu*.

⁵ René Girard, *Perilous Balance. A Comic Hypothesis*, u: *Modern Language Notes* (1972.), str. 811-826.

⁶ Usp. također: Julija Kristeva, *Pouvoirs de l'horreur. Essai sur l'abjection*, Pariz, 1980.

⁷ David Mamet, *A Whore's Profession*, London i Boston, 1994.

Čudovišni klaun

Pripovijedanje čudovišta

Cjelovečernje prepričavanje dnevne politike od strane moderatorâ Late Nighta, koje se prezentira kao "istinsko" objašnjenje najnovijih znanstvenih spoznaja, za razliku od iskrivljujućeg i prikrivajućeg izvještavanja u tisku, bezbrižno raskrivanje svega onoga što se „doista“ nalazi iza raznih skandala svakodnevnog trača – to je narativni svijet solo komičarâ, svijet koji je naposljetku bez posljedica, koji razračunava sa samim sobom i u kojem subverzivno pripovijedanje služi jedino trenutnom uveseljavanju, spontanom pražnjenju kroz smijeh.

Primjedba jednog *show*-kolege da bi Johnny Carson bio dobar predsjednik ipak djeluje zastrašujuće. Harald Schmidt kao njemački kancelar, David Letterman kao guverner Texasa, Jay Leno kao američki ministar vanjskih poslova – tu se krećemo u svojoj zoni političkog života, koja je jednako fascinantna kao što je i uznemirujuća. „Johnny Carson would have made a fine president“: u toj se rečenici naslućuje opasnost koja vrebâ u brisanju granica između politike i *entertainment*, dvoznačnost efekta u kojem smijeh prelazi u suzu i naposljetku u fanatično ridanje. Smijeh i kult dvije su strane iste medalje, spoznaja koja izlazi na vidjelo kod demagoga Nove desnice, kao što su Vladimir Žirinovski, Jörg Haider, Jean-Marie Le Pen i Silvio Berlusconi. Ti super-zabavljači znaju da svoju publiku neće osvojiti činjeničnošću i kompetencijom, nego istesanom dramaturgijom, izvanjskim čarima zabavljačke zvijezde i prije svega drskošću pripovijedanja. Osobito kod Žirinovskog upada u oči jednostavnost i dosljednost njegovih narativnih modela. On smjelim potezima kreira pripovijest o prošlosti i pripovijest o budućnosti, pritom se uvijek iznova služeći motivom globalno-političkog domino efekta. „Ako padne Rusija, past će i Mala Azija, ako padne Mala Azija, past će i Balkan, a nakon što je on pao, neće ostati pošteđen ni ostatak Europe. Prema tome: pazite na Rusiju. Naša katastrofa je katastrofa cijelog svijeta, a ako želimo, mi ćemo pokrenuti tu katastrofu i ona će vas pogoditi nespremljene.“ Žirinovski govori o čitavoj floti defektnih ruskih nuklearnih podmornica, koju treba samo odaslati u ocean i one će pustošiti same od sebe, izazivajući time globalnu nuklearnu kataklizmu.

Kod neofašista današnjice, kao i kod radikalno-konzervativnih televizijskih propovjednika u SAD-u, izazivanje smijeha je poželjno stilsko sredstvo. Njihovi govori često djeluju kao nekakav drugorazredni spektakl, koji ne traži i ne pronalazi svoje referentne točke prvenstveno u političkim diskursima, nego

8 V. I. Lenjin, Werke, sv. 38, Berlin, 1973., str. 161. Citirano prema: J. P. Faye, op. cit.

9 Ernst Krieck (ur.), Volk im Werden. 1934.-1940. Citirano prema: J. P. Faye, op. cit.

10 Ibidem.

opet na području zabave, ulazeći time u neku vrstu permanentne zabavljačke omče koja naposljetku, kako se čini, gubi svaku realnu političku utemeljenost. Ipak, njihova je bitna ograničenost u tome što smijeh tu uvijek predstavlja neku vrstu afektivne enklave i utoliko nikada ne smije postati sveobuhvatan. To je poput nekakvog tipično ljudskog ekskursa koji nikada ne dopijeva do kraja i nikada ne smije predstavljati srž onoga što je rečeno. Jer kod Žirinovskog i njemu sličnih pripovijest unatoč svemu zadire u domenu djelovanja, u ono područje u kojem se smijeh zamrzava u diplomatsku grimasu ili pak skončava u drhtaju strahopoštovanja i fanatičnom sljedbeništvu. To je pripovijest koja djeluje, a istodobno nema i ne želi imati nikakve veze s istinom. Pripovijest koja u sebi skriva negaciju zahtjeva koji je Lenjin zajedno s Hegelom postavio u svojim *Filozofskim bilježnicama*: „Ali filozofija ne bi smjela biti pripovijest o onome što se događa, nego spoznaja o onome što je u tome *istinito*.“⁸ Pripovijest nasuprot spoznaji ili *mythos* nasuprot logosu – suprotnost koju preuzima pripadnik Mladih konzervativaca i kasniji nacistički teoretičar Ernst Krieck i strastveno je proklamira u svojem časopisu *Volk im Werden*, obarajući se u istom dahu na „zapadni nihilizam logosu“ kao na „razdoblje najdužeg ludila i zabluda“, razdoblje „odluke o odnosu istine i neistine (...), koji od Parmenida do danas vlada umovima. (...) Gospode, poštedi nas dijalektičara!“⁹ Jedino moguće izbavljenje Krieck i njegovi epigoni vide u mitu, u onoj pripovijesti koja probija sitničavu ukočenost istine i neistine te otvara put za pravi, iskonsko njemački duh junaštva i volje za pobjedom. „Mit pripovijeda, pripovijeda sve do početka i kraja, do uspona i pada: on pripovijeda vijesti, povijest u najširem smislu: historiju.“¹⁰

11

Učinak koji proizvodi takva historija neodlučno oscilira između smijeha, zaprepaštenja i obožavanja. Na strani komedije mit ponekad nastupa kao drska, a ponekad bolna šala, a na strani fašizma tridesetih i četrdesetih godina kao užasna zbilja s kojom fantazma stupa u akciju. U neofašizmu današnjice koji je odavno dospio u stadij koji Guy Debord opisuje kao „integrirano spektakularno“, on se izražava kao složen i teško raščlanjiv konglomerat afekata koji se strateški služi i starom retorikom i suvremenom zabavom.¹¹ Upravo je to nejasno osciliranje ono što u komičnim obradama totalitarizma već na jezično-narativnoj razini upućuje na stvaranje onog od pedesetih godina nadalje sveprisutnog lika čudovišnog klauna, čije se naznake mogu zamijetiti u njemačkim filmovima o *Doktoru Mabuseu*, a jasnije se otkrivaju u likovima iz američke književnosti o super-junacima, kao što su *Joker* ili *Penguin Man* iz *Batmana* i poluljudska inkarnacija *Violatora* iz *Spawna*, ili pak *Jaws* iz Jamesa Bonda, koji cerekajući se otkriva svoje najstrašnije oružje, vilicu od pojačanog oplemenjenog čelika.

Čudovišna mehanika (1)

U fašistoidnoj retorici *actio* igra ulogu koju ne valja podcijeniti. Moglo bi se čak reći da totalitarni protusvijet uglavnom funkcioniše u domeni neverbalne inscenacije. Despotski solist iz Late Nighta proširuje svoja teatralna sredstva i stvara scenografiju s odgovarajućim mašinerijama. Njegova scena predstavlja se kao stroj koji pokreće neuništiva mehanika i koji okolini nameće svoj zahuktali ritam, tako dugo dok ga ova sasvim ne internalizira. Zato *showmasteri*, kada napuste krug svojih studija kako bi testirali gokarte na ulici ili razgovarali s prolaznicima, djeluju začuđujuće bespomoćno. Goli su i ranjivi, manji od ljudi kada iza sebe ostave svoj aparat moći, koji je iskrojen oko njih kao kakvo odijelo. U takvim situacijama njihovo tijelo gubi svoj smisao. Ono postaje nijemo, budući da tek mora osvojiti novu sposobnost za smisao u stranom govornom prostoru izvan studija. Međutim, onaj tko kroči u njihov studijski svijet morat će se prilagoditi specifičnoj mehanici tog svijeta ili pak pokušati probiti se s vlastitom mehanikom u obliku borbe protiv premoćne mašinerije. Iz toga rezultira dvoboj konkurentnih mehanizama, omiljeni komični efekt do kojega dolazi uvijek kada gimnastičarke, manekenke, pa i plesači, bilderi, dubleri i naposljetku životinje uđu u studio. To su redom gosti s izrazito drugačijom tjelesnošću, koja uvijek nudi i povod za mehanički eksperiment. U tome je i čar prizora kada Schmidt uči plesati tango od profesionalne plesačice ili kada hrani nilskoga konja, kada se po Lettermanu povješaju goleme zmije, kada se Leno igra s divljim mačkama ili isprobava novu spravu za fitnes ili kada Conan O'Brien pokušava na visokim petama trčati preko pozornice. Razumije se da takve borbe koje, isto kao i verbalne interakcije, funkcioniraju na temeljnoj postavci ravnopravnosti, uvijek sadrže napad na savršenu organiziranost sustava. Takav napad u tom slučaju nije samo dopušten, nego je čak izričito poželjan, budući da uvijek iznova potakne napeti i pomlađujući proces samooblikovanja.

12

U tom smislu se u despotskoj predstavi manifestira daljnji razvoj onoga što je Henri Bergson formulirao u svojoj zbirci eseja o smijehu.¹² Zašto se tako neobična i zapravo smiješna svojstva kao što su visina i ukočenost Haralda Schmidta, obujam Hermesa Phettberga, muškobanjasta pojava Dame Edne, brada Jaya Lena, ispučena gornja usna Davida Lettermana, nedostatak motorike Thomasa Gottschalka itd. ne samo svjesno ističu, nego čak prezentiraju kao jamstvo osobne moći? Hipoteza Henrija Bergsona da kontrast između takvih tjelesnih deformacija i ideala savršene prilagodivosti mehaničkim datostima života, dakle, neuskладivost između mehaniziranog tijela i tražene *souplesse* koja to deformirano tijelo čini smiješnim, isprva nudi samo pristup smiješnoj strani tih slika tijela. Međutim, ako pokušamo promatrati aranžman nekog *showa* kao zatvoreni sustav, onda se može uvidjeti i moćna strana takve tjelesnosti. Jer scenografija svakog *showa* odnosi se u velikoj mjeri na specifično tijelo svojega vladara i prilagođena je tom idealu. Show se izgrađuje oko specifične

fizionomije *showmastera*. Dobar primjer za to je austrijski *showmaster* Hermes Phettberg. Njegovo nevjerojatno voluminozno tijelo ključ je za mehaniku *showa*. Phettberg je biblijska gora koja se nikada neće pokrenuti s mjesta. On je središte, proročište, bunar mudrosti kojemu hodočastimo, učitelj u čiji krug sljedbenika ulazimo kao neiskusna djeca. Možda njegovo divovsko tijelo uopće više ne može proći kroz vrata studija, možda je urastao u svoj prostor kao kruška u bocu. Phettberg tu posustaje jer mu ne preostaje ništa drugo. Izvan pozornice zapravo je nezamisliv. Pozornica je odijelo koje dobro stoji samo onome tko ga nosi. Tjelesna forma, prema tome, uopće više nije apsolutna vrijednost koja se mjeri prema nekom vitalističkom idealu, nego je pitanje spretnog aranžmana. Nužno ju je postaviti u odnos prema umjetnom akcijskom polju djelovanja u kojemu djeluje dotično tijelo. Komični učinak specifične tjelesne mehanike proizlazi iz pokreta, promjena i preklapanja takvih akcijskih polja. U tom smislu se upad gosta (u ekstremnom slučaju manekenke kod Dalla ili Edne) ne doživljava kao natjecanje dvaju od početka različito „savršenih“ tijela, nego naprosto kao suprotstavljanje dvaju parcijalnih mehanizama koji se na komičan način trude oko sebe stvoriti ili obraniti prostor koji im odgovara. Tako se može bolje razumjeti i dar gosta. Predmet koji gost donosi i predaje u ruke *showmasteru* ne služi samo u svrhu product placement, nego je „interdividualan“ proces.¹³ Domaćin je prisiljen stupiti u odnos s jednim dijelom tijela svoga gosta, što često ima jasni prizvuk erotike, ali je još češće prvi napad od strane gosta, znak za početak razmjene udaraca: dar stvara situaciju kojoj je gost mentalno i fizički bolje prilagođen od domaćina. To nije samo dio njega samoga, nego i dio svijeta, ili bolje sustava u kojem živi, u kojem se kreće i kojem je on, samo on, savršeno prilagođen.

13

Takav koncept konkurentnih mehanizama mogao bi nam dati koncept komike u epohi tehnologije. I sam Bergson čini presudan korak u tom smjeru, ali pritom ne može izbjeći filozofsku formulaciju „podatnosti“, nekog nadljudskog *Je-ne-sais-quoi*, čije je bitno svojstvo neodređenost. Za razliku od toga, ako zamislimo ravnopravne sustave, onda možemo objasniti i neodoljivo komični efekt borbe među robotima, koji više nema nikakve veze s traženom *souplesse* ili odmakom od nje: borbene roboti su strojevi raznolike mehanike, redom različiti od čovjeka, koje njihovi pronalazači huškaju jedne na druge i koji vode borbe s dinamikom koja je određena isključivo kontrastom između njihovih načina funkcioniranja. Na isti način funkcionira i *show* kojim upravlja despot: to je stroj za dehumanizaciju, koji pretvara i *showmastera* i gosta u super-automate te oni drndajući i iskreći treskaju jedan o drugoga sve dok još postoji nešto što se može popraviti.

Dok se *show*, dakle, u svojoj referenciji na totalitarizam sasvim svjesno predstavlja kao enklava unutar potpuno drugačije oblikovanog svijeta, kao polje za društvene eksperimente u kojem se, ponekad prijateljski a ponekad neprijateljski susreću različiti mehanizmi koji potječu iz raznih sredina s obzirom na jezik, usmjerenje, zvanje i kulturu, u jednoj drugoj inscenaciji većeg formata, u spektaklu fašizma, i to osobito njemačkog, *jedna* specifična mehanika toliko se širi da u ekstremnom slučaju može zaraziti cijeli kontinent. Dok *show* relativizira sebe sama na temelju vlastite vanjštine te čak i prema unutra komičnim sučeljavanjima neprestano proizvodi distanciranja s komičnim učinkom, u totalitarnoj inscenaciji poželjno je da se ta relativizacija i to distanciranje ukinu na političkoj razini, ako je to ikako moguće. Suvremena *actio* pritom ne sadrži samo neverbalni sastojak govora, nego i slikovnu prisutnost u medijima, vidno oblikovanje sljedbeništva, nacrt za privatni život, arhitekturu priredbe, vlade, države.

Dakako, i tu je na početku došlo do oblikovanja parcele, kao što su *Bürgerbräukeller* ili *Hofbräuhäus* u „prijestolnici pokreta“ krajem dvadesetih godina. Već u toj početnoj fazi Hitler je akribijski nadgledao inscenaciju partijskih priredaba. Provjeravala se akustika, kao i opća atmosfera prostorije, kontrolirala se prozračnost i pazilo se na to da mjesta za okupljanje budu sasvim malena i da barem trećinu prostora zauzimaju pristaše nacizma kako bi se i u malobrojnog slušateljstvu pobudio dojam masovnog objavljenja i zajamčilo odgovarajuće temeljno raspoloženje. Vlastite borbene pjesme, vlastite zastave, vlastiti simboli, vlastiti pozdrav; SA-razbijači na vratima i s obje strane govornika; veliki broj uvodnih govora, koji pripremaju nastup zvijezde kao *warm-upper* i do samoga kraja ostavljaju masu u neizvjesnosti hoće li se „On“ danas uopće pojaviti – sve te pojedinosti i stilska sredstva postali su trajni inventar, i to ne samo na stranačkim skupštinama u Nürnbergu, nego od samog početka.¹⁴ I sam je Führer u potpunosti stiliziran, ni tu se ništa ne prepušta slučaju. Hitler naručuje serije fotografija prije nego se pojavi s novim kaputom ili novim pokrivalom za glavu pred javnošću, kako bi mogao provjeriti djelovanje novog komada odjeće i u pokretu, a ne samo pred ogledalom. Kasnije će svaki Hitlerov snimak pred objavljivanje biti podvrgnut ispitivanju kako bi se za nj dobilo izričito dopuštenje. A najkasnije 1936. godine, tijekom Olimpijade u Berlinu, dok SA-ovci pročešljavaju gradove kako bi provjerili urednost vrtova pred njemačkim kućama, inscenacija već obuhvaća cijelu državu, zajedno sa svim područjima života njezinih građana.

¹⁴ Usp. Joachim C. Fest, Hitler, Frankfurt, Berlin i Beč, 1973., str. 218 i dalje.

Međutim, slika koju se tu želi dati nije slika udobne idile njemačke pravocrtnosti. U prvom je planu prije opojni doživljaj države kao zajednice naroda i vlastitog postojanja kao svjedocanstva o jednoj velikoj epohi. Sve treba djelovati veliko i svečano, a to znači prije svega nesvakodnevno, drugačije. „Istina je da se tu nastojalo obmanuti narod, navesti ga da nešto što je uvježbano i strano shvati kao ponašanje koje je primjereno velikom čovjeku“, piše Brecht u Kupovini mesinga¹⁵, misleći pritom na satove koje je Hitler uzimao kod dvorskoga glumca Basila, glumca stare škole, koji se

¹⁵ Bertolt Brecht, Der Messingkauf, u: Schriften zum Theater 5, Frankfurt, 1963., str. 86-98.

osjećao ugodnije u usiljenoj pozi klasičnih glumačkih tehnika nego sa zahtjevima suvremene dramatičke. Brecht proširuje svoju tematsku analizu njegovih satova, koje je smatrao itekako ozbiljnom i korisnom inicijativom za govornika, u svojem komadu *Zaustavljeni uspon Artura Uija*, dodajući joj aspekt smiješnoga:

UI:

Iznesite ogledalo! Jedan od zaštitara iznosi veliko samostojeće ogledalo.

UI:

Najprije hod. Kako hodate u kazalištu ili u operi?

GLUMAC:

Razumijem. Vi mislite na hod u velikom stilu. Julije Cezar, Hamlet, Romeo, Shakespeareovi komadi. Gospodine Ui, došli ste k pravom čovjeku. (...)

GIVOLA:

Meni se čini da si se namjerio na pogrešnoga, šefe. On je out.

UI:

To će se još pokazati. Hodajte uokolo onako kako se hoda kod tog Shakespearea. *Glumac hoda uokolo.*

UI:

Dobro!

GIVOLA:

Ali ne možeš tako hodati ispred prodavača cvjetače! To je neprirodno!

UI:

Što znači neprirodno? Nitko danas nije prirodan. Kada hodam, želim da se vidi da hodam. *Imitira hod glumca.*

GLUMAC:

Glavu unatrag. *Ui zabacuje glavu unatrag.* Stopalo dodiruje tlo najprije vrhovima prstiju. *Ui jevo stopalo dodiruje tlo najprije vrhovima prstiju.* Dobro. Izvrsno. Prirodno ste nadareni. Samo još s rukama moramo nešto učiniti. Krute su. Čekajte. Najbolje da ih sklopite pred spolovilom. *Ui sklapa ruke u hodu pred spolovilom.* Nije loše. Neusiljeno, a ipak pribrano. Ali glava ostaje otraga. Tako je. Mislim da je hod za vaše svrhe u redu, gospodine Ui. Što još želite?**16**

16 Bertolt Brecht, *Der aufhaltsame Aufstieg des Arturo Ui*, Frankfurt, 1965., str. 54 i dalje.

17 Prema Joachim C. Festu, *op. cit.*

18 Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, Berlin, 1933., str. 544. Tu određenu ulogu igra i estetski koncept „zbunjivanja“ (stupefazione) i „brutalnih udaraca“ (colpi brutali) talijanskog futurizma. Usp. o tome: Helga Finter, *Semiotik des Avantgardetextes – Gesellschaftliche und poetische Erfahrung im italienischen Futurismus*, Stuttgart, 1980., str. 61.

19 Hitler. Eine Bilanz. Ciklus dokumentarnih filmova, Njemačka, 1997. Redatelj: Guido Knopp.

Taj je ulomak nastao iz dojma koji je na Brechta ostavio rani Hitler dvadesetih godina, Hitler iz pivnica i propagandnih kamiona, o kojem je časopis *Weltbühne* jednom napisao da među njegove učitelje spada i veliki upravitelj cirkusa Barnum**17**, Hitler čije patetično držanje navjestitelja na mitinzima nije izazivalo samo oduševljenje, nego redovito i smijeh, ali kojega to uopće nije diralo – bar em u onoj fazi, u kojoj je bilo važnije dospjeti u javni diskurs nego ga aktivno kontrolirati: „Nema veze smatraju li nas Ivicama Kobasicama [lik iz njemačkih pučkih pošalica, op. prev.] ili zločincima, glavno je da nas spominju, da se uvijek iznova nama bave.“**18**

Potencijalna komičnost tog lika je, dakle, prepoznatljiva i za Brechta i za samog Hitlera, ona nije rezultat neželjene komike. Lik Hitlera nije neprofesionalna greška ili rezultat inscenacijske površnosti. Njegova smiješnost je nužna posljedica onoga što Brecht naziva „neprirodnim“ ili preciznije „stranim“: inscenacija svijeta koji nije naš, divovskog stroja koji se usprotivi svemu na što naide, ali je sposoban tako podvrgnuti izvanjskost vlastitoj, navlastitoj funkcionalnosti da ona naposljetku postaje njegov sastavni dio. Pumperice i planinarske dokoljenke uz baloner i šešir, leptir-kravata i uštrkani ovratnik ispod uniforme s jahaćim čizmama, uska pilotska kapa koja kulturnu frizuru pretvara u kožnatu čelu s dugim klempavim ušima – općenito, siloviti zbroj različitih *dresscodeova*, koji inače služe podjeli društva... Pa zatim pretjerana simetrija brčića, kontrapunktirana asimetričnim razdjeljkom... taj je lik po sebi nakrivljen i sasvim svjesno naglašava tu nakrivljenost. Stran je, odbojan. Ali samo onda ako postoji neka referencijalna točka – ono što je navodno normalno, elastično, prilagođeno, vitalno, kako bi rekao Henri Bergson – ili naprosto neki drugi model s drugim programom. „‘Momci, podite u kino’“, citira Walter Jens jednog od svojih učitelja, „‘poslušajte Hitlera, poslušajte to deranje i onu masu oko njega – a zatim zatvorite oči i zamislite kako to djeluje u Londonu.’“ Zatvorili smo oči... grozno. Od tog trenutka više nismo mogli podnijeti Hitlera. Jedan trenutak otuđenja bio je dovoljan da otkrije tog čovjeka onakvog kakav je doista bio.“**19**

Puka predodžba o nekom drugom, potencijalno ravnopravnom načinu hoda, odijevanja, kretanja i komuniciranja dovoljna je da se cijeli teatralni sustav sruši sam od sebe. Od inscenacije govora u *Bürgerbräukelleru*, preko Olimpijskih igara i stranačkih skupština u Nürnbergu, pa sve do radija, tječnih novosti, filmova i kolosalnih arhitektonskih projekata, naposljetku se oko te mehanike izgradio

cijeli jedan svijet sa svim pojedinostima; na taj način, ne samo da se ta mehanika podupire i potiče, nego se i svaki drugi, relativizirajući obrazac funkcija izvan nje čini doslovce nezamislivim. „Žrtveno janje ili pobjednik“, „Pobjeda ili smrt“ – kult vođe jedan je dio tog ili-ili, dok je drugi dio vlastito uništenje (u smijehu). Stoga je odlučujući element u izgradnji Hitlerova osobnog trijumfa bilo to što je mogao reći „da se oni, koji su se u ono vrijeme još smijali, danas više ne smiju.“²⁰ Je li u tom kontekstu pretjerano pretpostaviti da se Hitler i sam, u privatnom krugu ljudi, smijao samo s rukom na ustima i da je, ako se zatekao u igri s psom, tog psa grubo otjerao?²¹ Smijeh kao rezultat komičnog efekta sučeljavanja proturječnih mehanizama – taj smijeh ne smije se dopustiti, on se mora zabraniti. Takav sustav, kako se čini, mora težiti k tome da zavlada svijetom, ka „konačnoj pobjedi“, kako bi iščistio i posljednji kutak u kojemu bi moglo doći do loma i kako bi naposljetku istrijebio i vlastitu komičnost.

Smijeh i posvećenje gađenja

Gubavac

Već dvadesetih godina o Hitlerovu mitu u tisku određenu ulogu igra kombinacija malograđanske sredine i megalomanije, boemske bijede i totalitarne moći, beskućništva i vlasti nad cijelim svijetom. Slijedeći tu tendenciju, Sebastian Haffner započinje svoje *Opaske* poglavljem o tom paradoksu,²² pri čemu nikada ne biva sasvim jasno je li tu uzdizanje s društvenog dna bečkog doma za muškarce samo sramotna mrlja koju je propaganda u Führerovoj biografiji zataškala, a Hitler ju je cijeli život nijekao, nešto što bi trebalo u retrospektivi otkriti licemjerje čitavog modela nacističkog nadčovjeka, ili u tom grotesknom društvenom jazu ipak čući neka tajanstvena dosljednost – kao da slika vladara svijeta tek u kombinaciji s glibom postaje potpunom. Ono što Haffner uvijek spominje s prizvukom omalovažavanja, to u analizi Hitlera iz pera Thomasa Manna prije izaziva zbunjenost. Lik Hitlera tu se opisuje kao lik „nevoljena brata“, kao podmukli kolega umjetnik, kojega bi čovjek radije prešutio i ignorirao, ali je obavezan baviti se njime zbog tog mučnog srodstva. Hitler kao neugodan izdanak sna o umjetničkom djelu koje sve obuhvaća, sve uključuje, briše sva proturječja i razlike.

To savezništvo s glibom javlja se i u Mussolinijevoj Italiji, i to sasvim opipljivo, ni najmanje simbolički uzvišeno. Tu se komični aspekt društvenog jaza javlja u neposrednoj tjelesnosti, koja je za karikaturu s one strane Atlantika isprva daleko mjerodavnija od samog Hitlera. Govor tijela Chaplinova Adolfa Hinkela više odgovara, baš kao i protagonistâ u filmu *Biti ili ne biti* Ernsta Lubitscha,²³ nabijenim, nabujalim, široko rastvorenim i liptećim Duceovim gestama. Oči koje iskaču iz duplji, neprestano naginjanje preko prozorskog praga ili preko prednjeg ruba govornice, puhanje s nadutim obrazima trubača, zadržavanje zraka u plućima, uslijed čega cijela figura postaje tako napuhnuta da postoji opasnost da će eksplodirati, potpuno ispunjavanje svakog okvira, svakog ograničenja, bez obzira na to je li to otvor vrata ili blende fotoaparata – pljuvanje, šmrkanje, dahtanje, kašljanje, znojenje, neugodno prskanje tjelesnim izlučevinama... sve to zahtijeva širenje vlastitog tijela i iskazuje apsolutno davanje i naposljetku žrtvovanje do samouništenja, koje može zaustaviti jedino čvrsto stegnuta uniforma.

U tom smislu su Hitlerova stroga krutost i njegov statični monumentalizam prije iznimni slučajevi u fašističkoj inscenaciji tijela. I autoinscenacija neofašista Žirinovskog pokazuje neusiljenu izravnost, koja bi bila nezamisliva u nacističkoj Njemačkoj. Naime, dok Hitler, protivno populističkoj ocjeni Guida Knoppa i njegova *Time-Life-Video*, nikada nije bio „privatna osoba“, ili je to barem bio samo u domeni nejasnih aluzija i mašte, dok je Obersalzberg od samog početka bio Zabranjeni grad i to u toj mjeri da je do danas ostao omiljeno neonacističko svetište, privatni život Žirinovskog predstavlja se u medijima s pretjeranom otvorenošću i nametljivošću. Taj veseli fašist, naime, spušta hlače tek kada se uključuje sve televizijske kamere. Vidimo ga kako u rebrastoj potkošulji boksa s jednim od svojih zaštitara – aktivnost od koje se toliko oznoji da pri naglom okretu glave na leću kamere polete krupne kapi znoja; vodi nas u svoju malenu kuhinju, zamagljenu od pare, gdje diže poklopce s lonaca i mljackajući trpa u usta prstima svježe punjeno tijesto, koje je upravo pripravila njegova kuharica; sjeda u rasklimanu stolicu tako da mu se trbušina prelijeva preko hlača; pokazuje TV-novinarima svoj zahod, svoj krevet, čak im objašnjava na kojoj strani najradije spava i kako običava protresti jastuk. Sve to djeluje prilično otrcano: voštani stolnjaci, pregrade od iverice, šalice za skupljanje i plastični tanjuri.²⁴ Intimna sfera demagoga izokreće se na van, prema promatraču i protiv njegove volje, a on je uzima na znanje, napola zabavljen, napola zgađen pri tom neželjenom kontaktu s doista grotesknim tijelom, grotesknom u smislu Mihaila Bahtina: s tijelom koje se „u osnovi svodi na razapljena usta“,²⁵ koje guta i samo biva progutano. „Bitni događaji u životu grotesknog tijela... jelo, piće, izlučevine (izmet, urin, znoj, nosna sluz, pljuvačka)... sve se to događa na granicama tijela i svijeta.“²⁶ Tijelo postaje nalik na tijesto i neprestano nadrađuje okvire koji su mu zadani. S druge strane, to podsjeća na motiv progutane kamere koja klizi niz ždrijelo do želuca i ondje biva probavljena. Izokretanje na van i unošenje u tijelo dva su smjera kretanja koja su samo naizgled suprotna, ali je posljedica jednog i drugog univerzalno obavijanje – komično-kulturna predodžba o sveobuhvatnoj, kozmičkoj tjelesnosti.

²⁰ Citirano prema Guidu Knoppu, op. cit.

²¹ Usp. J. C. Fest, op. cit., str. 709 i dalje.

²² Sebastian Haffner, *Anmerkungen zu Hitler*, München, 1978.

²³ *To Be Or Not To Be*. SAD, 1942.
Redatelj: Ernst Lubitsch.

²⁴ Spiegel-TV reportaža. Datum prvog emitiranja nije mi poznat.

²⁵ Mihail Bahtin, *Literatur und Karneval. Zur Romantheorie und Lachkultur*. S ruskog preveo Alexander Kaempfe, München i Beč, 1969., str. 16.

²⁶ Op. cit., str. 17.

27 *Der Tunnel*. Njemačka, 1915. Redatelj: William Wauer. Zanimljiva li dokumenta: tridesetih godina taj je film sa svojim junakom MacAllanom, koji se u potpunosti žrtvuje za ideju, bio sastavni dio nacističke propagande. Međutim, Hitlerov retorički uzor nije taj lik vođe, nego jedan od njegovih neprijatelja – komunistički obojeni vođa radnikâ, čiji zahtjevi su dijametralno suprotni nacističkom patosu žrtvovanja.

28 Usp. Klaus Theweleit, *Männerphantasien*. Sv. 2: *Männerkörper. Zur Psychoanalyse des weißen Terrors*, München, 1978.

29 Usp. Elias Canetti, *Masse und Macht*, Hamburg, 1960. Usp. također ulomak u Theweleitu koji se odnosi na tu knjigu, op. cit., str. 23 i dalje.

30 Pamela Ballinger, *Blutopfer und Feuertaufe*, u: Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht, Friedrich Kittler i Bernhard Siegert (ur.), *Der Dichter als Kommandant. D'Annunzio erobert Fiume*, München, 1996. Ballingerova se u svojem opisu elitne trupe „ardita“ osobito osvrće na problematiku hijerarhijskog odnosa prema „narodu“ i konfliktu takvog elitizma i ideologije vladavine mase.

31 Usp. Helga Finter, *Heterologie und Repräsentation. Strategien des Lachens. Zu George Batailles Le bleu du ciel*, str. 13-31. Bataillesov pojam heterogenog, na način na koji ga opisuje Finterova u vezi sa smijehom, važna je osnova tog istraživanja. Pritom moram ukazati na to da se heterogenost o kojoj govorim u vezi sa *showom* ne smije brkati s Bataillesovim „heterogenim“. Također, kada govorim o homogenizaciji, izjednačavanju ili omasovljenju, tu ne mislim na „homogeno“, dakle na sustav i strukturu, nego naprotiv, na gubitak strukture.

Geste samoraskrivanja i retoričkih fantazija o svemoći pritom su usko povezane. „Uzvisivanje samo po sebi sadrži ideju poniženja“, piše Bahtin, baš kao što poniženje sadrži megalomaniju. U filmu *Tunnel* iz 1915. godine, napravljenom prema romanu Bernharda Kellermanna, jedan se pučki govornik, čiji stil je mladi Hitler očito usvojio kao model za vlastitu retoriku, na kraju huškajućega govora baca s provizornog podija u uzavrelu masu.²⁷ I Žirinovski odmah po završetku privatne izložbe svoje malograđanske okoline odvodi televizijsku ekipu do crne limuzine s auto-telefonom, faksom i kompjuterskom konzolom. „Oдавde mogu razgovarati sa cijelim svijetom, čak i s američkim predsjednikom. Jednako sam moćan kao Boris Jeljcin i Helmut Kohl.“ Ili još moćniji, jer kralj-luda Bahtinova karnevala ne poznaje granice, ni prema gore ni prema dolje. Pad tu ne postoji kao eventualnost, kao politička katastrofa u kojoj skončava despotizam; ona prati te likove kao njihov *alter ego*.

Možda u toj uskoj povezanosti s grotesknim figurama karnevala leži sudbonosni pučki element, koji izbija na površinu u fašizmu, na političkoj sceni, osobito u kriznim situacijama ili u početnoj fazi dotičnih pokreta, kao gesta oslanjanja na korumpiranu vlast koja je lišena svake tjelesne prisutnosti. Međutim, taj se pučki element, iako služi svrsi, više neće moći dopustiti u situaciji koja se stabilizira. Prisvajanje vlasti je trenutak u kojemu se gađenje premješta u sferu simbolâ: procesije s bakljama, počasne straže, kult raspadanja i patos propadanja u posljednjim mjesecima rata prebacuju karnevalsku višeznačnost gađenja u sferu groze i uzvišenosti.

Masa i moć

U analizi retoričkih odnosa između zabave i totalitarne demagogije nije moguće jednoznačno klasificirati određena stilska sredstva kao totalitarnu ili naprosto parodijsku estetiku. Obrada totalitarizma u eksperimentalnim *show*-formatima poslijeratnog doba i formama koje su iz njih izvedene ne zadovoljava se komentarom izvana, već slijedi mimetička rekonstrukcija totalitarnih strategija sve do nesigurne sfere afekata. Niti u totalitarnom govoru niti u solističkom *entertainmentu* ne postoje jednoznačna recepcijska stajališta koja bi se mogla uzeti kao osnova za razgraničenje. Učinak scenskog despotizma uvijek počiva dobrim dijelom na isprovociranim afektivnim konfliktima i na skupu raznovrsnih aluzija i referencija koje se svjesno drži u neizvjesnosti. Isto tako ni dobro uređena vojska s „bijelim junakom“²⁸ na čelu nije isključivo obilježje totalitarne retorike, kao što anarhična masa karnevala jedina određuje njegovu pučku komiku. Klaus Theweleit – kojem ovaj ulomak mnogo duguje – tu razmišlja odviše dihotomijski: u *Muškim fantazijama* uvijek se zadržava jasno razgraničenje oklopljenog tijela i tromog carstva raspadanja i sluzi. Vojnički junak nije onaj koji „preživljava“²⁹, nego onaj „koji je preživio“, onaj koji je prevladao smrt ili stapanje s masom jednakih, koji u sjajnim okovanim čizmama gazi preko gliba i nedodirljiv vlada masom. Ali totalitaristički vođe ne insceniraju se samo kao vojskovođe; oni su uvijek i upravitelji kaosa, ceremonijal-meštri sluzi. Oni ne crpe svoj efekt veličine iz elitizma i prezira prema neredu, nego iz te borbe protiv zmaja. Elitističkom mišljenju suprotstavlja se agresivna proklamacija vlastite nekulture, opojno pomirenje s mnoštvom. Ono što je u protofašističkim eksperimentima Gabriela D'Annunzija u Rijeci još predstavljalo intelektualni problem, naime pitanje je li masa dobra ili vrijedna prezira,³⁰ to kod Hitlera i Mussolinija postaje spretno inscenirana, zamršena igra privlačnosti i odbojnosti, egalitarizma i diferencijacije.³¹

Isto tako, kao što samozatajni kontakt s masom pripada totalitarizmu kao opojno izvrtnje potrebe za kontrolom, tako i odbacivanje stvaranja kaosa u obliku prenatrpanosti želje za redom pripada motivima moći u suvremenom *showu*. Dobar primjer iz emisije *Wetten, dass...* je oklada u sali s Frankom Elsnerom, u kojoj nepregledna horda Bavaraca koji lupkaju petama nadire u salu, sve dok moderator, koji do kraja očajnički nastoji održati red, naposljetku ne nestane u toj masi koja se ne može obuzdati. Grotesknost te scene nije toliko u spontanoj navali pomahnitih statista, nego u vidljivom strahu *showmastera* pred tako monumentalnim i za *show* zapravo vrlo tipičnim gubitkom kontrole. Za razliku od toga, kada Dame Edna na kraju svojeg *showa* zadovoljno promatra mnoštvo zanjihanih gladiola i napola sumnjičavo, napola samozadovoljno promrmlja: „Look at that! What a gorgeous sight“, sasvim je jasno da su se u njezinim očima, iz povišene perspektive njezine tribine, pojedinačni elementi stopili u cjelinu. Samo ona vidi tu šumu, tu valovitu živost, kao organizam koji istovremeno izaziva divljenje i gađenje. Masa dopušta samo dvije alternative u kojima scenski despot jednako uživa: ostati iznad nje ili se s njome stopiti. Privlačenje i odbijanje, samouzvišenje i samouništenje, elitizam i antielitizam: nikada se jasno ne formulira na kojoj je tko strani. Jedini kontinuitet u tom teturanju jest teturanje kao takvo. U rekonstrukciji totalitarnih strategija moći, s kojima se despotski *show* igra na neugodan način, postupno se otkrivaju razlike u inscenaciji, ali isto tako mogu u idućem trenutku otići u potpuno suprotnom smjeru. Ono što je od odlučujuće važnosti za temeljnu različitost, koja – upravo zbog blizine sredstava – ne može biti više suprotstavljena nego što jest, to je mogućnost potpunog i konačnog rješavanja u smijehu, koju nudi i ostvaruje samo *show*, i u kojoj se totalitarni instrumentarij naposljetku ritualno lišava moći, ne samo na parodijskoj, nego i na daleko dubljoj razini koja obuhvaća cijelog čovjeka i prisiljava ga na oslobođenje.



Hermes Phettberg




Harald Schmidt



Jay Leno, foto: Nikolina Pristaš



Vladimir Žirinovskiy



B. Mussolini

Despotic Laughter and the Fascist Prohibition of Laughter

Veit Sprenger

Translated from German by Marina Miladinov

“So, you want it the hard way – I have warned you.
Then I will teach you the lesson.
Enough with funny, forget the clown.
I am not your joker or your dirty word,
your scapegoat or your doormat.
I am... horror and destruction. Aaaargh!”
(Todd Mc Farlane – Spawn)

Whenever one speaks of the way in which European fascism is presented in comedy, one always mentions Chaplin's *Great Dictator* as the best example of the comical treatment of the material.¹ That film is the standard against which all approaches to the matter must be evaluated, as if Chaplin had succeeded in making an ingenious trick of articulating and ridiculing Nazi atrocities at the same time. Thereby it is frequently ignored how vague and complex the film becomes at the end, when the small hairdresser, mistaken for the Führer and placed at the speaker's stand, is literally forced to speak for his life. The speech he is holding is a fiery ode to democracy, but it does not allow us to forget the basic situation: the motivation for what is spoken is not primarily political conviction, but a classical comedian's scenario of error, in which a protagonist is forced to leap into someone else's skin and fulfil his role in the world in order to save one's own bare existence. How will the speaker get out of this dangerous situation? The solution is surprisingly simple: the Führer against his will holds a speech that does not in the least resemble, be it in tone, gesture, or content, what the real Führer would have said – and the mass still does precisely what the mass is supposed to do after a speech: it bursts into cheering. What is shown in the last scenes of the film is not the cheering of a community of free individuals, which rubs the sleep of the captivated from its eyes after a long roaming, suddenly comprehending the democratic vision of the speaker as the better way. Instead, we are witnessing the cynical realization of rhetorical dramaturgy. Up there, we have a demagogue raging until his voice breaks and he ends his speech in exhaustion, whereas down there we have a collective answering with loud approval. All other elements of the speech are fully exchangeable. What is crucial in that final speech is precisely the same that was essential in the famous *grammelot* speeches in the beginning of the film – the presence of a great solo performer in body and voice. The final gaze into the sky, accompanied by *Lohengrin* strings, is not an apotheosis of common sense, but the resigned insight of a stand-up comedian, who has realized that the differences are not in the methods, but in their contexts and consequences. Likewise, the methods of the show are not totalitarian or democratic in themselves; rather, it is the socio-political context in which they are used. One could go even further and say that, in the simple theatrical arrangement of solo-entertainment, so much depends on the totalitarian speaker that the despotic soloist can only destroy his own totalitarianism if he destroys the very theatrical arrangement of his show – which he does, again and again, in each episode of his show.

The affinity of the despotic soloist for totalitarian rhetoric surpasses mere passages of parody and imitation numbers by far. It does not only happen on all levels of speech, but also affects the construction of myths, the cult of persons, the staging of one's own body, one's privacy, etc. The despot is not only aware of this problematic affinity, he is playing with it, exhibits it, and uses it in order to establish and destroy his comic empire. But if I step onto that precarious territory, my apparent carelessness is justified only by the actual carelessness of my protagonists in communication with the corresponding *material*.² In my opinion, the analysis of their references to geopolitical, racist, and totalitarian contexts should not be left out. However, one should also not reduce this analysis to a direct comparison and parallelism of entertainment and political demagoguery, but always observe and understand it in the cultural and historical relationship with the early popular reflections of European fascism in the USA, primarily in the comics about super-heroes and the horror literature of the 1940s and 1950s, as well as in the simultaneously evolving predecessors of the Late Night Show.³ The above-mentioned popular forms of expression constitute a connector, with the help of which one can reflect at the same time on aspects of fascist demagoguery and strategies of despotic entertainment. Therefore, the following paragraphs should not be read as a frowning expression of scepticism and cultural pessimism, which would proclaim a formal – and therefore perhaps content-related – proximity of contemporary entertainment and totalitarianism. On the contrary, they are a fresh attempt to classify the despotic show within the context of cultural history, this time, however, with a stronger consideration of the Late Night Show, together with the specific political circumstances in which it developed – namely America immediately after the war – and the resulting allusive and subversive way of dealing with the phenomenon of the real existing fascism. The fact that Hitler and Mussolini were in their own time perceived as potentially comic figures by international journalists, literary people, and artists, both at home and abroad, offers in the USA a welcome field of attack on the entertainment. This attack on the new material is not limited to its thematic treatment, but reaches, as we shall see, far deeper into the popular arsenal of types by affecting the rhetoric of the body, time, and theatre space beyond the content of the speech.

Why did precisely those things, which had caused masses to cheer with enthusiasm in fascist Germany and Italy, provoke laughter abroad in the 1930s? A perception so national and specific is not to be presumed. Besides, there was an inner exile within the lands under the fascist rule, as long as it was still possible, a conscious denial of the imposed communication contract. There were jokes, some of which can be found in the study on "Lingua Tertii Imperii" by Victor Klemperer,⁴ in which the leaders' figures were shown in a comic light. Should this ridiculing of leadership be more than just a cathartic discharge of the accumulated frustrations of everyday life? Is it imaginable that, in various popular treatments of fascism, laughter and cult should be two sides of the same medal? Why did Hitler explicitly prohibit laughter in his speeches, again and again, as if he were aware of

¹ *The Great Dictator*. USA, 1940. Directed by: Charles Chaplin.

² Here used as a term from entertainment business, in the sense of subject, topic, reference point of a stand-up sequence.

³ The points of divergence are found primarily in the character of the "concentrated spectacular," as opposed to the "diffuse spectacular" (Guy Debord). Cf. here Helga Finter, *Kunst des Lachens, Kunst des Lesens. Zum Theater in einer Gesellschaft des Spektakels*, in: Vittoria Borsò and Björn Goldammer (ed.): *Moderne(n) der Jahrhundertwenden*, Baden-Baden, 2000, p. 439-451. However, it should be noted that this approximation is about the basic differences, which could not be seen as such without it. I agree with Finter in seeing laughter in a show spectacle as a "revolt" or a "liberation from the image" (Jacques Lacan) and the show as a process of concentration and pictorialization of the society of spectacle, on whose end, however, entirely contrary to the stagings of fascism, one finds liberation from those very images. Cf. Helga Finter, *op. cit.*, p. 448f. Cf. also: *idem*, *Poesie, Komödie, Tragödie oder die Masken des Unmöglichen: Georges Bataille und das Theater des Buches*, in: Peter Wiechens and Andreas Hetzel (ed.): *Georges Bataille. Vorreden zur Überschreitung*, Würzburg, 1999, p. 259-273.

⁴ Victor Klemperer, *LTI*, Leipzig, 1975.

this fact, by threatening the laughing ones (be it the “international Jewry” or European neighbours) with a horrible destiny? Getting closer to these questions is extremely important for studying the despotic stage figure; moreover, it offers a contribution to the theory of laughter and comedy. In the process, both the explicit and the implicit points of contact between the fascist staging and its comic-despotic reflections in the entertainment media of the time should be identified. In both cases, verbal sacrifice, fateful denial, and mechanisation of the body appear as rhetoric strategies. In both cases, “Führer” and “Duce”, or the antihero who refers to them, are not staged only as active brawlers, but also as lepers, in league with disgust, decomposition, and decay.

In European fascism, the place of this paradoxical movement is not so much the mass staging of the later years, but rather the speech within small circles, in beer cellars and backrooms, that is, in the early phase of Nazism, in which there was still no Arian-heroic aesthetic of uniqueness. It is not so much about the perfect course of the speech in the first place, but rather about the spontaneous effect, about stirring up and bringing down the audience, as well as generating a trance of unity, which is always connected to the pathetic awareness of being a minority. The silent infamy, the possibility of sliding into dirt and chaos, are the elements that the Italian fascism brought with it into its (eternally unstable) era of flourishing far more than the German one and which the New Right of today has been picking up in Russia, Austria, and France. Laughter has been described as a “dangerous balance” between rejection and attraction, which provokes an ambivalent “allergic” reaction.⁵ Perhaps it is that very ambivalence of laughter, generated both by fascism and its reflection, comic despotism, that which in the first case is forbidden or at least precarious, whereas in the second case it is desirable and formative. While in fascist discourse the contact with the heterogeneous is preserved as a powerful “moment of madness” of pseudo-religious consecration,⁶ in the unstable realm of the stage despot it can only be discharged through laughter.

⁵ René Girard, *Perilous Balance. A Comic Hypothesis*, in: *Modern Language Notes*, 1972, p. 811-826.

⁶ Cf. also: Julia Kristeva, *Pouvoirs de l'horreur. Essai sur l'abjection*, Paris, 1980.

In the sections to follow, I will reconstruct the dramaturgy of the imaginary show, but from a slightly shifted angle. The enclave of the stage or the studio opens up, its edges are frayed in the direction of a social community, with all its domains of life. The show reflects this community and the reflections it generates have concrete effects on the social environment. The show is a constituent part of the society of spectacle. Of spectacles that comment, anticipate and reflect upon each other, in which art, politics, and popular culture are temporarily fused into a conglomerate of public perception. The only constant is the ever occurring movement of increasing order: from a game with clear rules to the arbitrary violation of these rules, to the growth, at first consequent and planned, of a despotic figure out of the game, to its unstoppable expansion, to the appropriation of the system and its total control, to the swelling into the irrational, to the slow intrusion of decadence, to the slow, but unpreventable overturn, ending in the pathetic or comic orgy of destruction. David Mamet has described the development of film as a way towards the state of greatest possible order.⁷ Starting from this description, which – with the exception of *zombie*-films, as we shall see – proves to be very useful, one could describe the movement of the despotic show as precisely the opposite: the show moves from a state of order towards the state of the greatest possible disorder, in which it ends. In this movement, the early Late Night Show also follows the corresponding strategies of spectacle and scenarios of cataclysm, but with an inverted sign, namely *in laughter*.

⁷ David Mamet, *A Whore's Profession*, London and Boston, 1994.

The Monstrous Clown

The Monster's Stories

The all-evening retelling of daily politics by the Late Night Show moderators, which is presented as the “true” explanation of the newest scientific knowledge as opposed to the falsified and misleading reports in the press, the casual account of all that “really” stands behind the petty scandals of everyday gossip – that is the narrative world of a stand-up comedian, a world which is eventually without consequence, which takes care of itself, and in which subversive stories only serve the purpose of momentary diversion, of spontaneous discharge into laughter.

The remark by a show colleague, namely that Johnny Carson would have made a fine president, still sounds alarming. Harald Schmidt as the German chancellor, David Letterman as the governor of Texas, Jay Leno as the American minister of foreign affairs – here we are moving in a grey zone of political life, which is fascinating as well as disconcerting. “Johnny Carson would have made a fine president”: this sentence senses the danger that lies in the blurring of politics and entertainment, the ambiguity of emotions which turns laughing into crying and ends in hysterical sobbing. Laughter and cult are two sides of the same medal, an insight which is evident in the demagogues of the New Right, such as Vladimir Zhirinovsky, Jörg Haider, Jean-Marie Le Pen, and Silvio Berlusconi. These super-entertainers know that they will not conquer their audiences with facts and competence, but rather with sophisticated dramaturgy, with the external charms of a star-entertainer, and above all, with the audacity of their stories. Especially striking are the narrative models of Zhirinovsky, which are extremely simple and consistent. With a daring twist, he con-

structs the history of the past and the history of the future, using the motif over and over again of a geo-political domino-effect: “If Russia falls, then Asia Minor will fall, if Asia Minor falls, then the Balkans will fall, and once the Balkans fall, then the rest of Europe will not be spared. Therefore: take care of Russia. Our catastrophe is the catastrophe of the whole world and if we want, we can release this catastrophe and it will catch you unawares.” Zhirinovsky speaks of an entire fleet of defective Russian submarines, which need only to be sent off into the ocean and they will bring about devastation on their own, in turn provoking a global nuclear cataclysm.

With the neo-fascists of today, as with the radical-conservative TV preachers in the USA, provoking laughter is a desirable stylistic instrument. Their addresses often sound like second-rate spectacles, which do not seek and find their reference points primarily in political discourses, but again in entertainment, drawing them into a sort of permanent loop of entertainment, which eventually seems to lose all basis in real politics. However, their main limitation is namely that laughter here always represents some sort of emotional enclave and therefore must never become comprehensive. It resembles a typical human digression, which never comes to its end and should never supply the quintessence of what is being said. With Zhirinovsky and his sort, the story nonetheless enters the domain of action, the realm in which laughter either gets frozen into a diplomatic grin, or ends in the shudder of awe and in fanatic partisanship. It is a story that acts, while at the same time it has nothing to do with the truth, wants to have nothing to do with it. A story that bears in itself the negation of a demand that Lenin posits in his *Philosophy Notebooks*, following Hegel: “Philosophy should not be the story of that what happens, but the knowledge of what is true in it.”⁸ Story against knowledge, or *mythos* against *logos* – an opposition which Young Conservative and later NS-theoretician Ernst Kriek picks up and passionately proclaims in his journal *Volk im Werden*, in the same breath speaking against the “Western nihilism of the logos” as “the period of longest madness and error,” the period of “deciding on the relationship between true and untrue (...), which has occupied minds from Parmenides to the present day. (...) Oh Lord, please save us from dialecticians!”⁹ The only possible solution for Kriek and his epigones lies in the myth, in the story with which the petty narrowness of true and untrue is broken, which opens up the path for the real, primordially German heroic spirit and the will for victory. “The myth tells the story all the way to the beginning and the end, the rise and the fall: it tells stories, history in the broadest sense: the historia.”¹⁰

Emotions provoked by such history oscillate indefinitely between laughter, amazement, and admiration. On the comedy side, the myth appears as a joke that is sometimes daring and sometimes painful, whereas in the fascism of the 1930s and 1940s it is a terribly serious myth, with which the phantasm begins to act. In the neo-fascism of today, which has long ago reached the state that Guy Debord has described as the “integrated spectacular,” it articulates itself as a complex conglomerate of emotions, which is difficult to analyse, since in its strategies it uses both old rhetoric and contemporary entertainment.¹¹ It is this unclear oscillation, which in the comic treatments of totalitarianism, on the linguistic-narrative level, anticipates the formation of the monstrous clown figure, which becomes omnipresent in the 50s, but is also partly suggested in German films about Doktor Mabuse and more clearly in American literature about super-heroes, such as the *Joker* or *Penguin Man* from *Batman*, or the half-human incarnation of *Violator* from *Spawn*, or *Jaws* from James Bond, whose grin reveals his most terrible weapon, namely teeth made of high-grade steel.

The monstrous mechanics (1)

The actio plays a role in fascist rhetoric that should not be neglected. One could even say that the totalitarian counter-world mostly functions in the realm of non-verbal staging. The despotic soloist of the Late Night Show extends his theatrical instruments to a real stage setting with the corresponding machineries. His stage presents itself as a machine, which moves according to an indestructible mechanics and hammers its puffing rhythm into its environment until the latter has internalised it completely. That is why the show-masters, when they leave their studios in order to test oo-carts in the street or talk with passers-by, appear strangely helpless. They are naked, vulnerable, less than human, when they leave their apparatus of power behind, which has been tailored around them like a suit. In such situations, their body loses its meaning. It becomes speechless, because it must first conquer a new meaning for itself in the foreign space outside the studio. On the other hand, if you step into their studio world, you must either adapt to the specific mechanics of that world or try to assert your own mechanics in the form of a battle against the superior machinery. This results in a duel of competing mechanisms, which is a much-loved comic effect, always coming about when gymnasts, supermodels, or even dancers, bodybuilders, stuntmen, and eventually animals step into the studio. These are all guests with an evidently different corporality, which creates an opportunity for a mechanistic experiment. That is why it is charming when Schmidt learns tango steps from a professional dancer or when he feeds a hippopotamus, when Letterman hangs giant snakes all over himself, when Leno plays with middle-sized wild cats or tries out a new fitness machine, or when Conan O’Brien tries to run across the stage in high-heeled shoes. It is understandable that such battles, which function on the presumption of equality, just like verbal interactions, always contain an attack on the perfect organisation of the system.

⁸ W. I. Lenin, *Werke*, vol. 38, Berlin, 1973, p. 161. Quoted from: J. P. Faye, *op. cit.*

⁹ Ernst Kriek (ed.), *Volk im Werden*, 1934-1940. Quoted from: J. P. Faye, *op. cit.*

¹⁰ *Ibidem.*

¹¹ To that extent, the New Right is not immediately comparable with the “concentrated spectacular” from the 1930s, since it refers to the popular entertainment media, partly even more strongly than to concrete political discourses. It has become part of the “integrated spectacular,” which no longer finds its reference points in the “world”, but primarily in the spectacle itself. Cf. Guy Debord, *Kommentare zur Gesellschaft des Spektakels*, in: *idem, Die Gesellschaft des Spektakels*. Trans. by Jean-Jacques Rauspud, Berlin, 1996.

In this case, such an attack is not only allowed, but also explicitly wanted, because it always enforces the exciting and rejuvenating process of self-formation.

12 Bergson, Henri, *Le Rire*, Paris, 1940.

In this way, the despotic show reveals a further development of what Henri Bergson has formulated in his collection of essays on the topic of laughter.¹² Why then are the unusual and actually ridiculous features such as the height and rigidity of Harald Schmidt, the volume of Hermes Phettberg, the masculine bearing of Dame Edna, the chin of Jay Leno, the upper jaw of David Letterman, the incoherent movements of Thomas Gottschalk, etc. not only consciously accentuated, but actually presented as a guarantee of one's personal power? The hypothesis of Henri Bergson that the contrast between such bodily deformations and the ideal of perfect adaptability to the mechanistic facts of life, that is, the incompatibility between a mechanised body and a required *souplesse*, is what makes the deformed body seem comical, at first offering only an approach to the ridiculous side of these bodily images. However, if one tries to observe the arrangement of the show as an enclosed system, then one can also see the powerful side of such corporality. Each show setting refers strongly to the specific body of its ruler and is ideally adapted to it. The show is built around the specific physiognomy of its show-master. A good example is the Austrian show-master Hermes Phettberg. His unbelievably voluminous body is the key to the mechanics of the show. Phettberg is the Biblical mountain, which will never stir from its spot. He is the centre, the oracle, the well of wisdom to which one makes a pilgrimage, the Master whose circle one joins as a stupid youngster. Perhaps the gigantic body even no longer fits in the studio door, since it has grown into its space like a pear into a bottle. Phettberg resides there because he has no choice. Outside the stage, he is actually unimaginable. The stage is a suit that only fits his wearer. Therefore, *bodily fitness* is no longer an absolute value, measured against a vitalist ideal, but rather a question of clever arrangement. It must be placed into a relationship with the artificial action field in which the body in question is acting. The comical effect of specific bodily mechanics is a result of movements, changes, and the overlapping of such action fields. In this light, the intrusion of a guest (in the extreme case of a supermodel on Dall or Edna's show) cannot be seen as a competition between two bodies which are from the beginning "perfect" in different ways, but merely as a contraposition of two partial mechanisms, both of which are trying in a comical way to create or defend some space around them, space that is compatible with them. This also helps to better understand the custom of the guest gift. The purpose of this object, which the guest brings and places into the hands of the show-master, is not only *product placement*; rather, it is an "interdividual" process.¹³ The host is forced to deal with a piece of his guest's body, which often takes on the tone of manifest eroticism, but even more frequently presents the first attack on the side of the guest, the opening move of an exchange of blows: the gift creates a situation to which the guest is better adapted, both mentally and physically, than the host. It is not only a piece of them, but also a piece of the world, or rather the system, in which they live, in which they move, and to which they, and only they, are perfectly adjusted.

13 Cf. n. 331.

Such a concept of competing mechanisms may suggest an idea of the comical in the era of technology. Bergson himself makes the decisive step in this direction, but cannot avoid the philosophical formula of "pliability", a hyper-human *Je-ne-sais-quoi*, the essential feature of which is actually its indeterminability. If we, on the contrary, think of equal systems, then we can also explain the irresistibly comical effect of battles between robots, which no longer have anything to do with the required *souplesse* or deviation from it: combat robots are machines with different mechanics, all of them equally different from humans and driven against one another by their inventors; they fight in battles, the dynamic of which is exclusively determined by their contrasting ways of functioning. The despotic show functions in a way which is quite similar: it is a dehumanisation machine, which transforms both the show-master and his guest to super-machines, which keep bumping against each other, rattling and throwing out sparks, as long as there is still something to repair.

Thus, the show presents itself in its reference to totalitarianism quite consciously as an enclave within a differently constructed world, as a field of social experiment in which various mechanisms encounter each other, sometimes friendly, sometimes hostile, mechanisms which originate from different milieus with respect to their language, orientation, profession, and culture, whereas in another staging on a larger scale, namely the spectacle of fascism – especially the German one – one specific type of mechanics is puffed up to such an extent that, in an extreme case, it can infect an entire continent. The show relativizes itself on the basis of its own outer appearance and even on the inside it permanently generates detachments with comical effect through comical contrapositions, whereas in the totalitarian staging on the political level, this relativization and detachment are abolished whenever possible. It should be noted that a contemporary actio does not contain only the non-verbal ingredient of the speech, but also the pictorial presence in the media, the visible construction of its supporters, the project for private life, the architecture of performance, government, and the state.

Naturally, the beginning is always made by restricting the area, such as the *Bürgerbräukeller* or the *Hofbräuhaus* in the "capital of the movement" of the late 20s. Even in the initial phase, Hitler

meticulously supervised the staging of party rallies. His people checked the acoustics and the general atmosphere of the room, controlled the ventilation, and took care that the space was small enough and filled to at least one third with Nazi supporters, in order to produce an impression of mass epiphany even with a small number of spectators, thus guaranteeing the appropriate basic mood. Special combat songs, special banners, special symbols, a special greeting; SA-gorillas on both sides of the speaker; a large number of introductory speeches serving as the *warm-uppers* for the great star, leaving the mass in doubt whether “He” would appear that evening at all – all these particulars and stylistic instruments firmly belonged to the Nazi inventory and not only from the party meetings at Nuremberg onwards, but from the very beginning.¹⁴ The Führer himself was completely *styled*, leaving nothing to chance. Hitler ordered a series of photos to be made before he would appear in public with a new coat or headgear, in order to prove the effect of the new piece of clothing, not only in front of the mirror, but also in movement. Later on, every photograph of the Führer would be scrutinized before being published and required special permission. In 1936 at the latest, at the time of the Olympic Games in Berlin, as the SA-men roamed through the towns checking whether German front gardens were in a satisfactory state of order, the staging had already encompassed the entire country, together with all spheres of life of its citizens.

¹⁴ Cf. Joachim C. Fest, *Hitler*, Frankfurt, Berlin, and Vienna, 1973, p. 218f.

The image that it was supposed to convey was, however, not that of a cosy idyll of German straightforwardness. In the foreground, there was rather the trancelike experience of the state as a community of people and one’s own existence as the testimony of a great era. Everything was supposed to look great and awe-inspiring, and that meant, first of all, unusual and different. “It is true that there was an attempt to deceive people, since they were supposed to take something that was painstakingly studied and alien for the natural behaviour of a great man,” Brecht wrote in his *Buying of Brass*,¹⁵ referring to the classes Hitler took with the court actor Basil, an actor of the old school, who felt more at home on stage with the affected pose of classical acting techniques than with the demands of contemporary drama. Brecht elaborated upon the factual analysis of his instruction, which he considered an entirely serious and useful initiative of the speaker, in his piece *The Resistible Rise of Arturo Ui*, complementing it with an aspect of the ridiculous:

¹⁵ Bertolt Brecht, *Der Messingkauf*, in: *Schriften zum Theater* 5, Frankfurt, 1963, p. 86-98.

Ui:

Bring the mirror! A bodyguard brings a large standing mirror to the front.

Ui:

First the walking. How do you walk in the theatre or in the opera?

ACTOR:

I understand. You mean the great style. Julius Caesar, Hamlet, Romeo, Shakespeare’s pieces. Mister Ui, you have come upon the right man. (...)

GIVOLA:

It seems to me, you have come upon the wrong man, boss. He is passé.

Ui:

That we will see. Walk around as you would walk in that Shakespeare. *The actor walks around.*

Ui:

Good!

GIVOLA:

But you can’t walk like that in front of cauliflower merchants! It is unnatural!

Ui:

What does it mean unnatural? Nobody is natural today. When I am walking, I want people to see that I am walking. *He imitates the actor’s way of walking.*

ACTOR:

Head backwards. *Ui throws his head backwards.* The foot touches the ground toes first. *Ui’s foot touches the ground toes first.* Good. Excellent. You have natural talent. Only we must still do something with your arms. They’re stiff. Wait. It will be best if you fold them in front of your genitals. *Ui folds his hands in front of his genitals while walking.* Not bad. Casual and still resolute. But the head still backwards. That’s right. I think you are walking well for your purposes, Mister Ui. Anything else?¹⁶

¹⁶ Bertolt Brecht, *Der aufhaltsame Aufstieg des Arturo Ui*, Frankfurt, 1965, p. 54f.

This passage was born out of the impression that the early Hitler made on Brecht in the 20s, the Hitler of the beer cellars and propaganda lorries, about whom the *Weltbühne* once wrote that he counted the great circus manager Barnum among his teachers,¹⁷ the Hitler whose pathetic messianic gesture provoked not only admiration in the rallies, but regularly also laughter, but who did not mind it too much – at least in that early phase, in which he cared more about entering the

¹⁷ According to Joachim C. Fest, *op. cit.*

18 Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, Berlin, 1933, p. 544. The aesthetic concept of “amazement” (*stupefazione*) and “brutal blows” (*colpi brutali*) of the Italian futurism plays a role here. Cf. on that topic: Helga Finter, *Semiotik des Avantgardetextes – Gesellschaftliche und poetische Erfahrung im italienischen Futurismus*, Stuttgart, 1980, p. 61.

19 Hitler. *Eine Bilanz*. Documentary series, Germany, 1997. Directed by: Guido Knopp.

20 Quoted from Guido Knopp, *op. cit.*

21 Cf. J. C. Fest, *op. cit.*, p. 709f.

22 Sebastian Haffner, *Anmerkungen zu Hitler*, Munich, 1978.

23 *To Be Or Not To Be*, USA, 1942. Directed by: Ernst Lubitsch.

public discourse than actively controlling it: “Whether they picture us as Jacks Sausages or criminals, the main thing is that they mention us, that they must deal with us again and again.” **18**

The potential ridiculousness of this figure was evident not only to Brecht, but also to Hitler himself, but it was not a mere result of unwanted comedy. Hitler’s figure was not an unprofessional mistake or a consequence of staging imprecision. Its ridiculousness is a necessary outcome of what Brecht termed “the unnatural” or, more precisely, “the alien”: the staging of a world that is not ours, a gigantic machine, which resists all that it comes across, but is able to draw the outer world so well into the service of its most characteristic functionality that it eventually appropriates it. Knickerbockers and Alpine knee stockings worn with a trench-coat and a hat, a bow-tie and a collar under the uniform with riding boots, the narrowly fitting pilot’s cap, which turns the cultic hairstyle into a leather bald head with long lop ears – on the whole, a violent conglomerate of the different dress-codes which otherwise divide society... Then the exaggerated symmetry of the moustache, contrasted with the asymmetric hair parting... the appearance is crooked, but it accentuates its crookedness with full awareness. It is alien, alienating. But only if there is a reference point – the supposedly normal, the elastic, adjusted, vital, as Henri Bergson would say – or at least a different model with a different programme. “Boys, go to the cinema,” Walter Jens quotes one of his teachers, “and listen to Hitler, listen to all the howling, listen to the masses around him – and then close your eyes and imagine how that sounds in London.” We closed our eyes... disgusting. From that moment, we could not stand Hitler. A moment of alienation was sufficient to show that man as he really was.” **19**

The mere imagining of another, potentially equal way of speaking, dressing, moving, and communicating is sufficient to make the whole theatrical system collapse. From the staging of speeches in Bürgerbräukeller through the Olympic Games and the Nuremberg party meetings, to the radio, the weekly news, the films, and the colossal architectural projects, a whole world was eventually built, with all its details, around this one mechanism; in that way, it was not only sustained and upheld, but every other relativizing pattern of functioning beyond it was also made literally unthinkable. “Sacrificial lamb or victor,” “Victory or death” – the cult of the Führer is one part of the either-or, whereas the other is self-destruction (in laughter). Therefore, it was a crucial element of Hitler’s personal triumph that he could say “that all those who used to laugh, laugh no longer today.” **20** Is it far-fetched to suspect in this context that Hitler himself, in his most personal circle, laughed only with a hand placed before his mouth and that, if he caught himself playing with his dog, chased it away immediately? **21** Laughter as the result of a comical effect produced by the contraposition of mechanisms – such laughter should not be permitted, it must be prohibited. Such a system, as it may seem, must tend towards the ruling of the world, towards the “final victory”, in order to cleanse the last corner in which rupture may be possible and to extinguish its own ridiculousness as such.

Laughter and the Consecration of Disgust

The Leper

It is as early as the Hitler-myth in the press of the 1920s that the coexistence of the petty-bourgeois milieu and megalomania, of Bohemian misery and totalitarian power, of homelessness and ruling the world begins to play a role. Following this tendency, Sebastian Haffner begins his *Remarks* with a chapter on this paradox, **22** whereby it never becomes quite clear whether it was the rise from the social lowliness of a Viennese home for men, a shameful stain in the Führer’s biography, which his propaganda swept under the rug and he himself denied his whole life, that in retrospective was supposed to cover the falsehood of the whole model of the Nazi *Übermensch*, or there is another mysterious consistency present in that grotesque social breach – as if the image of the ruler of the world were only complete in combination with sludge. What Haffner always mentions with a condescending undertone is rather a cause of confusion in the analysis of Hitler by Thomas Mann. He describes the figure of Hitler as that of an “unloved brother,” as an abject colleague in art, whom one prefers to deny and ignore, but is obliged to deal with him because of being painfully related to him. Hitler becomes the embarrassing outcome of a dream of total artwork – all-encompassing, all-comprehensive, something that erases all contradictions and differences.

Perfectly tangible and not at all symbolical, this association with sludge reappears in Mussolini’s Italy. There the comical aspect of the social breach reveals itself in its immediate corporality, which is at first far more fitting as the subject of a caricature on the other side of the ocean than Hitler as such. The bodily image of Chaplin’s Adolf Hinkel corresponds, just as that of the protagonist in *To Be Or Not To Be* by Ernst Lubitsch, **23** much better to the bulging, derailed, swaggering, and squirting gestures of Duce. Eyes jumping out of eye sockets, the constant leaning over the window rim or the front edge of the pulpit, the puffing with the swollen cheeks of a trumpet player, the stuffing of air in the lungs, through which the whole figure is so pumped up that it threatens

to explode, the complete filling in of all frames, all limitations, be it a door frame or a camera lens – the spitting, snuffling, coughing, sweating, the unpleasant exuding of bodily secretions... all that requires an expansion of the body and asserts the total giving, sacrifice down to self-annihilation, which can only be arrested by the stiffly fitting uniform.

In this light, Hitler's heavy stiffness and his static monumentality are rather special cases in the fascist staging of the body. Even the self-staging of the neo-fascist Zhirinovsky reveals casual directness, which would have been unthinkable in Nazi Germany. Namely, while Hitler, contrary to the populist evaluation by Guido Knopp and the *Time-Life-Video*, was never a "private person," or perhaps only in the sphere of vague allusion and imagination, while Obersalzberg was from the very beginning a Forbidden City to such an extent that it has remained the favourite sanctuary of the neo-Nazis until today, the private life of Zhirinovsky is shown in the media with exaggerated openness and obtrusiveness. This cheerful fascist lets his trousers down only when the camera is on. He shows himself in a ribbed undershirt, boxing with one of his bodyguards – an activity which makes him sweat so hard that a sudden move of his head sends off thick drops of sweat onto the camera lens; he lets the cameramen follow him to his small, steaming kitchen, where he raises the kettle lids and stuffs his mouth, using his fingers, with fresh ravioli, which his cook has just prepared; he sits down on a wobbly chair, so that his belly flows over his trousers; he shows the TV people his toilet, his bed, he even explains to them which side he prefers and how he likes to shake his pillow before going to sleep. Everything looks a bit shabby, the waxed tablecloths, the chipboard partition walls, the cups for collectors, and plastic plates.²⁴ The intimate sphere of the demagogue turns outward, toward the spectator and against his will, but he accepts it, half amused, half disgusted with this unwanted contact with a really grotesque body, grotesque in the sense of Mikhail Bakhtin: with a body that is "basically reducible to a gaping mouth,"²⁵ which swallows and gets swallowed in return. "The crucial events in the life of a grotesque body... eating, drinking, excreting (faeces, urine, sweat, snot, saliva) ...all that takes place on the border between the body and the world."²⁶ The body becomes pasty and grows steadily beyond the limits assigned to it. On the other hand, it is reminiscent of the motif of a swollen camera, which slides down the pharynx into the stomach and gets digested there. Excretion and appropriation are two directions of movement that are only apparently opposite, since their consequence is equally universal envelopment – the comical-cultic image of an all-encompassing, cosmic corporality.

Thereby, the gestures of self-exposure and the rhetorical fantasies of omnipotence are closely intertwined. "Exaltation already contains the idea of humiliation," Bakhtin has written, just like humiliation contains megalomania. In *The Tunnel*, a film from 1915 made after a novel by Bernhard Kellermann, a popular speaker, whose style the young Hitler obviously took as a model for his own rhetoric, throws himself down from the provisory podium into the boiling mass²⁷ at the end of an agitating speech. Zhirinovsky also leads the TV team, directly after the private exhibition of his petty-bourgeois environment, to his black limousine with a car phone, a fax machine, and a computer console. "From here, I can speak with the whole world, even with the president of America. I am just as powerful as Boris Yeltsin and Helmut Kohl." Or perhaps even more powerful, since the king of fools from Bakhtin's carnival knows no limits, above or below. The fall is not there as a possibility, as a political catastrophe which ends the despotism, but something that accompanies these figures as their *alter ego*.

Perhaps there is a fateful popular element in this close link with the grotesque figures of the carnival, which comes forth in fascism, on the stage of politics, especially in the situations of crisis or in the initial phase of the corresponding movements, as a gesture of leaning on corrupt power deprived of all corporal presence. However, this popular element is, although useful, actually no longer permissible in a stabilizing situation. The seizure of power is the moment in which disgust is shifted into the field of symbols: processions with torches and wakes, the cult of putrefaction and the pathos of decay in the last months of the war, transfer the carnival ambiguity of disgust into the field of terror and loftiness.

Masses and Power

In an analysis of the rhetorical links between entertainment and totalitarian demagoguery, it is impossible to classify certain stylistic instruments clearly as elements of totalitarian aesthetics or merely parody. The treatment of totalitarianism in the experimental forms of show during the post-war period, as well as their derivations, requires more than an outside commentary and drives the mimetic reconstruction of totalitarian strategies down to the precarious sphere of emotions. There are no clear reception attitudes, neither in the totalitarian speech, nor in the soloist entertainment, which could be taken as the basis of a division. The effect of stage despotism is always based largely on provoking conflicts of emotion, on a conglomerate of allusions and references that are kept intentionally vague. In the same way, the image of an orderly army led by a "white hero"²⁸ is not an exclusive feature of the totalitarian rhetoric, in the way in which the anarchic masses of the carnival alone define popular comedy. Klaus Theweleit – to whom this section owes a lot – thinks too much in dichotomies in this respect: in his *Men's Fantasies*, there always remains a

²⁴ Spiegel-TV report. I am unacquainted with the date of its first emission.

²⁵ Mikhail Bakhtin, *Literatur und Karneval. Zur Romantheorie und Lachkultur*. Transl. by Alexander Kaempfe. Munich and Vienna, 1969, p. 16.

²⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 17.

²⁷ *Der Tunnel*. Germany, 1915. Directed by: William Wauer. What an interesting document: in the 30s, the movie formed part of the Nazi propaganda with its hero MacAllan, who completely sacrifices himself for an idea. Hitler's rhetorical model, however, is not this figure, but that of its enemy – the workers' leader influenced by communism, whose demands are diagonally opposite to the sacrifice pathos of Nazism.

²⁸ Cf. Klaus Theweleit, *Männerphantasien. Band 2: Männerkörper. Zur Psychoanalyse des weißen Terrors*, Munich, 1978.

29 Cf. Elias Canetti, *Masse und Macht*, Hamburg, 1960. Cf. also the referring passage in Theweleit, op. cit., p. 23f.

30 Pamela Ballinger, *Blutopfer und Feuertaufe*, in: Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht, Friedrich Kittler, and Bernhard Siegert (ed.), *Der Dichter als Kommandant. D'Annunzio erobert Fiume*, Munich, 1996. Ballinger, especially in her description of the elite troop "arditi", is referring to the problem of hierarchical connection to the "people" and the conflict between this type of elitism and the ideology of mass regime.

31 Cf. Helga Finter, *Heterologie und Repräsentation. Strategien des Lachens. Zu George Batailles Le bleu du ciel*, str. 13-31. Batailles' notion of the heterogeneous, as described by Finter in relation with laughter, is an important basis for this study. Thereby, it should be noted that the heterogeneity about which I am speaking in relation with the show should not be confused with Batailles' "heterogeneous". Also, when I speak of homogenisation, egalitarianism, or massification, I do not mean the "homogeneous", i.e. the system and structure, but on the contrary, the loss of structure.

clear division between the armoured body and the inert realm of putrefaction and sludge. The warrior hero here is not the "survivor"**29**, but "the one who has survived," the one who has surpassed death or disappearance in a mass of equals, who marches with shiny iron-capped boots above the sludge and rules the masses, himself remaining untouchable. But the totalitarian leaders do not stage themselves only as army leaders; they are always at the same time the rulers of chaos and the masters of sludge. They do not draw their effect of grandeur from elitism and contempt towards disorder, but from their fight against the dragon. The elitist thought is contrasted with the aggressive proclamation of one's own lack of culture, the trancelike reconciliation with the many. That which was still presented as an intellectual problem in the proto-fascist experiments of Gabriele D'Annunzio in Fiume, namely the question of whether the masses are good or worthy of contempt,**30** turns with Hitler and Mussolini into a cleverly staged game of confusion between attraction and rejection, egalitarianism and differentiation.**31**

Just like the self-deceptive contact with the masses belongs to totalitarianism as a trancelike opposition to the need of control, thus also the rejection of this chaotization in the shape of an exaggerated strife for order belongs to the motifs of power typical for the contemporary show. A good example from *Wetten, dass...* is the studio bet with Frank Elsner, in which an immense hoard of shoe-slapping Bavarians storms the studio until the moderator, who desperately tries to preserve order, eventually vanishes in the overriding mass of people. The grotesque of that scene is not so much the spontaneous invasion of these extras gone mad, but rather the obvious fear of the show-master in front of such a monumental and actually show-typical loss of control. Contrary to that, when Dame Edna at the end of her show looks down on a forest of waving sword lilies and whispers half in disbelief, half in self-satisfaction: "Look at that! What a gorgeous sight", then it is completely clear that it is only in her eyes, from the lofty perspective of her platform, that singular elements are fused into a whole. She is the only one who can see that forest, that wavy, lively something, an organism to be admired and at the same time disgusting. The mass offers only two alternatives, which the stage despot equally enjoys: to stay above or to melt within. Attraction and rejection, self-exaltation and self-destruction, elitism and anti-elitism: it is never clearly formulated on which side one is fighting. The only continuum in this stagger is the stagger itself. In the reconstruction of totalitarian power strategies, with which the despotic show is playing in a precarious manner, gradual differences in staging become visible, but they can take a turn in the opposite direction at any moment. The decisive element of the basic difference, which – precisely because of the closeness of means – cannot be more contrasting, is the possibility of the complete and final discharge into laughter, which only the show can offer and give, and in which a totalitarian instrumentary is eventually ritually decomposed, not only on a parody level, but also on a far deeper one, which encompasses man in his entirety and forces him to liberate himself.



A. Hitler



BAD co., Ivana Sajko: *Misa (za predizborno šutnju)*, foto: Goran Petercol

Moja je snaga u govoru

Ivana Sajko

U pokušaju da izbjegnem dramske ili prozne umjetničke forme, kažem da pišem govore.

Pišem tekstove koji proizlaze iz iskustva kazališta i izvedbe, ali mu se nužno ne moraju i vraćati. Mogu ostati zaglavljene negdje između žanrova i birati način na koji žele komunicirati.

Napisani je govor ritmiziran mojim tijelom; odnosi između interpunkcija i duljine mojih udaha su proporcionalni.

(Danas moja pluća brže pišu tekstove nego li nekada.)

Tekst koji pišem i dovršavam je tijelo što se pomalja iz intuicije, približava mi se, raste pod kontroliranom paskom, trga se, izmiče u trenucima moga umora, no na kraju, ipak biva ukroćeno i oblikovano, na kraju, ipak, ja znam kronologiju i činjenice, pa čak i tajne devijacije njegova bujanja. Dubeći smisao teksta u sebi i osvajajući ga, on time ne tone u mene, već me zapravo napušta. Kada ga kasnije pronalazim u svijetu i tržištu, razmišljam kako ga ponovno dotaknuti, a da taj dodir bude jednako nužan, jednako bijesan i strastven kao u trenucima generiranja. Kako pronaći novi eros između nas dvoje koji smo se potrošili, dovršavajući se, artikulirajući se do krajnjih granica kroz sve moguće figure i trope. Upoznali smo se i proželi do granica dose.

(Taj višak znanja obično ubija ljubavnu vezu.)

Pitanje koje mi se u trenutku dovršavanja nameće jest kako održati odnos prema onome što sam napisala i čime sam impregnirana.

Ne znam kamo dalje, osim unazad, u auto-referencijalno čitanje. Ako tekst želim generirati u nekom drugom mediju, primjerice kroz vlastitu izvedbu ili predstavu, moram pronaći način kako da izmaknem onome u što sam sigurna - tom dovršenom tijelu teksta koje se, istina, rastvara nevinom čitatelju ili gledaocu, ali zato preda mnom šuti kao konačnost koju moram razbiti kako bih išta mogla izgovoriti.

Pogled u povijest daje mi tu mogućnost. Pronalazim erotiku kreacije u pričanju o procesu, o namjerama, o dokumentima, o zabilježkama, o svemu što negdje prethodi ili jednostavno okružuje onaj tekst toliko totalitaristički postavljen isključivo prema meni osobno. I kroz tu subverziju naspram sebe same, čini mi se, pronalazim način kako da dekonstrukcijom procesa konstruiram novi tekst, novi odnos, nešto što se tada, u stvaranju prvog teksta, moglo dogoditi, ali nije. Strategija, dakle, ostaje ista, ali umjesto da pristajem na tijelo koje sam već stvorila, ja ga zamjenjujem onim viškovima znanja, memorabilijama, novim saznanjima i asocijacijama, izokrećem naličje svog govora, izlažem i bijes i discipliniranu metodologiju, vječno se vraćam unazad.

(Kao kad potrošeni ljubavnik izgovori frazu: Sjećaš se..., jer više nema kamo dalje, osim u prošlost.)

Auto - referencijalno čitanje možda je čisti egzibicionizam institucionaliziran jednim diskursom o procesu, no istovremeno, u izvedbi tog sjećanja na procesualnost ja kreiram nove odnose i dokazujem vitalnost čak i onog dovršenog, upakiranog tijela. Iskazujem svu njegovu potenciju dok, primjerice, objašnjavam povijest "Žene-bombe", improvizirajući nove odlomke na temelju postojećih strategija, ali i aktualnih dokumenata, ili dok ispisujem di-daskalije u "Arhetip:Medeji" što govore o probama za prvu premijernu izvedbu tog teksta znajući da će mi upravo te di-daskalije otvoriti mogućnost da u svakom sljedećem čitanju te "Arhetip:Medeje" repliciram na predstavu ili čitanje koje je prethodilo, da ga pokušam ponoviti, odglumiti koju scenu, prepričati reakcije publike na određenu predstavu, i tako, konstruirati kolaž unutar prostora i vremena izvedbe, probijajući se naprijed, generirajući novu vezu autora i teksta iz metoda i procesa, jedan novi tekst u kojem pričajući o sebi govorim i o svijetu i o umjetnosti u koju sam uronjena.

(Vjerujem da bi tako mogla izgledati i starost.)

Izjednačenje dekonstrukcije i konstrukcije bila je i namjera teksta o "Misi (za predizbornu šutnju)", to je, uostalom bila namjera i samog projekta. Prošlo je gotovo dvije godine od nastanka tog referata napisanog za dvije radio-emisije (Ogledi i Rasprave, proljeće 2004. Hrvatski radio, ur. –. Otržan) u kojima su kao ilustracija osvrta bili montirani isječci predstave, audio-fragmenti proba i glazba sa CD-a.

Pišem novi početak osvrta donoseći samo njegove fragmente:

O projektu "Misa (za predizbornu šutnju)" za 30 gledaoca sa slušalicama na ušima

Vrijeme radnje: 2004. godina, nastavak jedne izborne zime

Mjesto radnje: desakralizirana džamija u Zagrebu - prostor jeke i zvučnih rupa

Način izvedbe: polifoni govor / šapat / pjevanje na 4 mikrofona

Za suradnike sam odabrala likovnog umjetnika Gorana Petercola, video umjetnika Simona Bogojevića Naratha i kompozitora Davida Simonsa. Izvođači su bili dvoje glumaca, Franjo Dijak i Rakan Rushaidat, te plesači, Željka Sančanić i Pravdan Devlahović. Nije me zanimalo raditi tzv. idealnu predstavu kojom ću dati konačnu riječ inscenacije, već što radikalnije otvoriti razine na kojima možemo interpretirati, analizirati ili pak potpuno nadići predložak. Tekst sam ionako pisala kao mrežu različitih referentnih točki, narativnih pozicija, miješanja sadašnjosti, budućnosti i prošlosti te kao neprekidno izvi-ranje potencijalnih izvedbenih rješenja - stoga je trebalo jednostavno nastaviti s istim modelom, nadovezati se na princip proizvodnje materijala kakav je već bio ispisan na papiru. Otvarati mogućnosti i izmicati konvencionalnom dramaturškom zaključku.

Projekt, skraćeno nazvan *Misa (za predizbornu šutnju)*, podijelili smo u tri segmenta: izložbu, predstavu i audio CD. Svaki se od tih dijelova na različit način vraćao samoj drami istovremeno nadopunjujući izvedbene, likovne ili glazbene materijale što su se stvarali paralelno. Po tom se modelu predstava

kontekstualizirala, ne samo odnosom prema stvarnosti i odnosom prema vlastitom umjetničkom mediju, već i vezom prema izložbi koja je imala pet različitih postava izmjenjivanih u vrijeme trajanja projekta te vezom prema ideji CD-a kao soundtracka neodigrane predstave.

Zanimalo me koliko moja subjektivna rečenica može postati i subjektivnom rečenicom nekog drugog. Ja sam kao redatelj pred sobom imala potpuno drugačiji put - učiniti svoju subjektivnu rečenicu objektivnom.

MISA je označavala glazbenu formu i sakralnu ceremoniju - mogućnost da se tekst otvori i na strukturalnoj i na tematskoj razini.

PREDIZBORNA ŠUTNJA je bila vrijeme radnje. Vrijeme prividnog primirja ostavljeno biračima da oslobođeni utjecaja i pritiska misle svojom glavom - prilika za koju je uvijek prekasno, jer sve se već dogodilo, a demokracija je samo inzistiranje na nepostojećim međustranačkim razlikama. Izbor ne postoji.

MRTVAC IZA ZIDA označio je mjesto radnje. Zločin koji je uvijek negdje u blizini, skriven iza zida ili među dokumentima - zločin koji uzrokuje krizu, ali nikada i krah sistema, jer sistem je napravljen da bude imun na vlastitu krivnju.

I na kraju - KOPITA U GRLU navode na način izvedbe - način govora.

.

Rad na predstavi započela sam iz uputa koje su mi davala dva teksta. Jedan se ticao mojih zabilježki koje sam nedugo prije bila ispisala razmišljajući o budućem projektu, a drugi je bio predgovor samoj drami.

U prvom tekstu, pod točkom 1 je pisalo:
"Treba riskirati."

Točka 7 je glasila:
"Ne želim razmišljati o konvencijama, osim kada ih prepoznam kako bih svakoj mogla postaviti pitanje:

Kada mi treba glazba?
Treba li mi uopće glazba?
Je li govor glazba moga teksta?"

Sada odmah dajem i odgovor: Jest, govor jest glazba mog teksta - razdvojen na ritmove, melodije, tutanj i tišine. Ponekad se javlja linearno, ponekad se zavrti u ponavljanjima ili semplovima. Govor jest onaj, već spomenuti, zvuk koji upućuje što da mislim, osjećam ili kuda da idem. On miruje u partituri teksta i gledajući u njegovu grafičku pasivnost postavljala sam si jedno te isto pitanje:

KAKO RAZLIKU KOJA POSTOJI NA PAPIRU UČINITI RAZLIKOM U PREDSTAVI - NA SCENI?

Odgovor sam tražila u drugom tekstu - predgovoru drami koji je također bio u točkama. Zadnje tri odredile su mi odnose između onog KAKO i onog O ČEMU se radi.

U predgovoru je pisalo:


"Točka 4.

Govor je oružje. I politika. Politički govor gotovo je snažniji od vjerskog jer ideologiju nosi kao vjeru, te se ne opravdava nad istinom ili laži, dokazivosti ili jalovosti vlastitih riječi-metaka. Politički je govor retoričan. On uvjerava i djeluje bez obzira na to što je pogrešan.

Točka 5.

Potpuno sam svjesno opet napisala dramu otvorenu prema mogućnostima inscenacija budući da se na takav način otvara jedno demokratsko područje slobode za njene buduće realizacije. Moje je pisanje upućeno ideji kazališta koje nazivam političko. Govor, dakle, koristim kao oružje i akciju. Moji likovi pokušavaju do iznemoglosti verbalizirati vlastite stavove, oni se bore za riječ, čupaju iz sebe argumentacije, međusobno se ranjavaju dokazima i stavovima pa njihov govor postaje natjecanje.

Video Simona Bogojevića Naratha iz predstave
Misa (za predizbornu šutnju), BAD co.



I točka 6.

Kazalište vidim kao retoričko. Direktno. Govor se prenosi i zabija u memoriju gledatelja poput zarazne bolesti. I govori kojim ste se zarazili na neki će način uvjetovati vaše buduće mišljenje. Stoga bi morao biti etičan. Nikad nije.”

Govor je vrlo fizička izvedba - on svojim porukama ili emotivnim sadržajem aficira tijelo govornika, pridaje mu određene geste, grči ga, izdužuje, nalaže mu ritam pokreta, koči ga ili oslobađa tenzije nakupljene u mišićima. Govor je čin akcije koji djeluje i prije no što je do kraja izgovoren. Upravo sam na taj način prenosila svoje iskustvo tekstualne partiture izvođačima. Vodile su me dvije paralelne linije: govor u politici i govor u kazalištu. Ideološko i fizičko djelovanje. Cilj je bio da se linije što više isprepletu te da govor postane urlajući ritam koji nas koreografira, ispunjavajući prostor scene i ulazeći u sve pore svjedoka u publici - misa koja će izrasti u punk koncert. Ulazila je kroz uši, kroz oči, pa možda i kroz potrebu da se sakrije od nasilja što govor može posjedovati u težnji da uvjeri u svoju ispravnost i snagu.

Jedna od instalacija Gorana Petercola s izložbe koja se unutar istog prostora izmjenjivala s izvedbama predstave zvala se jednostavno *Govor*. Rad je sadržavao digitalno obrađene fotografije svih sudionika na projektu. Da bi dobio konačnu verziju rada Petercol nas je najprije fotografirao, i to na dva načina: mirna lica te dok govorimo. Te bi dvije varijante naših portreta zatim spajao u jednu glavu - gornji dio lica miran, a donji u govoru. Taj donji dio, ta mutna izobličena usta prilijepljena za foto papir djelovala su kao maska na našim licima. Grimasa koja nas čini neprepoznatljivima. Govorenje se opredmetilo u krinku koja je skrivala naš pravi identitet i činila našu sliku - ne onim kako izgledamo, već onim kako govorimo. Govorenje smo stoga koristili umjesto kazališne maske i kostima koji ilustrira. Lica s projekcija Petercolove instalacije korespondirala su s izvedbenim funkcijama unutar predstave. Svjetla što su blještala preko projekcija tih fotografija, ista su svjetla što će kasnije osvjetljavati izvođače. Pozicije njihovih projiciranih glava u govoru - TALKING HEADS-a zamijenit će njihovim konkretnim tijelima stimuliranim i upravljanima rafalnom paljbom riječi.



“Neću ti suditi, već samo reći što će se i kako dogoditi. Priznati ćeš ono što ne bi smio priznati: sve što si učinio i namjeravao učiniti, sve što je bilo mrtvo, skriveno i zgaženo, sve tvoje gadne psovke, krvave prijetnje i tajni planovi smijati će ti se u lice vlastitim jezikom. Svaka će rečenica postati ispovijed i prvi će ti puta svi povjerovati. Stat ćeš za svoju pobjedničku govornicu, a istina će ti sama početi izlaziti na usta i nećeš je moći spriječiti, cijelo će ti tijelo sudjelovati u toj prevari pa kada ti se zgrči želudac pomisliti ćeš da moraš povratiti, no dok ćeš s olakšanjem očekivati da izbaciš tu kiselinu iz sebe iznenaditi će te riječi riječi riječi riječi riječi riječi riječi i htjet ćeš zatvoriti usta, poklopiti ćeš ih rukama, no riječi će ti napuhati balone u obrazima i u velikom šištanju izletiti van, da ih svi čuju, svi baš svi koji ih nikada nikada ne bi smjeli čuti i tako ćeš ih bljuvati na pedeset sto dvjesto metara daleko i dalje i sve glasnije i bespomoćno ćeš lamatati glavom prskajući tim smrdljivim govornastim ljepljivim riječima svuda oko sebe i kad pokušaš pobjeći samo ćeš glupavo sklizati po tlu zasranom svojim odvratnim zagađenim gnjilim govorom pa ćeš pasti u vlastitu bljuvotinu koja će rasti i urlati i rasti i urlati i bujati kao da je od pjene i prevaliti se preko tebe i kad se dovoljno upije u svaku poru tvoje kože polako će se početi vraćati unutra i sve što si povratio natrag ćeš pojesti. A ja ću te čekati jer živjet ćeš još dugo nakon toga.”

Navedeni monolog iz teksta *Misa za predizbornu šutnju, mrtvaca iza zida i kopita u grlu*, može poslužiti i kao primjer dekonstrukcije govora kakvu smo prakticirali u predstavi, jednako kao i primjer za subverziju nad političnosti samog jezika. Prvi je korak bio rad na očuđenju izgovora monologa s izvođačicom Željkom Sančanin. Ta je faza tekla usporedo s analizom značenja samog monologa i pokušajem da se to značenje naglasi i komunicira, ne njenim uživljavanjem u lik, već načinom govora čiji su ritam, onomatopeje ili glasnoća bili u relaciji prema fizičkom pokretu. Tekst se tretirao i kao koreografska i kao glazbena partitura. Audio snimke njene izvedbe monologa predala sam Lisi Karrer, pjevačici i suradnici Davida Simonsa na kompozicijama skladanim za CD *Misa (za predizbornu šutnju)*. Uopće ne razumijevajući značenje teksta, Njujorčanka je ponavljala monolog istovremeno s Željkinim glasom koji joj je dolazio kroz slušalice. Dakle, u drugom je koraku monologu bilo oduzeto značenje jer sve na što se Lisa mogla osloniti bio je način govora, ritam, visina glasa te emotivno punjenje nerazumljivih riječi koje se stvaralo kroz njihovu zvučnost. Zvuk je iznova kreirao sadržaj izgubljen jezičnom zaprekom. Tako je stvorena druga verzija monologa. Istovremeno je David Simons radio na sempliranju nekad poznatog pop hita skupine Culture Club pod nazivom *Love is*. Nakon što je sempliranje Boy Georgova feminiziranog glasa bilo gotovo, pridodan mu je i Lisin monolog te je stvorena kompozicija što je trebala biti podloga jednoj koreografiji u predstavi. Došli smo u poziciju gdje se govor više nije prenosio kao pojmovno značenje, već kao energija koja je proizašla iz prvotnog značenja da bi se zatim pretvorila u glazbenu informaciju što svoj intelektualni i emotivni sadržaj komunicira retoričkim izražajnim elementima.

Osjetila sam potrebu da radikaliziram odmak od disciplinirane strukture jezika, stoga su se dvoje izvođača prihvatili vratolomnog zadatka da nauče pjevati sempliranu skladbu. Pravdan Devlahović je pjevao Lisu Karrer, a Rakan Rushaidat semplirane stihove Boy Georga.

Imitacija skladbe nazvane *Headfone/Luv is* jedno je od tek tri mjesta tijekom predstave gdje zvuk iz pojačala izlazi kroz zvučnike razmještene u monumentalnom arhitektonskom valjku, te se dižući u spirali duž zidova penje i nestaje u potmuloj grmljavini ispod kupole uzdignute 17 metara iznad scene. Osim tih par trenutaka gdje sam zvuk tretirala kao kazališnu glazbu puštajući ga u prostor, ostalo se vrijeme izvedba pratila preko slušalica koje je svaki gledatelj imao pričvršćene za sjedalo. Bez tih bi pomagala bilo nemoguće pratiti predstavu zbog prostorne jeke koja se penjala i preko 10 sekundi izjednačavajući rečenice u neartikulirano mumljanje, zbog čega se govorilo isključivo u mikrofone i to gotovo nečujno. Time smo dobili neobičnu senzaciju potpune tišine u dvorani. Predstava se unatoč svoj vizualnoj dinamici i fizičkoj žestini odvijala gotovo bešumno, dok je istovremeno kroz slušalice strujala polifonija četiri glasa - bistra i kristalno jasna.

Primjer:

Franjo Dijak otvara verbalni dio izvedbe monologom političke moći. Šapće. Šapat je dio dramaturgije zvuka, ali i izraz političke uvjerljivosti. Željka Sančanin koristeći ljubav u svrhu mržnje. U pozadini njihova dijaloga Rakan Rushaidat i Pravdan Devlahović plešu. U sadržaju drame oni bi predstavljali svjedoke,

Mikrofon je bio uho slušatelja u koje smo pažljivo usipavali riječi. Tjelesnost i erotiku što smo je pridali govoru širili smo i na polje slušanja. Takav se odnos jela: njihov dah, pljuvačku, suha usta, kašljanje, pucketanje jezika... njihovo se fizičko stanje moglo precizno pratiti zvukom stvarajući intimnu vezu - čekati nekoliko sekundi, stoga je artifičijelni prijenos glasa postajao prirodniji od uobičajenog načina slušanja. Slušalice su bile najizravija veza sa stvarnošću predstave glas izvođača nestao bi prekriven zvukom pravog, neglumljenog političkog priopćenja. Tijekom predizborne kampanje u Hrvatskoj 2003. godine nisam radila po stranačkom ključu, već po modelima koje politička retorika rabi kako bi UVJERILA. Upravo je čin uvjeravanja onaj agens koji generira namjerom da diskutira ili pobija, već da bude uvjeren. On zapravo i nema što pobijati jer mu se ne nude argumenti podložni diskusiji, nego fizička izvedba

Misa (za predizbornu šutnju) bio je projekt o govoru: o tome kako i što reći. Monolog koji otvara situaciju politička je mantra predsjednika koji se priprema za je ponavlja sve dok u šupljij izjavi koja pripada njegovoj ulozi ne otkrije snagu koja pripada njegovoj privatnoj prisutnosti na sceni, sve dok u toj rečenici ne osjeti definiciju sebe i svojih mogućnosti. Glumac par minuta ponavlja jednu jedinu izjavu, ponavljanje je ubrzava, širi njeno referentno polje, ispisuje njome cijeli osim rotacije jedne te iste rečenice - ona je sve što mu daje razlog da bude izložen, bez icheg da ga sakrije - bez klasično izgrađene situacije i bez kulisa, unutar upravo sada.

MOJA JE SNAGA U GOVORU podjednako je i politički i umjetnički statement.

Pitanje o razlozima za nastanak projekta *Misa (za predizbornu šutnju)* vraća me na nužnost prepoznavanja strategija u kojima živimo te preuzimanje tih loopom započinje predstava: naša je snaga u govoru. U već spomenutim privatnim zabilježkama u kojima sam se pokušala obratiti samoj sebi prije no što je

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mu odgovara precizno srićući tekst. Njen je jezik formalno rascjepkan i raspucan. I njena je uloga rascijepljena - ona je i žena i muškarac, ona se osvećuje u izvedbi predstave oni su back-vokali. Do slušalica putuje ritam kojim pucketaju prstima.

mogao nazvati igrom pasivnog i aktivnog ljubavnika - krotili smo pažnju kroz neizbježnost slušanja. Slušalice su prenosile govor, ali i blizinu izvodačkog ti-gotovo konspirativno razumijevanje između publike i govornika. Kada bi gledalac skinuo slušalice da čuje takozvani realni zvuk, na njega je radi jeke morao i stoga sam htjela radikalizirati tu njihovu ulogu tj. upotrijebiti elemente stvarnosti - dokumentarnost - kao elemente subverzije. S vremena na vrijeme tijekom skupila sam arhivu političkih govora. Njih sam kasnije koristila kao jinglove što svojom vulgarnom porukom napadaju stilizirani govor glumaca. Kolekciju akciju i upravo je uvjeravanje onaj neupitan preduvjet koji okuplja mnoštvo - bilo na mitingu ili u kazalištu ili pod kupolom nekog hrama. Slušatelj ne dolazi s koja se bavi onim KAKO, a ne ŠTO govori. Kategorije laži i istine padaju u vodu, da bi ih zamijenile raznolike tehnike uvjeravanja.

izlazak pred birače. Rečenica što ga odvodi u trans glasi: MOJA JE SNAGA U GOVORU. Ta se izjava unedogled vrti u ušima publike. Uputa je glumcu bila da i vlastitu umjetničku poziciju - govor kao jedino preostalo sredstvo uvjeravanja. Govor što ne postaje snažniji ako ga odglumimo, već ako ga shvatimo kao prostor. Glumac stoji s jednom rečenicom pred publikom, okreće se kao pokvarena ploča, ne događa se ništa što bi s njega svratilo pažnju, ništa se ne pokreće vremena u kojem proživljava inicijaciju tetovirajući se rečenicom koja ne govori ni o kome drugom osim o - njemu samom, te ni o čemu drugom osim o onom

strategija u vlastiti rad - njihovo raskrinkavanje i komentar. Konstruiranje alternativnog prostora u kojoj se obistinjuje ona utopistička klica iz rečenice čijim započelo razdoblje proba, pod točkom broj 20, piše:

kazalište.
koji TUTNJI u mojoj glavi.
kojem prostoru.
njegovoj. Neka se izmjenjuju za govornicom.
PRISILA TEKSTA.
POLITIČKO KAZALIŠTE.
oružje je GOVOR.”

My strength is in my speech

Ivana Sajko

Translated from Croatian by Mima Simić



BAD co., Ivana Sajko: Mass (for election day silence), foto: Željka Galić-Gradecki

In the attempt to evade dramatic or prose art forms, I say I write speeches.

I write texts that spring from the experience of theatre and performance, but they do not necessarily return to it. They may remain stuck somewhere in between genres and choose the mode in which they want to communicate.

The written speech is rhythmized with my body; punctuation is proportional to the length of my breaths.

(Nowadays my lungs write shorter texts than they used to.)

The text I write and complete is the body that emerges from intuition, it approaches me, it grows under close surveillance, it struggles, it eludes me in the moments of my fatigue, but in the end it is tamed and shaped; in the end, I still know the chronology and the facts, even the secret deviations of its swelling. Burrowing into the meaning of the text within myself and conquering it, it does not sink deeper into me, it actually leaves me. When I later come across it in the world and on the market, I wonder about how to touch it again and for that touch to be equally essential, equally furious and passionate as it was in the moment of its generation. How to discover a new Eros between the two of us who have, completing each other, articulating each other to the last limits through every single figure and trope, spent each other. We met and consumed each other to tedium.

(This excess of familiarity usually kills the love affair.)

The question I am faced with at the moment of completion is how to maintain the relationship with what I have written and what I am impregnated with.

I don't know where to go, except back, into self-referential reading. If I want to generate this text in another medium, for instance through my own performance or a play, I have to find a way to avoid that which I am certain of – the completed textual body which, to be sure, opens itself up to an innocent reader or a spectator, yet in front of me it keeps silent as a definiteness which I need to shatter in order to speak again.

A look into history offers me an opportunity. I discover the eroticism of creation in talking about the process, about the intentions, about the documents, about the notes, about everything that predeceases or simply surrounds the text whose exclusive position towards me is so totalitarian. And through this subversion of myself, it seems that in deconstructing the process I have found a way to construct a new text, a new relationship, something that could have happened during the construction of the first text, but did not. The strategy, thus, remains the same but instead of accepting the body I have already created, I replace it with those excesses of knowledge, memorabilia, new understandings and connotations, I twist the flip-side of my speech, exposing the fury as well as the disciplined methodology, forever going backwards.

(It's like when the spent lover utters the phrase: "Do you remember..."; because there is nowhere else to go but into the past.)

The self-referential reading is perhaps pure exhibitionism institutionalized by a single discourse on the process, yet at the same time, in the performance of this memory of processuality, I create new relationships and prove the vitality of even that completed, packaged body. I express all of its potency whilst, for instance, explaining the history of "Woman-bomb", improvising new passages based on existing strategies, but also based on actual documents; or whilst writing stage directions for "Archetype: Medea", which talk about the rehearsals for the premiere performance of the text, knowing that those very stage directions will offer me the opportunity to replicate each following performance of "Archetype: Medea" or the reading that preceded it, to try to repeat it, act a few scenes, retell audience reactions to a specific play and, in this way, construct a collage within the space and time of performance, driving forwards, generating a new bond between the author and the text through methods and processes, a new text in which, talking about myself, I also talk about the world and the art in which I am immersed.

(I believe this is also what old age might look like.)

Equating deconstruction with construction was also the intention of the text entitled "Mass (for election-day silence)"; it was, after all, the intention of the whole project. It has now been nearly two years since this report was written for two radio broadcasts (Essays and Discussions, Spring 2004, Croatian Radio, ed. Otržan) where portions of the play, audio-fragments of the rehearsals and music from the CD were aired as illustrations to the essay.

I am writing a new introduction to the essay, presenting only its fragments:

About the project: "Mass (for election-day silence)" for 30 spectators wearing headphones

Time: year 2004, continuation of an election winter

Place: desacralized Zagreb mosque – a space of echoes and sound holes

Performative mode: polyphonous speech/whispers/singing into four microphones

For collaborators I chose visual artist Goran Petercol, video artist Simon Bogojević Narath and composer David Simons. The performers were two actors, Franjo Dijak and Rakan Rushaidat, and dancers Željka Sančanin and Pravdan Devlahović. I was not interested in writing a so-called ideal play through which I would offer the final word on stage management, instead, I wanted to open up new radical levels of interpretation, analysis or even transcendence of the piece. And besides, I conceived this text as a network of various referential points, narrative positions, a concoction of the present, future and past and a continual stream of possible performative solutions – thus it was necessary to simply follow the same model, the principle of production of the material as it was already written down. To open up new possibilities and to evade the conventional dramaturgical conclusions.

The project, with its title shortened to "Mass (for election-day silence)", was divided into three segments: an exhibition, a play and an audio CD. Each of the parts returned to the drama in a different way, complementing the performative, visual or musical material which was being created simultaneously. Following this model, the play was being contextualized, not only through its stance towards reality and its stance towards its own art medium, but also through the relationship with the exhibition and its five different layouts which were being changed during the project's duration, and through its relationship with the idea of a CD as a soundtrack for an unstaged play.

I was curious to see to what extent my own subjective sentence could also become the subjective sentence of another. As a director, I had a completely different task ahead of me – to make my own subjective sentence objective.

MASS denotes a musical form and a sacral ceremony – a possibility for the text to open up both on the structural and on the thematic level.

ELECTION DAY SILENCE marks the time of the play. The time of deceptive ceasefire allowed to voters to think with their own heads, freed from influence and pressure – an opening for which it is always too late, for everything has already happened, and democracy is but the insistence on non-existent differences between parties. There is no choice.

DEAD BODY BEHIND THE WALL marks the setting. The crime which is always near, hidden behind the wall or somewhere in the documents – the crime that causes a crisis, but never a system breakdown, because the system is created to be immune to its own culpability.

And, finally, HOOVES IN THE THROAT suggests the performative mode – the speech mode.

I started working on the play following instructions provided by two texts. One of them involved the notes I took some time earlier envisioning a future project, and the other was the foreword to the play.

In the first text, the first point read:

“Take risks.”

Point no. 7 read:

“I do not want to think about the conventions, except when I recognize them in order to ask each one the questions:

When do I need music?

Do I need music at all?

Is speech the music of my text?”

Now I have the answer: Yes, speech is the music of my text – divided into rhythms, melodies, thunder and silences. Sometimes it is linear, sometimes it twirls in repetition or in samples.

Speech is the already mentioned sound that directs my thoughts, feelings or movement. It rests in the score of the text, and observing its graphical passivity I kept asking myself one question:

HOW TO TRANSLATE THE DIFFERENCE THAT EXISTS ON PAPER INTO DIFFERENCE IN A PLAY – ON THE STAGE?

I searched for an answer in another text – the foreword to a drama which, too, consisted of numerous points. The last three defined the difference between HOW and WHAT it is about.

The foreword read:

“Point 4

Speech is a weapon. And politics. Political speech is almost more powerful than religious speech because it wears ideology like faith, and it does not attempt to justify itself against the truth or lies, provability or blankness of its own word-bullets. Political speech is rhetorical. It persuades and acts despite the fact it is wrong.

Point 5

Completely deliberately I have again written a play open towards the possibilities of stage managing, since this opens up a democratic space of freedom for its future realizations. My writing is directed towards the idea of a theater which I call political. I, therefore, use speech as a weapon and action. My characters attempt to verbalize their beliefs until they collapse, they struggle for speech, yanking argumentations out of themselves, wounding each other with evidence and opinions so that their speech becomes a competition.

And Point 6

I see theater as being rhetorical. Direct. The speech is transferred and embedded in the memory of the spectator like an infectious disease. And the speech you have been infected with will in a way condition your future thinking. Thus it should be ethical. It never is.”

Speech is a very physical performance – with its messages or emotional contents it inflames the body of the speaker, gives it certain gestures, makes it shudder, stretches it, orders its rhythm of movement, restrains it or relieves its muscles of tension. Speech is an act that has an effect even before it has been completely uttered. It is exactly in this way that I shared my experience of the textual score with the performers. I followed two parallel lines: speech in politics and speech in theater. Ideological and physical agency. The aim was for these two lines to get entangled as much as possible and for the speech to become a howling rhythm which choreographs us, filling the space of the stage, permeating each pore of the witnesses in the audience – a mass which will grow into a punk concert. It entered through the ears, through the eyes, maybe even through the need to hide from violence that speech can inflict in its desire to convince of its rightness and power.

One of Goran Petercol's installations from the exhibition, which was being staged in the same space as the performances and took turns with it, had the simple title “*Speech*”. The work was composed of digitally processed photographs of all the participants in the project. In order to obtain the final version of the work, Petercol first took two kinds of photographs of us: with our faces still and while we talked. He then blended these two kinds of portraits into one face – with the upper part of the face still, the lower performing speech. The lower part, the smudged, distorted mouth pasted onto the photo paper looked like a mask on our faces. A grimace which made us unrecognizable. The speech reified into the mask which hid our true identity and created our image – not through what we looked like, but through how we spoke. In this way we used speech instead of theatrical masks and illustrating costumes. The projected faces of Petercol's installation corresponded with the performative functions within the play. The lights which glared across the projected photographs were the same lights that later illuminated the performers. The positions of their projected heads in speech – TALKING HEADS – were replaced with their real bodies, and stimulated and controlled with a barrage of words.

"I'm not going to judge you, I'll just state the facts: what will happen and how. You'll confess what you shouldn't confess to: everything you did and intended to do. Everything that was dead, concealed and squashed, all your foul-mouthed curses, bloody threats and secret plans will turn against you and laugh in your face. Every phrase will become a confession and for the first time everyone will believe you. You'll stand a victor at the podium and the truth will start coming out all by itself, you'll be powerless to stop it, your whole body will take part in this scam: feeling sick, you'll think you have to puke, but while you await the relief of throwing up the acid, you'll be surprised by the words words words words words words words words words and you'll try to shut up, put your hands on your mouth, but the words will swell up your cheeks and burst out in a great hisssssssssss for everyone to hear, all those who should never hear them. So you'll be puking up words fifty a hundred two hundred yards further and further away, louder and louder all the time. While helplessly shaking your head, you'll be spitting these stinky sticky shitty words all around and when you try to run you'll just stupidly slide on the floor shifted by your repulsive, disgusting rotten language, you'll fall slap on the face into your own vomit, which will grow and scream and grow and scream and swell as if it's made of foam and then drench you all over and when it will soak into every pore of your skin it will start returning back inside and you'll eat up everything you puked. And I'll wait for you, because I'll live a long while after that."

The cited soliloquy from the text *"Mass for election-day silence, dead body behind the wall and hooves in the throat"* can also serve as an example of deconstruction of the speech as we practiced it in the play, as well as an example of subversion of the politicizing character of language itself. The first step was working with performer Željka Sančanin on estranging/defamiliarizing the articulation of the soliloquy. This phase took place simultaneously with the analysis of the meaning of the monologue itself and the attempt to stress and communicate that meaning, not through her identification with the character, but through a speech mode whose rhythm, onomatopoeia and loudness were correlated with the physical movement. The text was treated both as a choreographic and as a musical score. I gave audio recordings of Željka's monologue performance to singer Lisa Karrer, David Simons's collaborator on the musical pieces composed for the CD *"Mass (for election-day silence)"*. Not understanding the meaning of the Croatian text at all, the New Yorker repeated the monologue simultaneously with Željka's voice which was reaching her through the headphones. In the second phase, the monologue was thus relieved of meaning because all that Lisa could rely on was the manner of speech, the rhythm, the pitch and the emotional charge of the unintelligible words, created by their resonance. The sound was restoring the contents lost in the language barrier. So the second version of the monologue was created. At the same time, David Simons was sampling the once-famous pop hit *"Love is"* by Culture Club. When the sampling of Boy George's feminized voice was completed, Lisa's monologue was added to it, creating a composition which was to serve as the musical background to the choreography in the play. We arrived at the point where speech was no longer transferred as conceptual meaning, but rather as energy which sprang from the original meaning only to transform into musical information which communicated its intellectual and emotional contents through rhetorical expressive elements.

I was compelled to radicalize the distance from the disciplined structure of language so the two performers embarked on a foolhardy mission to learn to sing the sampled composition. Pravdan Devlahović sang Lisa Karrer and Rakan Rushaidat the sampled lyrics of Boy George.

The composition-imitation entitled *"Headfone/Luv"* is one of only three moments in the course of the play when the sound from the amplifiers comes out of the speakers arranged around the monumental architectural cylinder and, climbing in a spiral along the walls, disappears in muffled thunder under the cupola rising 17 meters above the stage. Except for those few moments when I treated sound as a theatrical score, releasing it into space, for the rest of the play's duration the performance was followed through the set of headphones that each member of the audience had attached to their seats. Without this equipment it would be impossible to follow the play, due to the spatial echo which soared and transformed sentences into inchoate mumbling, so that it was necessary to speak into microphones, yet almost inaudibly. The result we received was an extraordinary sensation of absolute silence in the theater. Despite its visual dynamics and its physical intensity, the play went on almost soundlessly, whilst a polyphony of four voices streamed through the headphones – sharp and crystal clear.

An example:

Franjo Dijak opens the verbal segment of the play with a monologue on political power. He whispers. The whisper is part of the sound dramaturgy, but also an expression of political persuasiveness. Željka Sančanin replies, meticulously spelling out the text. Her language is formally splintered and cracked. Her role is split, too – she is both a man and a woman, she takes revenge using love for hatred's purposes. Rakan Rushaidat and Pravdan Devlahović dance in the background of their dialogue. In the script of the play they would represent witnesses, in the performance of the play they are the back vocals. The rhythm they beat snapping their fingers travels through the headphones.

The microphone is the ear of the listener into which we carefully pour words. The physicality and eroticism that we assigned to speech we now spread to the field of listening. This kind of relationship can be called the game of a passive and an active lover – we tame attention through the inevitability of listening. The headphones transmit speech, but also the proximity of performers' bodies: their breaths, spit, dry lips, coughing, clicking of tongues... their physical state closely corresponds to the sound, creating an intimate bond – almost a conspiratorial understanding between the audience and the speaker. If the spectator takes off the headphones in order to hear the so-called real sound – due to the echo he will have to wait for it for several seconds, and so the artificial transmission of voice becomes more natural than the ordinary mode of listening. Headphones were the most direct link with reality, so I wanted to radicalise this function of theirs, i.e. use elements from reality – documentary quality – as ele-

ments of subversion. Occasionally during the play the voice of the performer would disappear, overlain by the sound of a genuine, non-acted political the stylized speech of the actors with its vulgar messages.

I did not compile this collection with respect to political parties, but rather according to the models used by political rhetoric in order to PERSUADE. The together – whether at a political assembly or in the theatre or under the cupola of a temple. The listener does not come with the intention to argue or ance concerned with HOW it speaks, rather than with WHAT it says. The categories of lies and truth come to nothing, just to be replaced with manifold

“Mass (for election-day silence)” was a project about speech: about how and what to say. The monologue in the opening scene is a political mantra of the audience’s ears ad nauseam. The actor was instructed to repeat it until he finds in this empty statement that belongs to his role the strength which belongs that does not become stronger if we act it, but only if we understand it as a definition of ourselves and our own potentials. For several minutes the actor dience with a single sentence spinning like a broken record, nothing happens to divert attention from him, nothing moves apart from the rotation of one and without the backdrop, as he undergoes the initiation of tattooing himself with the sentence that speaks about no one but himself, and about nothing but the

MY STRENGTH IS IN SPEECH is a political as well as an artistic statement.

The question about the reasons for launching the project “Mass (for election-day silence)” takes me back to the necessity of recognizing our strategies of of the sentence whose loop sets off the play sprouts to truth: our strength is in speech. In the abovementioned private notes in which I tried to converse

“This is
It is reading the speech
In any
Everyone should take words roaring in their
THIS IS THE OPPRESSION OF TEXT. THIS
Political – because the

announcement. During the 2003 Croatian election campaign I collected political speeches and built an archive. I later used them as jingles assaulting

very act of persuasion is the agent which generates action and it is exactly persuasion which is the unquestionable precondition that brings masses dispute, but to be persuaded. He in fact has nothing to dispute because no arguments here are subject to discussion, there is just the physical perform-techniques of persuasion.

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president preparing to meet the electors. The sentence that puts him into a trance is: MY STRENGTH IS IN SPEECH. This statement keeps resounding in the to his personal presence on stage, until in this sentence he senses his own artistic position – speech as the sole remaining means of persuasion. Speech repeats a single utterance, the repetition accelerates it, broadening its referential field, writing out the whole space with it. The actor stands in front of the audience, the same utterance – it is the only thing that gives him the reason to be exposed, with nothing to hide behind – without the traditionally developed scene and exact moment of the now.

**

living, taking them over and including them into our own works – exposing and criticizing them. To construct an alternative space where the utopian seed with myself before the time of rehearsals, point no. 20 reads:

not theater.

that ROARS in my head.

given space.

heads. Let them take turns at the rostrum.

IS AN UNBEARABLE POLITICAL THEATER.

weapon is SPEECH."



Ivana Sajko: Autoreferencijalno čitanje, BAD co., foto © Nada Žgank, Cow 2005.

u što te ja to mogu uvjeriti sad
i ovdje? od fragmenata prema
retorici poetske izvedbe

Mark Leahy

Prevela s engleskog Magda Juras, Language Lab

u što vas ja to mogu uvjeriti? da se ja upravo sada obraćam vama? ili vam čitam, predajem vam sebe od riječi, mojih riječi? tuđih riječi? kako znate da su to moje riječi? da li osjećate potrebu znati jesu li to moje riječi? ove riječi koje vam kazujem, u što vas mogu uvjeriti? da ste ih već čuli, da se sada nalaze u ovom prostoru između nas? jeste li uvjereni da su ove riječi odabrane, odmjerene i promišljene? kako vi to možete znati, mogu li vas ja uvjeriti u to? uvjeriti vas da i dalje slušate? što ste vi to prisiljeni slušati? nešto što zavrjeđuje vašu pažnju? u što to možete vjerovati van ovog konteksta riječi i onoga što čujete i prepoznate?

Ja se ovdje obraćam vama, ovdje pred vama. Ja sam sada ovdje pred vama i obraćam se vama. Vi ste tamo preko puta meni, preko puta podjele koja označava naše različite uloge u ovoj razmjeni. Ja se obraćam vama odavde, vama koji se nalazite tamo nasuprot meni. Ove riječi koje izgovaram vama moje su riječi, moje riječi upućene vama.

Publika je vrlo tiha dok [pjesnik] prilazi mikrofону. On izusti nešto. Glas mu je hrapav, jedva čujan, gotovo nerazumljiv, ali se čuje- pažnja je usmjerena, kao u onim tihim trenucima prije početka solo koncerta žičanog kvarteta (Stern, 67)

Moja šutnja se sluša kao i moj govor, vi obraćate pažnju na moj pokret i moju mirnoću. Riječi i ono što nisu riječi, i tijelo, moje tijelo.

Ja nisam imao namjeru biti predmet prikazivanja, ali je vjerojatno bilo naivno od mene što to nisam primijetio. (Benson, 77)

Ovdje pred vama ja se predstavljam, ja sam predstava, prikazan za promatranje.

možete to prepoznati
to je ovdje to je vizualno ispravna
spoznaja. to je obično prikrieno ili se
može vidjeti prikazano. izvrnuto. jedan
dodiruje drugog. ako je tako, možete to
napraviti sa smislom. (Andrews, 26)

Vi mi jamčite smisao, gledajući me pred vama. Slušajući ove riječi vi prepoznajete okolnosti, okolnosti koje nas oboje diraju, preko njih se i mi dodirujemo.

Ako je retorika usmena, govornici tada postavljaju svoje osjećaje osobnog, društvenog i fizičkog zadovoljstva iznad svojih sposobnosti da potiču, održe i usmjere svoj odnos sa slušačima na način koji bi bio plodonosan za jedne i druge. (Arnold, 166)

Nalazimo se na suprotnim krajevima ovog odabira uloga, ovog pretpostavljanja likova, mog bacanja glasa vama, pred vas. Mi se povezujemo preko ove verbalne osi.

On iznenada zastane. Spusti glavu. [...] čini se kao da šuti nekoliko minuta. Ja se pitam – svi se pitaju – može li nastaviti. (Stern, 69)

ako čitateljica/izvođačica ne pokušava 'svojim' riječima, ili iznošenjem 'svojih' riječi, uvjeriti slušatelje u vjerodostojnost nekog svog mišljenja (tragajući za mjestom gdje bi to mišljenje bilo locirano/ smješteno), ni u izvornost svog izraza (što bi nužno ovisilo o poimanju izvorne sebe koja govori) niti u cjelovitost svog argumenta, ili cijelog/zatvorenog/zaokruženog teksta (otkud mjereno, koristeći koje smjernice), pa što to ona u tom slučaju izvodi? što u tom slučaju sluša publika, što im to privlači pažnju (ukoliko je privlači, ili to čini samo povremeno i prolazno), što to oni u tom slučaju čuju?

Ja sam ovdje i čitam vama. Čitam pred vama iz rukopisa. Čitam vam iz svog rukopisa, sa svojih stranica, iz svoje knjige. Ovaj rukopis iz kojeg čitam vi ne vidite, on je skriven, on je dio ove čudesne razmjene. Vi ne možete vidjeti rukopis, ovo vam čitam iz skrivenog rukopisa. Vi slušate dok ja na glas govorim ovaj tekst skriven na ovim mojim stranicama, dok ga ja činim vama dostupnim.

U ovim javnim čitanjima uvijek postoji onaj osobni dio koji postaje dramski dio. Ovo se odnosi na čitatelja koji jedini svjedoči stranicama koje čita, bez obzira što će svi prisutni neizbježno čuti cijeli tekst, još cjelovitiji jer ga utjelovljuje glas. Što je to što čini tekst čudesnim? Činjeničnost, uprizorenje, nedostatak značenja koje izaziva čitanje među recima, metaforični odnosi, potencijalni nabori. (Benson, 79)

Bez ikakvih smjernica u obliku vodiča s uputama, u obliku partiture, kako ću ja, čitač/izvođač uvjerljivo pročitati svoj tekst, u čiju vjerodostojnost moram uvjeriti svoje slušatelje?

Bez partiture (partituru mogu koristiti muzičari, iz tonskih zapisa mogu raditi plesači) ne mogu ih uvjeriti u svoju uspješnu izvedbu teksta, u svoju sposobnost praćenja partiture. Ovo mjerilo kompetencije ili ova procjena izvedbe nije prisutna i to je čini nevažnom.

ono što čini čitaoca dvojnim
bićem nije društveni
ugovor. Neka tvoje ruke budu
mjesto, a ne alat. I odsad shvati
da si zaposlenik. Putova pisanja,
a ne korijena jezika. (McCaffery, 64)

Tekst predstavljen u čitanju pripada čitateljici (utoliko) što ga ona iznosi, ali ga ona ne treba smatrati svojim vlasništvom ili pak polagati ekskluzivno pravo na pristup njegovim značenjima ili namjerama teksta ili onim vezanim uz tekst (ovo ne znači da čitateljica ne zna postupak potreban za stvaranje teksta, ili izvore teksta, ili čak nagone i želje koje su dovele do njegovog pisanja). Publika dolazi u posjed teksta (zajedno s čitateljicom) u tijeku čitanja, i njihovo prethodno poznavanje jezika, riječi ili kulturološkog materijala, njihove želje i očekivanja od djela, i njihove namjere utjecat će na ono što čuju u sadašnjosti.

Ušla sam u veliku sobu. Rekla sam, ne, danas nije moj rođendan i ti si mi pokazao kako nacrtati zalazak sunca u šatoru. Došla sam kući i ti si gorio. (Jarnot, 103)

Čitateljica/izvođačica predstavlja tekst koristeći gestikulaciju i ton i intonaciju, i oni u tom trenutku oblikuju tekst, oni su *to određeno* čitanje. Druga glasovna izvedba teksta može izmijeniti ton, može naglasiti nešto drugo, može biti popraćena drugim pokretima, ostavljajući dojam da autorica-čitateljica nema namjeru otkriti određeno značenje ili skup asocijativnih naboja koji su sastavni dio teksta. Zvukovi također mogu biti vrlo različiti idući put kad to bude čitala, nekoj drugoj publici kojoj će biti poznata samo ona verzija koju je čula; u drugom čitanju neke rečenice će zvučati bolje i izazvati smijeh, u nekoj trećoj prilici možda će pak zvučati kao odjek udarnih dnevnih vijesti, ili će prisutnost neke određene imenovane osobe u publici dati posebno značenje nekoj određenoj frazi.

Ni glas koji govori, ni "ja" koje govori grafemski s lista papira, ni tijelo čitatelja koji stoji pred publikom ne može biti *istinska* osobnost lirske pjesme. Ono što vi ili ja ili bilo koji drugi čitatelj ili slušatelj može dati tekstu, [...], doprinosi njegovoj konstrukciji. Ukoliko postoji neravnoteža u odnosu snaga između autora i slušatelja, u tomu što samo jedan od njih proizvodi značensku tekstualnu nit, sama dinamika otvorena je prema primanju svijesti i pregovaranju između ove dvije uloge. Ukoliko je, društveno ili povijesno, neka pjesma otvorena prema kritičkom određenju koje ja zovem govorenjem iz trbuha, to je zbog toga što *moć prisustva* (MP) potiče prikriveno značenje. Ali govorenje iz trbuha je ono što ga šifrira. (Silliman, 372)

Postoji/e praznina/e između osobnosti koja se nalazi u prostoriji i glasno čita i osobnosti koja/e ispisana na stranice rukopisa iz kojeg čita. Postoje smjene moći između protagonista i čitanja koje na raznovrsne načine doprinose trenutnoj situaciji. Govorenje iz trbuha se doživljava kao osjećaj govorećeg tijela čitatelja koji služi kao kanal za riječi, kanal kroz koji one prolaze i putem kojeg dobivaju svoj čujni oblik. Za Sillimana ovo govorenje iz trbuha vodi do sužavanja mogućnosti interpretacije pjesme tijekom čitanja, jer bazira ili tumači tekst preko prisutnosti čitatelja govornika (373). Je li to zbog toga što očekujemo od retoričkog govornika da nas uvjeri, da postane protagonist koji se bori za predstavljanje značenja, argumenta, na način koji tiskani tekst prilikom čitanja u osami uvijek ne predlaže? Bez osjećaja izvorne osobnosti (iza riječi) (odgovorne za riječi) uvjeravanje publike u mogućnost otkrivanja takve osobnosti nije sastavni dio izvedbe. Možda će čitateljica shvatiti kako je njen zadatak uvjeriti slušatelje kako potraga za takvim izvornim glasom u njoj izvedbi nije ono što se od njih traži i očekuje.

Lirske pjesme su jednako dirljive, jednako posebne kad ih se sluša kao i kad ih se čita; čak i bez poznavanja ijedne riječi [njenog jezika], može se naslutiti njihovo značenje dok ih ona recitira. (Stern, 70)

Ukoliko tekst nije usmjeren na prenošenje neke određene poruke, ili prema objašnjenju određene teme ili problema, ili prema iznošenju neke istine, u tom slučaju konvencije retoričkog uvjeravanja moraju djelovati čudno; gdje u tom slučaju leži razlog njihove upotrebe? gdje je subjekt čiji su izrazi uvjerljivi? gdje je istina ili stanje stvari u koje se uvjerava slušatelj?

Ja sada pišem vama, pišem vama o govoru, pišem vam o čitanju. Ja sam ovdje sada pred vama, pišem vam svoje riječi, otkrivam vam tekst sa svojih stranica. Ja činim ove riječi dostupnim vama. Ove riječi koje vidite, koje čitate, koje čujete.

Kakva je ovo vrst kazališta, u kojem postoji samo jedna izvođačica, koja obično nije podučena u glumi, čak ni tehnikama javnog govorništva, koja često iznosi tekst već otprije dobro poznat, koji nije posebno napisan za izvođenje ni za čitanje na glas, ni posebno napisan da bi bio "kazalište?" (Stern, 75)

Načini izvedbe u ovom kazališnom obliku su znatno različiti od poznatih konvencija glume ili igranja određene uloge, to je mješavina prirodnog ponašanja – poput svjedoka u sudnici, dok se u isto vrijeme mora zadržati moć uvjeravanja, ali ne na umjetnički način, već prikrivajući umjetnost u predstavi prirodnosti.

Kada uvjeravanje mora postati prizor uvjeravanja čovjek pritom nije više jednako tako uvjeren u tu uvjerljivost. (Paul de Man, citirano u Weitin, 539-40)

Ja moram izvesti prirodno iznošenje svojih riječi, mora izgledati kao da vam ih predstavljam onakve kakve jesu, ne opravdavajući ih, ne na neki posebni izvedbeni način, ovo vas mora uvjeriti ili pridobiti vašu pažnju, vas slušatelja, za vrijeme čitanja, ovog retoričkog događaja.

Publika cijeni, naravno, ali ona također “vjeruje.” Sama činjenica da je došla poslušati čitanje ove pjesme – radije nego da je čita u osami – predstavlja čin vjerovanja u moć, kvalitetu i vjerodostojnost rada pjesnikinje. (Stern, 79-80)

Postoji vjerovanje u događaj, u grupu, u moć ocjenjivačkog suda institucije, u želju da se bude dio grupe koja vjeruje. Ovo je objava grupnog čitanja/slušanja, i u isto vrijeme objava pjesnikova pisanja/govora. Iz kojeg razloga publika vjeruje u situaciju čitanja, u što to oni vjeruju? Oni možda otprije poznaju čitateljicu/izvođačicu, i to poznanstvo (osobno, profesionalno, akademsko) može stvoriti temelj vjere u ono što ona, čitateljica/izvođačica, piše i čita. Kakav retorički posao mora obaviti čitateljica/izvođačica obraćajući se publici koja ju otprije poznaje, u što ih to ona mora uvjeriti? Da li je svaka njena riječ otprije određena, ili je ona tek mora uokviriti i uobličiti kako bi se izazvao neki određeni način slušanja? Ako je tako, kakav onda način slušanja iziskuje (zahtjeva) ne-lirska poezija? Shodno tome, kakve su strategije čitanja/izvedbe potrebne da bi ju se čulo (na pravi način)? Moraju li i čitanje i slušanje biti prilagođeni? Diskurs umjesnosti, vlasništva, uvodi se na mjesto čitanja – čitateljica (autorica) izvođačica proglašava svoje vlasništvo, svoju proizvodnju, stvara svoj tekst (iznova) u tijeku svoje izvedbe, i s prikladnim okvirom, prikladnim pokretima, nudi isti prisutnoj publici koja je sluša, i koja se ponaša prikladno primajući ovaj njen dar, ovu danu, ovu povremenu gestu.

Dakle, “nalog” za čitanje poezije ne dolazi iz “istinitosti” samih lirskih pjesama, već iz same činjenice što su priznate kao poezija od strane za to ovlaštene, organizirane skupine – društva, sveučilišnog odsjeka – koje je dogovorilo određeno čitanje [...]. (Stern, 74)

Okvir za događaj čitanja nije zadan od strane protagonista - autoritet figure koja stoji preda mnom proizlazi iz autoriteta koji joj je dala institucija, kao i iz činjenice da ona izgovara svoje riječi.

U konfrontaciji oralne retorike čovjek se mora *nositi sa* svojim simboličnim činom. Njegova osobna prisutnost (čak i samo prisutnost njegova glasa) sama je po sebi simbolična, retorička radnja. Njegovo verbalno i fizičko ponašanje stapaju se da bi stvorili protok simbolične radnje koja slušatelju predstavlja cjelovitu fizičku i psihološku organizaciju govornika [...]. Sve ovo se *prenosi* slušateljima na interpretaciju i prosudbu. Događa se više od stvaranja značenja, verbalnog i gestikulacijskog. Osobnost koja nije apstrakcija već je utjelovljena, dozvoljava i opravdava svako značenje. (Arnold, 164)

Izvođačica čitajući ima na raspolaganju druga pomagala, druge materijale osim onih koje ima zapisane na stranici (neka posebna vizualna pomagala nisu dostupna na stranici), i ona ih može upotrijebiti u stvaranju površinskog teksta, može koristiti tekstualni materijal u vremenu, u zvuku, u jačini svog glasa, u prostoru i pokretu, i to na načine koji mogu biti označeni na prostornim i topografskim mogućnostima stranice.

Činjenica da se tekst iznosi usmeno znači da prevladava ili će prevladati određeni stupanj međuzavisnosti između govornika i drugih, jer je nemoguće izbjeći uzajamni utjecaj interakcije ili njegovo očekivanje kad se obraćamo nekome ili kad se neko obraća nama.

Činjenica da se tekst iznosi usmeno također proizvodi bilo koje značenje koje je neki sudionik u usmenom iznošenju teksta naučen pridavati odnosima s drugim ljudskim bićima i procesima njihovog održavanja putem govora i slušanja. (Arnold, 161)

Usmena retorika zasniva se na razmjeni: ne samo značenja, već i na neprestanoj razmjeni očekivanja, asocijacija, radni i vjerovanja.

Jedna apstraktna lirski pjesma Bruca Andrewsa, u kojoj se bogohuljenje i opscenosti iznose kroz različite tonove, rodove, i politička gledišta, bez ikakvog izravnog konteksta koji bi ih uobličio, [...] traži od čitatelja vjerovanje da to djelo nešto znači, da ga treba poslušati, da izrazi u njemu znače ono što se čini da znače i da nisu šifra za nešto potpuno drugo, te da je njihov učinak upravo onakav kakav je želio autor. (Middleton, 2002, 38)

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Prilikom čitanja/izvedbe teksta u kojem nema pripovjedne niti, u kojem materijal nije organiziran oko nekakve priče, gdje nema nizova poveznica koje bi ga držale na okupu na sadržajnoj razini, napor izvođača može biti u tome što mora uvjeriti svoje slušatelje da se tekst upravo izvodi, da nije samo puka nepovezana hrpa tekstualnog materijala (ili ako je to upravo slučaj, onda je to od važnosti u toj prilici). Ono u što čitatelj mora uvjeriti slušatelje je da je to nešto što trebaju čuti, da je njihovo slušanje valjani odgovor, i da nešto moraju poslušati sada i ovdje.

Vrlo je lako shvatiti lirsku pjesmu kao prijevaru ili neslanu šalu, [...]. Ukoliko želimo da se pjesma prihvati dovoljno predano kako bi mogla djelovati, treba imati dokaze da se točno toj određenoj pjesmi može vjerovati, da nije izvještačena.

[...] vjerodostojan pjesnik koji stoji pred vama i čita vam na glas svoj rad značajno će doprinijeti izgledima da se povjeruje njegovom djelu, a još dojmljivije će djelovati mogućnost svjedočenja barem djelomičnog stvaranja same pjesme pred vašim očima tijekom njene izvedbe. (Middleton, 2002, 39)

Kako, bez pripovijedanja, bez argumenta, bez iznošenja obrane, čitateljica/izvođačica može uvjeriti svoju publiku da poslušat tekstualni materijal koji ona uprizoruje, da mu posveti pažnju, i da ga prihvatiti kao značajan, uvjerljiv, ili na neki način dojmljiv?

Jedan od načina razmatranja iznesenog tekstualnog materijala je da ga opišemo kao raznovrsno artikuliranu površinu teksta kroz formalne ili muzičke termine. U tom slučaju, promjene boje glasa, njegova jačina, snaga ili vrijeme neće se odnositi na konotativne aspekte riječi ili rečenica, već na njihovu denotativnu razinu. Tekst postaje poprište igre varijacija u naglašavanju, glasovi pritom ne djeluju kao "odjek smisla", već mogu biti jedne od glavnih smjernica za pronalaženje onog što je njegov smisao. U najformalnijem prilaženju i pridavanju pažnje materijalu, materijal koji se čita čuje se kao niz zvukova, fonema, slogova, riječi koje se grupiraju u izraze, ali njihov osnovni utjecaj ili snaga počiva u njihovom zvuku, a ne u činjenici što su nosioci smisla. Smisao koji može djelovati onomatopejski, ili geste, ritmovi, ili govorne izvedbe koje se stvaraju analoški, mogu biti shvaćeni od strane publike kao važnija namjera izvedbe/čitanja, i kao takve pojedine riječi i njihov semiotički sadržaj bit će podređeni drugim razumskim i osjetilnim načinima.

I problematizacija "čitanja" kroz nesigurnosti koje su sastavni dio njegove "izvedbe" sredstvo je udaljavanja od ustrajanja na pisanju o nečemu – uključujući i premisu da je osnovna zadaća izvedbe reprodukcija doslovnog jezika izvornog glasa koji stoji iza tiskanog teksta. (Benson, 85)

Čitateljica može predstaviti riječi svog teksta kao značajne i označavajuće, dozvoljavajući da slušatelji osjete težinu konotacije.

Pažljivo odmjeravajući u svojoj predstavi snagu, vrijeme, ili način izgovora raznih riječi, fraza, ili rečenica, ona može potaknuti igru označavanja, posebno pomičući naglasak s očekivanog mjesta ili komadajući rečenicu. Mijenjajući snagu, radikalno izmjenjujući njen očekivani ritam, čitateljica daje slušateljima mjesta da djeluju u i oko riječi. Ona se bori protiv otupljivanja čula držeći svoje slušatelje na vršcima prstiju, potičući ih da uvijek iznova procjenjuju odnose među riječima i frazama s namjerom da shvate kako značenje djeluje u njenom tekstu, skrećući im pažnju na mogućnosti varijacije značenja, te na način na koji je određena varijacija u skladu s načinom iznošenja/izvedbe i/ili je s njim u suprotnosti.

Predmeti želje, ja sam došla ovamo s razlogom. Donoseći bol i uzgajajući žito. Od otpadnog materijala. U ovim uvjetima. To je kontrolni mehanizam. Tko je rekao da sam ja divna. Ljubljani je zbog toga od mene. Kako bi se rasprostranili i parili. Kako bi obrali izgubljena stabla. kako bi doživjeli čistu strahotu. (Jarnot, 106)



Ivana Sajko: Auto-referential reading, BAD co., foto © Nada Žgank, Cow 2005.

what is it here now I can persuade
you of? scraps towards a rhetoric
of poetry performance

what can I persuade you of? that I am here now speaking to you? or reading to you, delivering myself of words to you, my words? others' words? do you know if they are my words? do you need to know if they are my words? these words I deliver, what do they persuade you of? that you have heard them, that they are here now in this space between us? are you persuaded that these words have been chosen, ordered, considered? how can you know this, can I persuade you of this? persuade you to keep listening? what is it you are persuaded to listen to? that something is worthy of your attention? what can you believe outside of this context of the words and hearing them and recognizing them?

I am here speaking to you, here before you. I am here now before you speaking to you. You are there across from me, across that division that marks our distinct roles in this exchange. I am speaking to you from here, to you over there. These words I speak to you are my words, my words to you.

The audience is very quiet as [the poet] moves to the microphone. He says something. The voice is hoarse, hardly audible, barely understandable, but heard – attention is focused, as in the quiet moments just before a string quartet's recital. (Stern, 67)

My silence is listened to along with my speech, you attend to my movement and my stillness. The words and the not words, and the body, my body.

I didn't mean to be so much the object of display, but it was probably naïve of me to miss it. (Benson, 77)

Here before you I am on show, I am the show, displayed for observation.

you can recognize
it there it is it's visually a correct
cognition. it's usually displaced or you
can see it displayed. splayed. one
touches one. if so you can do it
with the significance. (Andrews, 26)

You grant me significance, seeing me before you. Hearing these words you recognise the situation, the situation that touches both of us, by which we touch each other.

If rhetoric is oral, speakers thus stake their senses of personal, social, and physical well-being upon their ability to instigate, sustain, and direct relationships with listeners in such ways as shall seem to serve the ends of both. (Arnold, 166)

We are at opposite ends of this casting of roles, this assumption of characters, of my throwing my voice to you, at you. We relate along this verbal axis.

Suddenly he stops. His head droops. [...] he is silent for what seems like minutes. I wonder – everyone wonders – if he can go on. (Stern, 69)

if a reader / performer is not seeking in 'her' words, or in the delivery of 'her' words, to persuade the listeners of the validity of some point of view (where would the point of view be located / sited), nor of the authenticity of her utterance (that would necessarily depend on a notion of an authentic self that speaks), nor of the coherence of an argument, or of the whole / closed / complete text (measured from where, using what guidelines), then what is she performing? what does the audience listen to, what holds their attention (if it does, or if it does so fleetingly or fluctuatingly), what do they hear?

I am here reading to you. Reading in front of you from a script. Reading to you from my script, from my pages, from my book. This script I read from is not seen by you, it is hidden, it is part of the mystery of the exchange. You cannot see the script, this reading is from that hidden script. You listen as I vocalise the text, the text hidden on these my pages, as I make it available to you.

There's always a private part, which becomes a dramatic part, in these public readings. It's a reference to the reader only witnessing the page s/he reads from, even though everyone present ostensibly gets to hear the whole text, more whole for its embodiment through the voice. What's the mystery of the text? A facticity, the act of it there, meaning nothing, triggering meaning between lines, figure-ground relations, the potential creases. (Benson, 79)

Without a guide in the form of a set of instructions, in the form of a score, how am I, the reader / performer to plausibly read my text, what am I persuading my listeners of / to?

Without a score (the score a musician might use, the notation a dancer might work from) I am not persuading them of my successful delivery of the text, of my ability to follow that score. This measure of competence or this validation of the performance is not present and may therefore be irrelevant.

this turns a reader meaning
a dual is not a social contract.
Make of your hands a place not a tool.
And understand by here
an employee. The route of writing
not the root of language. (McCaffery, 64)

The text presented in the reading is the reader's (in as much) as she delivers it, but she need not claim to own it, or to have special access to its meanings or any intentions of / for the text. (This is not to say that the reader doesn't know the procedure employed to generate the text, or the sources of the text, or even the impulses or desires that led to the writing of the text). The audience comes into possession of the text (with the reader) in the reading, and their prior knowledge of language, or words, of cultural material, their desires for and expectations of the work, their intentions will impact on their hearing of it in that present.

I walked into a large room. I said, no, it's not my birthday and you showed me how to paint a sunset in the tent. I came home and you were on fire. (Jarnot, 103)

The reader / performer presents the text using gesture and pitch and intonation, and these momentarily fix the text, they are *that* reading. Another vocalization of the text might shift the tones, might change the emphases, might be gestured differently, giving a sense that the author-reader is not intent on revealing a particular meaning or set of associative charges immanent in the text. The sounds, the tones may well be different the next time she reads it, to a different audience who will know only the version they hear; on another reading some lines may work better and get a laugh, others may set off an unexpected echo of the days news, or the presence of a named person in the audience can shift the resonance of a particular phrase.

Neither the spoken voice, nor the "I" that speaks graphemically on a sheet of paper, nor the body of the reader in front of an audience can ever *truly* be the self of the poem. What you or I or any other reader or listener might bring to the text, [...], participates in that construction. If there is an imbalance in the power relation between author and audience, in that only one produces the signifying chain of the text, this dynamic is itself open to the admission to awareness and negotiation between these two roles. If, socially and historically, any poem is open to that critical appropriation I've called ventriloquism, it is because the *power of presence* (POP) triggers latent meaning. But it is ventriloquism that codes it. (Silliman, 372)

There is/are gap(s) between the self in the room before the audience speaking reading and the self/selves written onto the sheet script from which she reads. There are shifts in power between the protagonists at the reading, the variable contributions they make to the situation in the present. Ventriloquism is experienced as a sense of the speaking body of the reader as a channel for the words, a channel through which they pass and by which they are given audible form. For Silliman, this ventriloquism leads to a narrowing of possibilities for the poem in the reading, it fixes or interprets the text around the presence of the speaker reader (373). Is this because we expect the rhetorical speaker to persuade us, to become a protagonist in a struggle to present meaning, an argument, in a way that a printed text in a private reading situation does not always propose? Without a sense of an authentic self (behind the words) (responsible for the words) then the persuasion of the audience of the possibility of the revelation of such a self is not part of the performance. It may come to the reader as part of her task to persuade the listeners that to seek such an authenticating voice in her performance is not what they are being asked or expected to do.

The poems are as poignant, as remarkable in the hearing as they were in the reading, and even without one word of [her language], one can sense their meaning as she recites them. (Stern, 70)

if the text is not directed towards delivering a particular message, or towards explicating a specific issue or problem, or towards exposing some truth, then the conventions of rhetorical persuasion must function strangely within it; where does the objective of their deployment lie? where is the subject whose utterances are plausible? where is the truth or state of things of which the listeners are being persuaded?

I am here writing to you, writing to you of speaking, writing to you of reading. I am here now before you, writing to you in my words, revealing the text to you on my pages. I make these words available to you. These words you see, you read, you hear.

What kind of theatre is this, where there is only one performer, usually not trained in acting or even public speaking techniques, where she performs a text often already well-known, not particularly written to be performed or even read out loud, not particularly written to be “theatre?” (Stern, 75)

The performance modes in this form of theatre are distinct from the conventions of acting or playing a role, there is a mix of appearing natural – as a witness must in a witness box, while also being persuasive, but not persuasive artfully, but by the hiding of art in a performance of naturalness.

When a persuasion has to become a scene of persuasion one is no longer in the same way persuaded of its persuasiveness. (Paul de Man, quoted in Weitin, 539-40)

I must perform a natural delivery of my words, must appear to present them to you as they are, not in a special pleading, not in a specific performed mode, this must convince or persuade or gain your adherence, you the listeners, for the duration of the reading, of the rhetorical event.

The audience appreciates, surely, but it also “believes.” The very fact that it has come to hear this poet read – rather than to read this poet in private – is an act of belief in the power, quality, and validity of the poet’s work. (Stern, 79-80)

There is a belief in the event, in the group, in the validating power of the institution, in the wish to be part of a group that believes. This is a publication of the group’s reading/listening, and at the same moment a publication of the poets writing/speaking. What is it that the audience believes in in the situation of the reading, what is it they have faith in? They may already know the reader/performer, and that knowledge (personal, professional, academic) may form the foundation of a faith in what she, the reader/performer, writes and reads. For an audience with this prior knowledge, what rhetorical work does the reader/performer need to engage in, what is she to persuade them of? Will any utterance of hers already be granted significance, or must she still frame and shape that utterance in order for a particular mode of listening to take place? If so, then what sort of listening does experimental or non-lyric poetry demand (or require)? and in parallel, what strategies of reading/performance are required for it to be heard (properly)? Must both the reading and hearing be appropriate? A discourse of propriety, of property, is introduced into the reading site – the reader (author) performer proffers her property, her production, produces her text (again) in performance, and with the appropriate framing, the appropriate gestures, offers this to the listening attendant audience, who behave appropriately in receiving this gift, this given, this occasional gesture.

The “warrant” however, for the poetry reading does not come from the “truth” of the poems, but rather from their recognition as poetry by the authorizing, organizing group – a society, university department etc. – which has arranged the particular reading [...]. (Stern, 74)

The frame for the situation of reading is set up outside of the protagonists --- the authority of the figure standing before me is given authority by the institution, and by the fact that she speaks her words.

In the confrontations of oral rhetoric one must *stand with* his symbolic acts. His personal presence (even if only by voice) is itself symbolic, rhetorical action. His verbal and physical behaviours merge to form a flow of symbolic activity representing to the listener the rhetorical speaker’s entire physical and psychological organization [...]. All this is *carried* to the listeners for interpretation and judgement. More than signification, verbal and gestural, occurs. A self that is not an abstraction but has a body supportively authorizes each signification. (Arnold, 164)

In performing the reading, the performer has at her disposal other tools, other materials than she has in writing, than she has on the page (some of the page specific visual tools not being available), and she can choose to use these to articulate the textual surface, to deploy the textual material, in time, in vocalisation, in volume, in space and movement, in ways that can be mapped onto the spatial and typographic possibilities of the page.

The fact of orality means some degree of interdependence prevails or is going to prevail between speaker and others, for mutually influential interaction or the expectation of it is inescapable in speaking and being spoken to.

The fact of orality also generates whatever meanings any participant in orality has learned to attach to associations with other humans and to the processes of sustaining them by means of speech and listening. (Arnold, 161)

Oral rhetoric is founded on exchange, on an exchange of not only meaning but a back and forth exchange of expectation, of association, of action, of faith.

An abstract poem by Bruce Andrews, in which profanities and obscenities are spoken in different tones, genders, and political standpoints, with no immediate framing context, [...] requires readers to trust that this work matters, should be listened to, that the phrases mean what they appear to mean and are not code for something else entirely, and that the effect is one intended by the author. (Middleton, 2002, 38)

In reading / performing a text where there is no narrative thread, where the material is not organised around a story, where it is not held together by a chain of links at the level of content, the work of the performer may lie in persuading the listeners that a text is being performed, that this is not an incoherent jumble of textual matter (or if that is what it is, then it is this that is of relevance in this situation). What the performer must persuade the listeners of, is that there is something to hear, that listening is a valid response, and that there is something to hear here now.

It is all too easy to treat a poem as a fraud or a hoax, [...]. For a poem to be met with sufficient commitment to be able to work, it needs some reinforcement that this particular poem can be trusted, it is not a fake. [...] a solid poet standing in front of you reading the work aloud will add significantly to the viability of trusting the work, and even more persuasive will be the opportunity to witness the poem at least partly coming into being in front of your very eyes during a performance. (Middleton, 2002, 39)

How, without a narrative, an argument, or a plea, can the reader / performer persuade her audience to listen to the textual material she is presenting, to give it attention, and to consider that material as significant, plausible or persuasive in some manner?

One mode of reconsidering the textual material presented is as a variously articulated textual surface to be addressed in formal or musical terms, then the sense of the shifts in pitch, modulation, force or time will relate not to the connotative aspects of the words or sentences, but to the denotative levels. The text becomes a field of play for variations in emphasis, the sounds thus are not working as an “echo to the sense”, but may be one of the (chief) guides to what may be the sense. In the most “formalist” attending to or attention to the material, the material being read is heard as a sequence of sounds, of phonemes, of syllables, words, words that are gathered into phrases, but their primary impact or force is as sounds, not as sense carrying packages. Sense that may work onomatopoeically, or gestures, rhythms, or vocalisations that generate analogically, can be sensed by the audience as the more important intention of the performance / reading, and as such the individual words and their semiotic content will be subordinate to other sensing, sensual, sensory modes.


And the problematization of “reading” through the insecurities inherent in the “performance” of it has been a means of derailment from the insistence of about-ness – including the premise that the performance was about the job of reproducing the literal language of/through the authentic voice behind the printable text. (Benson, 85)

A reader may present the words of her text as significant and signifying, allowing the weight of connotation to be felt by the listeners. By presenting in terms of force, time, or modulation the various words, clauses, or sentences, she can allow for a play of signification to occur, in particular by shifting modulation away from that which might be expected or by breaking a clause. By altering the force, by radically shifting her pace, the reader gives the listener room to operate in and around the words. She works against a dulling of the sense(s) by keeping the listener on her toes, by encouraging the listener to reassess the relationships of word to word and phrase to phrase and so to consider how meaning is operating in the text, how the possibility of variation of meaning is being pointed to, and how this variation is in synchrony with the mode of delivery / performance and / or how it is in opposition to it.

Objects of desire, I came here for a reason. Bringing pain and growing wheat. From scrap material. In these conditions. It is a control mechanism. Who said I was wonderful. Beloved therefore to me. To spread and couple. To pick lost trees. To have a clean disaster. (Jarnot, 106)

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K. Kozyra: *Nightmare*, Teatro Sociale di Trento, 2004. (Courtesy of Galleria Civica di Arte Contemporanea Trento)

Dimenzije stvarnosti

Leonida Kovač

Ima govora bez odgovora, i ne radi se o pitanju. Dalje.

1983. godine Federico Fellini snima film *E la nave va*. U slobodnom prijevodu "I brod plovi". U hrvatskom, kao i u engleskom, uostalom, kao i u bilo kojem prijevodu, gubi se onaj nezadrživi fluid sadržan u zvučnosti originalnog Fellinijeva naslova, ona gotovo neprimjetna no esencijalna turbulencija izazvana veznikom na početku rečenice, veznikom koji gramatički gledano, ništa ne povezuje s konstativnim iskazom koji mu slijedi, iskazom koji konstatira da brod plovi. Fonetski ritam rečenice, započete gramatički potpuno nefunkcionalnim veznikom, odvodi nas u prostor gdje se granica između stvarnosti i fikcije otapa, i gdje fikcija, ma koliko groteskna bila, postaje stvarnom. *E*, taj jedva čujni veznik, ne upućuje na izricanje, primjerice činjenice da brod plovi, već na disanje, na ono što prethodi glasu koji govori. I upravo je to ono što je neprevedivo: istinsko iskustvo postojanja.

Radnja Fellinijeva filma događa se u osvit Prvog svjetskog rata na najluksuznijem postojećem brodu kojim probrani pripadnici "jet-seta"- prinčevi, kontese, lordovi, čuveni svjetski glazbenici - plove prema svome odredištu. Odredište je mjesto na pučini, a cilj putovanja ispunjenje posljednje želje najslavnije operne dive. Njezin pepeo na određenom mjestu treba prosuti u more. Glamurozno krstarenje zapravo je sprovod. *E la nave va*.

Krajem svibnja 2004. u Teatro Sociale di Trento, Katarzyna Kozyra izvodi performance koji naslovljuje *Nightmare*. Taj performance jedna je od sekvenci njezina rada *In Art Dreams Come True* čija je forma поближе označena konvencionalnim terminom *work in progress*. U umjetnosti snovi postaju stvarnost - rad u nastanku. Pod tim je nazivom performance *Nightmare* uostalom i najavljen na pozivnici čijim je tekstom publika obaviještena da je za prisustvovanje događaju obavezna svečana odjeća i dojam iznimne elegancije. Da se doista radi o pozivnici za gala koncert potvrđuju i ispisana imena javnosti poznatih pijanista i mezzosopranistica. Dok se publika okupljala u foajeu kazališta, Katarzyna Kozyra, odjevena u bijelu satensku haljinu koja konstrukcijom naliči onoj koju na Velasquezovoj slici nosi Infantkinja Margarita, šeće od pozornice do foajea gdje izabire osobe iz publike čija će lica kazališne vizistkinje preobraziti određenim make-upom. Istodobno, Maestro, koji je ujedno i Ceremonijal Majstor, vodi publiku do njihovih mjesta u gledalištu gdje im livrirani konobari poslužuju šampanjac i slatkiše, a ponetko dobiva i cvijet. Dok publika zauzima svoja mjesta na velikom ekranu obješenom nad pozornicom, projicira se video-snimka dostojanstvene pogrebne povorke koja se u svitanje kreće praznim ulicama stare gradske jezgre Trenta. Umjesto lijesa, četvorica u crno odjevenih muškaraca nose koncertni klavir u kojemu sjedi Katarzyna Kozyra, odjevena u istu haljinu u kojoj nastupa u kazalištu, i gleda - pogledom identičnim onome zabilježenom na fotografijama kojima je strukturiran njezin rad *Olimpia*. Radi li se o aktivnom ili o odsutnom pogledu? I što to ona gleda?

Na drugom projekcijskom platnu, smještenom po sredini gledališta, odvija se direktan prijenos zbivanja u kazalištu kojeg snima pet televizijskih kamera, smještenih u ložama, foajeu i na samoj pozornici. U jednom se trenutku na pozornici, u ulozi konferansjea pojavljuje Fabio Cavallucci, direktor Galleria Civica di Arte Contemporanea (u kojoj istodobno traje umjetničina retrospektivna izložba), i najavljuje performance, operu u tri čina, koja zapravo i nije operna izvedba na kakvu smo navikli, jer u ovoj sudjeluje i publika od koje se očekuje da doslovce čini sve što poželi. Ispričavši publici "libretto", odnosno objasnivši da je performance zapravo uprizorenje umjetničina sna, noćne more u kojoj ona nastupa na gala koncertu kao operna pjevačica i pri tom ne zna pjevati, Cavallucci najavljuje prvi čin. Trojica nekad svečano odjevenih, a sada napola razodjevenih muškaraca, unose na pozornicu koncertni klavir kojemu prilazi pijanist (Jacopo Mazzonelli) i otklapa ga. Iz njega trojica muškaraca vade Kozyru i postavljaju je na pozornicu. Koncert može početi. Publika aplaudira, baca umjetnici cvijeće, umjetnica trga cvijeće iz vaza smještenih duž čitave pozornice i baca ga na publiku, koju uz to zasipa i ogromnom količinom čokoladnih bombona. Nakon nekog vremena, uz klavirsku pratnju Kozyra počinje pjevati *Voi che sapete*, ariju Kerubina iz Mozartovog *Figarovog pira*. Njezin je pogled usmjeren prema loži u kojoj sjedi Maestro (igra ga poljski operni pjevač Grzegorz Pitulej) i gestikulirajući daje joj instrukcije za pjevanje. Pri tom se Maestrov lik ukazuje na ekranu smještenom iza umjetničinih leđa, a direktan prijenos onoga što Maestro čini u loži može se pratiti na velikom projekcijskom platnu koje se nalazi u gledalištu.

U drugom činu Maestro silazi na pozornicu i smješta se uz klavir nasuprot Kozyri koja bi trebala otpjevati ariju *Non so più che sono*. Maestro nije zadovoljan njezinim pjevanjem i na pozornici se pojavljuje operna pjevačica Daniela Sanniccolo odjevena u barokni kostim Kerubina, te polako ali sigurno preuzima Kozyrinu ulogu. Dok Maestrove kretnje odaju oduševljenje Kerubinovim pjevanjem, Kozyrin izraz lica sve nedvosmislenije pokazuje znakove očaja. Na kraju drugog čina, kao na kraju box matcha, Maestro podiže ruku pobjednice - Daniele Sanniccolo. Kozyra, pada na pod i leži kao u knock-outu. Ekran na pozornici pokazuje snimku u kojoj se Kozyra, u istoj haljini Infantkinje, penje na lomaču na kojoj će biti spaljena. Dok na ekranu pratimo spaljivanje koje se, dakako, događa u Trentu, gradu u kojemu je sredinom 16. stoljeća održan Crkveni Koncil, kojemu je glavna tema bila protestantizam i ostale hereze, između pozornice i gledališta diže se dimna zavjesa.

Najavljujući treći čin Cavallucci poziva publiku na pozornicu. Maestro poljupcem budi Kozyru iz mrtvih, i ona je spremna za novu ulogu. Zamolvši publiku da joj dade nešto od svog raskošnog nakita, Kozyra umjesto Mozartovog Kerubina postaje Gretchen iz Gounodovog *Fausta*. I dok se iz krčmećeg razgla-

sa ori snimka operne izvedbe dueta Fausta i Gretchen, Maestro u plesnom koraku pozornicom pokreće Kozyrino gotovo beživotno tijelo. Prizor neodoljivo podsjeća na sekvencu iz Felinijevog filma u kojemu Casanova na kraju pokušava zavesti i drvenu lutku. Nakon scene uznesenja Gretchen kojom je iscrpljen goetheovski scenarij, performance ne završava, već se nastavlja partyjem na pozornici gdje umjetnica poziva pojedince iz publike da zavire u objektiv kamere smještene na podu pozornice. Ono što kamera pri tom vidi istodobno postaje vidljivo na velikom ekranu smještenom u gledalištu. Što to kamera vidi s tako bliskog motrišta? Što to publika vidi na velikom ekranu? Izobličena lica elegantno odjevene publike nagnuta nad beživotno lice "pokojnice". Čiji to pogled zapravo vidi kako oni gledaju? I tko su oni? Operna publika ili pogrebna povorka? Učinak ovih dvaju pogleda mogao bi se sažeti onom Lacanovom frazom "vidjeti se kako se vidim", koja istodobno uspostavlja i poništava razliku između kategorije sebe i Drugoga. No, čemu opera?

Nightmare razformljuje formu opere. *Razformiti formu*: to bi se moglo shvatiti kao imperativ Kozyrinog umjetničkog djelovanja, kao performativni učinak svakog od njezinih radova.

No, što je to forma?

Prethodnim sam rečenicama pokušala prepričati scenarij Kozyrinog performansa, ali učinak, i uvjetno rečeno, smisao, nesvodiv je na opis vidljivih događaja. Ovim, kao i svim svojim ranijim radovima Katarzyna Kozyra zahtijeva živu tjelesnu percepciju - iskustvo bivanja u slici koju netko drugi promatra. A kakva je to slika? Stvarnost? San? Umjetnost? Performativ njezinog performansa očituje se upravo u relativiziranju i otapanju granica između tih kategorija. Ako u umjetnosti snovi postaju stvarnost, što je to umjetnost i čija je to stvarnost?

Pojam stvarnosti proizveden Kozyrinom *Noćnom morom* klizi izvan, ispod i preko onih čuvenih parametara *sada i ovdje*, jer *sada* je istodobno i prije i poslije, i u snu i na javi, a *ovdje* je uvijek i negdje drugdje. Na to nas ne upućuje samo takozvana multimedijalnost posredstvom koje se u Trentu dogodio performance, već i niz kulturalnih referenci koje, u formi diskurzivnih figura što posjeduju izraziti konotativni naboj, Kozyra koristi u svom redateljskom postupku događaja koji naziva *Noćnom morom*. Primjerice, pogrebna povorka u kojoj umjetnica u haljini određenog kroja biva nošena u klaviru, mogla bi upućivati na Ravelovu *Pavanu za preminulu Infantkinju*. Zacijelo, u povijesti umjetnosti najpoznatija Infantkinja jest ona koju slika Velasquez - Margarita. Margarita je i Gretchen iz Gounodove opere, a prisutna je i u Bulgakovljevom romanu gdje u nesanici Okrutnog Prokuratora Judeje životi mnogih likova postaju noćne more, a raznorazna bića doživljavaju posve čudnovate preobrazbe. Gotovo poput Kozyre koja bivajući ujedno i Diva i Učenica i Olimpia i Infantkinja i Kerubin i Gretchen i tko zna što još, izvedbom *Noćne more* postavlja niz pitanja o relaciji pojma subjekta i pojma identiteta. *Može li Subjekt shvatiti samoga sebe? Nadalje, je li Subjekt kao takav misliv?* Gdje je prostor Drugoga, koji nije objekt nego subjekt, koji međutim, *ne znači isto?*¹

¹ Ispisujući kurzive u tri zadnje rečenice ovog pasusa referirala sam na tekst Shosane Felman: "But if to comprehend is, on the other hand (taken in its metaphoricak and spatial sense), to enclose in onself, to embrace, to include, i.e., to contain within certain limits, the question then becomes: how can we comprehend *without* enclosing in ourselves, *without confining*! How can we understand the Subject, without transforming him (or her) into an object? Can the Subject comprehend itself? Is the Subject *thinkable* as such? To put the question differently: is the *Other* thinkable? Is it possible to think the Other, not as an object, but as a subject, a subject who would not, however, amount to the same?" (Shosana Felman, *Writing and Madness: Literature/Philosophy/ Psychoanalysis*, Stanford University Press, Palo Alto, California, 2003., pp. 41-42)

² Naslov francuskog izvornika *Les mots et les choses: Une archéologie des sciences humaines*, Ed. Galimard, Paris, 1966.

Svoju Čuvenu Arheologiju humanističkih znanosti, naslovljenu Riječi i stvari,² koja se u engleskom prijevodu pojavljuje pod simptomatičnim naslovom Poredak stvari (The Order of Things), Foucault počinje čitanjem Velasquezove slike *Las Meninas*. Slike u čijem se kompozicijskom središtu nalazi lik Infantkinje Margarite u kojemu, međutim nije locirano značenjsko središte. Smisao čuvene slike ne nalazi se u onome što je na njoj vidljivo, u prikazanome, u onome podložnome prikazivanju, reprezentabilnome. Zapičamo li se što je *Las Meninas* i ustvrdimo li da je to portret počasnih gospođica, ili portret Infantkinje Margarite, njezinog psa i njezinih patuljaka, ili autoportret dvorskog slikara, portret kralja i kraljice u formi bljeska zrcala u stražnjem planu slike, ili portret muškarca koji tamo negdje u daljini ulazi ili izlazi iz iluzioniranog prostora slike, mimoići ćemo performativ same slike.

Ova slika nije bilješka pogleda koji identificira stvari dovodeći ih u stanje mirovanja i pri tom ih mortificira, već ono što ih pokreće i daje im život. Ono što inducira proces nezaustavljivog pojavljivanja novih slika unutar jedne slike koja neprestano premiješta vlastito središte.

Kozyrin *Nightmare* čini to isto: slike, njihova simultanost i mnogostrukost neprestano premiještaju središte. Koja je od njih stvarna? Ona ispred nas na pozornici? Ona na projekcijskom platnu nad pozornicom? Ona iza nas, u gledalištu? Mi kao slika koju netko gleda s pozornice? Mi kao slika samih sebe dok se iz gledališta promatramo na projekcijskom platnu? U kojem vremenu i gdje? Sada i uvijek negdje drugdje.

Performativnost *Nightmare*a manifestira se u njegovoj vrtložnosti. Vrtložnost istodobno apsorbira i izbacuje, zaposjeda mjesto i napušta ga, briše granicu između unutrašnjeg i vanjskog i pri tom pitanje razlike između stvarnog i fiktivnog čini bespredmetnim, jer želja može postojati jedino kroz fantazme, a *Nightmare* je uprizorenje fantazmi. Diva nastupa na pozornici i ne zna pjevati. Mjesto radnje: prostor između *morati* i *ne moći*. Kozyra mora pjevati. Zašto baš pjevati?

Pokušam li reprezentirati vrtlog, nacrtat ću spiralnu formu. Spirala je decentrirana forma. Značenje znaka spirale u simboličkom je sustavu analogno značenju pojma labirinta. Simbolika labirinta redovito se vezuje uz takozvane rituale prijelaska, rituale u kojima pojedinac ili pojedinka biva prisiljen/

a definirati vlastiti rodni identitet koji je u osnovi društveni identitet. Internalizirajući jezik, govorni subjekt treba se uspostaviti unutar jezika i time ući u simbolički sustav u kojemu znakovi, pa tako i označitelji identiteta imaju precizno određena značenja. Postati forma koja cirkulira u procesima društvene razmjene i usvojenim identitetom reprezentirati značenja koja se konstituiraju unutar te razmjene.

U radovima Katarzyny Kozyra performativnost razformljuje formu, prezentnost potkopava reprezentaciju i opoziva značenje. Poznato je da konvencionalno definirana stvarnost nije ništa drugo doli učinak reprezentacijskih praksi, a Kozyra tu činjenicu izriče naslovom svoga rada *In Art Dreams Come True*. U umjetnosti snovi postaju stvarnost.

Postoji bitna razlika između glagola *biti* i glagola *postajati*. Postajati jest *work in progress*. O tome nam govori video-instalacija *In Art Dreams Come True*, postavljena u formi labirinta čiji segmenti svojim baršunastim pregradama konotiraju kazališnu svlačionicu. Posve je jasno kako je priča ispričana. To je vidljivo. Međutim, pitanje na koje odgovor ne postoji glasilo bi **“Što je priča?”**. Jer, scenarij nije očit.

U kataloškoj bilješci objašnjenje rada dano je sljedećim tekstom: **“Katarzyna Kozyra vidjela je nastup Glorije Viagra, berlinske Drag Queen. Prisjeća se naivnih snova iz djetinjstva. Želi pjevati, plesati i na sceni zablistati kao zvijezda. Kamera prati Kozyru kroz taj proces preobrazbe koji će završiti gala koncertom pred publikom koju čine njezini prijatelji”**³.

A gala koncert na kojemu nisu prisustvovali samo prijatelji postao je noćna mora. Zašto? I gdje: u snu, u umjetnosti, ili u stvarnosti? I postoji li nešto, primjerice, poput baršunaste stijenke svlačionice, što jedno odvaja od drugoga?

Pred labirintom, u čijem se svakom odsječku nalazi mali monitor koji prikazuje snimku nečega što je **“kamera zabilježila prateći Kozyru kroz taj proces preobrazbe”**, postavljeno je veliko platno na kojemu se prikazuje trailer *In Art Dreams Come True*. U brzom izmjeni filmskih sekvenci vidimo snimku rock koncerta Glorije Viagra u berlinskom gay baru, Kozyru koja uči operno pjevanje uzimajući satove kod Maestra, pri čemu joj fotografija lica i snimka koncerta Marie Callas služi kao model za identifikaciju, nadalje Kozyru s pretjeranim, ali ne i konvencionalnim make-upom u publici noćnog bara...

Trailer nas, dakako, mami u labirint da pogledamo film. No što nam je dano da bude viđeno? Filmska priča nastala na temelju određenog scenarija, s određenom radnjom, zapletom i raspletom, to u svakom slučaju nije. Hibridnom formom koja u sebi sadrži konotacije različitih i heterogenih prostora- labirinta, svlačionice i kina - Kozyra razformljuje formu filma. Jer, film je društvena tehnologija, semiotički aparat u kojemu se događa susret kodova i društvenih formacija koji definiraju pozicije značenja i pojedinca, kojemu se taj aparat obraća kao subjektu.⁴ Film je, nadalje, reprezentacijska forma *par excellence*, a reprezentacija je, ako je vjerovati Deleuzeu i Guattariju, represija. Ona potiskuje želeću proizvodnju, a želja je to što proizvodi ono stvarno.⁵ Stoga Kozyrin film odbija reprezentirati. Umjesto montaže kao temeljnog postulata filmske sintakse, u labirintu vidimo demontirane segmente dokumentarnih snimki **“procesa preobrazbe”**, pri čemu njihova labirintoidna prostorna dispozicija onemogućuje identifikaciju određenog kronološkog slijeda. Identificiranje onoga što je bilo prije i onoga što je uslijedilo kasnije. Kao u snu, ili u nesvjesnome, sve postoji istodobno i na istom mjestu.

Kao u snu, lekcija opernog pjevanja postaje groteska: sado-mazohistički odnos učitelja i učenice. Ionesco? I upozorenje sluškinje profesoru: **“Ne počinjte s lingvistikom, svaka strada kad dođe do lingvistike”**. Ionescova drama završava seksualnim zločinom. Što je to u lingvistici što ga potiče?

Trailer *In Art Dreams Come True* otvara kadar u kojemu u krupnom planu vidimo otvorena usta Glorije Viagra koja pjeva u mikrofonski. U Kozyrinom performanceu naslovljenome *A Quarter of an Hour*, koji je također jedan od segmenata rada *In Art Dreams Come True*, održanom u listopadu 2004. u Music Hallu Carnegie Museum of Art u Pittsburgu, prikazuje se videozapis lekcije pjevanja u kojoj, među ostalim, Maestro učenici rastvara usta žicom. Ako su usta posredno mjesto između tijela i govora⁶, što je to tjelesno u lingvistici?

Čitajući Austinovu teoriju performativa kroz mit o Don Juanu, odnosno kroz postupak davanja obećanja koje se ne može izvršiti, Shosana Felman postavlja sljedeće pitanje: **“Ako je performativ zapravo obredni događaj želje, hoće li nas začuditi tvrdnja da želja performativa uvijek retorički slijedi obrazac simbolike seksualne želje?”**. Osvrćući se pritom na Austinov termin promašaja (*misfire*) iskazivanja, podsjeća na Lacanovu primjedbku da se takozvana Freudova seksualnost sastoji u tvdnji da je sve što je u vezi sa seksom vazda promašeno, a to je i osnova i načelo samog pojma fijaska. Sam promašaj može se odrediti kao ono što je seksualno u svakom ljudskom činu. Zaključujući kako Lacan, poput Austina (a nakon Freuda) ponavlja donžuanovski skandal, Felman tvrdi da ako se problem mita o Don Juanu zapravo sastoji u odnosu između erotike i lingvistike, skandal se ne nalazi

³ katalog *Katarzyna Kozyra*, Silvana Editoriale, Galeria Civica di Arte Contemporanea Trento, 2003

⁴ Teresa de Lauretis, *Alice Doesn't: Feminism, Semiotics, Cinema*, Macmillan, London, 1984., p. 14-15

⁵ Gilles Deleuze/Félix Guattari, *Anti-Edip*, Izdavačka knjižarnica Zorana Stojanovića, Sremski Karlovci, 1990. str. 149, 23

⁶ Shosana Felman, Skandal tijela u govoru: Don Juan s Austinom ili zavođenje na dva jezika, Naklada MD, Zagreb, 1993., str. 46

toliko u činjenici da je lingvistika uvijek erotika, već u činjenici mnogo skandaloznijoj - da je erotika uvijek lingvistika. Jer, skandal ne prebiva toliko u seksu koliko u jeziku, s obzirom da je prožet *činom neuspjeha* kojim tijelo promašuje samo sebe: čin neuspjeha kojim se *činjenje* tijela nikad ne uspijeva iskazati, dok *kazivanje* uvijek uspijeva učiniti. **7** *Nightmare*.

Radom *In Art Dreams Come True*, koji je, ne zaboravimo, *work in progress*, Katarzyna Kozyra ne prikazuje, nego iskazuje - pjeva proces preobrazbe, i to iskazivanje *uspijeva učiniti* prezentnim *činom neuspjeha kojim tijelo promašuje samo sebe*. Ona to čini pjevajući ariju Kerubina iz Figarovog pira: *Voi che sapete che cosa è amor, donne vedete s'io l'ho nel cor*. Kerubin se obraća onima koji znaju što je ljubav; ali kojega je roda Kerubin?

Kojega je roda Gloria Viagra, koja u radu *In Art Dreams Come True* podučava Kozyru ženstvenosti? Uči je stavljati make-up. Masku? Kostim? Uči u ulogu. Ili izaći iz uloge. Ili pojam uloge i njezino značenje u procesu uspostave pojma identiteta učiniti bespredmetnim. Paradoksalno, oduzeti smisao samom pojmu identiteta upravo kroz proces identifikacije.

Jer, prisjetimo se, identifikacija je psihološki proces kojim se subjekt poistovjećuje s nekim vidom, osobinom ili pridjevkom drugoga i potpuno se ili djelomično preobražuje po uzoru na nj. Identificiranje se izvodi na objektima: na osobi, na crti osobe ili na parcijalnim objektima.

Postupnim identificiranjem zasniva se i izlučuje ličnost. Pojam identifikacije u Freudovoj je teoriji od jednog od mnogobrojnih psiholoških procesa prerastao u radnju kojom se zasniva ljudski subjekt. Takav misaoni razvoj podudara se prije svega s isticanjem u prvi plan Edipovog kompleksa i njegovih strukturirajućih učinaka, te s preinakama što ih donosi druga teorija psihičkog aparata gdje instancije koje se izdvajaju polazeći od Ida, samosvojnost stječu kao izvedenice niza identifikacija. Freud pritom razlikuje dva načina funkcioniranja psihičkog aparata koje naziva primarnim i sekundarnim procesom. Primarni je proces svojstven sustavu nesvjesnog i u njemu psihička energija teče nesputano i nastoji zaposjesti predodžbe u vezi s doživljajima iz kojih se rađa želja. Freud definira uspostavu identiteta misli karakteristikom sekundarnog procesa svojstvenog sustavu predsvjesno - svjesno. Sekundarni proces ima funkciju podešavanja koju omogućuje uspostava *Ja*, čiji je glavni zadatak zapriječiti primarni proces. Suprotnost primarnog i sekundarnog procesa analogna je suprotnosti dvaju načina optjecanja psihičke energije - slobodne i vezane energije, a usporediva je sa suprotnošću načela ugone i načela stvarnosti. **8**

8 tumačenje Freudovih termina dano je prema J. Laplanche - J.-B. Pontalis, *Rječnik psihoanalize*, August Cesarec, Zagreb, 1992.



K. Kozyra: *Punishment and Crime*, 2002.

Uspostava *Ja*? *Voi che sapete che cosa è amor, donne vedete s'io l'ho nel cor*. Nel cor. U srcu. Što to? Može li se vidjeti i imenovati? Što činimo imenujući? Prepoznamo li po imenu ili imenujemo po prepoznavanju? I što je pritom s ugodom?

Tko je Gloria Viagra? Zacijelo antipod Maestru, mina koja raznosi dramaturgiju imanentnu operi koja počiva na nedvojbenom značenju pojedinih uloga. Na simboli koja reprezentirajući edipovsku strukturu želje generira donžuanovski mit, u čijoj je srži tvrdnja o činjenju tijela koje se ne uspijeva iskazati. I dok Maestro doslovce funkcionira kao utjelovljitelj edipovske matrice u smislu utiskivanja te matrice koja upisuje Ime Oca u živo tijelo, Gloria Viagra postojeći mimo Edipa rastjelovljuje značenje. On(a) upravo jest činjenje tijela koje se neprestano iskazuje. To jest performativno tijelo. Drag Queen. Maska pod maskom koja to nije. Glas pod riječju koja to nije. Ne govorni subjekt, već pjevajuće tijelo kao skandal mimo maske označitelja, ili maska (koja to nije) kao skandal odznačenog tijela. Lingvistika koja se ne uspijeva učiniti.

Govor bez odgovora. Dalje.

Judith Butler piše kako je, shodno poimanju identifikacije kao odglumljenog fantazma ili inkorporacije, jasno da je koherencija ono za čim se čezne, ono što je željeno, idealizirano, te da je ta idealizacija učinak tjelesnog značenja (corporeal signification). Drugim riječima, radnje, geste i želja proizvode učinak unutrašnje jezgre ili supstance, ali to proizvode na površini tijela kroz igru označujućih odsutnosti koje ukazuju, nikad ne obznajući organizirajuće načelo identiteta kao uzrok. Takve su radnje, geste i gluma, performativne u smislu da je bit identiteta koju one namjeravaju iskazati, izmišljotina koja se proizvodi i održava kroz tjelesne znakove i druga diskurzivna sredstva. Tvrditi da je rodom određeno tijelo (gendered body) performativno, znači da ono nema ontološki status koji bi bio neovisan od različitih činova koji konstituiraju njegovu stvarnost. To također znači da je stvarnost izmišljena kao unutarnja bit, a sama ta unutarnost učinak je i funkcija javnog i društvenog diskurza, javne regulacije fantazama kroz površinu politika tijela, kontrola granica roda koje diferenciraju unutarnje od vanjskog te na taj način instituiraju integritet subjekta. Ako je unutrašnja istina roda izmišljotina, a instinski rod fantazam upisan na površinu tijela, tada se čini da rodovi ne mogu biti ni istiniti ni lažni, već jedino proizvedeni kao istinski učinci diskurza primarnog i stabilnog identiteta.⁹

⁹ Judith Butler, *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity*, Routledge, London, 1999, p.173

Ako u radu *In Art Dreams Come True* svjedočimo lingvistici koja se ne uspijeva učiniti, ako nam performance *Nightmare* demonstrira relativnost značenja pojma budnog stanja, ili, ako hoćemo, stvarnosti, i posve opipljivim čini austinovski termin promašaja - *misfire*, rad iz 2002. naslovljen *Punishment and Crime* potapa sva postojeća značenja zvukom pogotka. Pogotka iz vatrenog oružja napunjenog bojevom municijom. Reality show?



Kazna i zločin? Referencija na Dostojevskog iskazana inverzijom njegova naslova ovdje ne postoji u smislu rekonstrukcije, ili dekonstrukcije (posve je svejedno) značenja pojma moralne dileme s kojim nas suočava priča o Raskolnikovu, babi lihvarici, novcu, cilju, sredstvu, pravdi, nepravdi, iskupljujućoj ljubavi, itd. *Punishment and Crime*, gromoglasnom paljbom raznosi sam pojam smisla. U akciji koju promatramo na velikom projekcijskom platnu i na nekoliko manjih monitora, u akciji koja je stvarna po tome što se doista događa, neki ljudi pod maskama pucaju iz automatskih pušaka, gađaju iz minobacača, spaljuju bacačima plamena. Promatramo i slušamo paljbu koja ne prestaje, čujemo zaglušujuću buku eksplozija, vidimo pogotke, pogođene objekte koji doslovce lete u zrak i gore. Performativ rada *Punishment and Crime* manifestira se u zamjećivanju nesvrhovitosti eksplozije i izgaranja koja je ujedno njihova nezaustavljivost i neminovnost. *Punishment and Crime* svojom izvedbom demonstrira razliku i rekonstituirajućim potezima mete i cilja. Meta ponekad postoji, ali ona nije lingvistički cilj, značenjski definiran pripisanim mu razlogom i svrhom akcije. Posrijedi je govor koji se lišava mogućnosti odgovora. Tko su ljudi čija su lica zaklonjena grotesknim maskama izrađenim po predlošku Playbojevih pin-up ljepotica? Ljudi koji ne ciljaju druge ljude, već strastveno raznose neupotrebljive predmete i pucaju u prazno. Prazno? Što je to praznina? Rizik od pogotka odbijenim metkom ili krhotinom ispaljenog projektila? Je li performance koji gledamo performance za kameru, takozvani video-art ili nešto drugo? Reality show. But what is really real?

Kazna ili zločin? Što prethodi, a što slijedi, postoji li uopće poslije koje slijedi nakon onoga prije?

Kazna slijedi kad se prekrši zakon. Legitimna je. Propisana zakonom. Jezik je zakon koji riječima propisuje značenje. Također i značenje pojmu zločina. Što znači otarasiti se riječi? Riječi koje bi mogle opisati zločin i propisati kaznu. *Punishment and Crime* upravo to čini, rješava se riječi. Bez komentara, na jednom od monitora vidimo prizor linča. Stablo na čijim se granama njišu obješena tijela. Zločin ili kazna? Zakon linča ili neki drugi western?

Western? Western, eastern, western, eastern, western....Film, ili značenje riječi? Pucati. Pogoditi. Što? Ušećerani rječnik filmsku industriju ponekad naziva tvornicom snova. Kako se proizvodi san? I što je uopće san?

Imaginacija. Nije li to, doslovce, proizvodnja slika. Imaginarno postavljeno u binarnu opoziciju sa stvarnim. I što je uopće stvarno?

U psihoanalitičkim teorijama *imago* se definira kao "nesvjesna predodžba", no radije negoli slika, posrijedi je stečena imaginarna shema, statični obrazac kroz koji subjekt promatra drugu osobu.¹⁰

¹⁰ J. Laplanche - J.-B. Pontalis, *Rječnik psihoanalize*, August Cesarec, Zagreb, 1992.

Pojam “imaginarno” osmišljen je u kontekstu Lacanove razrade zrcalnog stadija, pri čemu on inzistira na razlici između imaginarnog i simboličkog. Zrcalni stadij shvaćen je kao poistovjećivanje, tj. kao preobražaj koji se događa u subjektu kad usvaja sliku. Radosno usvajanje vlastite zrcalne slike na stupnju infansa pokazuje da se u jednoj egzemplarnoj situaciji očituje simbolička matrica u kojoj se ja sedimentira u prvobitnom obliku, prije nego što se objektivizira u dijalektici poistovjećivanja s drugim i prije nego što mu jezik (**langage**) u univerzalijama uspostavi njegovu funkciju subjekta. Funkcija zrcalnog stadija pokazuje se kao poseban slučaj funkcije imago, koja se sastoji u uspostavi odnosa organizma s njegovom stvarnošću - odnosa *Innenwelt*-a s *Umwelt*-om. Stadij ogledala - nastavlja Lacan - drama je koja u subjektu uhvaćenom na mamac prostornog poistovjećivanja proizvodi fantazme koji dolaze jedan za drugim, od raskomadane slike tijela, do oblika koji se zbog njegove potpunosti naziva ortopedskim, i baca ga na kraju prihvaćenom oklopu otuđujućeg identiteta koji će svojom krutom strukturom obilježiti cjelokupni mentalni razvoj jedinke.**11**

11 Jacques Lacan, Stadij ogledala kao tvoritelj funkcije Ja kakva nam se otkriva u psihoanalitičkom iskustvu, u *Spisi*, Prosveta, Beograd, 1983., str. 6-11

Eksplodije koje čujemo i promatramo u pokretnim slikama video-instalacije *Punishment and Crime*, uskraćuju nam očekivanu raskomadanu sliku tijela. Jer, scenarij nije očit. Posrijedi je neka druga drama, ona koja odbacuje jezične univerzalije koje uspostavljaju funkciju subjekta. Tko puca? Možemo li identificirati lica? Tko puca?

Strojnica. Strojnica je stroj. I želja je stroj. Tako barem Deleuze i Guattari. Prema njima želja je stroj i pripada poretku proizvodnje, a svaka je proizvodnja istodobno želeća i društvena, pri čemu nema želećih strojeva izvan društvenih strojeva koje oni formiraju u velikim razmjerima; i nema društvenih strojeva bez želećih koji ih nastanjuju u malim razmjerima.**12**

12 Deleuze-Guattari, op.cit., str. 242, 278

Veliki i mali razmjeri želećih i društvenih strojeva navode me prisjetiti se teksta objavljenog u jednim poljskim dnevnim novinama, u kojem se akcija iz koje nastaje *Punishment and Crime* proizvodi u senzaciju ne spominjući ime umjetnice, već nagađajući o identitetu sudionika performansa. Tekst koji potpisuje Tomasz Molga, i naslovljuje ga *Unabomber hara Poljskom* počinje ovako:

Imaju čitav arsenal: automatske strojnice, bacače plamena, gomilu eksplozivnog materijala i protutenskove bacače raketa. Putuju po Poljskoj dižući u zrak zgrade, tvorničke dimnjake, automobile....zbog svog vlastitog užitka. “Ti su ljudi fascinirani onim što čine. Oni su poput piromana, ali mnogo opasniji” - kaže gospodin X koji je odlučio obznaniti aktivnosti paravojne grupe - “Vrijeme je da tome dođe kraj prije nego što se dogodi nešto dramatično”. Prema našem sugovorniku ovi poljski “Unabomberi” su rukovodioci tvrtke u Varšavi. Pripadnici više klase.

....Neki to zovu bezazlenom aktivnošću, adrenalinskim pucnjem.... Gospodin X kaže da će, ukoliko nastave, imati potrebu za još snažnijim emocijama, pa će tako sebi postaviti i više ciljeve.**13**

13 citirano prema faksimilu novinskog teksta, odnosno njegovom engleskom prijevodu objavljenom u katalogu *Katarzyna Kozyra*, Silvana Editoriale, Galeria Civica di Arte Contemporanea Trento, 2003, p. 103

Potreba za snažnijim emocijama postavlja više ciljeve, a viši ciljevi mogli bi dovesti do drastičnog događaja. Tako barem kaže gospodin X koji je u ovoj priči paradigma, glas i savjest javnosti.

Štoviše, on je u samoj toj javnosti odlučio progovoriti. O čemu i zašto?

Odgovor bez govora. Dalje.

Vratila bih se ponovo Anti-Edipu, u kojemu čitam kako je zadatak društva kodirati želju i proizvesti strah, strepnju od dekodiranih tokova.**14** Vratila bih se ponovno Lacanovoj zrcalnoj fazi čija je funkcija poseban tip funkcije *imago*, a sastoji se u uspostavi odnosa organizma s njegovom stvarnošću - odnosa *Innenwelt*-a s *Umwelt*-om. Zrcalnoj fazi u kojoj se imaginarno kanalizira prema simboličkom, a simboličko je društveno, ono društveno koje kodira tokove želje. Ne zaboravimo, želja proizvodi ono stvarno. I upravo to simboličko jest ono što generira strah od dekodiranih tokova želje, smještajući ih u područje kojemu daje ime izvanjskoga. Pojam izvanjskog u simboličkom sustavu proizveden je u značenju *izvan simboličkoga*. Podsjetit ću ovdje na Adorno-Horkheimerovu konstataciju o prosvjetiteljstvu kao radikaliziranom mitskom strahu, gdje sama predodžba izvanjskosti postaje pravim izvorom straha.**15** Ta izvanjskost dakako, ne postoji u značenju lacanovskog *Umwelt*-a, okružja definiranog kao stvarnost. Ta izvanjskost postoji kao ne-stvarno, kao nestvarnost, kao utvara, kao prijetnja simboličkome, odnosno rasapu značenja njegovih znakova. Rasapu lingvistike koja je uvijek erotika. I to je ono na što gospodin X upozorava. Na prijetnju dekodiranih tokova želje, na opasnost od postojanja erotike mimo lingvistike. Erotike u kojoj tijelo ne promašuje samo sebe ne dajući obećanja. **Fire!**

14 Deleuze- Guattari, op.cit., str. 112

15 M.Horkheimer - Th.W. Adorno, *Dijalektika prosvjetiteljstva*, Veselin Masleša, Sarajevo, 1974., str. 30

Vratila bih se i lingvistici. Tko stradava kad ne dođe do lingvistike?

Oglašavanje javnosti redovita je pojava pri pojavi Kozyrinih radova. Potvrđuje li to moju tezu o performativnosti njezinih radova? Potvrđuje li to onu Lacanovu “Nema govora bez odgovora”? Međutim, postavila bih pitanje o pojmu razumijevanja. Što znači razumjeti značenje riječi? Jezik je, dakako, javan. No, što je javnost? Samo jedan od arbitrarnih znakova? Lingvistika.

1993. godine Kozyrin diplomski rad *Piramida životinja* izložen je na Odsjeku kiparstva Umjetničke akademije u Varšavi. Javnost ga je osudila kao primjer nemorala u modernoj umjetnosti. Rad se sastoji iz tri dijela. Prvi je skulptura *Piramida životinja* izrađena od prepariranih životinja: konja, psa, mačke i pijetla. Manja životinja postavljena je na leđa većoj. Drugi dio instalacije dokumentarni je video-zapis koji pokazuje postupak usmrćenja konja smrtonosnom injekcijom, odvajanje kože sa mrtve životinje i proces prepariranja. Događaju prisustvuje autorica rada čije su emotivne reakcije također snimljene. Treći dio je tekst koji se za vrijeme izlaganja nalazio na zidu prostorije u kojoj je bila postavljena skulptura i video monitor. U tom tekstu Kozyra opisuje svoj misaoni proces koji je prethodio izvedbi rada. Polazište je motiv piramide životinja koji se nalazi u bajci braće Grimm, međutim sadržaj bajke nije ju zanimalo. Bavila se pojmovima koji su, shodno diskurzu povijesti umjetnosti, imanentni među skulpture. To su pojam spomenika i pojam *ready madea*. Dakle, Kozyra je problematizirala samo značenje ustaljenih pojmova: što znači načiniti spomenik životinjama i što znači upotrijebiti već postojeći materijal? Gdje pronaći materijal za spomenik? Nije otišla, primjerice u prirodoslovni muzej i posudila preparirane životinje, već je izabrala žive životinje koje će biti usmrćene i preparirane, te osobno sudjelovala u ubijanju i preuzela odgovornost za njihovu smrt. U tekstu Kozyra postavlja pitanje je li proces stvaranja postao važniji od samog djela, ističući kao sadržaj samog djela paradoksalni odnos konačnog estetičkog učinka i stvaralačkog procesa.

U dugotrajnoj i žestokoj polemici u poljskim se medijima spominjao rad *Piramida životinja*, ali ne i ime njegove autorice. Isto se dogodilo deset godina kasnije pri pojavi rada *Punishment and Crime*. U jednom tekstu u Časopisu *Gazeta Wyborcza* od 18. kolovoza 1993., objavljen je tekst pod naslovom "Diploma kiparice ili grobokopačice?" u kojemu se govori o nadomještanju tehničkog neznanja bučnom izvedbom, i protestira protiv ubijanja zbog dekoracije. Kao odgovor na spomenuti napis, Katarzyna Kozyra šalje uredniku časopisa sljedeći tekst koji nikada nije objavljen:

Varšava 20. kolovoza 1993.
Dragi uredniče,

Ja sam autorica kompozicije nazvane "Piramida životinja". Zajedno s ovim komadom izvedenim od punjenih koža konja, psa, mačke i pijetla, nalazio se i komentar u kojemu sam izložila svoju motivaciju, stvaralački proces i sumnje koje su ih pratile. Postavila sam pitanje: treba li vrednovati samo skulpturu ili i proces njezinog stvaranja, kao i reakcije i iskustvo koje su s njim povezane? Tim činom izložila sam se konfrontacijama s ljudima koji misle različito od mene, ali i s onima od kojih sam očekivala respekt prema činjenicama. U međuvremenu se ponavljaju i objavljuju različite laži, među kojima i to da sam ja odgojila te životinje, izvrgnula ih patnji i ubila ih vlastitim rukama. To nije istina. Za vrijeme mog diplomskog ispita javno je obznanjeno da su kože psa i mačke skinute s mrtvih životinja, a pijetao i konj bili su u klaonici gdje sam ih kupila i dala uspavati. "Ubijeni" su sa svrhom drukčijom od izrade para cipela ili jedenja mesa, što je također nepoštivanje pravila koja se smatraju obvezujućim i humanim. Izricanje smrtno kazne životinjama na civiliziran i industrijski način događa se anonimno i izvan dosega pogleda njihovih kasnijih konzumenata. Otvoreno oduzimanje života životinji od strane pojedinca uzrok je šoka i osude. Svjesno sam se izložila tom testu. Moje promatranje smrti konja bilo je 100% jezivije od svih pogrdi kojima sam obasuta. Da bi bila dosljedna, na sebe sam preuzela i smrt životinja koje su već bile mrtve. Moja kompozicija općenito govoreći kazuje o smrti te o smrti ove konkretne četiri životinje. Nisam to učinila zbog pobuđivanja zadovoljstva i zbog tehničkog neznanja. Učinila sam to iz moje unutrašnje potrebe da postavim pitanje: jesmo li još uvijek svjesni smrti dok jedemo odreske, upotrebljavamo kozmetiku ili druge proizvode životinjskog podrijetla - ili je to učinkovito neutralizirano uz pomoć životinjskih predstavnika u domaćinstvima koji svakodnevno primaju naše osjećaje?

"Piramida životinja" jest kršenje normi u tretiranju smrti životinja kao fenomena koji nema ništa s konzumentom. To što sam odlučila upotrijebiti tu formu u mom prvom, umjetnički potpuno neovisnom radu nije zato jer se umjetnost u društvu tretira kao igra među umjetnicima koja se odvija u njihovom vlastitom dvorištu, daleko od važnih tema, ili zato što, kao što gđa. Xymena Zaniewska piše, umjetnost služi samo u dekorativne svrhe.

S poštovanjem,
Katarzyna Kozyra¹⁶


Mogla bih ovdje napisati nešto o umjetnosti. O umjetnosti u kojoj snovi postaju stvarnost. Čudne li koincidencije; ubiti životinju na civilizirani način naziva se uspavlivanjem.

Mogla bih ovdje napisati nešto o stvaralačkom postupku Katarzyny Kozyra, jer radi se o umjetnosti, a umjetnosti je imanentan pojam stvaralaštva; premda se kritika zadnjih desetljeća dvadesetog stoljeća žestoko obrušila upravo na taj pojam, jer umjetnik, odnosno umjetnica, nije Bog. Kreacija pripada Bogu, a Bog je, kažu, odavno mrtav. I evo nas opet do smrti.

Vratila bih se još jednom lingvistici. *Svaka strada kad dođe do lingvistike*. Zavodenje ili nasilje? Zaobidimo apsurd.

Voi che sapete che cosa è amor, donne vedete s'io l'ho nel cor.... Otpjevati na lomači koju potpaljuje ožalošćena povorka. Javnost. Pogreb je samo simbolička forma koja estetizira ne-značenje, paradoksalno, značenje smrti. Samo riječ. I što je iza nje, mimo lingvistike? Posve je svezjedno mogu li me uvjeriti retorika estetike ili estetika retorike.

¹⁶ tekst pisma citiran je prema katalogu Katarzyna Kozyra, *The Men's Batthouse*, Polish Pavilion, 48. International Biennale of Visual Arts, 1999., p. 97 -98



Dimensions of reality

Leonida Kovač

Translated from the Croatian by Ana Nakić-Mihočević, Language Lab

K. Kozyra: *Nightmare*, Teatro Sociale di Trento, 2004. (Courtesy of Galleria Civica di Arte Contemporanea Trento)

There is speech without an answer, and it is not about a question. Pass.

In 1983 Federico Fellini made the film *E la nave va*. In free translation this reads, “And the ship sails on”. When translated into Croatian, as well as into English, or any other language for that matter, the title loses that irresistible fluid contained in the resonance of Fellini’s original title, the almost imperceptible, however essential turbulence caused by the conjunction at the beginning of the sentence, the conjunction which from a grammatical point of view connects nothing with the constative statement that follows, the statement which constates that the ship sails on. The phonetic rhythm of the sentence, which starts with a conjunction that is completely non-functional grammatically, takes us to the space where the border between reality and fiction melts away, and where fiction, no matter how grotesque it is, becomes real. *E*, the barely audible conjunction, does not refer to the uttering of, for example, the fact that the ship sails on, but to breathing, to that which precedes the voice that is speaking. And it is precisely this what is untranslatable: the true experience of existence.

The plot of Fellini’s film is set in the dawn of the First World War on the most luxurious ship in existence with a select number of “jet-set” members: princes, countesses, lords, world-famous musicians – sailing towards their destination. The destination is a place in the deep sea, and the point of the journey is the fulfilment of the last wish of a famous opera diva. Her ashes are to be scattered into the sea at the specified place. The glamorous cruise is in fact a funeral. *E la nave va*.

At the end of May 2004, at the Teatro Sociale di Trento, Katarzyna Kozyra holds a performance she titles *Nightmare*. That performance is one of the sequences of her work *In Art Dreams Come True* whose form is more closely defined by the conventional notion of *work-in-progress*. In art dreams come true – a work in progress. This very expression is also used to announce the performance *Nightmare* on the invitation whose text informs the audience that in order to attend the happening formal attire and the impression of exceptional elegance is obligatory. That this really is an invitation for a gala concert is attested to by the printed names on the invitation of a well-known pianist and mezzo-soprano. While the audience is gathering in the theatre foyer, Katarzyna Kozyra, wearing a white satin dress whose shape and construction is similar to the one worn by Infanta Margarita in Velasquez’s painting, walks from the stage to the foyer where she selects people from the gathered crowd whose faces will be transformed by the theatre makeup artists using special make-up. At the same time, the Maestro, who is also the Master of Ceremonies, leads the concertgoers to their seats in the auditorium where liveried waiters serve them with champagne and sweets, and some even receive a flower as well. While the concertgoers are taking their seats, on the large screen above the stage a video projection is in progress, showing a dignified funeral procession walking down the empty streets of the old city centre of Trento at dawn. Instead of a coffin, four men dressed in black carry a grand piano in which Katarzyna Kozyra sits. She is wearing the same dress as the one which she is performing in at the theatre, and she is looking out at – with a gaze identical to the one captured on the photographs which structure her work *Olympia*. Is that an active or absent-minded gaze? And what is she looking at?

On the other screen placed in the middle of the auditorium, there is a direct transmission of the events taking place in the theatre which are being filmed by five television cameras placed in the theatre boxes, the foyer and on the stage itself. At one point Fabio Cavallucci, director of Galleria Civica di Arte Contemporanea (where the artist’s retrospective exhibition is showing simultaneously), appears on stage in the role of host, and announces the performance, an opera in three acts, which is not really an opera performance of the kind we are used to seeing, because in this one the audience is also expected to take part, and to literally do whatever it wants. After telling the “libretto” to the audience, namely explaining that the performance is actually the staging of the artist’s dream, a nightmare in which she is performing at a gala concert as an opera singer but who cannot sing, Cavallucci announces the first act. Three once formally attired men, now half naked, carry a grand piano to the stage which is then approached by the pianist (Jacopo Mazzone) who lifts the lid up. The three men take Kozyra out of the piano and place her on stage. The concert can now begin. The audience applauds, throws flowers at the artist, the artist pulls out flowers from the vases placed along the entire length of the stage and throws them to the audience, also showering them with large amounts of chocolate candy. After some time, accompanied by the piano, Kozyra starts to sing *Voi che sapete*, the Aria of Cherub from Mozart’s *The Marriage of Figaro*. Her gaze is directed towards the box where the Maestro is seated (his role is played by Polish opera singer Grzegorz Pitulej) and gesticulating, giving her instructions on how to sing. While doing that the Maestro’s face appears on the screen behind the artist, and the direct transmission of what the Maestro is doing can be seen on the large screen placed in the auditorium.

In the second act, the Maestro comes down to the stage and positions himself next to the piano opposite Kozyra who is getting ready to sing the aria *Non so più che sono*. The Maestro is not satisfied with her singing, and opera singer Daniela Sannicò appears on stage dressed in the Baroque costume of the Cherub, and she slowly, but surely takes over Kozyra’s role. While the Maestro’s gestures show his enthusiasm of the Cherub’s singing, Kozyra’s facial expression is



K. Kozyra: *In art dreams comes true*, 2004.

Katarzyna Kozyra & Gloria Viagra, 2005.

now unequivocally showing signs of despair. At the end of the second act, as at the end of a box match, the Maestro raises the hand of the winner – Daniela Sannicolo. Kozyra falls to the stage in a dead swoon. The screen on stage shows a video recording of Kozyra, in the same dress as that of the Infanta, stepping atop a bonfire where she is going to be burned. While we are watching the burning on screen, which, of course, is taking place in Trento, the city where the Church Council was held in the middle of the 16th century where the main topic of discussion was Protestantism and other heresies, a screen of smoke rises between the stage and the auditorium.

While announcing the third act, Cavallucci calls the audience to the stage. The Maestro brings Kozyra back from the dead with a kiss, and she is ready for a new role. Having asked the audience to give her something of their luxurious jewellery, Kozyra instead of Mozart's Cherub becomes Gretchen from Gounod's *Faust*. While the recording of the opera duet performance of Faust and Gretchen is reverberating from the shrieking speakers, the Maestro moves Kozyra's almost lifeless body across the stage in a dance step. The scene is irresistibly reminiscent of the sequence in Fellini's movie where Casanova even tries to seduce a wooden doll at the end. Following the scene of the assumption of Gretchen that uses up the Goethian script, the performance does not come to an end, but continues with a party on stage where the artist invites individuals from the audience to take a peek into the camera lens placed in the stage floor. That what the camera sees at the same time becomes visible on the large screen placed in the auditorium. What is it that the camera sees from such a close up viewpoint? What is it that the audience sees on the big screen? The distorted faces of the elegantly dressed audience bending over the lifeless face of "the deceased woman". Whose gaze actually sees how they are looking? And who are they? The opera audience or the funeral procession? The effect of these two gazes could be summed up using Lacan's phrase "to be seen as I see myself", which simultaneously establishes and annuls the difference between the category of the self and the Other. But, why opera?

Nightmare breaks down the form of the opera. The *breaking down of forms* can be seen as an imperative of Kozyra's art, as the performative effect of each of her works.

But, what is form?

Through the previous sentences I tried to retell the script of Kozyra's performance, but the effect, and, tentatively speaking, the sense, cannot be reduced to a description of the visible happenings. By this, as by all her previous works Katarzyna Kozyra demands live bodily perception – the experience of being in the picture somebody else is looking at. And which picture is that? Reality? A dream? Art? The performative of her performance is revealed exactly through the relativizing and melting away of the borders between those categories. If in art dreams come true, what is art then, and whose reality is it?

The concept of reality produced by Kozyra's *Nightmare* slides outside, beneath and over those well-known parameters of *now and here*, as *now* is simultaneously the before and after, in the state of dreaming, and in the state of waking, while *here* is always somewhere else too. This is indicated not only by the so-called multimediality by the means of which the performance in Trento happened, but also by the number of cultural references which, in the form of discursive figures that possess a vivid connotative charge, Kozyra uses in her director's procedure of events she named *Nightmare*. For example, the funeral procession in which the artist, wearing a dress of a particular cut, is being carried in a piano, could point to Ravel's *Pavane on the Death of an Infanta*. In the history of art the most well known Infanta is the one Velasquez paints – Margarita. Margarita is also Gretchen from Gounod's opera, and is also present in Bulgakov's novel where in the insomnia of the Cruel Procurator of Judea the lives of many characters become nightmares, and diverse creatures go through truly extraordinary transformations. Almost like Kozyra, who by at the same time being the Diva, and the Learner, and Olympia, and Infanta, and the Cherub and Gretchen, and who knows what else, through the performance *Nightmare* puts forward a number of questions about the relation between the notion of subject and the notion of identity. *Can the Subject comprehend itself?* Furthermore, *is the Subject thinkable, as such?* Where is the space of the Other, who is not an object but a subject, but which, however, *does not amount to the same?*¹

Foucault begins his famous Archaeology of the Human Sciences, entitled *Words and Things*², which in the English translation appears under the symptomatic title *The Order of Things*, by reading Velasquez's painting *Las Meninas*. A painting at whose compositional centre lies the figure of Infanta Margarita, but at which the meaningful centre is not located. The meaning of the famous painting is not in what is visible in the painting, in the represented, nor in something that is the subject of representation, representable. If we ask ourselves what *Las Meninas* is, and if we establish that it is the portrait of maids of honour, or the portrait of Infanta Margarita, her dog and her dwarfs, or the self-portrait of the court painter, the portrait of the King and the Queen in the form of a mirror reflection in the background of the painting, or the portrait of a man who somewhere in the distance enters or exits the illusioned space of the painting, we are going to by-pass the performative of the painting itself. This painting is not a recording of a look which identifies

¹ In writing out the italics in the last three sentences of this paragraph I was referring to the text by Shosana Felman: "But if to comprehend is, on the other hand (taken in its metaphoric and spatial sense), to enclose oneself, to embrace, to include, i.e. to contain within certain limits the question then becomes: how can we comprehend without transforming him (or her) into an object? Can the Subject comprehend itself? Is the Subject thinkable as such? To put the question differently: is the Other thinkable? Is it possible to think the Other, not as an object, but as a subject, a subject who would not, however, amount to the same?" (Shosana Felman, *Writing and Madness: Literature/Philosophy/ Psychoanalysis*, Stanford University Press, Palo Alto, California, 2003, p. 41-42).

² The title of the French original *Les mots et les choses: Une archéologie des sciences humaines*, Ed. Galimard, Paris, 1966.

things and then brings them to a standstill and in the process mortifies them, but what moves them and what gives life to them. It is something what induces the process of the perpetual emerging of new pictures within that one picture which is constantly relocating its own centre.

Kozyra's *Nightmare* does the same: pictures, their simultaneity and multiplicity, constantly relocate their centre. Which one of them is real? The one before us on the stage? The one on the screen above the stage? The one behind us in the auditorium? We as a picture being looked at by someone from the stage? We as a picture of ourselves watching ourselves on screen from the auditorium? In what time and where? Now and always somewhere else.

The performativity of *Nightmare* is manifested in its whirling. The whirling simultaneously absorbs and ejects, it takes possession of a place and abandons it, it erases the border between the internal and external, making the question of difference between what is real and what is fictive irrelevant, because desire can only exist through fantasy, and *Nightmare* is the staging of fantasy. The Diva performs on stage and she cannot sing. The place of the plot; the space between *must* and *not being able to*. Kozyra must sing. But, why exactly sing?

If I try to represent a whirl, I will draw a spiral form. A spiral is a decentred form. In the symbolic system the meaning of the sign of the spiral is analogous to the meaning of the notion of a maze. The symbolism of a maze is always associated with so-called rites of passage, rites which involve a female or male individual being forced to define their own gender identity, which is in essence social identity. By internalising the language, the speaking subject needs to establish itself within a language and by doing so enter into the symbolic system in which signs, and also the signifiers of the identity, have precisely defined meanings. To become a form which circulates in the processes of social exchange and by the adopted identity to represent the meanings that are constituted within that exchange.

In the works of Katarzyna Kozyra the performativity breaks down the form, presence undermines representation and revokes the meaning. It is known that conventionally defined reality is nothing else but the effect of representative practices, and Kozyra states that fact by the title of her work *In Art Dreams Come True*. In art dreams become reality.

There is a significant difference between the verb *to be* and the verb *to become*. To become is *the work in progress*. This can be seen in the video-installation *In Art Dreams Come True*, staged in the form of a maze whose parts with their velvet partitions connote a theatre dressing-room. It is absolutely clear how the story is told. It is visible. However, the question to which there is no answer would be: "What is the story?" Because, the script is not obvious.

In the catalogue, the explanation of the work is given by the following text: "Katarzyna Kozyra saw the show of Gloria Viagra, a Berlin Drag Queen. She recalls the naïve dreams of her childhood. She wants to sing, dance and shine on stage like a star. A camera follows Kozyra through this process of metamorphosis that will finish with a gala concert in front of a public consisting of her friends."**3**

3 Catalogue *Katarzyna Kozyra*, Silvana Editoriale, Galleria Civica di Arte Contemporanea Trento, 2003.

And the gala concert which was not only attended by friends turned into a nightmare. Why? And where: in a dream, in art, or in reality? And is there anything, as for example, something like velvet partitions of a dressing-room, that can separate one from the other?

In front of the maze, in whose every section there is a small monitor showing the recording of something that "the camera recorded following Kozyra through that process of metamorphosis", there is also a large screen showing the trailer *In Art Dreams Come True*. During the fast exchanging of film sequences, we see a video-recording of the rock concert of Gloria Viagra in a Berlin gay bar, Kozyra taking singing lessons from the Maestro, while the photograph of the face and recording of Maria Callas' concert is used as a model for identification, and we then see Kozyra with excessive, but unconventional make-up, among the audience at the night bar...

The trailer of course, lures us into the maze to see the film. But, what is given to us for it to be seen? A film story based on a certain script, with a specific story and plot development, that it certainly is not. With a hybrid form containing within itself connotations of various and heterogeneous spaces – the maze, the dressing-room and the movie theatre – Kozyra breaks down the film form. Because, cinema is a social technology, a semiotic apparatus in which the encounter of codes and social formations takes place, defining the positions of meaning and of the individual who is addressed as a subject.**4** Furthermore, film is a form of representation *par excellence*, and representation is, if we are to believe Deleuze and Guattari, a repression. It suppresses the desiring production, and it is desire that produces the real.**5** Therefore Kozyra's film refuses to represent. Instead of editing as the basic postulate of the film syntax, within the maze we see the dismantled segments of documented recordings of "the process of metamorphosis", while the maze-based spatial dispositions prevent identification of the specific chronological sequences. The

4 Teresa de Lauretis, *Alice Doesn't: Feminism, Semiotics, Cinema*, Macmillan, London. 1984, pp. 14-15.

5 Gilles Deleuze/Félix Guattari, *Anti-Edip*, Izdavačka knjižarnica Zorana Stojanovićak, Sremski Karlovci, 1990 p. 149, 23.

identification of that what had happened before and what followed later. Like in a dream or in the unconscious, everything exists at the same time and at the same place.

Like in a dream, the opera-singing lesson becomes a grotesque: the sadomasochistic relationship between the teacher and the learner. Ionesco? And the warning of the Maid to the professor: "Don't start with linguistics, every woman learner gets hurt when it comes to linguistics." Ionesco's play ends with a sexual crime. What is it in linguistics that induces it?

The trailer *In Art Dreams Come True* starts with a scene where we can see the close-up of the open mouth of Gloria Viagra singing into a microphone. In Kozyra's performance titled *A Quarter of an Hour*, which is also one of the segments of the work *In Art Dreams Come True*, held in October 2004 at the Music Hall Carnegie Museum of Art in Pittsburgh, a video recording is being screened showing a singing lesson during which, among other things, the Maestro opens the mouth of the Learner using wire. If the mouth is an intermediate point between the body and speech⁶, what is it that is corporeal in linguistics?

⁶ Shoshana Felman, *The Scandal of the Speaking Body: Don Juan with J.L. Austin or Seduction in Two Languages*, Naklada MD, Zagreb, 1993, p. 46.

By reading Austin's theory of performatives through the myth of Don Juan, namely through the procedure of giving a promise that cannot be kept, Shoshana Felman poses the following question: "If a performative is actually a ritualistic event of desire, will we be surprised by the statement that desire of the performative always rhetorically follows the pattern of the symbolism of sexual desire?". Referring at the same time to Austin's concept of misfire of the speech act, she reminds us of Lacan's observation that Freud's so-called sexuality is contained in the statement that everything that has to do with sex is always misfired, and that is both the basis and the principle of the very notion of fiasco. The misfire itself can be determined as that what is sexual in every human act. Concluding that Lacan, like Austin (and after Freud) repeats Don Juan's scandal, Felman claims that if the problem of the myth of Don Juan consists in the relation between erotics and linguistics, the scandal is not contained that much in the fact that linguistics is always erotics, but in a much more scandalous fact – the fact that erotics is always linguistics. Because, the scandal does not reside within sex as much as within a language, considering that it is pervaded with the act of failure by which the body misfires itself: the *act of failure* through which *the making* of the body never succeeds to state itself, while expressing always manages to do so.⁷ *Nightmare*.

⁷ Ibid. pp. 95-98.

By the work *In Art Dreams Come True*, which is, let us not forget, a *work in progress*, Katarzyna Kozyra does not present, but rather states – she sings the process of transformation, and that her statement *manages to make* presentable *the act of failure by which the body misfires itself*. She does this by singing the Aria of Cherub from Mozart's *The Marriage of Figaro*: *Voi che sapete che cosa é amor, donne vedete s'io l'ho nel cor*. The Cherub addresses those who know what love is; but what is the Cherub's gender?

What is the gender of Gloria Viagra, who in the work *In Art Dreams Come True* teaches femininity to Kozyra? She shows her how to put on make-up. A mask? A costume? To enter a role. Or to egress from a role. Or to make the concept of role and its meaning in the process of establishing the concept of identity irrelevant. To deprive of meaning the very concept of identity, paradoxically, through the very process of identification.

For, let us remember, identification is a psychological process through which a subject identifies with an aspect, characteristic or attribute of another, and it completely or partially transforms itself according to it. Identification is carried out upon objects: upon a person, a personality streak or upon partial objects.

Personality is based upon and extracted from a gradual process of identification. The notion of identification, according to Freud's theory, has evolved from one of many psychological processes into an act which forms the basis of the human subject. This mental evolution corresponds above all to the emphasis of the Oedipus Complex and its structuring effects, and to the changes brought about by the second theory of the psychic apparatus where instances that are separated starting from the Id, acquire authenticity by being a derivative from a number of identifications. Freud thus differentiates the two ways of functioning of the psychic apparatus which he calls the primary and secondary process. The primary process is typical of the unconscious within which the mental energy flows freely and endeavours to occupy the ideas concerning the experiences which breed desire. Freud, through the characteristic of the secondary process, typical of the pre-conscious – conscious system, defines the establishment of the identity of thoughts. The secondary process has the function of tuning which is enabled by the establishment of I, whose main task is the obstruction of the primary process. The oppositeness of the primary and secondary processes is analogous to the oppositeness of the two ways of the flow of psychic energy – free and tied energy, and it is comparable with the oppositeness of the principle of pleasure and the principle of reality.⁸

⁸ Ibid. pp. 95-98.

Establishing the *l'ho nel cor*. Nel cor. In the heart. What? Can it be seen or named? What do we do by naming? Do we identify by name or do we give a name by identification? What happens to pleasure while doing so?

Who is Gloria Viagra? Surely an antipode to the Maestro, a mine which blows away the dramaturgy immanent to opera which is based upon the undoubted meaning of each role. Upon the symbolism which in the representation of the Oedipal structuring of desire generates the myth of Don Juan, in whose core lies the statement about the making of the body which fails to state itself. And while the Maestro literally functions as the embodiment of the Oedipus matrix in the sense of imprinting the matrix which inscribes the Name of the Father into a living body, Gloria Viagra, existing beyond Oedipus, disembodies the meaning. (S)he is the very making of the body that constantly states itself. That is the performative body. The Drag Queen. A mask under a mask which is not a mask. A voice under a word which is not a word. Not a speaking subject, but a singing body as a scandal beyond the mask of a signifier, or a mask (which is not a mask) as a scandal of the de-signified body. Linguistics that does not succeed in making itself.

Speech without an answer. Pass.

Judith Butler writes how, according to understanding identification as an enacted fantasy or incorporation, it is clear that coherence is desired, wished for, idealized, and that this idealization is an effect of corporeal signification. In other words, acts, gestures and desire produce the effect of an internal core or substance, but they produce it on the *surface of the body* through play, signifying the absences that suggest, but never reveal the organizing principle of identity as a cause. Such acts, gestures and enactments are *performative* in the sense that the essence of identity that they otherwise purport to express are *fabrications* manufactured and sustained through corporeal signs and other discursive means. To claim that the gendered body is performative, suggests that it has no ontological status apart from the various acts which constitute its reality. This also suggests that reality is fabricated as an interior essence, and this interiority itself is an effect and function of a decidedly public and social discourse, the public regulation of fantasy through the surface politics of the body, the control of the boundaries of gender that differentiate inner from the outer, and in this way insinuate the “integrity” of the subject. If the inner truth of gender is a fabrication, and true gender a fantasy inscribed on the surface of the body, then it seems that genders can be neither true nor false, but are only produced as the truth effects of a discourse of a primary and stable identity.⁹

⁹ Judith Butler, *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity*, Routledge, London, 1999, p. 173.

If in the work *In Art Dreams Come True* we witness linguistics that fails to make itself, if the performance *Nightmare* demonstrates the relativity of the meaning of the concept of the state of being awake, or, if we want to put it that way, reality, and if it makes Austin's concept of misfire completely palpable, the work from 2002 titled *Punishment and Crime* sinks all the existing meanings by the sound of a hit. A hit from a firearm loaded with live ammunition. Reality show?

Punishment and crime? The reference to Dostoyevsky expressed through the inversion of his title does not exist here in the sense of reconstruction, or deconstruction (it is completely irrelevant) of the meaning of the notion of moral dilemma we are faced with through the story of Raskolnikov, the old money-lender, money, the goal, means, justice, injustice, redeeming love, etc. *Punishment and Crime* thunderously blows to bits the very notion of meaning. In the action we are watching on the big screen and on several smaller monitors, in the action that is real because it is really taking place, some people hidden by masks are firing from automatic guns, attacking with mortar fire, torching with flamethrowers. We watch and listen to the firing which does not stop, we hear the deafening noise of explosions, we can see the hits, and the hit objects which literally fly up in the air and burn. The performative of the work *Punishment and Crime* is manifested in the perceptibility of the uselessness of the explosions and the burning down, which is also their uncontainability and inevitability. By its performance, *Punishment and Crime* demonstrates the difference and reconstructs the concepts of a target and aim. A target sometimes exists, but it is the linguistic aim, defined in the semantic sense of the reason and purpose of the action ascribed to it. It is a matter of the speech which deprives itself of the possibility of an answer. Who are the people whose faces are hidden behind the grotesque masks modelled on Playboy's pin-up beauties? People who do not aim at other people, but passionately blow up useless objects and hits into the empty. Empty? What is emptiness? The risk of being hit with a ricochet or bomb shrapnel? Is the performance we are watching a performance for the camera, so-called video-art or something else? Reality show. But what is really real?

Punishment or crime? What precedes, what follows, and is there an after that follows that which was before?

Punishment follows when the law is broken. It is legitimate. The law prescribes it. Language is a law which prescribes meanings to words. And the meaning to the concept of crime. What does it mean to get rid of words? Words that could describe a crime and prescribe a punishment. *Punish-*

ment and Crime does exactly that, it gets rid of words. On one of the monitors we see a lynching scene without any commentary. A tree on whose branches the hanged bodies are swaying. Crime or punishment? The law of the lynch or some other western?

Western? Western, eastern, western, eastern, western... A film, or the meaning of a word? To fire. To hit. What? A sugary vocabulary sometimes refers to the film industry as a dream factory. How is a dream produced? And what is really a dream?

Imagination. Is that not, literally, a production of pictures? Imaginary placed in the binary opposition to real. And what is really real?

In psychoanalytical theories *imago* is defined as the "unconscious image", but more than a picture, it is about an acquired imaginary scheme, a static pattern through which a subject observes another person.¹⁰

The concept of the "imaginary" was coined in the context of Lacan's elaboration of the mirror stage, by which he insists on the difference between the imaginary and the symbolic. The mirror stage is understood as identification, namely as a transformation that happens in the subject when adopting a picture. The cheerful adopting of one's own mirror picture on the level of an infant shows that in one exemplary situation a symbolic matrix appears, within which I is sedimented in its primary form, before it is objectified in the dialectics of identification with the other and before its function of a subject is established through language (*langage*). The mirror stage function is shown as a special case of the imago function, which consists of establishing the relation of an organism with its reality – the relation between *Innenwelt* and *Umwelt*. The mirror stage, Lacan continues, is a drama in which the subject caught on the bait of spatial identification produces fantasies that come one after the other, from a picture of a dismembered body, to a shape which, because of its wholeness, is called orthopaedic. At the end it throws it to the accepted armour of an alienated identity which in its rigid structure will mark the whole mental development of an individual.¹¹

The explosions we observe and hear in the moving scenes of the video-installation *Punishment and Crime* deprive us of the expected picture of a dismembered body. It is because the script is not obvious. This is a different drama, one which discards language universalities that determine the function of the subject. Who fires? Can we identify the faces? Who fires?

A machine gun. A machine gun is a machine. And desire is a machine. At least according to Deleuze and Guattari, desire is a machine and it belongs to the order of production, and every production is at the same time a desiring and social one. Therefore, there are no desiring machines outside the social machines that they form in large proportions; and there are no social machines without the desiring ones which inhabit them in small proportions.¹²

Large and small proportions of the desiring and social machines make me remember the text published in one Polish daily newspaper. It described the action from which *Punishment and Crime* emerges into a sensation without mentioning the name of the artist, but speculating about the identity of the performance participants. The text, signed by Tomasz Molga and entitled *Unabomber rage over Poland*, begins as follows:

They have an entire arsenal; automatic machine-guns, flamethrowers, great quantities of explosive materials and anti-tank grenadethrowers. They travel throughout Poland blowing up buildings, factory chimneys, cars, ... for their own amusement. "These people are fascinated by what they do. They are like pyromaniacs, but much more dangerous" -says Mr. X who decided to reveal the activities of the Para-military group. - "It's time for this to come to an end, before something drastic happens." According to our informer, these Polish "Unabombers" are the managers of a company in Warsaw. Upper class citizens.

...Some call it a harmless Sunday activity, adrenalin fire... Mr. X says that if they go on, they will need to live stronger emotions thus raise their objectives.¹³

The need for stronger emotions sets itself higher targets, and higher targets could lead to a drastic event. At least that is what Mr. X claims, who is a paradigm in this story, the voice and consciousness of the public. Moreover, he decided to speak in that very public. What and why?



¹⁰ J. Laplanche-J.-B. Pontalis, *Dictionary of Psychoanalysis*, August Cesarec, Zagreb, 1992.

¹¹ Jacques Lacan, "Stadij ogledala kao tvoritelj funkcije. Ja kakva nam se otkriva u psihoanalitičkom iskustvu", u *Spisi*, Prosveta, Beograd, 1938, pp. 6-11.

¹² Deleuze-Guattari, quat. p. 242, 278.

¹³ Quoted from the fax transmission of the newspaper article, that is its English translation published in the catalogue *Katarzyna Kozyra*, Silvana Editoriale, Galleria Civica di Arte Contemporanea Trento, 2003, p. 103.



K. Kozyra: *Punishment and Crime*, 2002.

An answer without speech. Pass.

I would like to go back to Anti-Oedipus, in which I read about the task of society being the coding of desire and producing fear, the fright of decoded courses.¹⁴ I would like to return to Lacan's mirror stage whose function is a special case of *image*, and which consists of establishing the relation between an organism and its reality – the relation between *Innenwelt* and *Umwelt*. The mirror stage in which imaginary is channelled towards the symbolic, and the symbolic is social, that social that codes the courses of desire. Let us not forget, desire is what produces the real. And it is precisely that symbolic that generates fear from the decoded courses of desire placing them in an area which we name the outer. The notion of the outer in the symbolic system is produced in the meaning of *out of the symbolic*. I will remind you here of the Adorno-Horkheimer statement about enlightenment being radicalized mythical fear, where the mere idea of the outside becomes the mere source of fear.¹⁵ That outside of course does not exist according to Lacan's meaning of *Umwelt*, a surrounding defined as reality. That outside exists only as the un-real, as an unreality, as an apparition, as a threat to the symbolic, namely a disintegration of the meaning of its signs. The disintegration of linguistics that is always erotics. And that is exactly what Mr. X warns us about. About the threat of the decoded courses of desire, about the threat of eroticism existing regardless of linguistics. Eroticism within which the body does not misfire itself without giving any promises. *Fire!*

14 Deleuze-Guattari, op.cit. p. 112.

15 M. Horkheimer – Th. W. Adorno, *Dijalektika prosvjetiteljstva (Dialectic of Enlightenment)*, Veselin Masleša, Sarajevo, 1974, p. 30.

I would also like to go back to linguistics. Who gets hurt when it does not come to linguistics?

Vehement reactions by the public is a common occurrence when Kozyra's works appear. Does this support my thesis about the performativity of her works? Does it prove Lacan's "There is no speech without an answer"? However, I would put forward a question about the concept of understanding. What does it mean to understand? To understand the meaning of a word? Language is of course public. But, what is public? Just one of the arbitrary signs? Linguistics.

In 1993, Kozyra's graduation work *The Pyramid of Animals* was put on show in the Sculpture Department at the Academy of Fine Arts in Warsaw. The public judged it as an example of immorality in modern art. The work consists of three parts. The first, a sculpture, *The Pyramid of Animals* is made from stuffed animal skins: a horse, a dog, a cat and a rooster. A smaller animal is placed on the back of a bigger one. The second part of the installation is a documentary video-recording showing the procedure of a horse being put to death by lethal injection, removing the skin from the dead animal and the process of taxidermy. The author of the work witnessed the event and her emotional reactions were also being recorded. The third part is a text that was on the wall of the room where the sculpture and a monitor were placed during the exhibition. In the text Kozyra describes her mental process which preceded the execution of the work. The starting point is the motif of the pyramid of animals which appears in the Brothers Grimm's fairy tale, however, she was not interested in the actual content of the tale. She was concerned with the concepts, which in accordance with the history of art discourse are immanent to the sculpture medium. The concepts are those of a monument, and the concept of the *ready made*. Therefore, Kozyra questioned the meaning of these well-established concepts: what does it mean to create a monument to animals, and what does it mean to use the material that is already there? Where to find the material for the monument? For instance, she did not go to the natural history museum and borrow the stuffed animal skins there, but she chose the living animals that were going to be put to death and stuffed, personally took part in the killing and took the responsibility for their death. In the text Kozyra puts forward the question of whether the process of creating has become more important than the work itself, pointing out that the very content of the work is a paradox between the final aesthetic effect and the process of its creation.

In the long-lasting and acute discussions in the Polish media, the work *The Pyramid of Animals* was often mentioned but not the name of its author. The same happened ten years later when the work *Punishment and Crime* appeared. In the *Gazeta Wyborcza* magazine dated 18th August 1993 a text was published under the title "A Sculptor's or that of Gravedigger?" which talks about the replacement of technical incompetence with a loud performance, and it protests against the killing for the purpose of decoration. As a reply to the above-mentioned text, Katarzyna Kozyra sent the following text to the magazine editor that was never published:

Dear Editor,

I am the author of the composition entitled "The Pyramid of Animals". Together with this piece executed in the stuffed skins of a horse, a dog, a cat and a rooster, there was a commentary in which I presented my motivation, the creative process and the doubts that accompanied it. I asked the question: is only the sculpture to be evaluated, or also the process of its creation and the reactions and experience linked to that? With that act I have exposed myself to the confrontations with people who think differently than I, but from whom I had expected respect for facts. Meanwhile, various lies have been repeated and publicized, among them that I had raised these animals, subjected them to suffering and killed them with my own hands. This is untrue. During my diploma exam it was publicly stated that the skins of the dog and the cat had been removed from dead animals, whereas the skins of the horse and the rooster from animals that were meant for slaughter, which I bought and then put to sleep. The killing was for purposes other than making a pair of shoes or the eating of meat, which is a violation of norms that are considered obligatory and humanitarian. The infliction of death on animals in a civilized and industrial manner takes place anonymously and beyond the view of their later consumers. The taking of the life of an animal in an open manner and by an individual is the cause of shock and condemnation. I consciously exposed myself to this test. My observing of the death of the horse was 100 percent more terrible than all of the invectives that have been levelled against me. In an effort to be consistent I also took upon myself the death of dead animals. My composition is about death, generally speaking, and about the deaths of these concrete four animals. I did not do this for that tingling pleasure and because of technical indolence. I did it out of my internal need to ask the question: do we still feel the presence of death while eating steaks, using cosmetics or using other animal-based products – or has that been effectively neutralized with the help of household variants of animals that receive our feelings on a day-to-day basis? "The Pyramid of Animals" is a violation of norms in treating the death of animals as a phenomenon that has nothing to do with the consumer. If I decided to use this form in my first totally independent artistic work it is not because art is treated by society as a game among artists playing in their own back yard, far from important issues or, as Ms. Xymena Zaniewska writes, serves only for decoration purposes.

Regards,

Katarzyna Kozyra¹⁶

¹⁶ The letter is quoted according to the catalogue Katarzyna Kozyra, *The Men's Bathhouse*, Polish Pavilion, 48th International Biennale of Visual Arts, 1999, pp. 97-98.

Here I could write something about art. About art in which dreams come true. What a strange coincidence; to kill an animal in a civilized way is to put it to – sleep.

I could write something here about Katarzyna Kozyra's creative procedure, because it is a matter of art, and the concept of creativity is immanent to art, although in the last decades of the twentieth century critics have fiercely swooped down on this notion, because an artist, he or she, is not God, and creation belongs to God, and God has, as they say, been dead for a long time now. And again we come to death.

I would once again go back to linguistics. *Every woman learner gets hurt when it comes to linguistics*. Seduction or abuse? Let us bypass the absurd.

Voi che sapete che cosa é amor, donne vedete s'io l'ho nel cor... To sing on a bonfire which is being kindled by the mourning procession. The public. And a funeral is just a mere symbolic form which aestheticizes non-meaning, paradoxically, the meaning of death. Only a word. And what is behind it, beyond linguistics? It is all the same whether the rhetoric of aesthetics or the aesthetics of rhetoric can convince me.





Krim 1943.

Retoričke figure Beuysovog šamanizma

Andrej Mirčev

Jedan od načina na koji se promatra i analizira Beuysovo umjetničko djelovanje odnosi se na specifičnu ideju umjetnika koji unutar šireg političkog polja djeluje kao šaman tj. koji svojom umjetničkom izvedbom ukazuje i doprinosi ozdravljenju bolesnog društva, propagirajući alternativne modele ustroja zasnovanog na sveopćoj kreativnosti. Na tragu takvog shvaćanja umjetnika kao svojevrsnog *modernog kreativnog šamana*, ovaj će tekst analizirati retoričke segmente i političku izvedbu Josepha Beuysa, fokusirajući politički kontekst i ideološke motive impregnirane u akcije/performance. Preuzimanjem teorije performativa koja simboličku moć sagledava u odnosu na sociološki kontekst, glavni pravac analize bit će usmjeren na otkrivanje institucionalnih okvira kroz koje se legitimirao i afirmirao Beuysov retorički modus.

Retorika obreda

Najznačajniji događaj iz beuysovog predumjetničkog života kontroverzna je anegdota o zrakoplovnoj nesreći u Drugom svjetskom ratu: "Godine 1944., u dvadeset i drugoj godini, čudom je izbjegao smrt u Aziji. Njegov zrakoplov, Ju 87, pao je s neba na snijegom prekrivenu zemlju što se zove Krim. Joseph je izgubio svijest na nekoliko dana, a napola smrznutog pravi su ga Tataři našli i vidali mu rane. Taj ga je narod, koji je živio u skladu s prirodom, vrlo brzo prihvatio kao svojega: *Du nix Njemecki, du Tatar* i vratio ga ponovno u život, omotavši ga u svoje tradicionalne pustene pokrivače i ogrijavši ga životinjskom mašću".¹ Po obrednom scenariju, osoba koja treba postati šamanom, biva dovedena u neposrednu blizinu smrti, ali ne umire, nego kao ponovno rođena, zadobiva moć vladanja nad arhaiskim tehnikama ekstaze, moć oslobađanja zajednice od demona. Anegdota o padu zrakoplova, bez obzira da li se nesreća doista dogodila, prva je u nizu retoričkih figura te se odnosi na ideju uskrnuća i ponovnog rođenja. Kao takva, ona je i važan segment poimanja *proširene umjetnosti*, kao revolucionarnog principa kojim se ostvaruje humanistička utopija društva jednakosti, bratstva i slobode.

Kada Pierre Bourdieu u knjizi *Što znači govoriti* analizira funkcioniranje obrednog simbolizma i performativnu magiju, iznosi se argument po kojem obredni simbolizam „ne djeluje sam po sebi nego jedino ukoliko *predstavlja* - u kazališnom smislu riječi - prijenos ovlasti: u točnom poštivanju koda jednoobrazne liturgije koji regulira sakramentalne geste i riječi ostvaruje se u isti mah i očitovanje i ovjera ugovora o ovlaštenju po kojemu svećenik postaje posjednik *monopola na rukovanje dobrima spasenja*".² Neki od performansa i akcija pokazuju strukturalnu sličnost s dramaturgijom i scenarijem sakralnih obreda. Simbolizam ostaje očuvan, ali dolazi do promjene konteksta same izvedbe. Primjer takvog performansa je *Celtic+* iz 1970. u kojem Beuys prisutnoj publici pere noge dok se kraj sastoji od chrstiansennovog polijevanja Beuysove glave vodom i izvedbe nalik obredu krštenja. Pozicioniranjem performansa u kontekst sakralne izvedbe, retoričke figure bivaju proširene nizom kršćansko-mitoloških simbola koji, iako predstavljaju *suvišak* u odnosu na instituciju umjetnosti, upravo doprinose *uvjerljivosti* izvedbe. S druge strane, s obzirom na krizu religijske performativnosti, topos unutar kojeg se još uvijek može legitimirati *uspješnosti* obreda *kao* izvedbe, sama je institucija performansa u umjetnosti, posebno u aspektu performansa kao svojevrsne *samotransformacije* koju zajedno umjetnik i publika ostvaruju. U tom smislu, P. Bourdieu navodi kako: „performativna magija obreda može potpuno funkcionirati samo onda ako religijski opunomoćenik, koji vrši obred u ime grupe, djeluje kao svojevrsan *medij* između grupe i nje same: upravo grupa njegovim posredstvom obavlja na sebi samoj djelotvoran magijski čin sadržan u performativnom iskazu".³ Preuzimajući religijsku simboliku, Beuysova se izvedba više ne događa u okruženju „čisto“ estetskih kodova, već zahvaća društveno polje za čijom transformacijom teži. Retoričke se figure obrazuju upravo oko te težnje, intencije govornika u uvjeravanju prisutnih u nužnost transcendiranja danog svijeta.

¹ Alain Borer, *Dossier Beuys*, Daf, Zagreb, 2003., str. 285

² Pierre Bourdieu, *Što znači govoriti*, Naprijed, 1992., Zagreb, str. 99.

³ P. Bourdieu, *Ibid*, str. 101.

Individualna mitologija

Prodorom autobiografskih elemenata još od razdoblja futurista i Duchampa, u izvedbenim je umjetnostima prisutna tendencija brisanja granice između privatne i javne ličnosti izvodača. Glumac i njegovo tijelo više nisu razdvojeni teškim kostimima niti pak obavijeni iluzijom u kojem tijelo ustupa svoju površinu reprezentaciji teksta. Umjetnik performansa stoji sam za sebe. Njegovo tijelo je poruka, a koža posljednje utočište materije u kolapsu taktilnog pred nadirućom agresijom virtualiteta. Međutim, takva privatnost, dodatno pojačana masmedijskim posredovanjem, uzdiže se na razinu mitologije i retorike, a svaki umjetnički čin ili skandal, korak je dalje u strategiji osvajanja medijskog prostora.

Dovoljno je sjetiti se Beuysovog šešira, ribarske jakne i pastirskog štapa. Beuys se bez tih rekvizita nikada nije pojavljivao u javnosti, a čak su i rijetke fotografije gdje ga se može vidjeti bez jednog od njih. Fokusirajući stoga njegov pristup predstavljanja sebe i svog djelovanja u javnosti, uočava se težnja k uzdizanju pojavnosti na razinu ikone, populistička retorika koja se oslanja na ponavljanje određenog stila i imidža s ciljem ocrtavanja individualnosti i neponovljivosti. Individualnost postaje apsolutizirana, uzdignuta do imperativa „svatko može biti umjetnik“, kojim se odriče ispravna egzistencija svemu što je masovno i serijsko, *onome* što nije prošlo kroz čin kreativnog individualiziranja.

4 Volker Harlan, *Was ist Kunst*, Urchhaus, Stuttgart, 1986., str. 27.

ja. Ovaj par excellence *egzistencijalistički* motiv Beuys je usko povezivao s ekonomsko-političkim pitanjem, problemom transformacije kapitalističkog društva u kreativno društvo odgovornih produhovljenih i slobodnih pojedinaca, čija individualnost postaje jamcem *ozdravljenja*. U jednom intervjuu, Beuys tvrdi: "Dakle, mi svi još uvijek živimo u kulturi koja kaže: to su umjetnici, a tamo su oni koji to nisu. To naravno nije ljudski te zbog toga i postoji otuđenje među ljudima."⁴ Ideja o transcendiranju otuđenja i izolacije posredstvom umjetnosti i sveopćeg *kreativiziranja* društva, nasljeđe je romantičarske estetike i kao takva, iako biva inkorporirana u retorički diskurs. Umjetnik, postavljajući sebe kao vrhunarnog spasioca društva, preobražen je u polubožanstvo koje jedino zna izlaz iz slijepe ulice. Međutim, retorička funkcija umjetnosti, bez obzira na konkretne društvene rezultate, inherentna je svakoj vrsti umjetničkog djelovanja koje je kritična spram postojećeg poretka. Kod Beuysa ta je retorička funkcija proizvod jedne izbalansirane mitologizacijske taktike i, s druge strane, humanističke vizije boljeg svijeta. Zbog toga je i broj onih koji Beuysa proglašavaju šarlatanom, vjerojatno jednak onima koji ga *doista* smatraju šamanom.

Kreativna izvedba političkog

Osim performansa kao što su „Kako objasniti umjetnost mrtvome zecu“ ili performansa s kojotom *I like America, America, America likes me*, u kojima više dominira religijsko-arhajska simbolika, Beuys se od sredine 60-tih sve više okretao direktnim političkim akcijama koje su bile odgovor na konkretan političko-povijesno kontekst Hladnog rata i neprevladanih društvenih dihotomija. Prvi u nizu takvih radova je Beuysov apel za povišenjem Berlinskog zida za 5 cm. Slijede akcije *Spašavanje šume* i *Prvomajsko čišćenje*, kroz koje se naglasak s religijske retorike prebacuje na kritiku ideologije i političkog ustrojstva zapadnog svijeta. Strukturalno gledano, razlike između tih izvedbenih modusa opažaju se u stupnju i načinu komunikacije s publikom. Dok se u ranijim performansima publika nalazi u poziciji voajera, najčešće odvojena od same mizanscene performansa (npr. staklom u performansu *Kako objasniti umjetnost mrtvom zecu* ili pak žicom u performansu *I like America, America likes me*), dotle u akcijama i predavanjima dolazi do intenziviranja komunikacije, stvaranja polja kolektivne izvedbe koja dolazi u prvi plan i ustrojava čisti politički govor.

5 Jon McKenzie, *Matrica performansa*, Frakcija, br.26/27., str. 005.

Promatrano s aspekta ideologije, Beuys odlično ilustrira McKenzievu tezu o *nezadovoljnim demokratima*, čija je osobina da «čvrsto vjeruju u demokraciju, ali nisu zadovoljni njezinim pojedinačnim utjelovljenjima».⁵ U periodu od 1967. godine, kada je osnovao «Njemačku studentsku stranku kao metastranku» pa do 1977. godine, kada je u okviru 6. dokumente u Kasselu osnovao «Freie internationale Hochschule für Kreativität und interdisziplinäre Forschung», Beuysova politička aktivnost pokazuje se intonirana i pedagogijsko-didaktičkim crtom koja, s obzirom na svoje uporište u privatnoj mitologiji, pokazuje izrazito retorički karakter. Događaj koji to najbolje potvrđuje je skandal oko Beuysovog otpuštanja s akademije u Düsseldorfu, od je čega Beuys ne samo napravio umjetnički rad „demokracija je smiješna“, već ga je i iskoristio ne bi li još više privukao medijsku pozornost i svom umjetničkom djelu osigurao snažniju auru. Tu se ponovo mogu prepoznati romantičarsko-anarhistički motivi; umjetnik kao onaj koji, slično liku režisera iz drame Thomasa Bernharda *Poznati*, uzvikuje: „Umjetnik mora biti sam protiv cijelog svijeta, usamljen protiv svih i protiv svega.“⁶ Retorička figura buntovnika koji se bori za pravdu i čija je politika sukobljavanja dio strategije postizanja globalnog uspjeha i slave. Pa ipak, bez obzira na mogući kritički prigovor o tome kako je u Beuysovom slučaju političko ishodište umjetničkog djelovanja dio strategije u kreiranju vlastitog mita, činjenica je da je on svojim kreativnim djelovanjem uspio regrutirati novu političku snagu. Riječ je o ekološkom pokretu i Stranci Zelenih koja, bez obzira na relativno mali broj zastupnika u njemačkom parlamentu, figurira kao primjer pozitivne sinteze kreativnog djelovanja i politike. Objašnjavajući navedenu sintezu, ponovo je moguće prisjetiti se McKenziea: «Tu umjetnosti i humanističke znanosti mogu mnogo ponuditi, ali kritika je nužna, kreativnost na koju mislim ne mora se ograničiti na sferu umjetnosti i kulture: ono što treba stvoriti, otkriti i pronaći poopćena je kreativnost, kreativnost koja djeluje ondje gdje ju se najmanje očekuje - u samoj stvari kojoj pružamo otpor»⁷

6 Thomas Bernhard, *Stücke 2*, Shurkamp, Frankfurt, 1988. str. 143.

7 J. McKenzie, Ibid. str. 009.

Izvedi svoju ranjenu povijest!

Institucionalni okviri unutar kojih se stvara retorički moment Beuysovog umjetničkog djelovanja, dvojaki su i proizlaze iz religijskog i političkog diskursa. U oba slučaja, koristeći se njima, umjetnik proizvodi uvjerljivost svoje izvedbe, čime ona počinje funkcionirati kao obred instituiranja kojim se posvećuju oni koji u njemu učestvuju. Njih se upućuje u tajnu i misterij ozdravljenja i preobraženog života. Slično retoričkom djelovanju koje nameće i nagovara na određeno ponašanje, stav i obredi instituiranja djeluju tako što „nameću pravo da budeš takav i takav, a to je ujedno i obaveza: moraš biti (ili bi trebalo da budeš) takav. To znači znakom *saopćiti* nekom što je on i saopćiti mu da se dosljedno tome mora i ponašati. Indikativ je u tom slučaju imperativ.“⁸ S druge strane, retorički imperativ ispunjava uvjete svoje uspješnosti tek s obzirom na određeni društveno-politički kontekst u kojem se odvija i s obzirom na postojeće povijesne okolnosti. Stoga je, objašnjavajući dvostruki retorički okvir, neophodno uočiti i specifičan političko-povijesni kontekst u kojem se afirmirao Beuysov rad.

8 P. Bourdieu. Ibid. str. 107.

Katastrofa Drugog svjetskog rata i potpuni kolaps humanističkih ideala iz temelja je destabilizirao društvenu ontologiju, ukazujući na prevlast destruktivnih principa i opasnost istih po civilizaciju. Kriza zapadnjačkog racionalizma time je dovedena do surovih konzekvenci, a masovna istrjebljenja, logori i žrtve još jednom su dokazali stravičan učinak totalitarističke retorike i ideologije. U situaciji potpunog raspadanja vrijednosti te konačne afirmacije nihilizma i apsurdna, potreba za retorikom koja bi iz temelja bila drugačija, mogla se tražiti jedino u umjetničkom djelovanju i estetičkoj razgradnji okoštalih ideoloških sustava. S obzirom na takvo stanje stvari, Beuys kao njemački pilot iz Drugog svjetskog rata mogao je pokazati svijetu izlaz iz dijalektike prosvjetiteljstva, ali i postati savršeni umjetnički proizvod za tržište. U svijetu zasićenom materijalizmom, mitološko-mistička retorika oslonjena na propagiranje novog političkog ustrojstva, odlična je taktika za kreiranje vlastitog mita i afirmaciju vlastite ikone. Jedan od kritičara Beuysovog *mesijanizma* Benjamin H. D. Buloch piše: «Beuysov je *mit o podrijetlu*», poput svakog drugog pojedinačnog ili kolektivnog mita, zamršena mješavina činjenica i sjećanja prerađenih prema dinamici neurotičnih laži: taj poriv za stvaranjem mita koji zbog različitih razloga ne može prihvatiti činjenice pojedinačne autobiografske povijesti kao takve. Kao u svakoj takvoj retro-projektivnoj fantaziji - takvom narcističkom i blago patetičnom iskrivljenju činjenično normalnih uvjeta pojedinčeva dolaska na svijet - pripovijest koju je ispričavao autor mita razotkriva istine, ali ne i istine koju bi njegov autor htio priznati.«⁹ Ono na što Buloch ovdje referira već je opisan događaj pada zrakoplova, za koji smatra da se nikada nije dogodio, te da su navodne činjenice zapravo falsifikati: «Tko bi mogao pozirati za fotografiju nakon pada zrakoplova i još k tome teško ozlijeđen? I tko je snimio fotografije? Tatari svojom kamerom od masti i pusta?»¹⁰ U nastavku teksta, Buloch Beuysove automitologizacijske intencije dovodi u vezu s navodnim pokušajem kreiranja novog identiteta koji raskida s Beuysom kao vojnikom Trećeg Reicha; «Očito da je mit smišljen da porekne njegovo državljanstvo i njegovo sudjelovanje u njemačkom ratu. Ali, naravno, ono se potisnuto vraća još većom snagom i sama negacija Beuysova podrijetla u povijesnom razdoblju njemačkog fašizma potvrđuje da je svaki aspekt njegovog djela posve ovisan o tom razdoblju i proistekao iz njega.»¹¹

⁹ Benjamin H. D. Buloch, *Beuys: sumrak idola, uvodne bilješke za kritiku, Dossier Beuys*, Ibid. str. 102.

¹⁰ Benjamin H. D. Buloch, Ibid. str. 102.

¹¹ Ibid. str. 103.

Povijest je rana, uvijek svježija i nema flastera koji bi zaštitili vrijeme da ne istekne kao krv. Treba se probuditi iz te patologije, ukinuti *profanost* vremena i živjeti *događa*, poručuje nam umjetnik, umotan u pustene pokrivače, s glavom zaronjenom u mast. Retorika topline protiv izolacije prošlosti i umjetnost *kao* medicina koja odstranjuje bolesne dijelove tijela. *Šaman* ili *šarlatan*?

Prije nekoliko dana, jedan mi je prijatelj pokazivao crno-bijele fotografije iz Auschwitza na kojima se mogu vidjeti ljudi umotani u neke grube materijale, nalik pustanim pokrivačima koje je Beuys koristio u svojim radovima. Tek sam tada uočio tu zapanjujuću sličnost u *gestusu*, iščeznuću tijela u masovnoj demonstraciji moći na koju Beuys opominje. Bez obzira kakvim se sredstvima služio i da li svoj umjetnički rad koristio isključivo u promociju svog lika ili doista vjerovao u spasonosnu funkciju umjetnosti, Beuysu se mora priznati dosljednost. S humanističkih pozicija, predstavljajući preobraženu figuru pastira koji spašava svijet, on utjelovljuje pozitivne principe umjetnika kao *agensa* političkih i društvenih transformacija, umjetnika kao vidara koji pokazuje na ranu te djeluje na njezino ozdravljenje, i to je sasvim legitimno. Ako pri tome uzmemo u obzir povijesno-politički kontekst te činjenicu da Beuys dolazi iz Njemačke, bit će razumljivo zašto se služio baš takvim retoričkim figurama, zašto su sredstva bila tako direktna, a poruka vrlo često bolna i otrježnjavauća. Jedino je na taj način bilo moguće izraziti i propagirati novu *antropologiju* koja bi se udaljila od nekrofilnih tendencija racionalnosti. Ono što mi se nadalje čini ključnim u Beuysovom slučaju, odnosi se na *etičnost* njegove retorike, na tu ideju *topline* koja mora biti kontrapunkt *izolaciji* i otuđenju. Vjerujem da je svaka etika retorična, ali da svaka retorika nije etična i da se neka aksiologija retorike uspostavlja upravo unutar tog traganja za etičnošću, za nekom porukom koja se decidirano oslanja na kategorički imperativ pojedinca nereduciranog na sredstvo. Vjerujem da je to i Beuysova pozicija; retorika *singularnosti* i etika produhovljenih ljudi koji ne pristaju na umrtvljujući racionalizam *na(r)cizma*, civilizaciju koja se boji pokazati svoje rane i ne poznaje smrt, društvo koje drugačijeg stavlja u logore.



B. Beuys: Celtica



B. Beuys, Documenta 4



B. Beuys, Documenta 5

Rhetorical figures in Beuys' shamanism

Andrej Mirčev

Translated from the Croatian by Mirna Herman

One of the optical foci for perceiving and analyzing Beuys' artistic engagement is related to the specific idea of an artist who, within a broader political field, operates as a shaman or rather, one who points out and contributes to the healing of a contaminated society through his or her artistic performance, propagating alternative models founded in general creativity. Following the traces of such perceptions of the artist as a kind of *modern creative shaman*, this text will try to analyze the rhetorical segments and political performance of Joseph Beuys, focusing on the political context and ideological motives impregnated in his actions/performances. Taking over the theory of the performative that analyzes symbolic power in relation to sociological context, the main direction of this analysis will be the discovery of institutional frameworks through which Beuys' rhetorical modus becomes both legitimate and affirmed.

Rhetorics of a ritual

The most important event in Beuys' pre-artistic life is a controversial anecdote about an airplane crash which happened during the Second World War: "In 1944, when he was twenty-two years old, Beuys miraculously escaped death in Asia. His airplane, Ju 87, fell from the sky to the ground covered in snow in the Crimea. Joseph lost consciousness for a few days, and real Tatars found him half frozen and helped him recover. These people, that lived in harmony with nature, soon adopted him as one of their own: "Du nix German, du Tatarian" and brought him back to life, covering him in their traditional blankets and warming him with animal fat."¹ According to a ritual scenario, a person who shall become a shaman is brought to a near death condition but stays alive and, being born again, gains powers which free the community from demons. The anecdote about the airplane crash, regardless of whether the accident actually happened or not, is the first in a sequence of rhetorical figures and it relates to the idea of resurrection and rebirth. As such, it is an important segment for understanding *expanded art* as a revolutionary principle through which a humanistic utopia of social egalitarianism, liberty and freedom becomes possible.

When Pierre Bourdieu in his book "What does it mean to speak" analyses the functioning of ritual symbolism and performative magic, he provides an argument according to which ritualistic symbolism "does not work by itself but only if it *presents* – in the theatrical sense of the word – the transition of authorities: a very precise respect of the code belonging to a single-faced liturgy regulating sacramental gestures and words, at the same time establishing both proclamation and confirmation of the agreement on the authorization according to which the priest becomes the owner of the *monopole on the salvation goods*".² Some of the performances and actions indicate structural similarities with the dramaturgy and scenarios characteristic for sacral rituals. The symbolism stays preserved, but the context of the performance changes. An example of such a performance is "Celtic+" created in 1970 in which Beuys washes the feet of his audience while the ending consists of Christiansenn's spilling water over Beuys' head, a performance similar to the ritual of baptism. By positioning the performance in the context of a sacral performance, rhetorical figures are being expanded through a sequence of Christian mythological symbols that, although they represent a *surplus* in relation to the arts institution, contribute to the very *credibility* of the performance. On the other hand, having in mind the crisis of religious performativity, the topos within which it is still possible to find and confirm the *successfulness* of ritual as a performance is the very institution of the performance, especially in the aspect of performance as a kind of self-transformation that is created by the artist and his/her audience together. In that sense, P. Bourdieu says that the: "performative magic of the ritual can completely function only if the religious plenipotentiary, who is performing the ritual on behalf of a group, acts as a *mediator* between the group and magic itself: it is the group who through his/her mediation performs a magical act on itself which is contained in the performative act."³ Taking over religious symbolism, Beuys' performance is no longer happening in the environment of "purely" aesthetic codes, but rather it takes over the social field for whose transformation it strives. Rhetoric figures are formed around that intention, the intention of a speaker to convince the present audience in the very necessity of transcending the given world.

¹ Alain Borer, *Dossier Beuys*, Daf, Zagreb, 2003, p. 285.

² Pierre Bourdieu, *Što znači govoriti*, Naprijed, 1992, Zagreb, p. 99.

³ P. Bourdieu, *Ibid*, p. 101.

Individual mythology

Ever since the futurists and Duchamp, through the breakthrough of autobiographical elements, there is a tendency to erase the borders between the private and public personality of a performer. The actor and his/her body are no longer separated by heavy costumes nor covered in illusion where the body translates its surface to the representation of text. The artist-performer stands for him or herself. His or her body is a message and the skin is the last sanctuary of substance in collapse of the tactile faced with the emerging aggression of virtuality. However, such privacy, additionally made stronger through the mediation of the mass media, rises to the level of mythology and rhetoric, and every artistic act or scandal takes a step further in the strategy of conquering the media.

It is sufficient to remember Beuys' hat, fisherman's jacket and shepherd's stick. Beuys has never appeared in public without those requisites, and it is even difficult to find photographs of him with-

4 Volker Harlan, *Was ist Kunst*, Urchhaus, Stuttgart, 1986, p. 27.

out them. Focusing on the approach of representing himself and his actions in public, one can note a tendency to elevate appearance to the level of an icon, a populist rhetoric which is based on the repetition of a certain style and image aiming to map individuality and unrepeatableness. Individuality becomes absolute, elevated to an imperative where “everyone can be an artist”, in which rightful existence is denied to everything which is serial and produced on a massive scale, *that* which has not undergone the act of creative individualization. Beuys has closely related such motifs, it can be said, *existentialistic* par excellence, to economic and political issues, the problem of the transformation of the capitalistic into a creative society composed of spiritualized and liberated individuals while individuality becomes a guarantee of *healing*. In one of his interviews, Beuys claims: “Therefore, we are still living in a culture which says: these are artists, and those are not artists. Of course, that is not human and because of that people are alienated.”⁴ The idea of making alienation and isolation transcendent by means of art and the general creativization of society is hereditary to the aesthetic of Romanticism and as such can easily be incorporated in rhetorical discourse. The artist, placing him or herself into the position of supreme savior of society as a whole, is thus undergoing a metamorphosis and becoming a half-god who knows how to escape a dead end. However, the rhetorical function of history, regardless of concrete social results, is inherent to every kind of artistic action, which is critical towards the existing system. In Beuys, that rhetorical function is a product of balanced mythologizational tactics and, on the other hand, a humanistic vision of a better world. Because of that the number of those who call Beuys a charlatan is most probably equal to the number of those who think of him as a shaman.

Creative performance of the political

Apart from performances such as “How to Explain Art to a Dead Rabbit” or the performance with a coyote “I like America, America likes me”, where religious and archaic symbolism dominates, from the mid-60s Beuys started to turn to direct political actions which were an answer to the concrete political and historical context of the Cold War and unsolved social dichotomies. First in the sequence of such actions is Beuys’ appeal for raising the Berlin Wall 5 cm higher. This is followed by the actions “Saving the Wood” and “Purification on the First of May”, through which the accent is taken away from the religious rhetoric to the criticism of ideology and political systems characteristic for the Western world. Structurally speaking, the differences between those performative modules are perceived in the degree and manner of communication with the audience. While in his earlier performances the audience finds itself in the position of voyeur, in most cases separated from the *mis-en-scène* (for example, by glass in the performance “How to Explain Art to a Dead Rabbit” or by wire in the performance “I like America, America likes me”), in his actions and lectures there is an intensive communication and the field of collective performance is being created which comes first and directs pure political discourse.

5 Jon McKenzie, *Matrica performansa*, Frakcija, br.26/27. p. 005.

Speaking from an ideological aspect, Beuys excellently illustrates McKenzie’s thesis on *dissatisfied democrats*, whose characteristic is that they: “firmly believe in democracy but remain dissatisfied with its individual personifications.”⁵ In the period between 1967, when he founded “the German Student Party as a Meta-party” to 1977, when in the framework of the 6th Documenta in Kassel he founded “Freie internationale Hochschule für Kreativität und interdisziplinäre Forschung”, Beuys’ political activism becomes intonated with a pedagogical and didactical note which, regarding its basis in private mythology, shows an explicitly rhetorical character. The event which proves this the best is the scandal in which Beuys was dismissed from the Academy in Düsseldorf, where Beuys did not only make an art project entitled “democracy is ridiculous”, but used it to attract even more media attention thus securing for his art an even stronger aura. At this point we can once again find Romantic and anarchistic motifs; the artist as the one who, similar to the character of the director in Thomas Bernhard’s play “Famous”, shouts: “An artist needs to be alone against the entire world, lonely against everybody and everything.”⁶ A rhetorical figure of the rebel who is fighting for justice and whose politics of confrontation is a part of the strategy of attaining global success and fame. And still, regardless of the possible criticism on how in Beuys’ case the political point of departure is a part of the strategy for creating a myth about himself, the fact remains that Beuys succeeded in recruiting new political forces through his creative activism. Namely, he participated in the creation of the environmental movement and the Green Party, which regardless of the relatively small number of representatives in the German parliament, stands as an example of the positive synthesis of creative activism and politics. Explaining the above-mentioned synthesis, it is possible to recall McKenzie: “In this case, arts and humanistic sciences can offer many things, but criticism is needed and the creativity I am talking about does not need to be limited to spheres of art and culture: what needs to be created, discovered, found is a generalized creativity, creativity that acts where it is least expected – in the very target issue to which we are directing our resistance.”⁷

6 Thomas Bernhard, *Stücke 2*, Shurkamp, Frankfurt, 1988 p. 143.

7 J. McKenzie, *Ibid.* p. 109.



B. Beuys: *Caltric+*

Perform your wounded history!

Institutional frameworks, inside which the rhetorical moment of Beuys' artistic involvement is being created, are double-faced and they result from religious and political discourse. In both cases, by using them, the artist creates the convincingness of his performance, where the performance itself begins to function as a ritual of institutionalization as those who participate in it get involved. They are getting to know the secrets and mysteries of a healed and transformed life. Similar to rhetorical acts that persuade and impose certain behavior, the attitude and rituals of institutionalization are "imposing the right to be such and such, and that at the same time represents a commitment: one needs to be (or should be) such and such. This means to communicate with a sign to someone what he or she is and tell that person that he or she must behave accordingly. What is indicative in that case becomes imperative."⁸ On the other hand, the rhetorical imperative fulfills conditions for its successfulness only in relation to a certain social and political context within which it is happening and in relation to existing historical circumstances. Therefore, while explaining the double rhetorical framework, it is indispensable to mark the specific political and historical context in which Beuys' work was affirmed.

⁸ P. Bourdieu. *Ibid.* p. 107.

The catastrophe of the Second World War and the complete collapse of humanistic ideals has fundamentally destabilized social ontology, indicating the domination of destructive principles and their dangerous influence on civilization. The crisis of Western rationalism was therefore brought to cruel consequences and the mass exterminations, camps and victims once again proved the horrifying effects of a totalitarian rhetoric and ideology. In the situation of a total dissolution of values and final affirmation of nihilism and absurdity, the need for rhetoric, which could be fundamentally different, could only be found in artistic actions and the aesthetic disintegration of ossified ideological systems. In respect of such a state of things, Beuys, as a German pilot from the Second World War, could have shown the world an exit from the dialectics of the Enlightenment, but also the perfect product of art ready for the market. In a world saturated with materialism, mythological and mystical rhetoric is based on propagating the new political system and represents a great tactic for creating one's own myth and the affirmation of one's own icons. One of the critics of Beuys' *messianism*, Benjamin H. D. Buloch writes: "Beuys' myth about origin' is, as any other individual or collective myth, a complex mixture of facts and memories processed according to neurotic dynamics: that urge for the creation of a myth which cannot accept, due to many reasons, the facts of individual au-

9 Benjamnin H. D. Buloch, *Beuys: sumrak idola, uvodne bilješke za kritiku, Dossier Beuys*, Ibid. p. 102.

10 Benjamnin H. D. Buloch, Ibid. p. 102.

11 Ibid. p. 103.

tobiographical history as such. As in any other retro-projective fantasy – such a narcissistic and mildly pathetic distortion of actual conditions of an individual's arrival to this world – the story told by the author of the myth reveals truths but not those truths which its author would like to admit.”⁹ At this point Buloch refers to the already described event of the airplane crash which he thinks never occurred and whose evidences are actually forgeries; “Who could pose for a photograph after an airplane crash and being seriously injured? And who took those photographs? The Tatars with their camera made of fat?”¹⁰ In the text that follows, Buloch relates Beuys' intentions for auto-mythologization with the supposed attempt to create a new identity which intends to break up the one of Beuys as a soldier of the Third Reich; “It is obvious that the myth was created in order to deny his citizenship and participation in the German war. But, of course, what has been repressed comes back even stronger and the very negation of Beuys' origin in the historical period of German fascism confirms that each aspect of his work is completely dependent on that period and results directly from it.”¹¹

History is a wound, always fresh and open and there is no bandage that can stop time from running the same as blood. “One needs to be awoken from such pathology, to annul the *profanity* of time and live the *event*,” says the artist, covered in blankets, head thrust in fat. The rhetoric of warmth against the isolation of history and art as the medicine that removes sick body parts. *Shaman* or *charlatan*?

A few days ago, one of my friends showed me black and white photographs from Auschwitz showing people covered in some raw textiles, similar to the blankets that Beuys used in his work. Only then did I notice the astonishing similarity in gestus, the disappearance of the body within the massive demonstration of power that Beuys wanted to warn about. Regardless of what means he uses and whether he uses his art exclusively for self-promotion, or because he sincerely believed in salvation as one function of art, Beuys is consistent and true to himself. From humanistic positions, through representing the metamorphosized figure of the shepherd who wants to save the world, he embodies the positive principles of an artist as an agent of political and social transformation, an artist as a healer who shows the wound and influences its recovery, and that is completely legitimate. If we take into consideration the historical and political context and the fact that Beuys comes from Germany, it is understandable why he used such rhetorical figures, why his means were so direct, and the message very often so painful and sobering. That was the only way to express and propagate the new anthropology, which could withdraw from the necrophiliac tendencies of rationality. What still seems to me as the key point in Beuys' case, relates to the ethics of his rhetoric, to the idea of warmth which needs to be the counterpoint to isolation and alienation. I believe that every ethics is rhetorical, and that every rhetoric is not ethical and that a certain axiology of rhetoric can be constructed within that quest for ethical behavior, for some message that is based on the categorical imperative of an individual who is not reduced to his means of action. I believe that is Beuys' position as well; a rhetoric of singularity and an ethics of spiritualized people who are not willing to accept the numb rationalism of na(r)ci(s)sism, and a civilization which is afraid to show its wounds and does not know death, a society which places a different one in camps.

Kada ste posljednji put nekoga zaveli?

Ljiljana Filipović

Kada ste zadnji put imali volje nekoga zavesti? Kada su vas posljednji put zaveli? Laskanjem, ulagivanjem, bespomoćnošću, iskrenošću, nepotkupljivošću. Znanjem. Revolucionarnošću. Lijepim rukama. Ideologijom. Ekskomuniciranošću. Glasom. Neurotičnošću. Onime da ste drugačijih od ostalih? Ili ste sve to propustili zavodeći sami sebe vlastitim očajanjem?

Kada ste posljednji put popustili svome nesvjesnom? Dopustili mu slabost da bude zavedeno i da zavede, a da ste bili uvjereni da u tome niste sudjelovali. Jer ste djelovali šutnjom? povučenošću? neprisutnošću? nezainteresiranošću?

Jesu li opomene za neplaćene račune jedina pisma koja ubrzavaju rad vašeg srca? A riječi nekog profesora još jedino što vama manipulira? Zato što mislite da ga akademska priznanja čine automatskim nositeljem istine i dobrote?

Kada vas je zadnji put zavela izloženost nekom tekstu?

Ali već je Kierkegaard sve o tome rekao:

Ponekad čitam Cordeliji pomiješano koješta zanimljiva i nezanimljiva, Edward pri tome služi, tako reći, kao paravan, suflirao sam mu da je to dobra metoda, posuđivati djevojkama knjige; time postaju odnosi prsniji. ... Pravu korist od toga imam ja, jer ja određujem knjige, upravljam dakle svime, a ipak ostajem iza kulisa.

Koliko puta ste se osobno zauzeli za vlastitu zavodnicu? Ili zavodnika? Presreli ih na cesti? Kao što se ponekad zaustavlja i zavodi vlastitog mogućeg ubojicu. A da vam možda oni i nisu željeli pristupiti. Koji ih je dio u vama odabrao? Otimače vašeg srca. Razoritelje vaših mirnih dana u malom malogradanskom gradu. Godinama nakon toga nastojite odgonetnuti jeste li zapravo samo dobrovoljno odabrali upasti u stupicu koja vam, što je najgore, i nije bila osobno namijenjena. Kierkegaard se izjašnjava: Meni je ideal ona djevojka, koja je sama u svijetu i nema prijateljica... Ona živi u svijetu fantazije.

Kada je posljednji put zavođenje bilo proizvođenje vašeg pristanka? Koji vas je naveo na izbor zbog kojeg ste godinama poslije trpjeli. Politički. Financijski. Estetski. Etički emotivno. No svako zavođenje ima svoj kraj. Svoju zasićenost. Ono je poput ostvarivanja čežnje. Rodovi nisu izuzeti. Kutke doma samoće koje nastanjuje maštanje, filozof je sigurno i predobro poznavao. Da se ne bi prestao protiviti svojoj želji i sam bio zaveden, ispunio ga je pisanjem dnevnika čije će riječi opčinjavati generacije samotnih zavodnika koji jedino jezičnim konstrukcijama dopuštaju da ih zanesu, puštajući da rezoniraju onime što misle da je autentično u njima. Bojeći se kraja? Života?

Jedan dan vladajuća partija zabrani flert. Sve što bi vas njemu moglo podučiti. Izmjenjivanje tajnih pogleda. Kao i ono što bi ih moglo potaknuti. Za mali smiješak koji vam nekontrolirano izleti s usana, dohvati li vas moralna policija, bit ćete strogo kažnjeni. Bit ćete društveno izbrisani i obilježeni uhvate li vam sms koji nije upućen vašoj legitimno odabranoj pratnji.

Dopušteno vam je samo raditi, moliti i ispovijedati grješne misli i pokrete. A u tom se svijetu niste rodili, nego ste se u jednom političkom zaokretu u njemu našli. Pomislite: super, mogli su i nešto drugo zabraniti i već se uhvatite kako skrivite *Dnevnik jednog zavodnika*, bacate svoje uske hlače, izbacujete cimet iz kuhinje. Zastanete i promotrite vlastiti prostor koji vas mami bojama i knjigama kao neka klopka koju ste sami sebe postavili. Pa neće to valjda shvatiti, ponadate se. Ipak sakrijete Prousta, Stendhala, a na kraju zamoreni odabiranjem sve ih pobacate, uključujući i religijske udžbe-

nike. Vašem su znancu pacijenti odjednom počeli otkazivati jer je lokalni sociolog napisao članak o zavođenju u liječničkom transferu. Uvedene su posebne patrole koje kontroliraju prodavaonice s dječjom odjećom jer su se odrasli požalili da ih dječja odjeća nadahnjuje pedofilskim maštarijama. Vratile su se i stare rasprave o tome je li pornografija zavođenje. Je li pretjeranost zavođenje? Jedan je religijski poglavar nespretno izlanuo da se mekana pornografija koristi na privatnim televizijskim kanalima za poticanje prokreacije. Kad su ga upitali zar se to ne radi na propovjedaonicama, bespomoćno je odmahnuo rukom. Zapitate se, kad se na konferenciji grupa izdvoji i strasno počne raspravljati o Cassireru, nije li i to zavođenje?

- Jasno da jest - naceri se moralna policija u vama. - U diskurzivnom obliku.

- Što hoće s tim postići? - postavite si pitanje vašeg oca.

Ubačeni leci u sandučiću zagovaraju:

- Da se okreneš životu?

- Da se počneš boriti za njega?

Zabrinete se, što će biti s prirodom? Pa ona vas je oduvijek najviše zavodila. Prvim snježnim pahuljama. Zorama. Patetičnim zalascima sunca. I nju će zabraniti?

- Ne, nju će razoriti - rezignirano će čak i zamorni, vama dodijeljeni, moralisti.

Timothy Learyju su poučno ukazivali kako nema ništa zanosnije od trenutka kad se stigne na vrh neke planine. Da, priznao je. Ali zamislite kakav je tek kad još na njemu popušite joint? Kada se više ne možete puniti potrebom da vas se zavede, to napušteno mjesto rijetko ostaje prazno. U njega se takmičarski naguravaju strah, fobija, bolest, fitnes, hrana ili izgladnjivanje. Vladaoci vašeg života, oni koji zamjenjuju one prve, vašu obitelj ili neku instituciju za djecu. Ili zavodite sebe vlastitom samoćom, vlastitom zrcalnom slikom, samosažaljenjem, tugom, patnjom. Pa i tu već odigravate nečiju postojeću pripovijest.

Priča se da je Mihail Bulgakov pisao samo za jednog čitatelja. Ali njega se nije moglo zavesti. Nije ga se moglo promijeniti. Staljina. Može li se to s velikim zavodnikom? Ponekad to pokuša neki stvaratelj dovodeći smrt na pozornicu. Vjerujući u pravdu. Nadajući se kazni onome za koga svojom dobrotom nastoji uspostaviti ravnotežu u svijetu.

Je li mogući zakon, represija zavođenja, tek potreba da se ono ponovno vrati u život? Jer sve dok imate što sakriti pred moralnom policijom, jasno ako se ne radi u kriminalnoj zloupotrebi druge osobe, involvirani ste, bar jednim dijelom, u priču s erosom. U pripovijest o samosvijesti.

Dok prelistavate novine u caféu neka se žena žali prijateljici kako ju je suprug optuživao da zavodi čak i kada stoji iza stakla na prozoru. Nekog prolaznika kojeg nije ni vidio. Kojeg nije ni bilo. Samoj joj se činilo da je od tih njegovih riječi sve zavedljivija. A onda su jednom slavili Novu godinu na ulici nekog stranog grada. Pristupila im je neznanka, taman je otkucana novogodišnja ponoć, ljudi su plesali, pjevali, pili tek otvoreni šampanjac, obratila se suprugu i upitala ga: Jeste li vi glumac? Oboje su se nasmijali. Ta bilo je očito da je tu ženu on podsjećao na nekog tamošnjeg glumca.

Nedugo zatim prasnula je bomba. Supruga je naletjela na njoj nepoznati šal u muževljevoj garderobi. Uvjeravao ju je da ga je sam kupio, ali šal ju je poput Arijadnine niti vodio po labirintu koji je otkrivao druge žene, dugogodišnje suprugove nevjere, prikrivanja njezina postojanja. Pokloni i ljubaznosti sada su imali sasvim drugu sliku. Dane provodi odgonetavajući o čemu se tu zapravo radilo.

Inscenirano zavođenje često pretpostavlja retoriku razmjene. Pri tome, jasno, ono nije samo verbalno te uspješno manipulira svim sredstvima komunikacije. Jedna od Berlusconijevih glasačica izjavila je da mu je odana zato što je on tako dobro odjeven i lijep. Zavođenje je neprekidno i postaje opsjedajućim u ideološkom kontekstu. Smješteno je u zavedenom. U njegovoj spremnosti da bude zaveden. U potrebi da se bude zaveden. U želji da se bude željen.

Zavođenje je proizvođenje smisla i zaborava. Ali i manipulacija i prijevara. Je li ponavljanje zavođenja jedina zaštita od ushita? Don Juan je takmičar, Casanova misli da ih obožava, psihoanaliza je uvjerena da oni vole samo svoje majke.

Na suđenju Angeli Davis, sudac je unizio njezino djelovanje rekavši da se njezino vladanje može jedino objasniti time što je bila zaljubljena. Znači li da nije bila svjesna? Da je djelovala poput proročišta kojem se informacija prosljeđuje neposredno, zadržavajući prisebnost proročice? Ali, postavlja se pitanje, što ako je bila zaljubljena jer je bila revolucionarna?

Kad nestane težnja da se bude zaveden, zavodnik odumire. Proizvodi ga potreba da se bude zaveden. Je li zavođenje zabavno? Tek kad se zbiva nepromišljeno, kada vas neki trenutak, neki pokret i neki miris pretvore u zamku za drugu osobu pa i za vas same. Opasne veze i dnevnicu zavodnika etički opterećuju i kompliciraju. Oni su poput vrpce s objašnjavajućim natpisom koje su stari majstori dodavali svojim slikama želeći da one progovore, vjerujući u moć riječi. Odumiranje natpisa, opterećujuće guranje slova u sliku koja se pretvara u pismo nestalo je samo po sebi, kazujući da kod zavođenja uistinu vrijedi pravilo da je manje više.

Zavođenje uvijek postiže svoj cilj. Možda ne u činjeničnom obliku opčinjavanja neke osobe u uobičajenoj ljubavnoj maskaradi. Ono uvijek stiže do dijela koji ga je proizveo. Do svoje nesvjesne destinacije. Retorika je zavođenje. Zavođenje je retorika. Ono je oduvijek. Govori istinu o vašoj želji.

- Postoji li to kao video igra? - odjednom vas prene vaš, srećom, infantilni dio moralne policije.

When was the last time you seduced someone?

Ljiljana Filipović

Translated from Croatian by Una Bauer

When was the last time you felt like seducing someone? When was the last time you were seduced? By flattery, fawning, helplessness, honesty, incorruptibility. Knowledge. Revolutionary inclinations. Beautiful hands. Ideology. Excommunication. Voice. Neuroticism. By being different from the rest? Or have you missed out on all of that while you were seducing yourself with your own despair?

When was the last time you gave in to your unconscious? Allowed it the weakness to be seduced. To seduce? And that you were convinced that you were not taking part in it. Because you were acting through silence? Shyness? Absence? Indifference?

Are the warning notices for unpaid bills the only letters that make your heart beat faster? And the words of a professor the only thing that can still manipulate you? Because you think that academic credentials make him the automatic carrier of truth and good?

When was the last time you were seduced by exposure to a text?

But Kierkegaard has already said all there is to say about this:

Sometimes I read to Cordelia a mix of various interesting and uninteresting things, while Edward serves, so to speak, as a cover, I suggested to him, that this was a good method, to lend books to girls; this brings people closer.... I am the one really benefiting from it, because I am the one deciding on the books, therefore controlling everything, and yet remaining behind the scenes.

How many times have you personally advocated for your own seductress? Or seducer? Intercepted them on the street? The way you sometimes stop and seduce your own possible murderer. And that they perhaps did not even want to approach you. What part of you chose them? The usurpers of your heart. The destroyers of your peaceful days in a small bourgeois city. Years after this you try to unravel whether you have only voluntarily chosen to fall in a trap that wasn't, to make it even worse, personally intended for you. Kierkegaard explains: My ideal is that girl, who is alone in the world and has no friends.... She lives in a world of fantasy.

When was the last time seduction was a product of your assent? That led you to a choice which made you suffer for years to follow. Politically. Financially. Aesthetically. Ethically. Emotionally. But every seduction has its end. Its saturation. It is like fulfilling a longing. Genders are not excluded. Corners in the home of loneliness inhabited by fantasy, the philosopher only knew too well. So that he would not stop opposing his desire and be seduced himself, he filled it by writing a diary whose words will fascinate generations of lonely seducers who allow only language constructions to captivate them. Leaving them to resonate with what they think is authentic about them. Being afraid of the end? Of life?

One day the ruling party bans flirtation. Everything that could teach you about it. The exchanging of secretive glances. As well as that which might inspire them. For a tiny smile that escapes your lips uncontrollably, if caught by the moral police, you will be severely punished. You will be socially erased and marked if they intercept an SMS message not intended for your legitimately selected partner.

You are only allowed to work, pray and confess your sinful thoughts and movements. And you were not born in that world, but found yourself in it through a political twist. Great, you think, they could have forbade something else, and you already catch yourself hiding *The Seducer's Di-*

ary, throwing away your tight trousers, throwing out the cinnamon from your kitchen. You stop and examine your own space which tempts you with colours and books like some kind of trap you have set for yourself. They won't figure that out, you hope. But you hide Proust, Stendhal anyway, and in the end, tired of choosing, you throw them all away, including the religious textbooks. Patients are suddenly calling off appointments with an acquaintance of yours, because of an article by a local sociologist on seduction during medical transfers. Special patrols have been introduced that control children's clothing shops because adults have started to complain that children's clothing induces pedophile fantasies for them. Old debates about whether pornography is seduction have also returned. Is exaggeration seduction? One religious leader awkwardly blurts out that soft pornography is used on private television channels to stimulate procreation. When asked whether this is not done from the pulpits, he helplessly waves his hand. You ask yourself, when a group of people detaches itself during a conference and starts to discuss Cassirer passionately, isn't that seduction?

- Of course it is, the moral police inside you grin. – In a discursive format.
- What are they trying to accomplish with that? – you ask yourself your father's question.

Leaflets from the mailbox advocate:

- Shall you turn to life?
- Shall you fight for it?

You are worried, what will happen with nature? It has always seduced you the most. With the first snowflakes. Dawns. Pathetic sunsets. Will they ban this too?

- No, they will destroy it – tired moralists, allotted to you, will say resignedly.

It was suggested to Timothy Leary that there is nothing more ecstatic than the moment when you reach the top of a mountain. Yes, he agreed. *But imagine what it's like when you smoke a joint up there?* Once you can no longer be filled with the need to be seduced, this abandoned space rarely remains empty. Fear, phobia, illness, fitness, food or starvation start to compete. The rulers of your life, those that replace the first ones, your family, or some child care institution. Or you seduce yourself with your own solitude, with your own mirror image, self-pity, sadness, suffering. Even here you are performing someone's already existing story.

The story goes that Mikhail Bulgakov wrote for one reader only. But this one could not be seduced. Could not be altered. Stalin. Can this be done with a great seducer? This is sometimes attempted by a creator by bringing death onto the stage. Believing in justice. Hoping for punishment for the one who attempts to establish balance in the world with his kindness.

Is the possible law, the repression of seduction, just a need to bring it back to life? Because as long as you have something to hide from the moral police, unless of course it is the criminal abuse of another person, you are involved, at least partially, in the story with *eros*. In the story about self-consciousness.

While you are leafing through the newspapers at a café, a woman complains to a friend that her husband had accused her of seduction even when she was standing behind a window. Of seducing a passer-by that he never even saw. Who wasn't even there. It seemed to her that she is more seductive from these very words. And then they once were celebrating New Year's Eve on the street of some foreign city. They were approached by a stranger, midnight had just passed, people were dancing, singing, drinking just opened bottles of champagne, who turned to the husband and asked: Are you an actor? They both laughed. It was obvious that he reminded this woman of a local actor.

Sometime after a bomb exploded. The wife came across an unfamiliar scarf in her husband's closet. He persuaded her that he had bought it himself, but the scarf, like Ariadne's thread, led her across a labyrinth that uncovered other women, her husband's age-long infidelities, the hiding of their existence. Gifts and kindness had a completely different face now. She spends her days untangling what it was really all about.

Staged seduction often presumes the rhetoric of exchange. It is, of course, not only verbal and it successfully manipulates all means of communication. One of Berlusconi's voters stated that she is loyal to him because he is so well-dressed and handsome. Seduction is continuous and becomes obsessive in an ideological context. It is located in the seduced. In its readiness to be seduced. In the need to be seduced. In the wanting to be wanted.

Seduction is the production of meaning and oblivion. But also of manipulations and deceits. Is the repetition of seduction the only protection from enchantment? Don Juan is a competitor, Casanova thinks he worships them, psychoanalysis is convinced that they only love their mothers.

During the trial of Angela Davis, the judge devalued her actions saying that her behavior could only be explained by the fact that she was in love. Does that mean that she wasn't aware of it? That she was acting like an oracle through which information is only transferred directly, bewitching the sanity of the fortune-teller. But, the question here is what if she was in love because she was revolutionary?

When the striving to be seduced disappears, the seducer dies. Only the need to be seduced produces him. Is seduction fun? Only when it happens unconsciously, when a certain moment, a certain movement and a certain smell turns you into a trap for the other person and for yourself. Dangerous liaisons and seducer's diaries ethically burden and complicate things. They are like the cartouches, with explanatory inscriptions that old masters added to their paintings in the desire to make them speak through the power of words. The dying out of the inscription, the burden of pushing letters into a painting that turns into a letter has disappeared on its own, recognizing that when it comes to seduction, the rule 'less is more' is truly applicable here.

Seduction always achieves its goal. Maybe not in a factual form, by the seduction of some person in a usual love masquerade. It always reaches the part that has produced it. Its unconscious destination. Rhetoric is seduction. Seduction is rhetoric. It has always been. It tells the truth about your desire.

- Does it exist as a video game? – suddenly you are aroused, luckily, by your infantile part of the moral police.

Suvremenost upisana u međuprostore drame

Razgovor s Petrom Pogorevc

Razgovarala Ivana Sajko

Prevela sa slovenskog Leila Al Shammary



FRAKCIJA: Kad kažem retorika - mislim na umijeće uvjeravanja, možda čak i zavodjenja, umijeće komunikacije koje ne prenosi samo intelektualni sadržaj, već i emociju. Kad su u pitanju žive izvedbe mjesto je retorike, čini mi se, jasnije. Npr. govornik (političar?) ne mora govoriti istinu, a IPAK biti uvjerljiv. To IPAK djelo je retorike. Na koji način retorika može biti upisana u tekstu? Dramskom tekstu? Postoji li za tebe uopće nešto što bi tako nazvala u odnosu na dramu? Retorika u tekstu, retorika koja prethodi činu govora? Neki višak, neka emanacija koja te uvjeri u ono što čitaš? Odakle bi mogla doći? I na kraju, koji su tvoji razlozi da vjeruješ ili ne vjeruješ, da voliš ili ne voliš neki dramski tekst?



Petra Pogorevc, foto: Damjan Švarc

POGOREVC: Počet ću od kraja tog sveprisutnog pitanja, naime digresijom da ti pomalo zavidim jer možeš za razliku od mene na svom jeziku tako spontano koristiti glagol *voljeti*; ne samo u odnosu s voljenom osobom, nego i tada kada pričaš o svom jakom, pozitivnom odnosu spram dramskog teksta ili kazališne predstave. Slovenski se jezik na papiru inače koristi takvom upotrebom, ali je u praksi mnogo više suzdržan i taj drski glagol također unutar međuljudskih odnosa često se istiskuje s neprimjerno bljeđom sintagmom *biti drag*. Kako god bilo, do odgovora na tvoje pitanje željela bih doći posredno, kroz govor o konkretnome tekstu, a da pri tom ne mogu zaobići kako me zabavlja činjenica da mu mogu taj put, računajući na hrvatski prijevod, direktno i izričito izjaviti svoju *ljubav*. To još nisam učinila iako nisam nikad skrivala svoju fascinaciju njime i čak sam mu ponekad dozvolila da prespava na mom jastuku...

Radi se o tekstu suvremenog engleskog dramatičara Martina Crimpa *Attempts on her Life*, koji je svoju premijeru u gornjoj dvorani kazališta Royal Court doživio godine 1997. Taj uznemirujući tekst koji ostavlja standardno koncipiranu građu i postavu dramskih osoba, u sedamnaestim se "scenarijima za kazalište" usredotočuje na verbalizirani "lov" na svoju odsutnu protagonistkinju. Žena, koja se na pozornici nikada ne pojavljuje, iz prizora u prizor dobiva nove značajke jer ju bezimena glasovi, koji u tekstu

zamjenjuju fiktivne dramske osobe isključivo na nivou naglog govora, stalno nanovo izmišljavaju, stavljaju je u različite kontekste te joj mijenjaju identitet. Za mene je bitna činjenica da ta odsutna žena postoji samo na nivou živog, maničnog, sugestivnog govora, koji je predočava u mašti gledatelja i da taj govor nije stavljen u usta nekih izmišljenih osoba, nego je koncipiran tako da već na papiru računa na direktno prisustvo i retoričku vještinu trenutačnih izvođača toga teksta. Njegovo optimalno izvođenje na sceni zato zamišljam kao događaj koji je potpuno lišen balasta fikcije i iluzije. Na pozornici vidim samo performere koji slično antičkim retorima uvjeravaju gledatelje u postojanje te žene na temelju dviju stvari: unaprijed pisanih "govora" i svoje retoričke vještine.

Naravno, govorim o primjeru, ne o pravilu. Prema mom mišljenju, za dramski tekst nužna je autorova svijest o tome za koji medij stvara. U biti, svedjedno mi je da li ključ za njegovu tematizaciju pronalazi u didaskalijama, u epskim probojima klasičnog dramskog modela ili u bavljenju konstruktivnim kategorijama drame kao što su prostor ili vrijeme. Bitno je ono što je upisano iza tih pokušaja, što su tekstovi na pozornici sposobni rasplesti. U tom me smislu prije svega zanimaju drame u kojima pisci problematiziraju vlastite postupke i u njih upisuju svijest o njihovoj inscenaciji. Kako dokazuje praksa, postoji nekoliko putova za dostizanje istog cilja pa stoga ne bih željela generalizirati. Ali mi se čini da sve te raznovrsne pristupe spaja nastojanje da kazalište ne bude samo po sebi shvaćeno kao stroj za produkciju iluzije, već da preko pitanja o vlastitim postupcima i mogućnostima dođe do osobnih, rizičnih i suvremenih oblika izraza.

FRAKCIJA: Postoji li prema tebi nešto prepoznatljivo suvremeno u dramskom tekstu prije no što je on insceniran. Jasno je da na suvremenoj pozornici sve može zamijeniti dramski tekst: reklama, filozofski članak... pa u takvoj konstelaciji i putem takvih dramaturških intervencija moliereovska šala može biti jednako suvremena kao što, npr. citat nekog političkog govora, može biti klasičan. To je stanje teksta na pozornici. Zanima me da li se u suvremenoj drami može vidjeti ta situacija? Postoji li suvremenost scenske prakse koja je već upisana u tekstove kraja dvadesetog stoljeća? Postoji li ipak neka razlika spram prethodnika, neke oznake što ih čine pristupačnijima za razumijevanje u suvremenom kontekstu?

POGOREVC: Ponovno ću odgovoriti primjerom iz britanske dramatike devedesetih, koju sam u posljednjih pet godina najviše pratila i proučavala. U mislima imam *Cleansed* Sarah Kane; baš taj tekst očigledno demonstrira razliku između mainstreamovskog dramskog pisanja, koji kazališni

medij zapostavlja na račun literarnosti, te pojedinačnih primjera teksta koji taj medij shvaćaju kao cjelovit i dinamičan semiološki sistem. Područje u kojem je Sarah Kane u *Cleansed* iskazala svoju osjetljivost su didaskalije, koje su pune onog što konvencionalno mimetično kazalište razumije kao nešto što se na pozornici ne može izvesti ili je u najmanju ruku problematično stoga što krši famozan zakon o zabrani nepovratnog, koji prema Josette Féral "pozornici nalaže reverzibilnost vremena i događaja" odnosno "protivi se svakojakom osakaćenju ili pogubljenju subjekta". U *Cleansed* se susrećemo s upornim nizanjem osakaćenja i pogublivanja koji svoje potencijalne izvođače upozoravaju kako na ograničenja tako i na mogućnosti medija u kojem stvaraju. Čak i ako ostavimo sa strane razvikane prikaze fizičkog nasilja, ne možemo zaobići činjenicu da se u didaskalijama tog teksta na pozornici množe štakori i niču narcisi; da se uspostavlja cjelovit nacrt moguće inscenacije koji optička, zvučna i ostala rješenja tretira jednakovrijedno sa sadržajem dramskih replika. Time se prethodno u tekst upisuje svijest o njegovom izvođenju na sceni, pa ipak mu nije "štetan", ne ograničava ga u mogućnostima te ga interpretativno ne zatvara.

Didaskalije kao ono međuprostorno područje dramskog teksta koje uspostavljaju produkciju smisla dramskog teksta na izmišućoj granici između verbalnog i neverbalnog, već zbog tog statusa *međuprostornosti* nude višesmjernu riječ vodilju za izlazak iz škripca literarnosti, no bilo bi nepažljivo ako bismo ih proglasili kao jedino. Pojedinačni primjeri suvremenog dramskog pisma, među njima i oni koji na prvi pogled djeluju pomalo staromodno, uz temeljito čitanje mogu iznenaditi. U vezi s britanskom dramatikom devedesetih puno se pričalo o nasilnosti, brutalnosti i degutantnosti pojedinačnih tekstova, ali se kao mjerilo svega toga osobito navodilo pojedinačne "nečuvene" prizore. Ali ako te tekstove čitaš pomno uočavaš da je u njima često najstrašnije i najmučnije ono što je stavljeno u usta osobama: ne (po pravilu naivno režirani) prizori nasilja, nego razbuktao govor o njemu, koji u najboljim primjerima može biti tako ustrajan, usmjeren i sugestivan da postaje stvarno neizdržljiv. Takvi proboji modela apsolutne drame nisu ništa novo, dramatika ih u obliku prostorno i vremensko sakrivenih izvještaja razvija od antičkih vremena naovamo, ali je zanimljivo što mnogi britanski autori devedesetih s njima nisu ništa više "zakrivali" i isto tako nisu objašnjavali ili educirali, nego su provocirali; ne bez razloga, u kombinaciji s verizmom koji ih je napravio još življima jer pretpostavlja relacije jedan na jedan.

FRAKCIJA: Možda imam krivi dojam, ali mi se ljubav prema drami ponekad čini kao neko izopćeno mjesto, stravično zastarjelo i patetično, budući da većina ljudi dramski tekst izjednačuje s nečim "dramskim" ili "dramatičnim", nečim "fiksiranim" ili "tromim", nečim nesposobnim da (samostalno) odgovori na umjetničke i teorijske koncepte današnjice. Gdje po tebi leži mogućnost revitalizacije dramskog kazališta? Kakvo je to kazalište koje sama zamišljaš ili kojemu težiš... ili možda, koje prepoznaješ kad čitaš tebi bitne tekstove?

POGOREVC: Činjenica da većina ljudi dramski tekst izjednačuje s nečim "dramskim", "dramatičnim" ili "fiksiranim", kako kažeš, po mom je mišljenju posljedica toga što većina dramskih tekstova stvarno odgovara njihovim predodžbama. Uostalom, i zbog toga što ih njihovi autori lansiraju na kazališno tržište kojim, kao i svima drugima, vlada kapital. Umjetnički su vođe kazališta svjesni toga da im na prodane preplate utječu prije svega dobro napisane priče, pa stoga njihov nastanak bodre daleko više nego pisanje drukčijih i stoga riskantnijih tekstova. Pozicija osobe koja usprkos svemu tome brani i istražuje dramski tekst, bio to dramatičar, redatelj, glumac ili kritičar, takva je da gotovo upoče nema sugovornika: na jednoj te strani čudno gleda kazališni aparat mainstreama, kao da stalno nešto gnjaviš jer želiš više od lijepo pakiranih i uglađeno izvođenih priča; s druge su strane prema tebi isto tako sumnjičavi predstavnici onog manjinskog područja hibridnih scenskih umjetnosti, koje kazalište kao medij razdvajaju bez milosti od dramskog teksta kojeg guraju u područje literature i misle da prema njemu s pravom gaje skepsu i prezir. Ja mislim da oba stajališta znače neproduktivne krajnosti oko kojih se nema smisla svadati te da garanciju za inspirativan događaj sam po sebi ne daju ni dramski tekst ni njegova odsutnost.


Prije si spomenula da dramski tekst na pozornici može zamijeniti takoreći sve: od promidžbe do filozofskog članka. Vjerojatno je obzirno pitati se što suvremeno kazalište dramskim tekstom gubi odnosno dobiva. Moj odgovor glasi da je to autorska pozicija pisca, ali ne u onom klasičnom i prevladanom smislu "čuvar značenja", koju u procesu rada u kazalištu vlastitim (re)interpretacijama izaziva redatelj, nego u smislu traženja i preispitivanja te pozicije koja se ne tiče samo sadržaja nego i forme svakog teksta i, na kraju krajeva, predstave. Kamo se dramski pisac svrstava danas kad mu se više nije potrebno skrivati iza replike izmišljenih osoba; kako i odakle nam govori o pokretima svoje duše zbog kojih se prihvatio obrade određene teme za određeni medij, koja su mu se pitanja i prepreke nametale kod pisanja; do kuda je spreman dogurati i izložiti se skupa sa svojim skepsama i preprekama? Suvremeno kazalište ne zamišljam kao sukob dvaju monolitnih značenja, koje zastupaju samo po sebi razumljivi autoriteti pisca s jedne i redatelja s druge strane. Iskustvo mi govori da materijal koji najviše uznemiruje na pozornici nastaje tada kada se takve pozicije prekriju, zaljuljaju; kad se stvori lomljivo i nježno područje između u kojem svojim radom mora biti privučen i performer. Gdje mu je mjesto, kako varira raspon njegovog identiteta, što se s njim događa kad na pozornici ispred nas balansira u onom između, između interpretacije i prisutnosti, značenja i forme, poruke i izraza, uloge i svoje privatnosti?

FRAKCIJA: Ovo je donekle pojašnjenje prijašnjih pitanja... koje su retoričke strategije koje bi odgovarale suvremenoj drami? Kakav je to govor? Koja je to gesta? Koji je to prostor? Jačina? Što očekuje publika? Naravno svi su ovi upitnici upućeni samo tebi. Ne očekujem nikakve opće istine, već me zanima tvoje iskustvo kazališne kritičarke, kad, primjerice, ideš pogledati inscenaciju Sarah Kane i odnos tog očekivanja naspram onog što vidiš kao predstavu.

POGOREVC: Nisam sigurna hoće li te moj odgovor zadovoljiti jer smo kritičari naviknuti na dril koji od nas ne traži serviranje potencijalnih rješenja, nego njihovo prepoznavanje na pozornici. I ja kao kritičar moram sebi svakako uvijek iznova postavljati pitanja o vlastitoj poziciji. Koliko sam sposobna vidjeti na osnovi jednog oglada, koji su moji kriteriji procjene, kako razvijam svoju argumentaciju te u kakvom odnosu trebaju pri tome biti forma i značenje? Da se izražavam u prvom licu jednine ili množine? Da se izložim ili sakrijem? Smijem li se ponoviti? Za kritičara je, na kraju krajeva, važno i to da održava demokratičan pogled: zdravo je biti svjestan subjektivnih preferencija koje ne smiju i ne mogu prerasti u jedino mjerilo kod pisanja. I meni se postavlja pitanje o između, naime: odakle sam gledatelj i odakle sam dalje kritičar, kako da budem između jednog i drugog, kako da ustrajem između subjektivnih i objektivnih parametara gledanja?

Bitno je da unatoč bezbrojnim predstavama, koje se pred tobom nižu iz večeri u večer, sačuvaš kondiciju i u tom smislu da još imaš volje dozvoliti si iznenađenje. Spomenula si Sarah Kane: kad sam prije četiri godina u SNG Mala Drama Ljubljana gledala izvođenje *Cleansed* u režiji Jerneja Lorencija bilo je to potpuno suprotno s mojom prethodnom predstavom o tom tekstu, koju sam stvorila na temelju čitanja. Stišana, stilizirana, svladana, minimalistička, zamalo krhko sterilna. Ali s raskošnom metaforikom rješenja koje je proizvela u sukobljavanju s prije spomenutim didaskalijama, a prije svega s time što ih je zgustila u koherentan sistem koji je uz precizno plasirani tekst obuhvatio još cijeli niz inteligentnih, strateško povezanih gestualnih, vizualnih, zvučnih i drugih invencija, uvjerila me i preuzela me. Važno je ne očekivati previše, ali ne i premalo; samo tako možeš izbjeći unaprijed dane nesvjesne "prosudbe" koje ti mogu zamagliti pogled i štetiti umjetničkim djelima. Kazalište je općenito puno iznenađenja: ako bih se ravnala samo po tome koje tekstove želim doživjeti na pozornici, u prvom bih redu išla gledati Bernard-Marie Koltesa, Heinera Müllera, Sarah Kane, Martina Crimpa, Elfriede Jelinek, Thomasa Bernharda... i Ivanu Sajko. Ali bi to, naravno, bila velika besmislica.

Uvijek me najviše uznemire izvedbe koje se na ovaj ili onaj način laćaju svega onoga o čemu smo već bile govorile. Jamstva da će se na pozornici rastvoriti čaroban između i da će se ono što će u njemu zažariti, nepovratno doći u moju svijest, to mi sami po sebi ne mogu dati ni tekst ni redatelj ni glumci. Ključna su kombinacija, motivacija, stav. Vidjela sam puno jasnijih izvedbi sjajnih tekstova koje su redatelji reducirali na dopadljivo upakiranu priču, a da nisu ni okom trepnuli. I da, vidjela sam i nekoliko izuzetnih inscenacija filozofskih tekstova i promidžbi. Ali ako me pitaš, a sada govorim kao gledateljica a ne kao kritičar, uvijek će mi *zadrhtati srce* kada ću na pozornici vidjeti predstavu u kojoj će se između teksta, pozornice, redatelja i glumca otvoriti fine, lomljive, letimične pukotine, koje će u događaj uvući i mene kao gledateljicu i koje će mi se obratiti. Opomenuti me, recimo, da gledam predstavu te me pitati, zašto to radim.



Jernej Lorenzi: *Cleansed*, SNG Mala Drama, foto: Peter Uhan

Contemporariness inscribed in the interspaces of drama

Interview with Petra Pogorevc

Interviewer Ivana Sajko

Translated from Slovenian by Leila Al Shammmary

FRAKCIJA: *When I say rhetoric – I have in mind the art of persuasion, maybe even seduction, the art of communication which is not confined solely to the transmission of intellectual content, but also of emotion. When it comes to live performances, the position of rhetoric seems to me to be clearer. For example, the orator (politician?) does not have to speak the truth, and STILL be persuasive. The STILL is the work of rhetoric. In what way can it be inscribed in the text? Dramatic text? Is there at all, in your opinion, something you could call that in relation to drama? Rhetoric in the text, rhetoric prior to the act of speech? Some excess, some emotion which persuades you in what you read? Where could it come from? And finally, what are your reasons to believe or not believe, to love or not love a particular dramatic text?*

POGOREVC: I'll start from the end of your comprehensive question, namely by a digression that I envy you a little, because, unlike me, in your language you can use so spontaneously the verb *love*; not only in relation to a person you love, but also when you talk about your strong, positive relation to a dramatic text or theater play. The Slovenian language commonly utilizes that meaning in writing, but in practice it is more reserved and that cheeky verb is often squeezed out even in interpersonal relations by inappropriately vague phrase *fond of*. In any case, I would like to reach the answer to your question indirectly, through the speech about a particular text, whereas I can't avoid my amusement by the fact that this time, counting on the Croatian translation, I can directly and explicitly express my *love* to it. I haven't done it yet, although I have never kept secret my fascination by it and I even occasionally let it sleep on my pillow ...

It is a text by contemporary English dramatist Martin Crimp *Attempts on her Life*, which premiered in the upper hall of the Royal Court Theatre in 1997. This exciting text, which leaves in standard manner envisaged material and shape of *dramatis personae*, in seventeen "scenarios for theatre" focuses on verbalized "hunt" on its absent protagonist. The woman, who never appears on the stage, gains new features from scene to scene, because nameless voices, which replace fictive *dramatis personae* in the text solely on the level of sudden speech, reinvent her constantly, put her in different contexts and change her identity. For me, the important fact is that the woman exists only on the level of live, manic, suggestive speech, which presents her in spectator's imagination, and that the speech is not put in the mouth of some invented persons, but is organized in such a way that already on paper it counts on the direct presence and rhetoric skill of the current performer of the text. Hence I imagine its optimal performance on the stage as an event completely stripped of the weight of fiction and illusion. On the stage I see only performers who like classical orators persuade spectators in the existence of the woman based on two things: written "speeches" and their rhetoric skill.

Of course, I speak of an example, not of the rule. In my opinion, the dramatic text needs author's awareness of the media he creates for. Actually, I don't care if the key for his thematic treatment of the subject is found in stage directions, epic break-outs of the classic dramatic model or in dealing with constructive dramatic categories such as time and place. What is important is what is inscribed behind those attempts, what texts on the stage are capable of untangling. In that sense I am interested primarily in the dramas where writers deal with their own treatments and inscribe in them the awareness of their staging. As the practice proves, there are several ways to reach this goal, so I wouldn't like to generalize. But it seems to me that all these various approaches are bound by an effort not to understand theatre as a machine for the production of illusion, but to reach personal, risky and contemporary expressions through questions about its own treatments and possibilities.

FRAKCIJA: *Is there, in your opinion, something distinctively contemporary in the dramatic text, before it has been staged. It is obvious that on the modern stage anything can replace the dramatic text; advertisement, philosophical article ... so that in such a constellation and through such dramaturgic interventions a Molieresque joke may be as contemporary as, for example, a quotation of a political speech may be classical. This is the condition of the staged text. I would like to know whether this situation can be seen in the contemporary drama? Is there contemporariness of the stage practice which has already been inscribed in the late 20th century texts? Is there some distinction from its antecedents, some marks which make them more accessible in the contemporary context?*

POGOREVC: I will answer again with an example from the British drama of the '90s, which I have followed and studied for the last five years. I have *Cleansed* by Sarah Kane on my mind; this text demonstrates in an obvious way the difference between mainstream drama writing, which neglects theatre on account of literature, and individual texts which understand theatre as an entire and dynamic semiotic system. The area in which Sarah Kane in *Cleansed* expressed her sensitivity are stage directions, which are full of the stuff that conventional mimetic theatre understands as something that cannot be performed on the stage or is at least problematic because it breaks the famous law on the prohibition of irrevocable, which, according to Josette Féral "imposes on the stage reversibility of time and events", that is, "it is against any mutilation or destruction of the subject". In *Cleansed* we are confronted with a persistent string of mutilations and killings which warn their potential performers of the limitations as well as of the possibilities of the media they create in. Even if we leave aside well known scenes of physical violence, we cannot ignore the fact that in the stage directions of that text rats multiply and daffodils

grow on the stage; that an entire draft of the possible staging is established, which treats visual, audio and other solutions equally valid as the content of characters' lines. This, a priori, inscribes in the text the awareness of its staging, but nevertheless it is not "damaging" to it, this does not limit its possibilities and does not end its interpretative capabilities.

Stage directions, as the inter-space of the dramatic text, which establish the production of the sense of the dramatic text on the elusive border of verbal and non-verbal, due to its status of inter-spatialness offer a multi-directed key word for avoiding literariness, but it would be unwise to count them as one. Individual examples of contemporary drama writing, among them those looking a bit old-fashioned at first glance, may surprise us when we read them closely. In regard of British drama of the '90s there have been lot said of its violence, brutality and disgusting character of particular texts, but individual "shocking" scenes were often stated as the measure of all that. However, if you read those texts you notice that often the most awful and unpleasant things in them are those which are pronounced by the characters: not (as a rule naively directed) scenes of violence, but inflammable speech about it, which in best examples may be so persistent, focused and suggestive that it becomes unbearable. Such break-outs of the absolute drama model are not a novelty; dramaturgy has developed them in the form of spatially and temporally hidden reports since ancient times, but it is interesting that many British authors of the '90s didn't use them to "conceal" something or to explain or educate, but to provoke; not without a reason in combination with *vérisme*, which made them even more vivid because it assumes one to one relations.

FRAKCIJA: *I may have a wrong impression, but love of drama sometimes seems as an excluded place, awfully outdated and pathetic, since the majority of people equals dramatic text with something "drama related" or "dramatic", something "fixed" or "slow", something incapable of (independent) response to artistic and theoretic concepts of today. Where do you think lies revitalization of the drama theatre? What is the theatre that you imagine or you strive for like... or maybe, that you recognize when you read the texts that are important to you?*

POGOREVC: The fact that the majority of people equals dramatic text with something "drama like", "dramatic" or "fixed", as you say, in my opinion is the consequence of the fact that the majority of dramatic texts actually meet their preconceptions. Well, also because their authors launch them on the theatre market which is, as any other, governed by capital. Art directors in theatres are aware that their sold subscriptions are dependant primarily on well written stories, so they encourage the creation thereof much more than writing of different and hence risky texts. The position of the person who despite all that defends and researches dramatic text, whether it be dramatist, direc-

tor, actor or critic, is such that s/he has almost nobody to talk to; on the one hand the mainstream theatre apparatus observes you as if you bother it constantly, because you want more than nicely wrapped and politely performed stories; on the other hand the representatives of the minority field of hybrid performing arts are suspicious of you, as they mercilessly detach theatre from dramatic text which they push into literature and think of it righteously with skepticism and scorn. I think that both positions represent unproductive extremes not worth arguing with and that the guarantee of an inspirational event is not either dramatic text or its absence per se.

You have mentioned that the dramatic text on the stage can be replaced by almost anything: from advertisement to a philosophical article. It is probably considerate to ask what contemporary theater gains or loses with the dramatic text. My answer is that it is author's position of the writer, but not in that classical and outdated sense of "keeper of meanings", which is in theatre challenged by the director through his own (re)interpretations, but in the sense of searching and questioning that position which is not solely related to the content but also to the form of each text, and finally the play. Where does drama writer belong now when he doesn't need to hide behind the lines of invented persons; how and from where does he speak of the movements of his soul which made him adjust a particular subject for a particular medium, what questions and obstacles did he meet while writing; how far is he ready to go and expose himself together with his skepticism and obstacles? I don't see contemporary theatre as a conflict of two monolithic meanings represented by self evident authorities of the writer on the one and the director on the other hand. Experience tells me that the most inspiring material on the stage is created when such positions are covered, swung; when it is created a fragile and gentle in-between area where both spectator and performer must be attracted by their own work. Where is its place, how does the range of its identity vary, what happens to it when it balances on the in-between before us, between interpretation and presence, meaning and form, message and expression, role and its privacy?

FRAKCIJA: *To a certain extent this is an explanation of our previous questions... what rhetorical strategies would fit the contemporary drama? What is that speech like? What gesture is that? What space is that? Intensity? What does the audience expect? Of course, all these question marks are directed only at you. I don't expect any general truths, but I would like to know your experience of a theatre critic, when, for example, you watch a staging of Sarah Kane and the relation of that expectation and what you see as a play.*

POGOREVC: I am not sure if you will be satisfied with my answer, because we, critics, are used to a drill which does not ask for providing potential solutions, but their recognition on

the stage. I, as a critic, have to ask myself over and over again questions on my personal position. How capable am I to see on the basis of one mirror, what are my criteria of assessment, how do I develop my argumentation and, in that regard, in what relation should form and meaning be? Should I speak in first person singular or plural? Should I expose myself or hide? Can I repeat my arguments? Finally, for a critic it is important also to reflect a democratic view: it is healthy to be aware of subjective preferences which should not and cannot grow into the only measure of writing. I face the question of *in-between* too, namely: from which point am I a spectator and from which point on am I a critic, how to be between those two, how to persevere between subjective and objective parameters of viewing?

It is important that despite numerous performances that you watch evening in and evening out you maintain condition in the sense that you still have strength to let yourself be surprised. You have mentioned Sarah Kane: when four years ago in SNG Mala Drama Ljubljana I saw staging of *Cleansed* directed by Jernej Lorenci it was completely opposite to my prior image of that text, which had been made based on reading. Quiet, stylized, subdued, minimalist, almost sterile. But with opulent metaphoric solutions created in clashing with the mentioned stage directions, and above all created by condensing them in a coherent system, which encompassed, besides accurately presented text, a whole range of intelligent, strategically related gesture, visual, audio and other inventions. It persuaded me and overwhelmed me. It is important not to expect too much, but not too little too; only thus you may avoid a priori given unconscious "assessments", which may cloud your vision and be damaging for works of art. Theatre is generally full of surprises: if I would take into account only the texts I want to see staged I would first like to see Bernard-Marie Koltes, Heiner Müller, Sarah Kane, Martin Crimp, Elfriede Jelinek, Thomas Bernhard... and Ivana Sajko. But, of course, it would be nonsense.

I am always disturbed most by the performances which in some way deal with what we have been talking about. Guarantees that the stage will reveal the magic *in-between* and that what sparkles in it will enter my consciousness irrevocably cannot be given by either text director or actors by themselves. The combination, motivation and attitude are crucial. I have seen a lot of poor performances of great texts reduced by their directors to attractively wrapped stories, without so much as a blink. And yes, I have seen several exceptional stagings of philosophical texts and advertisements. But if you ask me, and now I am talking as a spectator and not as a critic, my heart will always *tremble* when I see a performance which will reveal fine, fragile, hasty cracks among the text, the stage, the director and the actor, which will include me as a spectator in the play and will talk to me. Remind me, let's say, that I watch the performance and ask me why I do that.

Retoričke figure budućnosti

Freddie Rokem



Prevela s engleskog Mirna Herman, Language Lab

Kako da vam kažem? Meni se čini, da se sve na zemlji mora malo po malo promijeniti i da se već pred našim očima mijenja. Za dvjesta, trista, najkasnije za tisuću godina – ne radi se tu o roku - nastat će nov, sretan život. Mi dakako nećemo učestvovati u tom životu, no mi za njega živimo sada, radimo, patimo, mi ga stvaramo, i jedino u tome je cilj našega bitka i, ako hoćete, naša sreća.

Veršinjin, Čehov, *Tri sestre*, drugi čin¹

Za filozofsko pismo je karakteristično da se stalno mora konfrontirati s pitanjem reprezentacije.

Walter Benjamin, *Porijeklo njemačke tragične drame*



¹ Op.prev. citat prijevoda *Tri sestre* na hrvatski jezik, preveo Milan Bogdanović, Sysprint, Zagreb, 1996.

Započet ću svoju raspravu o retoričkoj organizaciji, a posebno izvedbenih tekstova, pričom koju je Walter Benjamin ispričao u svom eseju o Kafki iz 1934. Taj kratki narativ poslužit će umjesto polazišne točke za raspravu o tome kako se konstruiraju **figure budućnosti**, te što one čine. Isto tako, napominjem da, dok svjesno uvodim Benjaminovu priču gestom citiranja, Benjamin također započinje svoj narativ dajući svojim čitateljima znak da **“tako kaže priča”**, te da ćemo pročitati ili čuti priču u koju se postepeno ugrađuje nekoliko drugih priča razvijajući tako niz narativnih fragmenata koji završavaju neobičnom pričom prosjaka. Ta sekvenca će, nadam se, zauzvrat potaknuti drugi niz priča čija interpretacija je probuđena našom glađu za razumijevanjem i značenjem. Čini se da svaka priča u sebi sadrži takav zavjet ili obećanje drugih, novih priča koje će tek biti ispričane.

Evo Benjaminove priče:

U hasidskom selu, tako kaže priča, Židovi su sjedili u trošnoj krčmi navečer na Šabat. Svi su bili domaći, osim jedne osobe koju nitko nije poznao, a to je bio strašno siromašan čovjek u prnjama koji se skrivao u mračnom kutku, u dnu prostorije. Raspravljalo se o svemu i svačemu, a onda je netko predložio da svatko ispriča što bi poželio kada bi dobio priliku da mu se želja ostvari. Jedan je poželio novac, drugi zeta, treći je sanjao o novoj klupi i tako su svi zaredali svoje želje. Kada je i posljednji završio, ostao je samo još prosjak u mračnom kutku. Oklijevajući, nevoljko i on odgovori na pitanje. **“Želio bih biti moćan kralj koji vlada velikim kraljevstvom. Onda, jedne noći dok spavam u svojoj palači, neprijatelj bi osvojio moju zemlju, a do zore bi njegovi konjanici stigli do mog dvorca i ušli u njega bez otpora. Tek probuđen, ne bih imao vremena odjenuti se, pa bih morao pobjeći na sebi noseći samo u noćnu košulju. U trku preko brda i planina, skrivajući se u šumama danju i noću, stigao bih napokon od ove krčme i klupe u kutku. To je moja želja.”** Ostali su međusobno razmijenili zbuđene poglede. **“A, kakve koristi bi ti imao od te želje?”**, upita netko. **“Imao bih košulju”**, glasio je odgovor.²

² Walter Benjamin, *Selected Writings*, volume 2, 1927-1934, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1999, 812.

³ Ibid, str. 818. Bez sumnje, radi se o priči koja nas povezuje s nejasnom i nerazjašnjenom povijesnom tradicijom hasidskih priča, pa pozivam sve koji znaju nešto više o tome da prilože svoj doprinos.

⁴ S obzirom na način na koji pripovijedanje priča u socijalnom kontekstu u sebi sadrži figure budućnosti, kao što ja tvrdim za slučajeve koje navodim u ovom tekstu, moraju se dodatno proučiti, uključujući djela poput *Kanteburijskih priča*, *Decameron*, i brojnih drugih. U tom kontekstu se detaljno moraju istražiti veze između pripovijedanja i izvedbe priče kao i to ukazuju li one na budućnost.

Prije nego što se zapitamo na koji način Benjaminov narativ generira niz priča, postavlja se pitanje gdje je pisac pronašao inspiraciju za ovu priču. Koje je njeno porijeklo? Gdje i kako ju je Benjamin pronašao? Prema onome što piše u zabilješci izdanja Benjaminovih *Odabranih zapisa* na engleskom jeziku takve priče su bile **“vrlo česte u knjigama o židovskom humoru s početka 20. stoljeća.”**³

Benjamin prezentira kompleksan narativ kojemu je budućnost, kao izraz nečega imaginarnog, uobličena u želju, čežnju koju svatko od ljudi prisutnih u krčmi želi ostvariti. Kasnije u tekstu pokušat ću istražiti u kakvim se sve okvirima razvijaju te figure. No, prije toga, dopustite mi reći nekoliko riječi o dramskoj situaciji u kojoj su te želje predstavljene. Skupina ljudi okupljena je oko stola na kojemu su najvjerojatnije poslužena jela i pića. Netko odjednom predloži da, baš kao u Platonovom *Simpoziju*, svatko ispriča priču, u ovom slučaju želju: **“htio bih ovo”** ili **“htio bih ono.”** Platonov dijalog, u kojemu svaki govornik priča o Erosu, očito se bavi nečime što je željeno, a s te perspektive je također usmjeren prema budućnosti koja je izražena širokim rasponom diskursa i priča o Erosu.⁴ Ne zaboravimo da u Platonovom *Simpoziju* Sokrat povezuje ono što je čuo o Erosu od proročice Diotime. Eros kao figura budućnosti, ispunjenje žudnje, međutim, puno je kompleksniji od narativa koji nam predstavlja Benjamin.

Zanimljiv aspekt priče o prosjaku je (a to je, na neki način, također slučaj i sa Sokratovim narativnim tehnikama) da se ona istovremeno implicitno odnosi i na prošlost jer objašnjava svojim slušateljima na koji je način on stigao u krčmu, ali bez košulje koju je zamislio u svojoj želji i koja je, zapravo, figura budućnosti. A ono što prosjakova priča prenosi jest činjenica da bi on, u slučaju da mu se želja ispuni, kao nešto što pripada i prošlosti i budućnosti, na sebi imao košulju. Priča nas, isto tako, navodi da zamislimo kako je prosjak zapravo odjeven dok sjedi u mračnom kutku prostorije i priča o svojoj želji što predstavlja dramatični trenutak u sadašnjosti. Iz ove je perspektive čak moguće tvrditi da se u isto vrijeme pripovijedaju tri simultane priče: prva o tome kako je zapravo stigao u krčmu u prnjama, protjeran na neki nama neobjašnjen način te kako izgleda dok tamo sjedi u trenutku dok govori o svojoj želji. Istovremeno, saznajemo kako bi on volio izgledati ili kako bi mogao izgledati sljedeći puta kada dođe, pod uvjetom da se ispunila njegova želja da postane **“moćan kralj koji vlada velikim kraljevstvom”**. Kompleksna interakcija između nepoznate prosjakove prošlosti i njegove želje za košuljom kreira jedan teološki, gotovo apokaliptični podtekst.

U predgovoru svoje teze o *Trauerspielu*, u kojoj Platonov *Simpozij* ima prominentnu ulogu, Benjamin piše:

Iako je porijeklo **[Ursprung]** jedna posve povijesna kategorija, nema nikakve veze s postankom **[Entstehung]**. Pod pojmom porijekla ne namjerava se opisati proces putem kojeg je ono što postoji nastalo, već se prije pokušava opisati ono što se rađa iz procesa postanka i nestanka. Porijeklo vrtloga je **[Strudel]** u strujanju postojanja **[im Fluß des Werdens]**, a u svojoj struji ono guta materijal uključen u proces postanka. Onaj koji je izvoran **[das Ursprüngliche]** nikada se ne otkriva u svojoj golotinji i pokazuje postojanje činjeničnog; njegov ritam je očit samo pri dvostrukom uvidu. S jedne strane, on se mora prepoznati kao proces obnavljanja i ponovne izgradnje, ali s druge strane i baš zbog toga, kao nešto nedovršeno **[Unvollendetes, Unabgeschlossenes]**. U svakom

izvornom fenomenu događa se određenje oblika u kojemu se zamisao stalno sukobljava s povijesnim svijetom, sve dok se u ukupnosti povijesti ne otkrije kao ispunjena. Porijeklo, stoga, nije otkriveno utvrđivanjem stvarnih otkrića već je u vezi s onim što je prethodilo i uslijedilo njihovoj povijesti. **【Vor- und Nachgeschichte】**. Načela filozofskog promišljanja zabilježena su u dijalektici koja je neodvojiva od porijekla. Ta dijalektika ukazuje da su singularnost i ponavljanje u svojoj suštini međusobno uvjetovani. Kategorija porijekla, stoga, nije, kao što smatra Cohen, potpuno logična, već prije historijska. **5**

Ovo je kritika Nietzscheovog pojma *Geburt* na mjestima gdje pokušava istražiti porijeklo tragedije, ali i kritika razumijevanja vječnog povratka. Prema Beatrice Hansen,

Benjamin je smatrao da je Nietzscheovo načelo ponavljanja neuvjerljivo i nedovoljno objašnjenje za jednu od središnjih antinomija povijesti, odnosno da se načelo ponavljanja manifestira u obliku povijesnih razdoblja ili epoha, dok je povijest sama po sebi singularan i neponovljiv proces. Zapravo, ono što se Benjamin nadao postići svojim novim pojmom porijekla nije bilo ništa manje nego promišljati u istom vremenu, te spojiti u jedan pojam singularnost i ponavljanje. **6**

Ovakvo poimanje porijekla je, možda, ono što prosjak izrekavši svoju želju ljudima okupljenim u krčmi pokušava objasniti svojim slušateljima koji ga ne razumiju. A košulja u tom slučaju predstavlja zamišljenu utopijsku situaciju.

No, umjesto daljnjeg razvijanja ove utopijske želje i načina na koji se ona povezuje s prošlošću te ukazuje na budućnost kao još neostvarena želja, radije ću nastaviti postavljajući pitanje kako je ta želja retorički konstruirana kao figura budućnosti. To će nam pomoći u razumijevanju suštinske osobine takvih figura. Ono što želja zapravo izražava, čak i ako zvuči kao tautologija, jest: “Ako se moja želja ostvari, onda će se ispuniti moja čežnja, a ja ću imati ono što želim.” Želja je na taj način formulirana kondicionalnom rečenicom koja se najjednostavnije formulira kao tvrdnja strukture “ako x, onda y.” **7** Moj temeljni argument je da se figure budućnosti (a one nisu samo želje, što ću pokazati kasnije) mogu na neki način svesti na jezik takve kondicionalne rečenice.

Ovaj oblik argumenta koji ima strukturu silogizma imao je nevjerojatan utjecaj na same temelje zapadne logike. U početku su takve kondicionalne rečenice bile formulirane u tri uzastopna koraka:

1. Sokrat je čovjek
2. Svi ljudi su smrtni.
3. Dakle, Sokrat je smrtni (=mora umrijeti).

Alternativna, kondicionalna formulacija glasi: “Ako su svi ljudi smrtni, a Sokrat je čovjek, onda je Sokrat smrtni (=mora umrijeti).” I, baš kao što su logičari već primijetili, a ja samo ponavljam ono što je poznato svima, kondicional koji se uvodi s ‘ako’ sastoji se od dva dijela. Prvi nam prenosi tvrdnju koja se odnosi na pojedinca dok je drugi dio univerzalna tvrdnja koja određuje vrstu objekta o kojemu se govori. Treća je rečenica, “onda y,” dedukcija, koja je rezultat prethodne dvije tvrdnje, i koja odgađa budućnost, te ukazuje da je Sokrat još uvijek živ.

Važno je napomenuti da je ovaj klasični silogizam, koji se pojavljuje u svakom uvodu rasprave o logici, zapravo o Sokratovoj smrti, pa se čak može promatrati kao neka vrsta iskonskog prizora filozofije i logike scene putem kojeg se personalizira apstraktno filozofsko razmišljanje. Silogizam se istovremeno bavi i krajnjim granicama budućnosti pojedinca, njegove smrti. Dok univerzalna tvrdnja da su svi ljudi (što se, naravno, odnosi i na žene) smrtni nije ograničena u budućnosti jer se radi o opće poznatoj činjenici, pojedinac će neizbježno prijeći granicu onoga što Hamlet naziva “neotkrivenom zemljom iz koje se niti jedan putnik ne vraća...” **8** Jedno od nastojanja teatra je neprestano testiranje i potvrđivanje takvih “obzorja očekivanja”, pri čemu se namjerno i na pomalo osobit način koristim konceptom koji su osmislili Wolfgang Iser i Hans-Robert Jauss u *Rezeptionsästhetik*. I upravo to želim ustvrditi jer obzorje očekivanja u određenim tekstovima postaje postavljeno iznad onoga što mi znamo o ljudskom životu i njegovim neizbježnim ograničenjima. Figure budućnosti nalaze se na raskrižju između univerzalnog i partikularnog.

Hamlet se, međutim, mora suočiti s jednim takvim putnikom, svojim ocem, koji se vratio iz te neotkrivene zemlje kako bi zatražio osvetu za svoju smrt, pri čemu se istovremeno gledatelj/čitatelj ovih događanja poziva na suočavanje s narativnim strategijama koje Shakespeare uvodi pojavljivanjem duha čime daje smisao tekstu, odnosno predstavi. Istovremeno, prema Iseru, “čitanjem [ili gledanjem] procesa stalno dolazi do međugre između modificiranih očekivanja i transformiranih sjećanja” **9** koja su podložna čitateljevoj aktivnosti sinteze. Psihologizirajući univerzalnu tvrdnju, Iser zaključuje da je “svaki trenutak čitanja [kao i svaki trenutak gledanja predstave] dijalektika protezanja i zadržavanja koja otvara buduća i još nezauzeta obzorja zajedno s prošlim (stalno nestajućim) obzorjima koja su već ispunjena /.../” **10** Fenomenološka dubinska struktura takve simultane dijalektike kretanja naprijed i nazad u vremenu u stalnoj je interakciji s kondicionalnom “ako x, onda y” strukturom, postav-

5 Walter Benjamin, *The Origin of German Tragic Drama*, translated by John Osborne, Verso, London and New York, 1998, 45-46, with modifications made by Beatrice Hanssen, “Philosophy at Its Origin: Walter Benjamin’s predgovor *Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels*,” MLN, 110, 4, 1995, 822, bilješka 27.

6 Ibid., 823.

7 Htio bih zahvaliti Galit Hasan-Rokem koja mi je svojim radom na strukturi kondicionala u poslovicama pomogla shvatiti značenje takvih rečeničnih konstrukcija.

8 Shakespeare, *Hamlet*, The New Cambridge Shakespeare, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985, III, 1, 79-80.

9 Wolfgang Iser, *The Act of Reading: A Theory of Aesthetic Response*, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1978, 111.

10 Ibid., 112.

ljajući srž narativne sintaktičke sekvence ispred kompleksnih vremenskih konstrukcija stvorenih u svijetu fikcije putem niza raznih implicitnih i eksplicitnih konfiguracija. Duh mrtvog oca princa Hamleta vraća se kako bi oblikovao budućnost sukladno sličnoj dijalektici u koju je, prema Iseru, uključen čitatelj, gdje duh predstavlja mrtvu prošlost koja paradoksalno "otvara buduće dimenzije koje se tek trebaju osvojiti." Prema Benjaminu, duh ne predstavlja samo povratak potisnutog, već ponovno uobličavanje načela porijekla, tj. *Ursprung*.

11 Douglas N. Walton, "Practical Reasoning and the Structure of Fear Appeal Arguments," *Philosophy and Rhetoric*, vol. 29, 4, 1996.

Osim artikulacije želja koje stvaraju figure budućnosti sa svojom očitom psihološkom podlogom u odnosu na subjekt koji ih izražava, struktura "ako-onda" može također poslužiti kao dubinska struktura obećanja, upozorenja i prijetnji. U tim slučajevima, koji utječu na ono što se oslovljava prije nego govornika, blizina takvog oblika verbalnog ponašanja samom činu govorenja koju su u tom smislu razradili Austin i Searle, postaje još očitija. Obećati nešto, dati upozorenje ili izreći prijetnju znači oblikovati verbalni izričaj koji ima određene posljedice, posebno u odnosu na onoga na koga se odnose. Prijetnje, upozorenja i obećanja su ono što Walton naziva "komisivni govorni činovi," odnosno kategorija govornih činova koje govornika obvezuju na budući slijed radnji /djelovanja koji u slučaju prijetnje može imati učinak gramatičkog imperativa.¹¹ Većina obećanja, iako ne sva, uključuju kondicionalnu strukturu "ako-onda", dok upozorenja i prijetnje, koja su u bliskoj vezi, čvršće prijanjaju kondicionalnoj strukturi.

Možemo li pretpostaviti da je moguće identificirati i izolirati kondicionalne strukture želja, obećanja, upozorenja i prijetnji u narativnoj strukturi svih umjetničkih djela poput romana, kazališnih predstava i filmova kao figura budućnosti koje čitatelja/gledatelja zadržavaju u njegovim naporima interpretacije tih umjetničkih djela dok se one postepeno otvaraju pred njegovim očima? I na koji način te kondicionalne strukture utječu na nas, ne samo u pogledu percepcije određenog umjetničkog djela, tj. njegove estetike, već u odnosu na naš osobni doživljaj budućnosti? Takve kondicionalne narativne strukture, odnosno načini na koji su one ugrađene u umjetnička djela i na koji prenose značenje izvan samog estetskog iskustva, do sada nisu bili iscrpno istraživani. Radi se o jednom području koje otvara čitav niz kompleksnih izazova, a ja ću ovdje prikazati samo jedan kratki primjer iz djela izraelskog dramskog pisca Hanocha Levina koji je objavio 56 kazališnih komada od kojih je otprilike njih 30 bilo izvedeno prije njegove smrti 1999. godine i koji je imao vrlo originalan pristup ovoj problematici.

U Levinovom teatru strukture kondicionala koje se čine logičnima, prekidaju se i umjesto njih počinitelj prijeti drugom liku nekim oblikom kazne za razloge koji se čine potpuno nevažni za situaciju ili razloge prijetnji uopće ne otkriva. Na taj način prvi dio prijetnje – "Ako x" – koji navodno stvara racionalnu osnovu za prijetnju obično izostaje. U Levinovim komadima postoji bezbroj situacija prijetnji koje su potpuno nelogične ili sadrže samo "onda y"-dio. Nadalje, zbog svoje okrutnosti, te se prijetnje čine potpuno nemotivirane situacijom. U većini slučajeva gledatelji samo moraju pronaći razloge za takvu okrutnost. Gledatelj mora opravdati prijetnju u skladu s nekom normom s kojom se uopće ne identificira. Budući da je prijetnja toliko okrutna da dovodi u pitanje prihvaćene moralne norme, postaje problematična ne samo iz perspektive žrtve već i u odnosu na senzibilitet gledatelja; rjeđe se temelji na nekom obliku apsurdna ili crnog humora.

Osim predstavljanja prijetnje, počinitelj odnosno osoba koja na osnovu iracionalnog hira izjavljuje da će biti okrutna, već u sljedećem trenutku obično dodaje da prijetnja ne vrijedi te da nikada nije bila ozbiljna. Takva promjena stava daje žrtvi, a i gledateljima, dojam da je početna prijetnja transformirana u neku vrtu ekstremne benevolentnosti. Govorni čin prijetnje transformira se u drugačiju vrstu govornog čina kojim se obećava da prijetnja zapravo neće biti izvršena. Razlog za takvu naglu promjenu, isto tako, obično nije izravno prikazan, a utemeljen je u još jednom iracionalnom hiru. Međutim, promjena stava bivšeg počinitelja postaje samo privremena odgoda početne prijetnje, taktika kojom se ublažuje napetost. I kada žrtva povjeruje da je opasnost prestala, početna se prijetnja ipak izvršava.

Promjena se doživljava kao veliko iznenađenje kako žrtvi, tako i gledateljima. Privremena odgoda ostavlja dojam da je počinitelj shvatio svoju okrutnost i nelogičnost početne prijetnje, te da se prijetnja može izbjeći. Kada se okrutnost napokon provede, čini se da je na neki način početna prijetnja bila neizbježna, da je ona zapravo bila izraz sudbine počinitelja koji je započeo niz okrutnih događanja samom prijetnjom, pa odgovodom i naposljetku njenim konačnim ostvarenjem, te da je on na neki način nije mogao kontrolirati zbog čega čitatelj/gledatelj doživljava još veći nemir i nela-godu.

Ovakva narativna shema, koja je osnova većine Levinovih kazališnih komada i performansa, često služi kao razvidni alegorijski veo kroz koji autor istražuje temeljna pitanja ljudskog djelovanja u povijesti bez potrebe da se počinitelju ili žrtvi nužno mora odrediti specifični identitet tijekom izvedbe na sceni. Radi se o alegorijskim figurama koje na sceni same provode svoje prethodno određene sadamozohističke uloge. Kao posljedica ovakve alegorijske dimenzije, nastala narativna shema Levinu omogućava konfrontirati izraelsku publiku s njihovom ulogom ne samo žrtvu okrutnosti, već i počinitelja koji drugima stvaraju patnju. Također je posve očito da je ovakav narativ primjenjiv na konkretne povijesne situacije i židovsko povijesno iskustvo, posebno ono iz šoe.

Ovdje ću samo kratko istražiti na koji način je ovaj temeljni oblik ugrađen u mikro i makro razinu Levinovih *Dječjih snova* u produkciji Habime iz 1993. godine. Predstava započinje ženskim glasom koji pjeva neku sentimentalnu melodiju za koju kasnije otkrivamo da je glazba zemlje iz koje dolaze mrtva djeca. Dok slušamo evokativnu pjesmu, promatramo idiličan prizor u kojemu se roditelji ponosno nagnu nad krevetom djeteta koje spava, u njemu vidimo nešto vrlo poznato, čak i stereotipno čisto. Međutim, prve rečenice koje izgovara otac odmah uvode mogućnost da je dječak koji nevino spava u svom krevetu, unatoč svoje nevinosti ili možda baš zbog nje, izložen nekoj nedefiniranoj prijetnji zbog koje će neizbježno postati žrtvom:

Dok spava, ljubav prema našem djetetu je beskrajna;
tih je, bespomoćno otvorenih usta,
kao da nas podsjeća: ovako ću izgledati ako umrem.¹²

U tom trenutku ne znamo kada i kako će se ostvariti ova prijetnja, ali njeno ostvarenje, dolazak djeteta u zemlju mrtve djece s obećanjem dolaska Mesije, predstavlja inkluzivan narativni smjer čitave predstave.

Majka je također svjesna opasnosti i želi da se početna idilična slika zauvijek zamrzne:

Kada bi se barem sada vrijeme zaustavilo, na vrhuncu sreće,
Jer ništa ljepše neće doći;
I kada bismo nas troje mogli ostati nepomični u slici
ovog trenutka koju bi svi zvali:
"Roditelji promatraju dijete koje spava."¹³

Ova se opasnost može ukloniti samo ako se zaustavi vrijeme. Također, vidimo kako Levin već u prvih nekoliko rečenica pažnju usmjerava na odnos prizora idilične obitelji i potencijala njegove estetske predstavljenosti, same izvedbe i to uvođenjem meta-teatralne dimenzije: naslikani prizor života koji se zaustavio u jednom trenutku. Međutim, kada počne predstava, postaje nemoguće zaustaviti unutarnju dinamiku razvoja okrutnih zbivanja.

Anksioznost i implicitna prijetnja pokrenuti trenutkom 'vrhunca sreće' gotovo odmah služe samodostatnom proročanstvu strke koja odjednom naglo prekida idiličan prizor. Skupina prestrašenih izbjeglica pojavljuje se gotovo niotkuda, a predvodi je mladić obliven krvlju: čini se kao materijalizacija nesvjesnih strahova roditelja. Odmah zatim na scenu ulazi, jednako tako niotkuda, skupina vojnika u crnim uniformama. Oni su ostvarenje nejasno naznačenih prijetnji. Ranjenik, talentirani muzičar, oplakuje svoju naglo prekinutu karijeru – "četrdeset godina sviram violinu" koja je sada u lokvi pored mojih cipela"¹⁴ – nakon čega pada na tlo. Ovaj prizor može predstavljati sliku budućnosti njihovog sina koji sada mirno spava u svom krevetu, pretkazanje da njegova smrt neće biti mirna i tiha kao što je to sada njegov san.

Skupina izbjeglica okupljenih oko obitelji može se shvatiti i kao san usnulog dječaka, ono što mi vidimo kao njegovu noćnu moru koja nagovještava smrt koja uzima svoj oblik oko njegovog kreveta. Ovakvo razumijevanje naglog prekida pronalazi svoje utemeljenje u samom nazivu predstave: *Dječji snovi*.¹⁵ Međutim, istovremeno, konkretna individualnost izbjeglica omogućava razumijevanje ove scene kao kazališnog dokumentiranja događaja koji se dogodio negdje u svijetu gdje se skupina izbjeglica i ranjeni violinist pojavljuju u istom svijetu fikcije kao i dijete koje spava u krevetu. Takvo razumijevanje dodatno se pojačava konverzacijom koja slijedi. Violinist obliven krvlju ironično nastavlja i kaže: "ozbiljan pristup glazbi me ozbiljno raznio".¹⁶ Čini se da je mrtav, ali se odjednom oporavlja nakon čega ga vojnik udara i on naposljetku umire. Umjetnosti nema mjesta u noćnoj mori svijeta prikazanog u ovoj izvedbi.

Budući da je izvedba stvorila tako snažnu naznaku slutnje – nekoliko trenutaka nakon što je otac rekao da njegov sin izgleda kao da je preminuo u snu vidimo violinistu koji umire ranjen – obje mogućnosti počinju postojati istovremeno pri čemu svaka zasebno govori o prijetnji buduće smrti dječaka iz različitih perspektiva. S jedne strane, strah roditelja pojačan zbivanjima na sceni, i noćna mora dječaka s druge, na sceni se počinju dvosmisleno miješati. Niti jedna od ove dvije interpretacije ne postaje nužno ona koja je dominantna. Gledatelj sam može odabrati jednu u određenom trenutku u predstavi, ali zbog alegorijskih kvaliteta isto tako ima slobodu promijeniti dominantni modul u bilo kojem trenutku. *Dječji snovi* u tom pogledu nisu nalik Strindbergovoj *Igri snova*, gdje je glavni način prezentacije san unutar kojeg se pojavljuju fragmenti stvarnosti. Važna napomena u ovom kontekstu jest da su oba interpretativna ključa utemeljena u neznatno različitim vrstama prijetnji koje se postepeno pojačavaju s obzirom da se stalno ponavlja upravo ona narativna struktura koju pokušavam istražiti. Monumentalna, apstraktna scenografija sačinjena samo od kreveta kojemu je pridodana skupina ljudi, zbog dvostrukog kodiranja pojačava ovu kompleksnu kazališnu situaciju.

Znakovite situacije nalik naslikanom platnu u prvoj sceni predstave odmah bude čitav niz različitih povijesnih i kulturoloških asocijacija: obožavanje djeteta koje spava sa svojim kršćanskim kono-

¹² Hanoch Levin, *The Child Dreams: A Play in Four Parts*, in *The Labor of Life: Selected Plays*, translated by Barbara Harshav; uvod: Freddie Rokem, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 2003, 129.

¹³ Ibid., 129.

¹⁴ Ibid., 130.

¹⁵ O snovima i načinu na koji oni oblikuju budućnost raspravljalo se u raznim kontekstima koje sada nisam u mogućnosti navoditi.

¹⁶ Ibid., 130.



tacijama koje u Izraelu također nosi i mitsku vrijednost židovskih roditelja koji vole svoje dijete, ustrašene izbjeglice u svojoj iznošenoj odjeći koji nose kovčege i iznenadno pojavljivanje vojnika. Asocijacije na specifične povijesne događaje pobuđene su dobro znanim prizorima ljudi koji su bježali za vrijeme šoe i žrtvi kao i televizijskim slikama izraelskih vojnika koji ulaze u palestinske domove usred noći ili izbjeglica na brodovima u istočnoj Aziji. Te fragmentirane i daleke kulturne i povijesne reference grade temelje teatralnoj alegoriji kojoj se ne može dodijeliti nikakva specifična i konkretna interpretacija. To je fragmentarna alegorija s brojnim referencama koje kondicionalnu narativnu strukturu čine još snažnijom, stvarajući hermeneutičku anksioznost kod gledatelja, oponašajući prijetnju koju su iskusili izmišljeni likovi u samoj predstavi. U posljednjem činu predstave nazvane *'Mesija'* narativna struktura ponovno predstavlja prijetnju koja se privremeno odgađa, ali koja se unatoč svemu ipak ostvaruje. Od samog početka predstave buduća smrt djeteta je prijetnja koja najviše zastrašuje, ali koja je i najjasnija, no kada do nje zapravo dođe paradoksalno se čini da donosi novu nadu drugoj mrtvoj djeci:

Dok se igramo u vrtu,
sretni, uživajući do krajnjih granica,
odvode nas i bacaju u grob.**17**

17 Ibid., 159.

Na pitanje, "kada ćemo se uzdići", Mrtvo dijete kaže:
Vidio sam anđela, lebdio je na sunčevoj svjetlosti,
Plutao, kao da je na moru
Meda, i sišao je i šapnuo mi:
"Pričekaj još malo dok se ne okupe sva tvoja braća koja će umrijeti baš kao i ti".**18**

18 Ibid., 159.

Na pitanje kada će se to dogoditi, anđeo glasnik odgovara da je potrebno samo još **jedno** dijete i da je tada kvota mrtve djece ispunjena. Na te riječi sva djeca postaju vrlo uzbuđena.

Još jedno mrtvo dijete! Još jedno!
Uskoro ćemo se probuditi, obasjat će nas svjetlo
uskrsnuća, uzdignut ćemo se, oprat ćemo zube,
umit ćemo lica— i krenuti prema suncu! Moru!
Prskati se i smijati se dugom vremenu koja smo proveli
Čekajući u tami!**19**

19 Ibid., 160.

Sada, kada majka nosi svoga mrtvog sina u zemlju mrtve djece, početna prijetnja da će dijete umrijeti uvodi potencijalno obećanje spasa ne samo za njega već i za svu drugu mrtvu djecu.

Za ovo mrtvo dijete, koje će posljednje umrijeti, smrt će biti brza:
O, kako je samo sretan onaj koji je umro
trenutak prije uskrsnuća!
Ništa nije propustio! Nije imao vremena ležati u grobnici.
Možda je propustio jedan popodnevni obrok,
Možda jedan slatkiš, i već se ponovno digao, kao
Da je usnuo popodnevni san nakon kojega se pred njim pojavio čitav njegov daljnji život!**20**

20 Ibid., 160.

Nakon što se majka rastala od svog mrtvog djeteta, s dvije putne torbe ulazi Mesija koji sliči na preprodavača. Mrtva djeca, dršćući od iščekivanja, mole starca da izvadi čarobni štapić kojim će napokon izvesti čudo njihovog uskrsnuća.

Ali Mesija, koji, čini se, nije u žurbi, nespreno maše kovčezima. Ponovno ulaze vojnici u pratnji komandanta te *'Žena rođena za ljubav'* dok se Mesija pokušava sakriti među djecom. Kada ga otkriju vojnici, djeca isprva vjeruju da će ih on svladati:

Evo, evo! Uskoro će pljusak;
Nebo će se otvoriti, to će se sada dogoditi!
Da, da, tako to bude u filmovima,
Glavni junak pada na pod, čini se
da je sve izgubljeno i tek u posljednjem trenutku —
u posljednjem trenutku— **21**

21 Ibid., 168.

No umjesto toga, nakon kratke stanke, komandant puca u Mesiju, jasno dajući do znanja da mesijanska očekivanja sama po sebi nisu ništa drugo nego odgađanje realizacije neizbježne konačnosti smrti. Predstavljajući mogućnost da se stanje smrti može promijeniti usvojenom judéo-kršćanskom sustavu vjerovanja. Ono što se u jednom trenutku činilo svojevrsnim iskupljenjem gdje smrt pojedinca čudom dovodi spasenje čitavoj zajednici, kasnije se pokazuje samo kao još jedna privremena odgoda konačnog koje svi prepoznajemo kao neizbježno.

Slike u posljednjem činu Levinovih *Dječaćkih snova* su bez sumnje u bliskoj vezi s poznatom meditacijom Waltera Benjamina o slici Paula Kleea "Angelus Novus." Za tu sliku Benjamin kaže da:

Prikazuje anđela koji izgleda kao da će se odmaknuti od nečega što dugo promatra. Njegove su oči razrogačene, usta otvorena, krila raširena. Tako zamišljamo anđela povijesti. Njegovo lice okrenuto je prošlosti. Tamo gdje mi uočavamo niz događaja, on vidi samo jednu katastrofu zbog koje se stalno gomilaju olupine pod njegovim stopalima. Anđeo bi htio ostati, probuditi mrtve i ponovno spojiti ono što je bilo razbijeno.²²

Anđeo je svjedok, gleda unazad prema nama koji se nalazimo u prošlosti. Oluja koja dolazi iz Raja, gdje je počela povijest, zapela je u njegovim krilima i ona ga "neprekidno tjera u budućnost kojoj je okrenuo leđa."²³ To znači da mi gledamo u budućnost iza leđa anđela. Ono što ćemo tamo vidjeti ovisi o sljedećoj generaciji kazališnih umjetnika i umjetnika performansa, u nadi da će i anđeo jednom moći okrenuti svoje lice u drugom smjeru i pogledati u budućnost, baš kao što to čini Čehovljevi Veršinjin u *Tri sestre*. Tamo, u budućnosti "nalazi se svrha našeg postojanja i, ako baš hoćete, naša sreća."²⁴ No, možda je ta nada, baš kao i želja koju je poželio prosjak u Benjaminovoj priči, ipak previše naivna.

²² Walter Benjamin (1969), "Theses on the Philosophy of History" in *Illuminations*, New York: Schocken Books, 257.

²³ Ibid, 258.

²⁴ Anton Chekhov, *Three Sisters*, in *Major Plays*, translated by Ann Dunnigan, Signet, New York, 265.

Rhetorical Figures of the Future

Freddie Rokem

How shall I put it? It seems to me that everything on earth must change little by little, and is already changing before our eyes. In two or three hundred years, let's say a thousand years – the time does not matter – a new happy life will dawn. We'll have no part in that life, of course, but we are living for it now, working, yes suffering, and creating it – in that alone lies the purpose of our existence, and, if you like, our happiness.

Vershinin, in Chekhov's *Three Sisters*, Act II

It is characteristic of philosophical writing that it must continually confront the question of representation.

Walter Benjamin, *The Origin of German Tragic Drama*

I will begin my discussion of the rhetorical organization of texts, and performance texts in particular, with a story told by Walter Benjamin in his essay on Kafka published in 1934. This short narrative will serve as my point of departure for discussing how **figures of the future** are constructed and what these figures do. Note also, that as I introduce Benjamin's story with the conscious gesture that I am going to quote a story, Benjamin also begins his own narrative by signaling to his readers, that "so the story goes," and that we are going to read or hear a story, a story in which gradually several other stories are embedded in a progressively developing chain of narrative fragments, ending with the remarkable story of the beggar. This sequence will hopefully in turn give rise to yet another set of stories, the accounts of interpretation triggered by our zeal for understanding and meaning. Every story apparently holds within it such a pledge or promise of other, additional stories to be told.

Here is Benjamin's story:

In a Hassidic village, so the story goes, Jews were sitting together in a shabby inn one Sabbath evening. They were all local people, with the exception of one person no one knew, a very poor, ragged man who was squatting in a dark corner at the back of the room. All sorts of things were discussed, and then it was suggested that everyone should tell what wish he would make if one were granted him. One man wanted money; another wished for a son-in-law; a third dreamed of a new carpenter's bench; and so each spoke in turn. After they had finished, only the beggar in his dark corner was left. Reluctantly and hesitantly he answered the question. "I wish I were a powerful king reigning over a big country. Then, some night while I was asleep in my palace, an enemy would invade my country, and by dawn his horsemen would penetrate to my castle and meet with no resistance. Roused from my sleep, I wouldn't have time even to dress and I would have to flee in my shirt. Rushing over hill and dale and through forests day and night, I would finally arrive safely right here at the bench in this corner. This is my wish." The others exchanged uncomprehending glances. "And what good would this wish have done you?" someone asked. "I'd have a shirt," was the answer.¹

¹ Walter Benjamin, *Selected Writings*, volume 2, 1927–1934, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1999, p. 812.

² Ibid, p. 818. It is no doubt a story which connects us to a vaguely defined historical tradition of Chassidic stories, and I invite everyone who knows more about it to contribute.

³ Concerning the way in which the telling of stories in a social context intrinsically contains a figure of the future, as I claim for the cases discussed here, a more detailed study has to be made, including works like *Canterbury Tales*, *The Decameron*, and many more. In this context the relationships between story-telling and performativity, and if they point towards the future has to be examined in detail.

Even before we begin to ask how the embedded chain of stories is generated in Benjamin's narrative, it raises questions of where he got his inspiration. What is its origin? Where and how did Benjamin find it? According to the note in the English edition of Benjamin's *Selected Writings* it was "current in books on Jewish humor around 1900."²

Benjamin presents a complex narrative through which the future as an expression of something imaginary or imagined is figured as a wish, a yearning which each of the people present in the inn wants to have fulfilled. In what follows I will try to explore in what frameworks such figures are developed. But before that let me say a few words about the dramatic situation where these wishes are presented. A group of people are gathered around a table on which most probably a meal and drinks are served. Someone suggests, just like in Plato's *Symposium*, that everyone tell a story, in this case a wish: "I want this" or "I want that." Plato's dialogue, where each of the speakers talks about Eros is obviously also about something that is desired, and from this perspective is also towards the future, expressed through the broad variety of discourses and stories about Eros.³ Let us also keep in mind that in Plato's *Symposium* Socrates relates what he has heard about Eros from Diotima who is a prophetess. Eros as a figure of the future, a fulfillment of desire, is however much more complex than the narrative Benjamin presents.

The interesting aspect about the story of the beggar, however (and this is in a way also the case with Socrates' narrative techniques), is that it is at the same time implicitly also about the past, tell-

ing his listeners how he has actually arrived at the inn, but without the shirt he imagines in his wish, as something which figures a future. And what the beggar's story transmits is how, had his wish been fulfilled, as something which is both past and future, he would actually be wearing a shirt. The story also induces us to imagine how the beggar is actually dressed as he is sitting in the dark corner of the room telling about his wish, thus also presenting a dramatic moment in the present. From this perspective it is even possible to claim that there are three simultaneous stories being told here: the first how he has actually arrived at the inn in his rags, being exiled in some unexplained way, and how he looks as he is sitting there now. And at the same time we learn how he would have liked to arrive, or how he would look the next time he will come, granted that his wish to have been "a powerful king reigning over a big country" had been fulfilled. The complex interaction between the unknown past of the beggar and his wish to have a shirt creates a theological, almost apocalyptic subtext.

In the prologue to his *Trauerspiel* thesis, where Plato's *Symposium* also figures prominently, Benjamin writes:

Origin **[Ursprung]**, although an entirely historical category, has, nevertheless, nothing to do with genesis **[Entstehung]**. The term origin is not intended to describe the process by which the existent came into being, but rather to describe that which emerges from the process of becoming and disappearance. Origin is an eddy **[Strudel]** in the stream of becoming **[im Fluß des Werdens]**, and in its current it swallows the material involved in the process of genesis. That which is original **[das Ursprüngliche]** is never revealed in the naked and manifest existence of the factual; its rhythm is apparent only to a dual insight. On the one hand it needs to be recognized as a process of restoration and reestablishment, but, on the other hand, and precisely because of this, as something unfinished **[Unvollendetes, Unabgeschlossenes]**. There takes place in every original phenomenon a determination of the form in which an idea will constantly confront the historical world, until it is revealed fulfilled, in the totality of its history. Origin is not, therefore, discovered by the examination of actual findings, but it is related to their pre- and post-history **[Vor- und Nachgeschichte]**. The principles of philosophical contemplation are recorded in the dialectic which is inherent in origin. This dialectic shows singularity and repetition to be conditioned by one another in all essentials. The category of origin is not therefore, as Cohen holds, a purely logical one, but a historical one.⁴

This is a critique both of Nietzsche's notions of *Geburt*, in his attempt to explore the origins of tragedy, as well as his understanding of the eternal return. According to Beatrice Hansen,

Benjamin considered Nietzsche's principle of repetition to be an inconclusive and insufficient explanation for one of the central antinomies of history, namely that a principle of repetition manifests itself in the form of historical periods or epochs, while history itself is a singular and unrepeatable process. In fact, what Benjamin aspired to accomplish with his new notion of origin was nothing less than to think together, and to bring together in one term, historical singularity and repetition.⁵

This notion of origin is perhaps what the beggar telling his wish to the people assembled in the inn has communicated to his uncomprehending listeners. And the shirt represents an imagined utopian situation.

But instead of developing this utopian wish any further and how it relates to the past as it points at the future, as a wish not yet realized, I will rather proceed by raising the question how the wish, as a figure of the future, is constructed rhetorically. This will help us to understand what I believe is an essential feature of such figures. What the wish actually expresses, even if it sounds like a tautological statement is: "If my wish comes true, then I will have my desire fulfilled, and I will have that which I wish for." The wish is thus formulated as a conditional statement, which can be formulated most simply as a proposition with the structure "If x, then y."⁶ My basic argument here is that figures of the future, and they are as I will point out below not confined to wishes, can in some way be translated to such a conditional proposition.

This form of argument, which has the structure of a syllogism, has had an enormous impact on the foundations of western logic. Originally these conditional statements have been formulated as an argument in three consecutive steps:

1. Socrates is a man.
2. All men are mortal.
3. Thus Socrates is mortal (=will die).

The alternative, conditional formulation of this is: "If all men are mortal, and if Socrates is a man, then Socrates is mortal (=will die)." As logicians have already noted, and I am only repeating what is common knowledge, the "If x"-condition consists of two parts. The first makes a predication

⁴ Walter Benjamin, *The Origin of German Tragic Drama*, translated by John Osborne, Verso, London and New York, 1998, pp. 45-46, with modifications made by Beatrice Hanssen; "Philosophy at Its Origin: Walter Benjamin's Prologue to the *Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels*," *MLN*, 110, 4, 1995, p. 822, note 27.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 823.

⁶ I want to thank Galit Hasan-Rokem who through her work on the conditional deep-structure of proverbs has helped me to understand the significance of such statements.

about an individual, while the second part is a universal proposition qualifying the class of objects discussed. The third sentence, the “then y,” is the deduction, resulting from the first two propositions, which is deferred to the future, had Socrates still been alive.

It is important to note that this classical syllogism, which appears in every introductory discussion of logic, is actually about Socrates’ death and it can perhaps even be seen as a kind of primal scene of philosophy and logic, through which abstract philosophical thinking becomes personalized. The syllogism is at the same time also about the ultimate limit of the future of the individual, his or her death. While the universal proposition, that all men (and also all women) are mortal is not limited by any horizon in the future, because it is a universal statement, the individual will inevitably cross the border to what Hamlet calls, “The undiscovered country from whose bourn/ No traveller returns...”⁷ One of the endeavors of the theatre is constantly to test and contest such “horizons of expectations,” to use the concept coined by Wolfgang Iser and Hans-Robert Jauss in their *Rezeptionsästhetik*, intentionally here used by me somewhat idiosyncratically. And this is exactly my point, because the horizon of expectations created by a certain text becomes superimposed on what we know about human life and its inevitable finiteness. The figures of the future are at the junction between the universal and the particular.

7 Shakespeare, *Hamlet*, The New Cambridge Shakespeare, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985, III, 1, pp. 79-80.

Hamlet, however, has to confront such a traveler, his father, who has apparently returned from this undiscovered country in order to demand revenge for his death, while at the same time the reader/spectator of these events is invited to confront the narrative strategies developed by Shakespeare through the appearance of the ghost in order to make sense of this text or a performance of it. At the same time, according to Iser, “throughout the reading [or viewing] process there is a continual interplay between modified expectations and transformed memories”⁸ subjected to the synthesizing activity of the reader. “Thus,” Iser, psychologizing the universal statement, concludes that, “every moment of reading [as well as every moment of watching a performance] is a dialectic of protension and retention, conveying a future horizon yet to be occupied, along with the past (and continually fading) horizon already filled /.../”⁹ The phenomenological deep-structure of this simultaneous dialectic backward and forward movement in time is constantly interacting with the conditional “if x, then y” structure, superimposing the core of the narrative syntactic sequence onto the complex temporal constructions created in the fictional world through a variety of implicit and explicit configurations. The ghost of prince Hamlet’s dead father returns to fashion the future according to the similar dialectics that the reader, according to Iser, is involved in, where the ghost is representing the dead past that is paradoxically “conveying a future dimension yet to be occupied.” In Benjaminian terms the ghost is not just a return of the repressed, but a refiguration of the principle of origin, the *Ursprung*.

8 Wolfgang Iser, *The Act of Reading: A Theory of Aesthetic Response*, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1978, p. 111.

9 Ibid., p. 112.

Besides the articulation of wishes or desires that create figures for the future with their obvious psychological underpinnings for the subject expressing them, the “if-then” structure can also serve as the deep-structure for promises, warnings and threats. In these cases, which affect the addressee rather than the speaker, the proximity of this form of verbal behaviour to speech-acts, in the sense developed by Austin and Searle, is even more obvious. To make a promise, issue a warning or express a threat is to formulate a verbal expression which will have consequences, in particular for the addressee. Threats, warnings and promises are what Walton has termed “commissive speech acts,” a category of speech acts committing the speaker to a future course of action, which in the case of threats can also have the implied effects of a grammatical imperative.¹⁰ Most promises, but not all, involve a conditional “if-then” structure, while threats and warnings, which are very closely related, are more strictly adhering to this conditional structure.

10 Douglas N. Walton, “Practical Reasoning and the Structure of Fear Appeal Arguments,” *Philosophy and Rhetoric*, vol. 29, 4, 1996.

Can we then assume that it is possible to identify and isolate the conditional structures of wishes, desires, promises, warnings and threats in narrative works of art like novels, theatre performances and films, as figures of the future that the reader/spectator becomes captured by, in his or her efforts to interpret these works of art as they gradually unfold? And how do these conditional structures affect us, not only with regard to the perception of a specific work of art, in aesthetic terms, but in particular with regard to our own sense of the future? Such conditional narrative structures, the ways in which they are embedded in works of art, and how they carry meanings beyond the aesthetic experience itself, have not yet been extensively examined. It is a field which opens up a number of very complex challenges, and I will only present one short example here, from the work of Israeli playwright Hanoch Levin, who published 56 plays, from which approximately 30 were performed, before his death in 1999, and who had a very original approach to these issues.

In Levin’s theatre the seemingly logical structure of the conditional statement is disrupted and instead a perpetrator threatens another character with some form of punishment for reasons which seem totally irrelevant to the situation or without revealing what the reasons for this threat are. Thus the first part of the threat – ‘If x’ – supposedly creating a rational basis for the threat is usually lacking. In Levin’s plays there are innumerable situations with threats which are completely illogical or contain only their ‘then y’-part. Furthermore, because of their cruelty, these threats seem to be totally unmotivated by the situation. In most cases the spectators have to supply the

reasons for this cruelty. The spectator has to justify the threat according to some norm which he or she does not at all identify with. Since the threat is so cruel it challenges our accepted moral norms and thus it becomes problematic not only for the prospective victim but for the sensibilities of the spectators as well; less frequently, it is also based on some form of absurd or black humor.

In addition to presenting a threat, the perpetrator – the person who on the basis of an irrational whim has declared that he or she will be cruel – after a short moment usually declares that the threat has been cancelled and that it was not really serious. This change of attitude gives the victim as well as the spectators the impression that the initial threat has been transformed into some form of extreme benevolence. The speech-act of threat has been transformed into another speech-act of promising in some way that the threat will not be carried out. The reason for this sudden change is also usually not directly exposed; it is based on another irrational whim. However, the change of attitude on the part of the former perpetrator turns out to be nothing but a temporary postponement of the initial threat, a tactic to ease the tension. Then, when the victim believes the danger is over, the initial threat is finally carried out.

This change usually comes as a great surprise both to the victim as well as the spectators. The temporary postponement has created the impression that since the perpetrator has realized how cruel and even illogical the initial threat has been, the threat could perhaps have been avoided altogether. When the cruel deed is finally carried out, however, it seems as if the initial threat had somehow been inevitable; that it was an expression of a scheme of Fate which also the perpetrator, who initiated the cruel chain of events – from the threat, to the postponement and to its final realization – was somehow even unable to control, something which causes great anxiety and discomfort for the reader/spectator.

This narrative scheme, which is the basis for most of Levin's plays and performances, also frequently serves as a transparent allegorical veil through which he examines fundamental issues of human agency in history, without having to assign a specific identity in the performance on stage to the perpetrator or to the victim. These are allegorical figures that carry out their pre-assigned sado-masochistic roles on the stage. As a result of this open-ended allegorical dimension the recurring narrative scheme also makes it possible for Levin to confront his Israeli audiences with their own role not only as victims of cruelty but also as perpetrators of suffering upon others. It is also quite obvious that this narrative pattern is applicable to concrete historical situations and to the Jewish historical experience, in particular to the Shoah.

Here I will only briefly examine how this basic pattern has been embedded on both the micro- and the macro-levels in the 1993 Habima-production of Levin's *The Child Dreams*. This performance begins with a female voice singing a sentimental melody, which, as we will discover much later, is the music from the country of the dead children. And as we listen to the evocative song, we observe an idyllic scene with two parents proudly leaning over the bed of their sleeping child with something quite familiar, even stereotypically pure about it. The very first lines of the play by the father, however, immediately introduce the possibility that the boy who is sleeping innocently in his bed, in spite of his purity, or perhaps because of it, is subject to some undefined threat which will inevitably make him a victim:

When he sleeps, endless is our love for our child;
quiet, mouth gaping open helpless,
he reminds us: this is how he will look
if he dies.¹¹

At this point we do not know when or by whom this threat will be realized, but its realization, the arrival of the child to the country of the dead children bringing with it the promise of the coming of Messiah, constitutes the inclusive narrative curve of the whole performance.

The mother is also aware of this danger and wants the initial idyllic tableaux to freeze eternally:

May time stop now, at the height of bliss,
For nothing better is to come;
let the three of us turn into a still life, so it seems:
"Parents observing a Child Who Dreams."¹²

Only by stopping the time of history can this threat be alleviated. We also see how already in the very first lines of this play Levin draws attention to the relationship between the idyllic family scene and the potentials of its aesthetic representation, the performance itself, introducing a meta-theatrical dimension – a painted still life. However, once the performance has begun, it is impossible to halt the inner dynamic development of the cruel events.

¹¹ Hanoch Levin, *The Child Dreams: A Play in Four Parts*, in *The Labor of Life: Selected Plays*, translated by Barbara Harshav; with an introduction by Freddie Rokem, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 2003, p. 129.

¹² Ibid., p. 129.

13 Ibid., p. 130.

The anxieties and the implicit threat triggered by this 'peak of happiness' almost immediately serve as a self-fulfilling prophecy by the commotion suddenly interrupting the idyllic scene. A group of frightened refugees appearing as if from nowhere, and primarily a bleeding young man, seem to be a materialization of the unconscious fears of the parents. And immediately after them a group of soldiers in black uniforms enters the stage also as if from nowhere. These are the realizations of the vaguely pronounced threats. The wounded man, a talented musician, mourns his now violently ending artistic career – "Forty years playing the violin/ pouring there in a little puddle at my shoes"¹³ – and he falls down. This could be the future vision of their boy, now sleeping quietly in his bed, a premonition that his death will not be as peaceful and tranquil as his present sleep is.

14 Dreams and the ways in which they figure the future has been dealt with extensively in different contexts, and I am not able to deal with it here.

At the same time, the group of refugees gathering around the family can also be understood as the dream of the sleeping boy himself; what we see is his own threatening nightmare foreboding his death taking shape around his bed. This understanding of the sudden interruption is also based on the fact that the name of the play is *The Child Dreams*.¹⁴ But at the same time, however, the concrete individuality of the refugees also makes it possible to understand this scene as a theatrical documentation of an event in the world, where the group of refugees and the wounded violinist are appearing in the same fictional world as the child sleeping in his bed. This understanding is reinforced by the ensuing conversation. The bleeding violinist somewhat ironically adds that, "the serious approach to music/ takes a serious blow here."¹⁵ He seems to be dead, but suddenly he recovers, to be trampled by the Officer, finally leading to his death. There is no room for art in the nightmare world depicted in this performance.

15 Ibid., p. 130.

Since the performance has created such a strong pattern of foreboding – moments after the father says that his son will look as if he were asleep in his death we see the young violinist dying from his wounds – both these possibilities begin to exist simultaneously, each one confronting the threat of the young boy's future death from a different perspective. The anxieties of the parents, reinforced by the events themselves, on the one hand, and the nightmare of the boy, on the other, become ambiguously intermingled on the stage. Not one of these interpretations necessarily seems to become the dominant one. A spectator may choose one at a particular point in the production, but he or she, because of its allegorical qualities, is also free to change the dominant mode at any point. *The Child Dreams* is not like Strindberg's *The Dream Play* in this respect, where the basic mode of presentation is the dream, within which there are fragments of reality. The important point in this context, however, is that both of the interpretative keys are based on a slightly different kind of threat which becomes gradually reinforced as the narrative structure I am examining here is constantly repeated. The monumental, abstract set with only a bed visible on the stage, besides the groups of people, reinforces this complex theatrical situation with its double coding.

The emblematic tableaux-situations in the opening scenes of the performance immediately evoke a broad range of historical and cultural associations: the adoration of the sleeping child with its Christian connotations, which in Israel also carries a mythic quality of the Jewish parents admiring their child; the frightened refugees with their worn clothes carrying suitcases, and the sudden appearance of the soldiers. The associations to specific historical events are triggered by well-known representations of Shoah refugees and victims as well as by televised images of Israeli soldiers entering Palestinian homes in the middle of the night and boat refugees in East Asia. These vague and fragmented cultural and historical references create the basis for an open-ended theatrical allegory which cannot be given any one concrete specific interpretation. It is a fragmentary allegory with many references, and that makes the conditional narrative structure even stronger, creating a hermeneutic anxiety for the spectators as well, mimicking the threat experienced by the fictional characters in the production itself.

In the last act of the play, called '*The Messiah*', the narrative structure again presents a threat which is temporarily postponed but which is realized in spite of this. From the very beginning of the performance the future death of the child has been the most comprehensive and terrifying threat, but when it has actually taken place it paradoxically seems to bring new hope to the other dead children who

16 Ibid., p. 159.

While playing in the yard,
happy, enjoying ourselves most,
we were taken and tossed into the grave.¹⁶
To the question, "When shall we arise", the Dead Seer Child says,
I saw an angel; he was floating in the sun,
a slow dive as in a sea
of honey, and he came down and whispered to me:
"Rest a little longer for the full quota of your companions and brothers
who are to die like you".¹⁷

17 Ibid., p. 159.

When asked when this will take place the messenger angel has answered that **only** one more child is needed for the quota of dead children to be filled. This brings great excitement to all of the children.

One more dead child! One more!

Soon we shall wake up, the light of resurrection
will shine on us, we shall arise, we shall brush our teeth,
we shall wash our faces – and into the sun! The sea!
To sprinkle water and to laugh at all
the long time we've been waiting in the dark!**18**

18 Ibid., p. 160.

Now, when the mother is carrying her dead son to the country of the dead children the initial
threat, that he will die, instead bears the potential promise of bringing salvation not only to him,
but also to the other dead children as well.

For this dead child, who will be the last one to die, death will be very short:

Oh how happy is he who died
a moment before the resurrection!
He didn't miss anything! He didn't
have time to lie in a tomb and crumble.
Maybe he missed one afternoon snack,
maybe one piece of candy, and he gets up again, as
from a short afternoon nap and afterward
his whole life is stretched out before him!**19**

19 Ibid., p. 160.

And after the mother has parted from her dead child, the Messiah, looking like a peddler with two
suitcases, enters. The dead children, trembling with expectation, ask the old man to take out the
magic ointment which will finally bring about the miracle of their resurrection.

But the Messiah, who does not seem to be in a hurry, is fumbling with his suitcases. And again
the soldiers followed by the Commander and the 'Woman Born for Love' enter while the Messiah
tries to hide among the children. When the soldiers discover him the children first believe that he
will overcome them:

Now, Now! The downpour is about to burst;
the sky – to open; that will happen now!
Yes, yes, that's how it happens in the movies,
the hero falls onto the floor, everything
seems lost, and only at the last moment –
at the very very last moment – **20**

20 Ibid., p. 168.

But instead, after a short postponement the Commander shoots the Messiah, making clear that
the Messianic expectations have also been nothing but a postponement of the realization of the
inevitable finality of death. By presenting the possibility that the state of death can be reversed
through resurrection, Levin has shown how impossible the dreams and fantasies of such a state
are, a position that goes against the accepted Judeo-Christian belief systems. What for a moment
seemed to represent some form of redemption, whereby the death of an individual will miracu-
lously bring salvation to the whole community, proves to be just another temporary postponement
of that finality, which everyone knows is inevitable.

The images in the last act of Levin's *The Boy Dreams* are no doubt closely related to Walter Ben-
jamin's well known meditation on the Paul Klee painting "Angelus Novus." This painting, Ben-
jamin says,

shows an angel looking as though he is about to move away from something he is fixedly contem-
plating. His eyes are staring, his mouth is open, his wings are spread. This is how one pictures
the angel of history. His face is turned towards the past. Where we perceive a chain of events,
he sees one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage and hurls it in front
of his feet. The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead, and make whole what has been
smashed.**21**

21 Walter Benjamin (1969), "Theses on the Philosophy of History" in *Illuminations*, New York: Schocken Books, p. 257.

This angel is a witness, looking back at us, who are situated in the past. A storm blowing from
Paradise, where history began, has got caught in his wings and it "irresistibly propels him into the
future to which his back is turned."**22** This means that we are looking into the future behind the
back of the angel. What we will see there is up to the next generation of theatre- and perform-
ance-artists to show, hoping that the angel will eventually also be able to turn his face in order to
look into that future, like Vershinin does in Chekhov's *Three Sisters*. There, in that future, he says
"lies the purpose of our existence, and, if you like, our happiness."**23** But maybe that hope, just
like the wish of the beggar in Benjamin's story, is too naïve.

22 Ibid, p. 258.

23 Anton Chekhov, *Three Sisters*, in *Major Plays*, translated by Ann Dunnigan, Signet, New York, p. 265.

Zaboravljajući fon¹: zvuk, virtualnost i retorika u sredini

Frances Dyson
Prevela s engleskog Una Bauer

Za vrijeme 90-tih, kako se digitalna veza etablirala u svijesti, srcima i kreditnim karticama sve većeg broja potrošača, metaforička mapa 'kiberije' ('cyberia') je nadrasla sposobnosti aplikacija i hardverske podrške – što je dovelo do podrugljivog iako preciznog termina 'šupljovert' ('vapor-ware') da bi se opisala ispraznost obećanja i kratkotrajnost tisuća naglo iskrsljih tvrtki koje su trebale proizvesti novu najpoželjniju aplikaciju. Metafora mreže bila je samo jedna u mnoštvu kiber znakova koji su obilježavali navodno potpuno 'nov' teritorij, koji je zapravo bio istražen i usvojen tijekom dvadesetog stoljeća. Posljednjih pedeset godina, tehnološki su sajmovi osvajali potrošača proizvodima, dok su ih radio, televizija, filmovi, knjige, stripovi, igrčke itd. - bombardirali glavnom ideologijom moderniteta – neizbježnošću napretka i apsolutnom nužnošću tehnološkog razvoja. Postupno je mehanička paradigma koja je predstavljala vrli novi svijet tehnologije popustila: apstraktni je kod istisnuo alate i poluge, moć je postala inteligentna a fizikalnost ambivalentna. U isto je vrijeme spektakl istraživanja svemira i hladnoratovskog militarizma povezao tehnologiju, masivne količine kapitala i nacionalne ciljeve za beskonačno osvajanje svemira s jedne strane i uništenje planete s druge. Tako je 1999., jedna već 'umrežena' zapadna, prvenstveno sjevernoamerička kultura dvadeseto stoljeće napustila oplemenjena planovima za montažnu budućnost, dok je istovremeno bila opterećena ekonomskim, ekološkim i psihološkim dugom koji je bio nužna posljedica praćenja tih planova.

Ono što bismo mogli nazvati dugom virtualnog, koji je, mogli bismo reći, također i njegovo potisnuto, intrinzično je povezano s glasom, tijelom, okolišem i tehnološkom revolucijom koja je omogućila njihovo odvajanje. Ono je također ukorijenjeno u još uvijek prisutnim snovima o tehnološkom napretku koji su pratili uvođenje medija i telekomunikacija, i u praznovjerju koje je u taj razvoj usadilo auru spiritualnog i magijskog. Unutrašnje funkcioniranje tog duga, voljela bih sugerirati, ponovo izlazi na površinu sa svakom novom metaforom primijenjenom na digitalni teren. Ono privlači i zavodi, nudi nadu, obilje, čudo, smiruje živce, osigurava uporište, djeluje kao stup srama. Ali dok suvremene metafore kao što su 'mreža', 'kaos', 'apsorpcija' ('immersion'), 'povezanost' ('connectivity'), 'pojava' ('emergence'), mogu neutralizirati oštri brid racionalističkog, silikonskog svijeta, one također postavljaju fundamentalna pitanja kao što su: Što je sebstvo? Što se razumije pod postojanjem? Što čini društveno? Ako je bitak određen kao digitalan, kao što bi neki voljeli da jest, koje je onda mjesto tijela – glasa osobe koja govori u tom novom postojanju? Kako netko može govoriti o svojoj kiberniziranoj nematerijalnosti?

Govorenje – i tehnologije koje su odvojile glas od tijela ovdje su od iznimne važnosti. Vrijedi se prisjetiti da je guru virtualne realnosti, Jaron Lanier, prvi povezao virtualnu realnost s telefonom – analogija, mogli bismo primijetiti, koja je brzo napuštena usprkos svojoj prikladnosti. Kiberkultura i multimedija mogu zapravo puno dobiti od zvuka. Puno prije nego što su stopljene slike (image morphs), miksevi i općenite manipulacije bile povezane s postmodernom kulturom, zvuk je bio sniman, sempliran, uslojen, miksan, pojačan, korišten za stvaranje atmosfere, za izazivanje emotivnih i fizičkih reakcija, stvaranje osjećaja trodimenzionalnosti i uronjavanja. Usko povezan s muzikom, zvuk je naslijedio sublimno muzike, transcendentalne i kozmičke asocijacije – asocijacije koje se također pojavljuju u velikom dijelu kiber retorike. Pitagorejska muzika sfera, ideal totalnog umjetničkog djela, i pretpostavljena istinitost osjećaja, sve su one povezane su s fenomenalnošću zvuka, s njegovom sposobnošću da prodre kroz skriveno i unutrašnje - otkrivajući možda praznu posudu, šuplje zidove ili bijesnu unutrašnjost inače odmjerenog govornika.

Povijesno gledano, zvuk je također prvi medij koji se elektronski prenosio. Trebali bismo se sjetiti da je prvi instrument masovne teleprezencije bio telefon, i prvi fizički, ljudski atribut koji se 'rastjelovio', inicijalno fonografom, bio je glas. Također, ta su se tehnološka dostignuća pojavila u vrijeme povećanog interesa kasnog devetnaestog stoljeća za okultno: o medijima se govorilo kao o 'bežičnom telefonu', razne su naprave izmišljene kako bi se uhvatili nemirni glasovi duhova, a susreti novih teozofskih društava bili su česti. Razvojem radija, mnogi su operateri govorili kao da su direktno priključeni na eter – koji je bio zamišljen kao demokratsko mjesto otvoreno porukama

odasvud, uključujući prijenose od nevidljivih duhova s drugog svijeta, koji, za razliku od političara, nisu imali nikakvog razloga da lažu.

Svi su ti elementi prisutni u retoričkim osnovama kiberprostora i virtualnosti: izobilje koje predstavljaju nematerijalnost, elektronski prijenos i tehnološki napredak, veze sa sublimnim i okultnim, pitanje utjelovljenja i zaokupljenost budućnošću. Unatoč tim sličnostima, unatoč zajedničkoj kozmoginiji, telefoniju (odnosno osobito rane dane radio stanica) rijetko spominju kiberentuzijasti – ni kao relevantan historijsko-kulturni fenomen niti kao prototipsku tehnologiju. Je li to jednostavno slučaj propuštene povijesti, ili je to oblik negiranja? A ako je ovo potonje, zašto nalazimo, na svakom koraku u retoričko, nakupine auralnih metafora koje se koriste da bi se ‘popunilo’ virtualno iskustvo, da bi se stvorio osjećaj uranjanja u okoliš koji ironično, skriva činjenicu da se tehnološko posredovanje ikada dogodilo. Kakav je taj skriveni i dvostruki odnos između auralnosti i virtualnosti? Do koje mjere zvuk – kao audio – vraća potisnute virtualnosti u obliku, recimo, simuliranog prirodnog zvučnog okoliša, ili prisutnosti evocirane glasom, ili osjećaja tjelesnosti izazvanog zvukom koji okružuje?

Kako bih se pozabavila tom dvostrukošću, počet ću s ‘metafizikom nematerijalnog’ koju zvuk i virtualnost dijele. Gotovo realna, gotovo tamo, ne sasvim u statusu objekta ali definitivno neko ‘mjesto’ ili ‘realnost’, isprva se činilo da virtualna realnost nudi velike mogućnosti za doživljavanje i teoretiziranje načina spoznaje svijeta koji nisu ukorijenjeni u diskretnom, singularnom, statičkom, trajnom, provjerljivom i nadasve konkretnom objektu i njegovom korelatu, individualnom, sjedinjenom i autonomnom subjektu. Virtualni objekt, i onaj oksimoron kojeg neki ljudi upotrebljavaju – zvučni objekt, čini se da dijele zajedničku nezainteresiranost za objektivitet – i sve što on implicira. U području virtualnog (ili tako kaže retorika) stvari su promjenjive, lako nestaju, posve su prekrajive. Identitet je određen onim koji ga upotrebljava – stolica se može predmetnuti u šalicu, bilo kad, bilo gdje. Jednako tako, ljudski identitet i subjektivitet postaje tekuć: rod, starost, zapravo sve povezano s fizikalnošću je nevažno. To se također odnosi na auralnost. U soničkoj sferi postoji nekoliko granica ili oznaka za uspostavljanje identiteta: zvuk je uvijek dvostrukost, uvijek je heterogen. Zato što nije ni vidljiv ni opipljiv zvuk ne uspijeva ispuniti kriterije za status objekta, on je ontološki neodređen i semantički neprecizan – što je zapravo ‘mukli udarac’ ili ‘pucketanje’ mogli biste se pitati. Nematerijalnost zvuka dobro pristaje uz nematerijalnost informacija, uz sposobnost zvuka da okruži slušatelja; njegova povezanost s prisutnošću (osobito prisutnošću glasa) dobro se slaže s obilatom anarhičnom masom kakva je kiberkultura ili s okružujućom dimenzijom sfere podataka: nevidljiva, nedodirljiva, egzistencijalno prikrivena ali uvijek ‘tamo negdje’.

Nematerijalnost koju zvuk i virtualno dijele ima važne posljedice za pojmove subjektiviteta. U zapadnoj filozofskoj tradiciji, ne samo da je koncept sebstva i drugog baziran na vidljivosti, već je svjesnost i znanje samo definirano vidom (vidim=znam). Čuti ali ne vidjeti (npr. čuti nečiji govor) s druge strane, povezano je sa žamorom, bukom, ‘lošim zvukom’, odsustvom, ili nesigurnošću znanja. Sluh zamjenjuje vanjskost i unutrašnjost, budući da se zvuk istovremeno čuje i osjeća. Glas se seli iz unutrašnjosti tijela na površinu, prolazeći iz subjektiviteta u objektivitet, iz unutrašnjosti u vanjskost: miješajući granice, razotkrivajući bolest i anksioznost, razotkrivajući emocije iz kašlja ili drhtanja, protivno namjeri govornika. Apsorpcijska kvaliteta zvuka, zajedno s fiziologijom uha, destabilizira subjektivnost subjekta; za razliku od oka, uho ne može biti zatvoreno, za razliku od pogleda koji je uvijek ispred subjekta i projicira se na svijet, slušanje uključuje svijest o neviđenim i možda negostoljubivim mjestima na periferiji nečijeg bitka.

Kiberprostor predstavlja slične metafizičke zagonetke. Kiberprostor nije toliko stvar koliko mreža. Nema početka ni kraja, i čini se da nudi sličnu vrstu obilja koju je radiofonijski eter nudio ranim entuzijastima kristalnog radija. Mreža nema jedinstveno mjesto nastanka, ne može biti autorizirana određenim imenom, dopušta korisnicima da zauzmu brojne identitete, i najvažnije, čini nevažnim bilo koja svojstva koja pripadaju fizičkom, materijalnom svijetu. U ranim devedesetima, kiberprostor je još uvijek unutar svog čudnog neologističkog okvira, nepreglednih oceanskih metafora i mogućnosti pa ga je Kevin Kelly, pišući 1994, nazvao ‘bitkom roja’:

“Mreža je amblem mnogostrukosti. Iz nje dolazi bitak roja – distribuirani bitak – koji proteže sebstvo preko cijele mreže tako da niti jedan dio ne može reći “ja i Ja”. Izražava logiku i Komputera i Prirode – koji za uzvrat izražavaju moć koja nadilazi razumijevanje.”

Usprkos tome, dok ta mnogostrukost podstiče fenomenološki pristup – onaj koji je, kao i zvuk, antitetičan zapadnoj, racionalnoj tradiciji, i, na razne načine antitetičan znanostima kao što je inženjerstvo, računarstvo i informatika kojih je začetnikom, kad promatramo tehnologiju koja stoji iza audio ili novih medija, sve te organske, protočne, prozirne kvalitete čini se da nestaju. Kako bismo shvatili kako bi se to moglo dogoditi s obzirom na zvuk, važno je ponovo ući u trag recepciji audiofonije u medijskoj kulturi dvadesetog stoljeća u razvoju. Povijesno gledano, činjenica da zvučna snimka reproducira trodimenzionalnog zvuka i čuva svoju prolaznost bio je dovoljan razlog da se pretpostavi da je reproduciran zvuk, za razliku od fotografske slike, ontološki identičan originalnom zvuku. Ali kao i fotografija, čin snimanja zvuka odmah uvodi perspektivu, i jednom snimljen,

zvuk postaje dislociran i fragmentiran, moguće je da ga u bilo koje vrijeme, na bilo kojem mjestu čuje bilo koji slušatelj. Zvuk prestaje biti vremenski fenomen vezan uz ovdje i sada življenog iskustva, i postaje pseudo objekt. Kao i vizualni objekt, može biti sakupljan i sačuvan, transportiran i prenošen preko velikih udaljenosti i beskonačno ponavljan. Kao slika, može funkcionirati kao ikona, logo, zvučni efekt kojeg kultura tumači koliko ga slušač sluša. Dok se to priznaje u vizualnoj kulturi (govorimo o slikama ne o 'vidovima') u auralnim terminima o audiju se još uvijek govori kao o 'zvuku'.

S pojavom digitalnog audija, upisana površina analogne snimke zamijenjena je enkodiranim signalom a s njim su indeksne asocijacije audiofonije nadomještene arbitrarnošću podataka. Rastavljen od bilo kakvog fenomenološkog odnosa prema formama i tokovima zvukova koji se pojavljuju u okolišu, zvuk se točnije definira kao signal, ni zvučan ni tih, već samo 'uključen' ili 'isključen'. Materijalne posljedice te transformacije mogu se čuti u ekstremnom obliku, na mreži ili unutar interaktivne multimedije, gdje je veliki postotak audio semplova prestao funkcionirati na isti način na koji je recimo, zvuk s ekrana funkcionirao u prošlosti. Dok su semplovi (jedva) mogli udahnuti 'život' slici, bilo bi zaista nategnuto reći da su oni ipak uspjeli predstavljati tijelo i mjesto, ili čak odnositi se ikonički kako to čine zvučni efekti. Umjesto toga, signal-zvuk počeo je funkcionirati na potpuno simbolički način, a nije iznenađujuće da se zlatno doba semplova dogodilo u isto vrijeme kad i eksplozija u audio umjetnosti i muzičkim formama kojima dominira simpliranje i miksiranje. S digitalnim zvukom i stiliziranim zvučnim efektom, to "tamo" zvuka, njegova prisutnost ovdje i sada, njegova drugost u odnosu na proždrljive vizualne porive suvremene, eksternalizirane kulture, gotovo je u potpunosti iščezla.

Paradoks je u tome da su mainstream mediji prisvajali - dok je zvuk bio sniman, pojačavan, izoliran, uređivan, sklapan, miks, poboljšavan, sintetiziran i simpliran u komadiće veličine bitova - zvučne asocijacije s onima ne-posredovanima: najvažnije, njegovu prisutnost ovdje i sada i njegove apsorbirajuće kvalitete. Kino je na primjer uvelo "surround" zvuk, zgrade su suptilno uključivale atmosferu u svoj design, likovni umjetnici i kipari dodavali su zvuk kao element instalacije, zloški rtovi unajmljivali su dizajnere zvuka kako bi stvorili džunglu, svatko je koristio zvuk kako bi simulirana iskustva učinio stvarnijima. Iako je vizualizam kulture na neki način zvuk učinio nevidljivim i tako izuzetom od pažljivog ispitivanja, također je stvorio senzorni primitivizam, nudeći neiskvarenu divlinu, autentično iskustvo kulturi koja pati od zamora slike. U isto vrijeme, stupanj cinizma koji mediji potiču, i sofisticiranost tehnologija za transformiranje istine, stvorili su želju za medijem koji bi bio "unplugged", "stvaran" i potpun. Ne samo da su mreže oduševljeno prigrlile ponekad besmislene amalgame nadzora i produkcije poznate kao reality TV, već su se "apsorbirajući mediji" - često razvijeni izvan komercijalnog područja - pojavili kao protuotrov sve većim razinama skepticizma prema istini, stvarnosti i relevantnosti suvremenih medija. 'Istina' i/ili vjerodostojnost novih medija pripisiva je gotovo u potpunosti načinu na koji su "apsorbirajući" mediji fizički međudjelovali s tijelom korisnika a ta je interaktivnost bila najizazovnija u relativno kratkovječnom ali retorički fundamentalnom mediju poznatom kao virtualna realnost.

Dok zvuk, ili bolje reći audio, ne reproducira već reprezentira zvuk kao proizvod serije tehnoloških medijacija, s razvojem virtualnog audia, te su medijacije postale još kompleksnije, sakupljajući na neki način u jednoj točki intenzivnu vezu između utjelovljenja, tehnologije i želje za prisutnošću koja u isto vrijeme potvrđuje i negira virtualnost. Virtualni audio predstavlja glavnu promjenu u shvaćanju slušanja. Filozofski, ponovo povezuje uši s tijelom prije nego s glavom, disperzirajući slušnost kroz regije tijela koje su bile smatrane irelevantnim za senzornu percepciju i formaciju znanja. Tehnološki, demaskira ideju da stereofonska perspektiva može proizvesti 'savršen' zvuk. Kulturalno, uvodi stupanj tehnološke intervencije u prostor slušanja koji se, još od vremena gramofona, smatra privatnim, intimnim i individualnim.

Sada moramo pitati - kakvo tijelo ili prostor se ovdje reaktiviraju? Kultura dvadesetog stoljeća razvila je visok stupanj medijske pismenosti: audiofili su naučili 'čitati' telefonski, radiofonski, fonografski i sinematski zvuk, izvući iz mase statike one dijelove informacije koji su važni. Generacije koje su odrasle na filmu i televiziji naučene su i očekuju apstrakciju i redukciju koju je zvuk s ekrana prošao, naučene su, drugim riječima, slušati zvuk već kao znakove, već kao značenja. Generacije su također bile istrenirane i u umijeću prizivanja fantomskih tijela. Na filmu, simulirano jedinstvo zvuka i slike, dvodimenzionalnog ekrana i trodimenzionalnog audija, stvarnog i fantomskog, puno duguje uvjerljivosti lip-synca, koji može djelomično biti pripisan nemogućnosti zamišljanja glasa i tijela na ekranu kao odvojenih kad promatrač osjeća kako je njegov vlastiti glas 'utjelovljen'. Virtualni okoliši dijele ovu insinuciju tijela, dok zvuk doprinosi svojoj vlastitoj "auri" trodimenzionalnosti, prostornosti i osjećaju apsorpcije u sveukupnosti. A zato što je tijelo korisnika navodno "u" tom okolišu, nemogućnost da se osjeti taj okoliš kao "istinit" ili "autentičan" može samo korespondirati sa sumnjom u vlastitu egzistenciju, u bivanje i ne-bivanje tamo u isto vrijeme. Zaista, nesigurnost koja odgovara virtualnom tijelu podsjeća na rane dane telefonije, kad su ljudi ili sumnjali u realnost glasa u slušalici, ili pretpostavljali prisustvo osobe u sobi, ili fabricirali vlastitu verziju toga kako se ovaj na prvi pogled magičan prijenos mogao dogoditi.

Zaključak:

Tako se vraćamo telefonu, i poznatom “halo” telefonskog glasa: sad bežičan, često automatiziran, njegova je familijarnost toliko normalizirana da lako zamagluje ulogu koju su zvuk i glas igrali u razvoju našeg suvremenog, “virtualnog” života i vrstu kulture kojom robotika, kiborzi i umjetni stvorovi svih vrsta nastanjuju sferu datosti. U svojoj knjizi *The Mechanical Song*, Felicia Frank raspravlja o vezi koja se razvila u kasnom devetnaestom i ranom dvadesetom stoljeću između ženskog glasa i automata – predstavnika artifičijelnosti same. To je bilo vrijeme u kojem su se žene generalno povezivale sa spektaklom tehnologije – žene su nosile haljine ukrašene žaruljama; djevojčice su navodno bile očarane lutkama koje govore. Kao što Frank piše, “tehnološka inovacija bila je projicirana na lik žene, koja više nije bila znak prirode.... već prije ekran za moderni, tehnološki eho... njen je glas simulakrum, eho samog sebe.” Povezano sa sigurnošću ženskog, s tijelom i materijalitetom, fonografski, rastjelovljen glas smatran je glavnim tehnološkim razvodnikom u elektronskom dobu, koji ohrabruje pomak od koncepcije mašina kao “teglećih životinja”, ekstenzija muskularne moći do ideje mašina kao laganih, elektronskih, benevolentnih i češće korištenih u trenucima opuštanja. Kako ulazimo u novi milenij, vidimo da se sigurnost koju je telefonski glas nekoć nudio – sigurnost zvuka, tijela, prisutnosti, ponovo pojavljuje kao potreba da se ubrizga “život” u tvrdi svijet računarstva. Ta potreba i želja za prisutnošću – kao utjelovljenjem – gotovo korelira s načinom na koji su kina nekoć koristila zvuk kako bi “udahnula život” u sliku na nijemom ekranu, koja je bila poput duha. Ona pokazuje metafore koje lebde oko kiberprostora, i koje ponavljaju, na tako mnogo načina, ideju beskonačnog, dobronamjernog, živog i nedefiniranog ženskog obilja – matrice (tvari).

Kao što kažu, potisnuto se vraća kao noćna mora – a u ovom slučaju, noćna mora može biti tijelo. Baveći se potisnutim virtualnog znači, smatram, ozbiljno se baviti s vrlo realnim posljedicama virtualnosti. Što je u tom jednostavnom činu podizanja slušalice sadržano? Neka vrsta “neutralnog” rastjelovljenja koju je telefon uveo, i navodno oslobađajuća dislokacija, fragmentacija, medijacija i simulacija koja je nastavila s razvojem u medijima i telekomunikaciji, počiva na vjerovanju da je zvuk istinit, da je tijelo tamo, da je transcendencija moguća i da će nas eter spasiti. Moramo shvatiti težinu ovih vjerovanja o nematerijalnom i vidjeti njihova duboka preklapanja s našim shvaćanjem tehnologije i medija. Samo onda kada materijalni, zvučni i tjelesni svijet prestane biti evociran kao surogat istine i značenja dug virtualnog prestat će izazivati zanimanje. A u ovom globaliziranom svijetu, izvući se iz duga je vjerojatno najbolje što bilo tko može učiniti.

Forgetting the Phone: Sound, Virtuality and the Rhetoric in-between.

Frances Dyson

During the 90s, as digital connectivity established itself in the minds, hearts and credit cards of an increasing number of consumers, the metaphoric map of 'cyberia' outgrew the capabilities of the applications and hardware which could support it - leading to the derisive yet succinct term 'vapor-ware' to describe both the vacuity of the promises and the ephemerality of the myriad start up companies that were to produce the next hot application. The metaphor of the web was but one in a host of cyber signs marking a territory that - whilst claiming to be entirely 'new,' had in fact been explored and internalized throughout the twentieth century. Over the past fifty years, technology fairs, captivated the consumer with products, while radio, television, film, books, comics, toys, etc.- bombarded them with a central ideology of modernity - the inevitability of progress and the absolute necessity of technological development. Gradually the mechanical paradigm representing technology's brave new world become unstuck: in its undoing, abstract code supplanted gears and levers, power become intelligent and physicality become ambivalent. At the same time, the spectacle of space exploration and cold war militarism linked technology, massive amounts of capital, and national objectives to the endless conquest of the universe on the one hand, and the annihilation of the planet on the other. Thus, in 1999, an already 'wired', western and primarily north American culture left the twentieth century uplifted with designs for a prefab future while burdened with the economic, environmental and psychic debt that following these designs would entail.

What could be called the debt of the virtual, which one might say is also its repressed, is intimately connected to the voice, the body, the environment and the technological revolution that has enabled their separation. It is also embedded in the still reverberating dreams of technological progress that accompanied the introduction of media and telecommunications, and the superstitions that instilled these developments with an aura of the spiritual and magical. The entrails of this debt, I would like to suggest, resurface with every new metaphor applied to the digital terrain. They beckon and seduce, they offer hope, plenitude, wonder, they calm the nerves, they provide an anchor, and they act as a whipping post. But while contemporary metaphors like 'web', 'chaos', 'immersion', 'connectivity', 'emergence', might counter the sharp edge of the rationalist, silicon world, they also beg fundamental questions like: what is the self?, what counts as existence? and what makes up the social? If 'being' is determined as being digital, as some would like to have it, then what place does the body - the voice of the person speaking, have in this new existence? How can one speak one's cyberized immateriality?

Speaking - and the technologies that have separated voice from body, is extremely relevant here. Its worth remembering that the guru of virtual reality, Jaron Lanier, first likened VR to the telephone - an analogy, we might note, that was quickly dropped despite its appropriateness. In fact, cyberculture and multimedia have a lot to learn from sound. Long before image morphs, mixes and general manipulation became associated with postmodern culture, sound has been recorded, sampled, layered, mixed, enhanced, used to create atmosphere, to trigger emotional and physical responses, to provide a sense of three dimensionality and immersion. Being so closely tied to music, sound has inherited music's sublime, transcendent and cosmic associations - associations that also figure in much cyber rhetoric. The Pythagorean music of the sphere's, the ideal of the total work of art, and the supposed truth of the emotions, are all attached to the phenomenality of sound, with its ability to penetrate the hidden and interior - revealing perhaps, the empty vessel, hollow walls, or the angry insides of an otherwise measured speaker.

Historically, sound is also the first medium to be electronically transmitted. We should remember that the very first instrument of mass telepresence was the telephone, and the first physical, human attribute to become 'disembodied', initially by the phonograph, was the voice. Further, these technological developments occurred at a time in the late 19C of heightened interest in the occult:

mediumship was referred to as 'the wireless telephone', various devices invented to capture roving spirit voices, and meetings of fledgling theosophical societies were common. With the development of radio, many operators spoke as if they had directly tapped into the ether - conceived as a democratic space open to messages from everywhere, including transmissions from invisible, otherworldly spirits, who, unlike politicians, had no reason to lie.

All these elements are present in the rhetorical underpinnings of cyberspace and virtuality: the cornucopia that immateriality, electronic transmission and technological development present, the links to the sublime and the occult, the question of embodiment, and a preoccupation with the future. But despite these similarities, despite a shared cosmogony one might say, telephony (or in particular the early days of ham radio) rarely rate a mention amongst cyber-enthusiasts - neither as a relevant historic cultural phenomenon nor a prototypical technology. Is this simply a case of missed history, or is it a form of denial? And if the latter, why then does one find, at every turn in the rhetoric, clusters of aural metaphors being used to 'flesh out' the virtual experience, to create a sense of immersion in an environment which, ironically, hides the fact that technological mediation has ever occurred. What is this hidden and duplicitous relationship between aurality and virtuality? To what extent does sound - as audio - return virtualities repressed, in the form of say, a simulated natural soundscape, or the presence evoked by the voice, or the sense of corporeality triggered by surround sound?

In order to address this duplicity, I'm going to start with 'metaphysics of the immaterial' that sound and virtuality share. Almost real, almost there, not quite an object but definitely some 'place' or 'reality', at first VR seem to offer great opportunities for experiencing and theorizing ways of knowing the world that wasn't grounded in the discrete, singular, static, enduring, identifiable and supremely concrete object and its correlate, the individual, unified and autonomous subject. The virtual object, and that oxymoron some people refer to as the sound object, seemed to share a common disinterest in objectivity - and all that implies. In the realm of the virtual (or so the rhetoric goes) things are mutable, evanescent, totally recombinant. Identity is determined by the user - a chair can morph into a cup anytime, anywhere. Likewise, human identity and subjectivity becomes liquid: gender, age, in fact anything connected with physicality, is irrelevant. This also applies to aurality. In the sonic realm there are few borders or markers to establish identity: 'a' sound is always a duality, always heterogeneous. Being neither visible nor tangible sound fails to meet the criteria for object status, it is ontologically vague and semantically imprecise - just what is a 'thud' or a 'cluck' you might ask. The immateriality of sound is a fine match for the immateriality of information, sounds' ability to surround the listener, its associations with presence (especially the presence of the voice) go well with the teeming anarchic mass that is cyberculture, or the enveloping dimension that is the data sphere: invisible, intangible, existentially oblique but always 'out there.'

The immateriality that sound and the virtual share has important consequences for notions of subjectivity. In the Western philosophical tradition, not only is the concept of self and other based on visibility, but consciousness and knowledge itself is defined by sight (I see = I know) To hear but not see (e.g. to hear someone's speech) on the other hand, is associated with rumor, noise, 'bad sound', the absence, or the uncertainty of knowledge. Hearing gets confused between the exterior and the interiors, as sound is both heard and felt at the same time. The voice moves from within the body to the outside, passing from subjectivity to objectivity, from interiority to exteriority: confusing borders, exposing illness and anxiety, revealing emotions through a cough or a quiver, in spite of the speakers intention. Sound's immersive quality, together with the physiology of the ear, destabilizes the subjectivity of the subject; unlike the eye, the ear can't be closed, unlike the gaze which is always in front of the subject and projected onto the world, listening involves an awareness of the unseen and possibly unwelcome spaces on the periphery of one's being.

Cyberspace presents similar metaphysical conundrums. Cyberspace isn't so much a thing as a network (a web). It has no beginning or end, and seems to offer a plenitude not unlike that which the radiophonic ether offered early crystal set enthusiasts. The net has no singular point of origin, it can't be authorized by a particular name, it allows users to assume multiple identities, and, most important, it makes irrelevant any attributes that belong to the physical, material world. In the early 90's 'cyberspace' still held within its odd, neologistic frame, the vast ocean metaphors and possibilities that Kevin Kelly, writing in 1994, gave voice to as 'swarm being':

The Net is an emblem of multiples. Out of it comes swarm being - distributed being - spreading the self over the entire web so that no part can say 'I and the I.' It conveys the logic of both Computer and Nature - which in turn convey a power beyond understanding.

However, while this multiplicity encourages a phenomenological approach - one that, like sound, is antithetical to the western, rational tradition, and, in many ways, antithetical to sciences such as engineering, computing, and informatics that it has spawned, when we look at the technology behind audio or new media, all these organic, flux like, diaphanous, qualities seem to vanish. To understand how this might happen with regard to sound, it is important to retrace the reception of audiophony

with in the developing media culture of the twentieth century. Historically, the fact that the aural recording reproduces the three dimensionality of sound and maintains its temporal ephemerality has been reason enough to assume that reproduced sound, unlike the photographic image, is ontologically identical to the original sound. But like the photograph, the act of recording sound immediately introduces a perspective, and once recorded, sound becomes dislocated and fragmented, able to be heard at any time, in any place, by any listener. Sound ceases to be a temporal phenomenon bound to the here and now of lived experience, but a pseudo object. Like the visual object, it can be collected and stored, transported and transmitted over great distances and infinitely repeated. Like the image, it can function as an icon, a logo a sound effect that is read by a culture as much as it is heard by a listener. While this is acknowledged in visual culture (we speak of images not 'sights') in aural terms audio is still referred to as "sound."

With the advent of digital audio, the inscribed surface of analog recording is replaced with the encoded signal, and with it the indexical associations of audiophony are superseded by the arbitrariness of data. Divorced from any phenomenal relation to the forms and flows of sounds occurring in the environment, sound is more correctly defined as signal, neither sonorous nor silent but only 'on' or 'off'. The material consequences of this transformation could be heard in extreme form, on the net or within interactive multimedia, where a good percentage of audio samples ceased to function in the same way that say, screen sound functioned in the past. While samples may have (barely) breathed 'life' into the image, it would be a real stretch to say that they still managed to re-present the body and the place, or even to refer iconally in the way that sound effects do. Rather, signal-sound began to function almost entirely in a symbolic way, and it is not surprising that the heyday of the sample also coincided with an explosion in audio art and musical forms such dominated by sampling and mixing. With digital sound and the stylized sound effect, the 'there' of sound, its here and now presence, its otherness to the voraciously visual drive of contemporary, externalised culture, has almost entirely evaporated.

The paradox is that while sound was being recorded, amplified, isolated, edited, collaged, mixed, enhanced, synthesized and sampled into bit sized chunks, mainstream media was appropriating, as it were, sounds associations with the the non-mediated: most notably, its here and now presence and its immersive qualities. Cinema, for instance, introduced surround sound, buildings subtly included ambiance in their design, visual artists and sculptors added sound as an installation element, zoos hired sound designers to re create the jungle, everyone used sound to make simulated experiences seem more real. Although the visualism of culture had, in a sense, made sound invisible and thus exempt from scrutiny, it had also created a sensorial primitive, offering a pristine wilderness, an authentic experience to a culture suffering image fatigue.

At the same time, the degree of cynicism that media arouses, and the sophistication of technologies for morphing the truth, created a desire for media that was 'unplugged', 'real', and unbridged. Not only did networks enthusiastically embrace the sometimes senseless amalgams of surveillance and production known as reality TV, but 'immersive media' - often developed outside the commercial field - appeared as the antidote to increasing levels of skepticism about the truth, reality and relevance of contemporary media. The 'truth' and or/credibility of new media was due almost entirely to the way immersive media could physically interact with the body of the user, and this interactivity was most compelling in the relatively short lived but rhetorically foundational media known as VR.

While sound, or rather audio, doesn't so much reproduce as represent sound as the product of a series of technological mediations, with the development of virtual audio, these mediations become ever more complex, focusing in a way, the intense relationship between embodiment, technology and the desire for presence that virtuality both affirms and denies. Virtual audio represents a major change in the understanding of hearing. Philosophically, it realigns the ears with the body rather than the head, dispersing audition through regions of the body that, like the paunch, have been regarded as irrelevant to sensory perception and the formation of knowledge. Technologically, debunks the idea that a stereophonic perspective can deliver 'perfect' sound. Culturally, it introduces a degree of technological intervention in the listening space which, since the time of phonography, has been considered private, intimate and individual.


Now we have to ask - what kind of body or space is being reactivated here? Twentieth century culture has developed a high degree of media literacy: audiophiles have learned to 'read' telephonic, radiophonic, phonographic and cinematic sound, to pull from a mass of static those bits of information that are important. Generations brought up on film and television are used to and expect the abstraction and reduction that screen sound has undergone, they are used, in other words, to hearing sound already as signs, already as effects. Generations have also been trained in the art of conjuring phantasmatic bodies. In cinema, the simulated unity of sound and image, of the two dimensional screen and three dimensional audio, of the real and the phantom, owes much to the persuasiveness of lip-sync, which can in part be attributed to the near impossibility of imagining the voice and body on the screen as separate when the viewer feels their own voice to be 'em-

bodied'. Virtual environments share this insinuation of the body, with the sound contributing its own "aura" of three dimensionality, spatiality and the sense of immersion to the overall effect. And because the user's body is supposedly "in" this environment, the inability to experience this environment as "true" or "authentic" could only correspond to a doubting of one's existence; of being there and not there at the same time. Indeed, the uncertainty corresponding to the virtual body is reminiscent of the early days of telephony, when people either doubted the reality of the voice on the phone, or assumed the presence of the person in the room, or fabricated their own versions of how this seemingly magical transmission could occur.

Conclusion:

Thus we return to the phone, and the familiar "hello" of the telephonic voice: now wireless, often automated, its familiarity is so normalized that it easily obscures the role that sound and the voice has played in the development of our contemporary, 'virtual' life, and the kind of culture that robotics, cyborgs, and artificial creatures of all kinds populate the data-sphere. In her book, *The Mechanical Song*, Felicia Frank discusses the association that developed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century between the female voice and the automaton - representative of artificiality per se. This was a time when women were generally associated with the spectacle of technology - women wore dresses decorated with light bulbs; little girls were supposedly enthralled mechanical talking dolls. As Frank writes, "technological innovation was projected upon the figure of the woman, no longer a sign of nature ... but rather the screen for the modern, a technological echo ... her voice a simulacrum, a echo, of itself." Linked to the security of the feminine, to the body and materiality, the phonographic, disembodied voice is seen as a key technology ushering in the electronic age, encouraging a shift in the conception of machines as 'super beasts of burden', extensions of muscular power, to the idea of machines as light, electronic, and, with increased use in leisure activities, benevolent. As we embark on the new millennium, we see the security that the telephonic voice once offered - the security of sound, the body, presence, re-emerge as a need to inject 'life' into the hard world of computing. This need and desire for presence - as embodiment - is virtuality's correlate to the way cinemas has used sound to 'breathe life' into the ghostly image on the silent screen. It manifests in the metaphors that hover around cyberspace, and that reiterate, in so many ways, the idea of an infinite, benevolent, animate and vaguely feminine plenitude - a matrix (**mater**).

As they say, the repressed returns as a nightmare - and in this case, the nightmare may well be the body. Dealing with the repressed of the virtual means, I believe, seriously engaging with the very real consequences of virtuality. What is bound into that simple act of picking up the phone? The kind of 'neutral' disembodiment that the telephone inaugurated, and the supposedly liberatory dislocation, fragmentation, mediation and simulation that has continued with developments in media and telecommunications, relies upon the belief that sound is true, that the body is there, that transcendence is possible and that the ether will save us. We need to realize the weight of these beliefs about the immaterial and to see their deep imbrications in our understanding of technology and media. Only when the material, sonorous and corporeal world ceases to be evoked as surrogates for truth and meaning will the debt of the virtual stop accruing interest. And in this globalized world, getting out of debt is probably the best thing anyone can do.



«Smrt nije tišina,
smrt je gubitak glasa»¹

Pavlica Bajsić

I AVANT-PROPOS

1 kod nas je to tradicija pod imenom «dokumentarna radio-drama», u inozemstvu «feature», «les créations radiophoniques», itd.

2 Joseph Nicéphore Niépce (1765.-1833.), franc. izumitelj, strastveni obožavatelj litografija ali loš crtač, pa mu je sin morao pomagati u crtanju. Kada je sin bio mobiliziran, Niépce ostaje sam i rezultat njegovih napora kako da nadoknadi vlastitu nesposobnost je prva heliografija

3 Roland Barthes, «Chambre Claire»

Najzanimljiviji, najstrastveniji i najzahtjevniji dio dramaturškog posla u području radiofonije uvijek mi je bio ples na žici između dokumentarnog i fikcije. Tu re-kreaciju svojevrstih *akustičkih filmova*1 sazdanih od dokumentarnog materijala možemo, ali i ne moramo nazvati žanrom, jer oko njenih definicija i imena beskorisno je polemizirati. Sve što nam je za sada potrebno jest da shvatimo da se radi o bilježenju mikrofonom, pisanju i slikanju zvukovnim znakovljem koje iz nekoliko razloga dovodi u pitanje naš odnos prema stvarnosti.

Prvo poluvrijeme

Dvanaest godina nakon ove Niépceove2 heliografije iz 1827. godine, neobičnog amalgama između fiksanog objekta i različenog vremena, u francuskoj *La Gazette* pompozno je najavljen izum gospodina Daguerra kojim su konačno «fiksirane slike u cameri obscuri i te slike više nisu samo trenutne refleksije objekta nego su postale fiksirani otisci koji se u potpunosti mogu odvojiti od prisutnosti objekta».

Zbog vrlo dugačke ekspozicije, čini se da je Daguerrov pariški bulevar bio potpuno prazan u trenutku kad je snimljen. U stvarnosti, bilo je sasvim drukčije. Kočije i prolaznici prebrzo su se kretali da bi bili zaustavljeni, zato su nestali iz dokumenta sebe samih. Svi osim jednog prolaznika koji se dovoljno dugo zaustavio ispred čistača cipela kojeg možemo zamijetiti tek ako uvećamo donji desni kut. Zbog svojih prašnjavih cipela, ovaj gospodin je sam sebe *nadživio* ili, upravo suprotno a blisko, on je *ubi-jen* prije svoje vlastite smrti. Ova dokumentirana scena praznog pariškog bulevara za kojeg znamo da nije bio takav u stvarnosti, čini mi se nekako grandiozna u svojoj odsutnosti prisutnih. Naravno da nam Daguerrova fotografija može služiti kao jasni prikaz dokumenta jedne stvarnosti, izmijenjene tehnološkim manjkom zbog kojeg vrijeme još nije zaustavljeno nego samo usporeno. Ali može li takav dokument, upravo zbog svoje očite *fikcionalizacije*, poslužiti i kao dispozitiv kojim možemo naslutiti postojanje dijaloga između Stvarnosnosti i Stvarnosti? Percepcija bulevara ispunjenog prolaznicima i istovremena slika tog istog bulevara bez prolaznika predstavljaju dvije različite slike, dvije stvarnosti jedne iste stvarnosnosti, ako je Stvarnosnost zamišljena kao ona koja se nameće u svojoj uzvišenoj, okomitoj liniji a Stvarnost kao njena vodoravna manifestacija, djelomično dostupna našim osjetilima i svijesti, te djelomično dostupna snimanju i reprodukciji, toj svojoj mikro-verziji smrti po Barthesu3. Možda zato što su svi elementi, koji su u ovom primjeru učinili dokumentiranu stvarnost toliko različitim od prvotne očiti i lako shvatljivi, dok pri analizi vrlo sličnih procesa percepcije, utiska, procesuiranja, sjećanja i svjedočenja, koji su također uvjetovani, nailazimo na puno veći broj nepoznanica.

Veliko fonografovno uho

U samoj biti zvuka nalazi se vrijeme. Zvuk traje i u najmanjim segmentima sebe samoga jer potječe od vibracije, pokreta. Jedna čestica udara u drugu. Fotografija je trajala ranije, sve do trenutka fiksiranja.

“Mary had a little lamb.
Her fleece was white as snow.
And everywhere that Mary went
The lamb was sure to go.”

Edison je znao da glas pri govoru proizvodi zvučne titraje koji podražuju slušni bubnjić. Umjesto bubnjića uzeo je tanki lim na koji je smjestio šiljak. Kad se taj šiljak okomito postavio na rotirajući valjak presvučen cinkom – kasnije će ga zamijeniti voskom – on je urezivao u glatku plohu trag koji je odgovarao različitim zvučnim titrajima. Reprodukcia se događala točno obrnuto. Šiljak se kretao žlijebom urezanim u voštanom valjku a titraji titrajuće pločice ili membrane pojačavali su se kroz veliki lijevak. 1877. godine Edison je u lijevak, u to umjetno uho, zapjevao dječju pjesmicu o Mary i janjetu, koja je postala prvim reproduciranim zvukom. Taj izum je od Edisona učinio prvog čovjeka koji se susreo s reprodukcijom vlastitoga glasa, percepcijom svojeg drugog *sebe, sebe odvojenog od sebe*, ili prvog čovjeka koji je slušao svoj glas iz prošlosti, glas već mrtav, glas već vječan.

Zbogom, rekao je Bog

-bilješke o subjektu i objektu, glasu i tijelu, vremenu i mjestu

«S mogućnošću izgovaranja nemogućeg izraza *Ja sam mrtav*, drevni topoi vremena i mjesta su zauvijek transformirani. Mogućnosti kolaža, montaže, snimanja i emitiranja potvrđuju činjenicu da jedinstvo vremena i mjesta više nije pred-uvjetna nužnost svijesti.» 4

4 Allen S. Weiss, «Breathless; Sound recording, Disembodiment and the Transformation of Lyrical Nostalgia»

Allen S. Weiss istraživao je posljedice te nove objektivizacije ljudskog glasa, rastavljanja glasa od pripadajućeg tijela. Po njemu je «zbrka između stroja i čovjeka, koja se pojavila pojavom fonografa, a uzimajući u obzir vječnu bitku protiv smrti, promijenila očekivanja i oblike melankolije i žalovanja». Na sličnom putu je i američki autor Gregory Whitehead koji radiofoniju naziva «mad Totentanz»⁵.

Radio bodies are nobodies. ⁶

Već s odvajanjem glasa od tijela, čovjek se «rastjelovio»⁷ i sam sebi omogućio simulaciju vječnosti. «Fonograf i radio su imali dvojaku ulogu u općenitoj ekonomiji reprezentacije jer su počeli emitirati glasove mrtvaca kao vječno živeći simulakri» Uzimajući u obzir Weissa i Whiteheada, medij radija možemo analizirati kroz dva aspekta emitiranja:

1. Mogućnost emitiranja *uživo*

2. Mogućnost emitiranja ranije pripremljenog materijala

U oba navedena aspekta medija svjedoci smo rastavljanja glasa od tijela, no s jednom bitnom razlikom. U prvom slučaju, manipulacija mjestom čini mogućim da u isto vrijeme slušamo jedan glas koji je ovdje odvojen od svojega tijela tamo. Radi se o putovanju bez vremena, preseljenju s jednog mjesta na drugo bez mogućnosti percepcije vremena puta, tj. prošlosti (vremenska razlika kašnjenja je mala za dimenzije ljudske percepcije i u rijetkim svjedocima joj svjedočimo, tako da smijemo govoriti o emisiji uživo). U drugom slučaju, radi se o promjeni mjesta i vremena koja čini mogućim da u sadašnjosti slušamo glas odvojen od tijela, glas snimljen u prošlosti. Manipulacija mjestom bez promjene vremena ili manipulacija i vremenom i mjestom subjekta pretvorenog u objekt kroz rastjelovljenje, odnosno gubitak vlastitog glasa, taj Totentanz ne mora biti toliko daleko od čovjekove pljuske Bogu, konačni protest protiv akcije utjelovljenja u trenutku Stvaranja kojom je čovjek zauvijek ostao ponižen, onda kad se «Riječ utjelovila», kako se navodi u Bibliji. Weiss će pisati: «Smrt nije tišina, smrt je gubitak glasa». Iako se sam autor odriče bilo kakvih transcendentálnih smjerova, i jasno tvrdi da je za njega smrt tijela ujedno i smrt subjekta, smije li ovaj citat u našem uhu odzvoniti dvojako, zavisno od može bitnih različitosti u shvaćanju pojma smrti i gubitka? Prvo shvaćanje bilo bi u skladu s ranijim shvaćanjem rastjelovljenja. Ako je smrt prihvaćena kao smrt tijela a gubitak glasa kao odvajanje glasa od našega tijela, imajući u vidu kontekst fonografa, nezaobilazna posljedica bi bila objektivizacija tog istog, odvojenog glasa kako bi ga mogli percipirati. Već ranije dezintegrirani subjekt sada kroz percepciju svojeg neovisno postojećeg glasa, kroz autopercepciju sebe u prošlosti, postaje mrtvim subjektom u sadašnjosti a vječnim u prošlosti. Postaje li tako blizak objektu melankolije? Druga interpretacija je sljedeća. Ako je već na samom početku smrt shvaćena kao smrt subjekta, kakav je onda odnos s gubitkom glasa? Ako subjekt gubi svoj glas, nijemi subjekt gubi sredstvo manipulacije samim sobom, mogućnost dezintegracije svojeg tijela kroz autopercepciju svojeg odcijepljenog glasa. Subjekt bez glasa je osuđen zauvijek ostati vezan sa svojim tijelom, čak i u smrti. Poput vizije neke totalne smrti. Postaje li tako blizak objektu žalovanja?

Dokumentarnost – u službi melankolije ili žalovanja?

Upravo se Weiss prisjeća Poeovog *Ovalnog portreta* u kojem pratimo priču o slikaru koji portretira svoju voljenu.⁸ Kako portret postaje sve ljepšim i ljepšim, i sve više dovršenim, žena koja sjedi ispred slikara postaje sve slabijom i blijedom. U trenutku kad je portret gotov, žena biva mrtvom. Ona je konzumirana svojom vlastitom reprezentacijom. Ona sama je morala umrijeti kako bi reprezentacija nje same postala vječnom. Ako se na ovom mjestu vratimo našim pitanjima o dokumentarnosti, fikcionalizaciji i sjećanju, možemo li sve pokušaje za dokumentiranjem i materijaliziranjem reducirane stvarnosti u prošlosti svesti na jednu zajedničku namjeru za njenim sakaćenjem, njenim usmrćivanjem na putu do vječnosti kroz fikcionaliziranu repetitivnu prihvatljivu percepciju? Ovaj brutalno pojednostavljeni rezime vodi nas blizu prve interpretacije weissovke smrti, mjestu gdje su se na istom raskršću paradoksalno susrela dva vremenska pravca, jedan koji nudi mogućnost vječnosti i drugi koji nudi nemogućnost uskrsnuća. Tu čežnju koja se konstantno stvara unutar paradoksa jedne mogućnosti i druge nemogućnosti možemo nazivati različitim imenima. Ako prihvatimo tu čežnju kao jedno pomalo sebeljubivo stanje u kojem računamo na mogućnost, a nismo sposobni oprostiti, pomiriti se s nemogućnošću, jedno od prihvatljivih naziva bi upravo bila: melankolija, a ne žalovanje.

Zvučna slika, misao zvuka

Sjećam se događaja sa snimanja radio dokumentarca Terra Rossa Terra Nera. Željela sam snimiti livadu. Tihu atmosferu livade negdje u središnjoj Istri. Stavila sam slušalice na glavu (kroz njih slušamo ulaz preko mikrofona). Većinom sam čula cvrčke. Pčelu u letu. Mjestimice, negdje iz daleka, sasvim tiho dopiralo je koze blejanje. Okretala sam se prema izvoru zvuka, ali koze nisam vidjela jer su očito bile izvan mog vidokruga. Završivši snimanje, skinula sam slušalice. Slušajući samo ušima ponovo sam čula cvrčke. I povremeno pčelu u letu. Moje uši nisu hvatale blejanje. Blejanje nije bilo dio moje stvarnosti, ali bilo je prisutno u njenom zvučnom dokumentu.

⁵ Gregory Whitehead, «*Out of Dark: Notes on the Nobodies of Radio Art*», u «*Wireless imagination; Sound, Radio and Avant-garde*», ur. D.Kahn i G.Whitehead

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Allen S.Weiss, orig. «*disembodiment*»

⁸ Allen S. Weiss u «*Breathless*»

9 René Farabet, francuski autor, jedan od osnivača «*Atelier du Création Radiophonique*» pri France Culture, bilješka s predavanja održanog na Hvaru u sklopu Festivala Prix Marulić 2003.

10 Ibid.

Osim toga, zanimljivo je upitati se što se događa s *otpacima*, elementima stvarnosti koji su ostali izvan dosega svoje materijalizacije u vidu dokumenta, izvan kadra, izvan dohvata mikrofona, onima koji su činili jednu cjelinu u trenutku našeg doživljaja. Ponaša li se naš mikrofoni, taj tehnički produžetak naših osjetila, prema Stvarnosti na isti način kao i naša osjetila prema Stvarnosti? Hvatamo li ono što možemo, ono što želimo, ono što moramo? Je li dramaturgija, kao proces obrade snimljenog materijala, «u isto vrijeme protočan i solidan proces»?9, u sličnom odnosu prema dokumentarnom materijalu kao i naš unutrašnji «prihvatni centar» prema refleksijama, odjecima Stvarnosti destilirani nakon unosa uhvaćenih podataka? Apsorbirajući na taj način ono što možemo, ono što želimo, ono što moramo i stavljajući našu misao u pogon, kreirajući tako jednu novu, bastardnu, egzistenciju? Da, mikrofoni je mali špijun, koji svoju stvarnost prezentira kao dokument naše stvarnosti. On snima zvuk i vrijeme, osjetljiv je na prostorne uvjete, te ako je združen s medijem koji adresira, koji komunicira – radijem, njih dvoje će zajedno transformirati valove u svojevrstu ispovjedaonicu u kojoj je uvijek nesigurno tko se nalazi s druge strane prozorčića. Ako je fotografija bila pokušaj zaustavljanja vremena, u snimci zvuka vrijeme se odvija. To je prošlost koja se pred nama predstavlja u svojem trajanju. Zato slušanje zahtijeva vrijeme. Prema Farabetu10, uho već fizički određuje vremensku nužnost. Njegova arhitektura vodi zvuk u cik-cak putanji prema misli. Da bi tamo stigao, prošao sve zavoje, potrebno je vrijeme. «Osjećam i čujem misli kako mi prolaze glavom. Uho je otvor, spilja koja vodi u unutrašnjost tijela, put kojim zvuk teče, pleše, gmiže poput gusjenice. Glava je mjesto tranzita, centar razvrstavanja, mjesto alkemijskog i poetskog procesa. Kao što je zvuk jednog grada oblikovan njegovom arhitekturom, tako je i s uhom koje se pretvara u protezu zvuka.» Vrijeme je potrebno da zvuk odzvoni i da se njegova jeka razvije. Nije rijetkost da slušajući samo zvuk zamišljamo slike, mirise, prisjećamo se ili fantaziramo, kreiramo vlastitu *zvučnu sliku*. Zahvaljujući vremenu i našoj koncentraciji na samo jedno čulo «ulaza», sva ostala čula mogu se udružiti u «izlazne» senzacije, napadajući sjećanje i kreaciju. Kad smo već ponovno kod sjećanja, što to znači *sjećati se određenog zvuka*? Naravno da u sjećanje pohranjujemo i zvukove. Ali zašto je toliko teško opisati neki zvuk? Čak i pri opisivanju glasa kojeg lako prepoznavamo, teško ga opisujemo. I ponekad krivo. Je li to zato što teško zamišljamo glas bez tijela? Ponekad nas zbunjuje upravo reakcija naših ostalih čula i skloni smo opisivati glas plavokose, nježne žene kao svijetli glas, mekan glas. Znači li to da je percepcija zvuka itekako uvjetovana ostalim čulima ili je to radnja koja se zbiva naknadno za vrijeme procesuiranja informacije? Ako je naša percepcija zvuka u stvarnosti uvijek oštećena/obogaćena intervencijom ostalih čula i ako je ona apsorbirana u kontekstu cijele kompleksnosti sjećanja, emocija, imaginacije itd., što nam to govori o procesu slušanja snimljenog dokumentarnog zvuka? Provocira li blokada ostalih čula osim sluha za vrijeme slušanja reproduciranog zvuka intenzivniju unutrašnju reakciju nego što je to slučaj s konzumacijom reprodukcije koja je zahvaćena s više čula u isto vrijeme? Ako da, možemo li tu kreaciju što nastaje *uvećanjem*, tom otvorenošću našeg unutrašnjeg senzibilnog aparata ohrabrenom vremenom zvuka, nazvati *misli zvuka*?

11 prema Johnu Theocaristu, BBC

«Na počecima televizije u Velikoj Britaniji, novinari BBC-ja proveli su veliku anketu među građanima postavljajući im pitanje: “Volete li više radio ili televiziju?”. Jedan dječak, zaustavljen pred svojom školom odgovorio je bez razmišljanja: “Radio! Tamo su mi slike bolje.”» 11

Taj dječak, koji to danas vjerojatno više i nije, bio bi zadovoljan pretpostavkom da snimljeni zvuk nema reprezentiranu sliku; upravo zato što je od nje oslobođen, nudi nam bezbroj intimnih mentalnih slika. Prostor unutrašnjeg doživljaja tako biva manje precizan a konotativna igra plutajuća, individualna i teže predvidljiva. Te moguće karakteristike snimljenog zvuka nisu nas spriječile da od vremena fonografa do danas razvijemo cijelu strategiju *fikcionalizacije*. *Fikcionalizacije* koja se na više ili manje očigledan način manifestira u procesu snimanja, dramaturgije i reprodukcije.

II AVE MARIA, epilog

Ovog ljeta naišla sam na članak u novinama koji mi je zaokupio pažnju: «Vidjeli u Međugorju opisuju Djevicu Mariju kao djevojku između 18-20 godina, tešku oko 60kg i visoku oko 165cm. Crna kosa nazire se ispod vela, oči su joj intenzivne plave boje, ovalnog je lica, tankih usana, rumenih obraza i malenog nosa». Ti podaci su me iznenadili svojom preciznošću opisa, bez obzira na ikonografske elemente figurativnih prikaza Djevice Marije, bez obzira na moguća objašnjenja dugogodišnjih ukazanja u Međugorju, ali i sumnji. Čitajući taj članak, pomislila sam: što ako taj fenomen jednostavno prihvatimo kao činjenicu, kako je javno donosi dnevni list, kao objektivnu informaciju o našoj stvarnosti, bez traga ironije i ne osvrćući se na njenu bizarnost. Postoje svjedoci koji svjedoče jedan događaj, jedno religijsko ukazanje, jednu, sasvim sigurno, njihovu stvarnost. Stvarnost koju ja ne mogu dokumentirati svojim mikrofonom, ali koju mogu dokumentirati njihova svjedočanstva. Cilj mog odlaska u Međugorje bio je popunjavanje rupe u osobnoj karti Djevice Marije, on se ticao percepcije njenog glasa. Tom zadatku željela sam pristupiti jednako činovnički egzaktno kao što je to bio diskurs u ranije citiranom članku. Ipak, zašto tražiti odgovore na pitanja o nekoj Stvarnosti i nekoj Stvarnosnosti noseći mikrofoni u Međugorje? U mjesto gdje 6 osoba tvrdi da viđaju biblijsku osobu, Djevicu Mariju, i da su u dijalogu s istom već skoro 24 godine? Zašto uopće tražiti tragove svjedočenja događaju koji očito klizi iz naše svakodnevne stvarnosti i koji proizvodi i uvjetuje cijelu paletu socioloških, etičkih, ekonomskih, političkih, teoloških i sličnih manifestacija koje su možda zanimljivije kao eksces nego

kao događaj sam po sebi? Jedna informacija možda je pomogla u mojoj neodlučnosti pred polazak na *ekspediciju*. Ukazanja nisu nikada bila sadržaj Creda nego pripadaju sferi *osobnih događaja* i Crkva se o njima službeno izjašnjava tek nakon njihova prestanka. Taj podatak nudi nam mogućnost da otputujemo u Međugorje na temelju istraživanja *osobnog događaja* koji je u tijeku i koji još nije prisvojen od strane službene nadležne institucije. Zašto nam je sve to uopće potrebno? Uvijek propitujemo prihvatljivu stvarnost oko nas. Njenu pojavnost oko koje se možemo složiti samo u tome da ona provocira naša čula na reakciju. Pa ipak, sve drugo, tj. analiza njenog odnosa s objektivnošću, subjektivnošću, svijesti, kretanjem naših misli, naravi slika, utjecaja prepoznavanja i ne-prepoznavanja, njena materijalizacija u dokumentarnom okviru, reprezentacija i multiplikacija, njeno značenje i iznad svega, njezin odnos prema istini, sve to nam, bez svake sumnje, predstavlja problem koji se manifestira u varijacijama interpretacija.

Zašto ne početi s druge strane? Zakoračiti u svijet «neprihvatljive» a ipak svjedočene stvarnosti? Može li nam u tome pomoći Rancière¹² koji piše o dvije figure vrednovanja riječi svjedoka: «To je opozicija jednostavnog prepričavanja prema umjetnom mimetičkom koja danas naglašava vrijednost riječi svjedoka u dvije figure. Prva vrednuje jednostavno prepričavanje, koje ne smjera k umjetnosti nego samo pokušava prevesti iskustvo pojedinca. Nasuprot njoj je druga figura koja u govoru «svjedoka» vidi novi umjetnički put. Ne radi se toliko o prepričavanju događaja koliko o svjedočenju da se «nešto imalo» koje nadilazi misao, ne samo u svojoj krajnosti, nego i zato što upravo «to što se imalo» nadilazi samu misao. (...) Postojanje događaja koji nadilaze mislivo priziva umjetnost koja svjedoči o nemislivom općenito, na suštinski nesklad između onoga što možemo osjetiti i onog što naša misao može savladati.»

Epilog

Ako ga proučavamo u cjelini s događajem odnosno glavnom radnjom koja je prethodila, svjedočenje jest neka vrsta epiloga. Ovaj marijanski epilog ima izvjesnu dozu «teatralnosti» u sebi. Pojava nečeg neobičnog u svijetu običnog, čak i tehnički efekti (sve grandezza ukazanja, svjetlo koje se pali i gasi kao projektor, Gospa koja lebdi na oblaku iznad zemlje poput glumca koji visi uz pomoć nevidljivih cugova), upućuju pomalo na kazalište. Gospa je orator koji poput glumca prenosi misao pisca, odnosno bića tobože superiornijeg u svojoj mudrosti nego što je to njegov reprezentant na sceni. Radi se dakle o kratkoj priči koja slijedi iza glavne radnje, scena koja slijedi nakon zadnjeg čina. Možda samo u obliku jednog monologa, prepričavanja događaja od strane jednog dramaturški sporednog i skoro nevidljivog lika. Pa ipak, radi se o liku koji jest prisustvovao ranijim radnjama što mu daje pravo da nam svjedoči sa svoje pozornice. Nevidljiva osoba koja, noseći usmenu poruku, postaje vidljivom.

Banka glasova i generalna proba

Osim opreme za snimanje, u Međugorje sam ponijela i banku glasova, snimku ženskih glasova različitih akustičkih kvaliteta (svjetliji, tamniji) i različitog porijekla (regije/akcenti, godine, profesije). Sve snimljene žene izgovarale su istu Gospinu poruku kako bih iste riječi suočila s različitim glasovima i interpretacijama. Već prije samog odlaska na put, bila sam svjesna da banka glasova nosi u sebi opasnost diskreditiranja mojeg znanstvenog pristupa pred vidiocima.

Večer prije puta, jedan Vedran i jedna ja, u kuhinji jedne Sanje i jednog Hrvoja, vježbali smo moguće varijante mojeg nastupa na međugorsku scenu. Iz tada zabilježenih, imaginarnih dijaloga izdvajam:

Vjerujem li u ukazanja ili ne?

- Ja sam prazna magnetofonska vrpca, spremna da budem ispunjena svime što moj mikrofonski prepoznata. Mikrofonski i prazna vrpca ne sude, oni zapisuju.

Zašto sam ustvari došla u Međugorje?

- Snimiti razgovore s ljudima koji viđaju Djevicu Mariju i razgovaraju s njom.

Razgovore o čemu?

- Zamolit ću ih da ispune moju praznu vrpcu opisima onoga što vide, čuju i svega drugoga što čini njihovo iskustvo ukazanja.

Što to nosim sa sobom?

- To je moj alat. Mikrofonski i banka glasova. Željela bih da pokušamo zamisliti tu banku glasova na sličan način kao i ploču kod oftalmologa¹³, ispisanu slovima većih i manjih dimenzija. Ako liječniku samo prepričavamo impresije o našem vidu, on ne može iz toga detaljnije shvatiti u kojoj je mjeri naš vid pogoršan i ne može nam prepisati pravilnu dioptriju. Umjesto ploče sa slovima, mi imamo «banku» u kojoj se nalaze različiti glasovi. Molim vas da ih poslušate i odgovorite kojem bi od tih glasova glas Gospe bio najbliži.

¹² Jacques Rancière, » *Le destin des images* », La fabrique editions 2003

¹³ paralela naravno ne stoji, jer različitost veličine slova među sobom je dosljedna, dok različitost glasova ne može biti, a utjecaj interpretacije pri čitanju je nemoguće izbjeći

14 i osim toga, dokumentirati vaš glas

15 pogrešno-montažom zvuka i komentarima možemo razgovor o pticama pretvoriti u razgovor o predizbornoj kampanji

Zašto je potrebno da se razgovori snimaju mikrofonom?

- Zato jer sam došla akustički dokumentirati vaš opis iskustva **14** i zaštititi njegovu autentičnost smanjujući mogućnost reinterpetacije. Kao što u novinarstvu autoriziramo razgovor za novine, a na radiju to nije nužno jer se snimka uvijek smatra *autentičnom*, riječi su izrečene i snimljene **15**. Također, mikrofoni snimaju dokument koji ostaje u arhivama Sveučilišta Pariz 8, dakle, *ostavit će trag*.

Što ja točno studiram?

- Studiram estetiku, to je disciplina promišljanja o Lijepom. Vi govorite o Gospi kao o nevjerojatnoj ljepoti, idealnoj, nikada viđenoj. Zanima me, dakle, forma te njene idealne ljepote. Željela bih da mi nacrtate *senzitivnu mapu* Gospine pojave.

Kako se to radi?

- Dat ću vam primjere pitanja: kako je kadrirana njena pojava, vidite li njenu cijelu figuru, ima li sjene na zemlji, što se događa u odnosu Gospine pojave i okruženja, prostora i objekata, nestane li prostorija ili stablo kada se Gospa pojavi, što se događa s glasovima i zvukovima koji dolaze iz okoline, čujete li ih za vrijeme ukazanja, dolazi li Gospin glas izdaleka ili iz blizine, ima li jeke, šumova, govori li vam glasno ili tiho, šapuće li, dok vi njoj govorite čuju li vas ljudi okolo, govori li Gospa hrvatski, radi li se o dijalektu ili književnom jeziku, jeste li je ikada dodirnuti po tijelu ili odjeći, kakav je to osjećaj, jeste li ju poljubili, osjetili neki poseban miris i slično.

Zašto se toliko inzistira na glasu?

- Već ste vrlo precizno opisali boju njene kose, koliko ima kila i sl. No, ja sam specijalist za zvuk. Negdje sam pročitala da ste jednom kiparu tjednima opisivali njen izgled. On vam je pokazivao uzorke boja, različitih nijansi, tkanine različitih tekstura i sl. te vas zamolio da ih uspoređujete s Gospinima. Možete li isto učiniti za mene, u mojem istraživanju zvuka?

She's got the look


16 neurološka ispitivanja dr Lerona, rezultati u: René Laurentin, « La Vierge ; apparaît-elle à Medjugorje », O.E.I.L., Paris 2002

Ukoliko istraživanje u Medjugorju možemo nazvati istraživanjem, moji su rezultati, odnosno dokumentirana svjedočanstva **16**, pokazala "neodredivost i neusuglašenost" isključivo u pokušajima opisa Gospina glasa, pa i uspoređivanja istoga s ponuđenim reprodukcijama. Povezivala ih je jedino ista tvrdnja, da za razliku od ostalih, vrlo jasnih i preciznih senzacija, doživljaj glasa ne mogu u svojoj svijesti izolirati od doživljaja cjelokupne pojave pomiješane s emocionalnim uzbuđenjem. Glas Gospe, u ovom slučaju, prenositelja oralne poruke, nije moguće svjedočiti. Ostade li nam tako Gospa, na neki način, bez glasa?

Vraća li nas to na pitanje zašto često miješamo senzacije pri opisivanju nečijeg glasa? Ima li *multi-senzacionalni efekt*, koji se događa prilikom naše koncentracije isključivo na slušanje reproduciranog zvuka isti put, samo drugi smjer?

Pretpostavka je dr Lerona da suspenzija naše senzoralne pažnje olakšava prizivanje sjećanja i mašte ili jednostavnije, da određeno zatvaranje omogućuje drugo otvaranje. Nije li to temelj nekog pokreta, dinamike? Pokreta koji omogućuje misli da sklizne u ponore zvuka bez tereta ostalih čula, a da njihove proizvode re-kreira, re-percipira na svoj, subjektivan način, kroz jeku svih naših unutrašnjih svjesnih i nesvjesnih sadržaja. Pokreta koji svoju energiju crpi i puni u stalnom dramaturškom krugu žudnje da se kroz oblike i reprezentacije Stvarnosti približava i udaljava od svoje okoline, Stvarnosti, ma nigdje god ona bila.





«Death is not silence,
 death is a loss of voice»

Pavlica Bajsić

Translated from Croatian by Marina Miladinov

I AVANT-PROPOS

The most interesting, most passionate, and most demanding aspect of dramaturgical work in the field of radio broadcasting has always been, to my mind, the tightrope balancing between the documentary and the fictitious. We may, but need not call that re-creation of some sort of *acoustic films*,¹ composed of documentary material, a genre, for it is useless to debate about its definitions and names. All we need to understand now is that it is all about recording by microphone, writing and depicting by means of sound symbols, which for several reasons bring into question our attitude towards reality.

First Half-Time

Twelve years after Niépce's² heliograph from 1827, which was an unusual amalgam between a fixed object and of liquefied time, the French journal *La Gazette* pompously announced the experiment of Mr. Daguerre, who finally "fixed the images which paint themselves within a camera obscura, so that these images are no longer transient reflections of objects, but their fixed and everlasting impressions which, like a painting or engraving, can be taken away from the presence of objects."

Because of his extremely long exposures, it appeared as if Daguerre's Paris boulevard was perfectly empty at the moment of taking the photograph. However, the reality was completely different. Carriages and pedestrians were moving too quickly to be registered, thus vanishing from the document of themselves. All but one, a man who lingered long enough in one spot while having his shoes shined, but we can notice him only if we enlarge the bottom left corner. Owing to his dusty shoes, that gentleman managed to *outsurvive* himself or – contrary to that, but still close enough – he was *murdered* before his own death. The documented scene of an empty Paris boulevard, which we know was far from being empty in reality, seems to me somehow magnificent in its absence of those who were present. Certainly, Daguerre's photograph may serve as a manifest document of reality transformed by means of technological deficiency, which did not stop time, but only slowed it down. But can such a document, precisely because of its evident *fictionalization*, also serve as a dispositive that would make us discern the existence of a dialogue between Realisticity and Reality? Our perception of a boulevard full of people and the parallel image of the same, but empty boulevard are two different images, two realities of the same realisticity, if Realisticity is conceived as that which imposes itself in its elevated, vertical line, and Reality as its horizontal manifestation, partly accessible to our senses and our consciousness, as well as to recording and mechanical reproduction, its micro version of death, according to Barthes.³ It might be because all those elements, which in our example make the documented reality so different from the original, are manifest and easily understood, whereas in the analysis of the very similar processes of perception, impression, processing, remembering, and testifying, which are likewise conditioned, we encounter a far larger number of unknowns.

The Large Ear of the Phonograph

There is time in the very essence of sound. Sound persists even in the smallest segments of itself, since it originates in vibration, in movement. One particle hits another. The photograph had persisted earlier, until the moment of fixation.

"Mary had a little lamb.
Her fleece was white as snow.
And everywhere that Mary went
The lamb was sure to go."

Edison knew that when we speak our voice produces sound vibrations that stimulate the ear-drum. Instead of the ear-drum, he took a piece of tinfoil, on which he placed a stylus. As the stylus ran vertical to a rotating, galvanized cylinder – later to be replaced by wax – it left a trace in the smooth surface that reacted with different sound vibrations. The playback occurred in exactly the reverse order. The stylus moved along the furrow cut in the wax cylinder, while the vibrations of the vibrating plate were enhanced by means of a large funnel. In 1877, Edison sang the nursery rhyme about Mary and her little lamb into that funnel, the artificial ear, and it became the first mechanically reproduced sound. The invention made Edison the first man who was faced with the playback of his own voice, the perception of his other *self*, *the self separated from himself*, the first man who listened to his voice from the past, a voice that was already dead, already eternal.

Goodbye, Said God

-notes on subject and object, voice and body, time and place

¹ In Croatia, this genre is known under the name of "documentary radio-drama," in English-speaking countries as "feature", in French as "les créations radiophoniques," etc.

² *Joseph Nicéphore Niépce* (1765-1833), French inventor, ardent admirer of lithography, but a poor drawer himself, so that his son had to help him with drawing. After his son was recruited, Niépce was left on his own and the result of his efforts to make up for his lack of talent was the above-described first heliograph.

³ Roland Barthes, "Chambre Claire".

4 Allen S. Weiss, "Breathless; Sound Recording, Disembodiment and the Transformation of Lyrical Nostalgia."

5 Gregory Whitehead, "Out of Dark: Notes on the Nobodies of Radio Art," in "Wireless Imagination; Sound, Radio and Avant-garde," ed. by D. Kahn and G. Whitehead.

6 *Ibid.*

7 Allen S. Weiss.

"That archetype of impossible locations, *I am dead*, takes on a disquieting new meaning: the ancient *topoi* of time and place are forever transformed, since collage and montage, recording and broadcast, assure that unified time and space are no longer prerequisites of consciousness."⁴

Allen S. Weiss explored the consequences of this new objectification of human voice, the separation of voice from the corresponding body. In his opinion, the "confusion between man and machine, which came about with the invention of the phonograph, and taking into account the eternal struggle against death, changed the expectations and the forms of melancholy and mourning." American writer Gregory Whitehead seems to agree with that, since he describes radio broadcasting as a "mad Totentanz".⁵

Radio Bodies Are Nobodies⁶

In the very act of separation between voice and the body, man has "disembodied"⁷ himself and made it possible to simulate eternity. "...The phonograph and the radio have an ambiguous role in the general economy of representation, since they diffuse the voices of the long dead as eternally living simulacra." Taking into account Weiss and Whitehead, one can analyse the radio as a medium according to two aspects of broadcasting:

1. the possibility of *live* broadcasting,
2. the possibility of broadcasting previously recorded material.

In both of these aspects, one is witnessing the separation between voice and the body, but with a crucial difference. In the first case, the manipulation of place makes it possible to listen over here to a voice that has been separated from its body over there. It means travelling without time, moving from one place to another without being able to perceive the time of the journey, i.e. the past (the time lag is minor in terms of human perception and we notice it only rarely, so we may speak here of live broadcasting). In the second case, it is about the change of place and time, which makes it possible in the present to listen to a voice that has been separated from the body and recorded in the past. Manipulating time without changing it, or manipulating both time and place of the subject that has been changed into an object through disembodiment, that is, the loss of one's own voice – that Totentanz need not be too far from Man's slapping the face of God in the final protest against the action of embodiment in the moment of Creation, an action that has left Man humiliated forever as the "Word became flesh", as the Bible says. Weiss has written: "Death is not silence but loss of voice". Even though the author himself renounces any kind of transcendental tendencies, claiming loudly that, for him, death of the body is at the same time death of the subject, can this quotation perhaps ring in our ear in two different ways, depending on the possible differences in understanding death and loss? The first way of understanding would agree with the aforementioned idea of disembodiment. If death is understood as the death of the body, and the loss of voice as the separation between voice and the body, keeping in mind the context of the phonograph, the inevitable consequence would be the objectification of that same separated voice in order to become perceptible. The formerly disintegrated subject now becomes, through the perception of its independently existing voice, through its self-perception in the past, a dead subject in the present and an eternal one in the past. Does it approach the object of melancholy that way? The other interpretation is the following: if death is from the very beginning understood as the death of the subject, how do things stand with the loss of voice? If the subject loses its voice, the mute subject loses the means of manipulating itself, the possibility of disintegrating its body through the self-perception of its disconnected voice. The voiceless subject is forever doomed to remain tied to its body, even in death. Like a vision of some total death. Does it approach the object of mourning that way?

Documentariness – In the Service of Melancholy or Mourning?

8 Allen S. Weiss in "Breathless".

It is precisely Weiss that recalls Poe's *Oval Portrait*, the story of a painter portraying his beloved.⁸ As the portrait becomes more beautiful, more perfected, the woman sitting for the painter is getting weaker and paler. In the very moment in which the portrait is completed, the woman dies. She is consumed by her own representation. She had to die in order that her representation should become eternal. Getting back to our questions of documentariness, *fictionalization*, and remembering, is it possible to bring all attempts at documenting and materializing the reduced reality in the past down to a single common intention of mutilating it and murdering it on the way to eternity through the fictionalized repetition that is accessible to perception? This brutally simplified summary brings us closer to the first interpretation of Weiss's death as the place in which two time vectors paradoxically meet on the same crossroads, the one offering the possibility of eternity and the other offering the impossibility of resurrection. We can use various names for that longing, which is constantly created within the paradox of possibility and impossibility. If we accept it as a somewhat egotistical

state, in which we are counting on the possibility but are not able to forgive or accept the impossibility, an adequate name would actually be that of melancholy, not mourning.

Sound Image, Sound Thought

I remember an episode from the recording of the radio documentary *Terra Rossa Terra Nera*. I wanted to record a meadow. The quiet atmosphere of a meadow somewhere in central Istria. I put on the headphones (through which we control the microphone input). Mostly I could hear the crickets. A bee flying by. Sometimes, somewhere from far away, there was this very distant bleating of goats. I was turning towards the source of the sound, but I could not see any goats, since they were obviously out of sight. When we finished recording, I put off the headphones. Listening with my ears only, I again heard the crickets. And occasionally a bee flying by. But my ears could not catch the bleating. The bleating was not a part of my reality, but it was there in its sound document.

Moreover, it is interesting to ask what happens with the *remnants*, with those elements of reality that remained out of reach for materialization in the form of document, out of frame, out of reach for the microphone, those that made up a unity in the moment of our experience. Does our microphone, that mechanical continuation of our senses, stand towards the reality in the same way as our senses stand towards Realisticity? Do we catch what we can, what we want, or what we must? Does dramaturgy, as the processing of recorded material, “a process that is fluid and solid at the same time,”⁹ stand towards the documentary material in the same way as our internal “reception centre” stands towards reflections and echoes of Realisticity, distilled after the input of the registered data? By absorbing what we can, what we want, and what we must, by putting our thought into movement and creating a new, bastard existence? Yes, the microphone is a little spy, it presents its reality as a document of our reality. It records sound and time, it is sensitive to spatial environment, and if joined to the medium that talks to people, communicates – namely, the radio – the two of them together will transform the waves into a sort of confessional, in which it is never sure who is on the other side of the window. If the photograph is a way of arresting time, then the sound recording is the passage of time. It is the past, which presents itself before us in its duration. That is why listening takes time. According to Farabet,¹⁰ it is the very ear that physically determines the necessity of time. Its architecture takes the sound towards the thought on a zigzag track. In order to get there, to master all the curves, it needs time. “I feel and hear thoughts running through my head. The ear is an opening, a cave that leads into the interior of the body, the path through which sound flows, dances, crawls like a caterpillar. The head is a place of transit, the centre of classification, the location of an alchemical and poetical process. Just as the sound of a city is shaped by its architecture, the same goes for the ear, which turns into a prosthesis of sound.” Time is needed for sound to ring and for its echo to develop. It often happens that, while listening to sound alone, we imagine pictures, smells, remember or fantasize, create our own *sound image*. Owing to the time and to our concentration on a single sense of “input”, all other senses are able to join into the “output” sensations, assailing our remembrance and our creation. Speaking about remembrance, what does it mean to *remember a sound*? Certainly, we do store sounds in our memory. But why is it so difficult to describe a sound? Even when describing a sound that we would easily recognize, we are able to do it only with difficulty. And sometimes we do it wrong. Is it because it is difficult for us to imagine a voice without its body? Sometimes we are confused precisely by the reaction of the rest of our senses and we tend to describe the voice of a fragile blonde as light and soft. Does it mean that the perception of sound largely depends on the rest of our senses or is it something that happens afterwards, during the information processing? If our perception of sound is, in reality, always damaged/enriched by the intervention of other senses, and if it is absorbed in the context of the whole complexity of remembrance, emotions, imagination, etc., what does it tell us about the process of listening to the recorded documentary sound? Does blocking other senses during the listening of mechanically reproduced sound, apart from hearing, provoke a more intense inner reaction than it would be the case with the listening of a playback in which more senses were active at the same time? If yes, can we call that creation, which is produced by *enlargement*, that openness of our inner sensory apparatus encouraged by the time of the sound, the *sound thought*?

“In the beginnings of television in the UK, some BBC journalists conducted a poll in the population, asking them whether they preferred radio or TV. A boy whom they stopped in front of his school answered without much thinking: “Radio! I find the pictures better.”¹¹

That boy would be content with the supposition that recorded sound has no representative image, and precisely because it is free from it, it can offer an abundance of intimate mental pictures. The space of inner experience thus becomes less precise, while the game of connotations becomes floating, individual, and less predictable. These possible characteristics of the recorded sound did not stop us from developing a whole strategy of *fictionalization* from the phonograph era until today. *Fictionalization* that is, in a more or less evident way, manifested in the process of recording, dramaturgy, and playback.

⁹ René Farabet, French author, one of the founders of “Atelier du Création Radiophonique” at France Culture, note from a lecture held on Hvar, at the Festival Prix Marulić, 2003.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ According to John Theocaris, BBC.

II AVE MARIA, an Epilogue

This summer, I came across an article in the newspaper that caught my attention: “The seers of Međugorje describe the Virgin Mary as a girl of 18-20 years of age, about 165 cm high and weighing around 60 kg. Black hair can be discerned under the veil, her eyes are of intense blue, she has an oval face, thin lips, ruby cheeks, and a small nose”. This data struck me with its precision of description, notwithstanding all the iconographic elements of the visual depictions of the Virgin Mary, possible explanations of the years of apparitions in Međugorje, or doubts. While I was reading the article, I thought: what if we just accepted that phenomenon as a fact, as it is publicly announced by a daily newspaper, as a piece of objective information about our reality, without a trace of irony and regardless of its bizarreness. There are witnesses and they are testifying to an event, a religious apparition, a reality that is most certainly their own. A reality that my microphone cannot document, but their testimonies do. The aim of my trip to Međugorje was to fill in the gap in the identification card of the Virgin Mary as to the perception of her voice. I wanted to approach that task with an equal bureaucratic exactness as it was the case with the discourse in the above-quoted article. Still, why should we look for answers to the questions about Reality and Realisticity by carrying a microphone to Međugorje? To the place where 6 persons claim that they have been seeing a Biblical personality, the Virgin Mary, and that they have been in communication with her for almost 24 years? Why should we search at all for the traces of testimony to an event that obviously escapes our everyday reality, producing and conditioning a whole range of sociological, ethical, economic, political, theological, and similar manifestations that may be more interesting in their excessive quality than the event as such? A piece of information may have helped my indecision before setting on the *expedition*. The visions were never a part of the Credo; they belong to the sphere of *personal experiences* and the Church makes official statements about such things only when they have ceased to be. That circumstance creates a possibility to travel to Međugorje in order to investigate *personal experiences* that are still going on and have not yet been appropriated by the official institution in charge. Why do we need all that? We are always questioning the acceptable reality around us. We are questioning its manifestation, about which we can agree only insofar as it provokes our senses to a reaction. But all the rest of it, i.e. the analysis of its relationship with objectivity, subjectivity, consciousness, the flow of our thoughts, the nature of images, the impact of recognition or non-recognition, its materialization in terms of documents, representation and multiplication, its significance and, above all, its relationship with truth, all that doubtlessly constitutes a problem that is noticeable in the variety of interpretation.

12 Jacques Rancière, “Le destin des images”, La fabrique éditions, 2003.

Why not start at the other end? Why not step into the world of the “unacceptable”, but nevertheless attested reality? Perhaps Rancière¹² might help us there, since he writes about two figures in evaluating the words of a witness: “It is an opposition of simple narration and the artificially mimetic that emphasizes the value of witnesses’ words today in two figures. The first evaluates simple narration, which aims not at art, but only seeks to translate the individual’s experience. On the other side, there is another figure, which sees a new way of art in the speech of the “witness”. The most important thing is not the narration, but the testimony of “having had something” that surpasses thinking, not only in its extreme, but because precisely “that something that one had” surpasses thinking as such. (...) The existence of events that surpass the thinkable evokes art that testifies of the unthinkable in general, an essential discordance between what we are able to feel and what our thinking can master.”

Epilogue

If we study a testimony in unity with the event, that is, with the main action that preceded it, then it is indeed a sort of epilogue. This Marian epilogue has a certain amount of “theatrical” in it. The appearance of something extraordinary in this ordinary world, even the special effects (all that grandezza of the apparition, the light going on and off like a film projector, the Virgin floating on a cloud above the earth like an actress hanging on invisible ropes), somehow belong to the theatre. The Virgin is an orator transmitting, like an actress, the thoughts of the author, a being that is quasi superior in his wisdom than his representative on the scene. Thus, it is a short story following the main action, a scene succeeding the final act. Perhaps only in the form of a monologue, of retelling the event by a dramaturgically minor and almost invisible character. Nevertheless, it is a character that was present in the preceding acts and that gives him or her the right to testify from his or her stage. An invisible person that becomes visible by carrying a spoken message.

The Voice Bank and the Final Rehearsal

Besides my recording equipment, I took a voice bank with me to Međugorje: the recording of female voices of various acoustic qualities (lighter, darker) and various origins (regions/accents, age, profession). All the women recorded uttered the same message spoken by the Virgin in order that I

默主歌耶(Medjugorje)讯息

2005/5/25



亲爱的孩子们，

我再一次邀请你们谦虚地活出我的讯息。要它为它作证，尤其是现在，又快到我显现的周年紀念了。小孩子们，为那些离天主以及离他的爱情很远的人，你们要成为他们的标向。我和你们在一起，我以母性的祝福祝福你们。

感谢你们回应我的呼吁。

默想 (奕丰写，德来译)

圣母要求我们谦虚地活出她的讯息。

通常她只要求我们活出她的讯息，这已经是很多了，因为我们常看了一遍之后就把它抛

在脑后。然而我们的好母亲提醒我们，显现很快又要一年了。这不禁让我想起耶稣对门徒的话：“这么长久的时候，我和你们在一起，而你还不认识我吗？”（若 14: 9）圣母和我们在一起这么久，她的训诲应该已经深深地刻在我们内，我们应该是已经充满了爱情，恒心祈祷，对所有的人充满耐心，因为大家都是她的爱子。

然而，自满之心阻碍了我们成为她讯息的见证。内心的骄傲以法利塞人的行为表现出来。我们自认拥有真理，所以判断那些和我们不一样的人。今天，基督徒代表信条主义，狭隘的精神，及对异己缺少宽容。我们没意识到世界已改变了，我们不再是世界的中心，大家征询的权威。玛利亚告诉我们，如果我们要把人人带到基督前，我们必须先以爱情、温柔及谦虚的心活在真理中。

might be able to balance these words with various voices and interpretations. Even before starting on my journey, I was aware that the voice bank includes the danger of discrediting my scientific approach with the seers.

The evening before the trip, a certain Vedran and a certain me, sitting in the kitchen of a certain Sanja and a certain Hrvoje, practiced the possible variants of my performance on the scene of Medjugorje. From the imaginary dialogues, which we noted down on that occasion, I have selected the following:

Do I believe in the visions or not?

- I am an empty tape, ready to be filled with all that my microphone recognizes. The microphone and the empty tape do not judge, they just record.

Why did I come to Medjugorje in the first place?

- To record conversations with people who see the Virgin Mary and talk to her.

Conversations on what?

- I will ask them to fill my empty tape with descriptions of what they see or hear and all the rest that makes up their experience of vision.

What am I taking with me?

- These are my tools. A microphone and a *voice bank*. I want us to imagine the *voice bank* somewhat like an ophthalmologist's board¹³ with larger and smaller letters. If we only tell the physician our impressions about our sight, he will not be able to understand in detail to which extent our sight has deteriorated or recommend the right glasses. Instead of the letter board, we have a "bank" with various types of voices. I want you to listen to them and say which one would be the closest to that of the Virgin.

¹³ This parallel is, of course, wrong, since the difference in the letter size is consequent, while the difference in voices cannot be and it is impossible to avoid the impact of interpretation in reading.

14 And moreover, to document *your voice*.

15 If we do the sound montage wrong and add commentaries, we can turn a conversation on birds into a pre-election debate.

Why is it necessary to record the conversations with the microphone?

- Because I came here in order to document acoustically your description of the experience **14** and to protect its authenticity by reducing the possibility of reinterpretation. In the same way, we usually authorize interviews for newspapers in journalism, while on the radio it is not needed because the recording is always considered *authentic*, since words have been uttered and recorded. **15** Besides, the microphone records a document that will remain in the archives of the University of Paris 8, so it will *leave a trace*.

What exactly am I studying?

- I am a student of aesthetics, it is a discipline that reflects on the Beautiful. You speak of the Virgin as an unbelievable beauty, an ideal yet unseen. Therefore, I am interested in the form of that ideal beauty of hers. I would like to ask you to draw the *sensory map* of the Virgin's figure.

How do you do that?

- I will give you some examples of possible questions: how is her figure framed, do you see her entire body, does she cast a shadow, what is happening in the relationship between the Virgin's figure and her surrounding, I mean space and the objects, does the room or the tree disappear when the Virgin appears, what happens with the voices and sounds from the surroundings, do you hear them during the vision, does the voice of the Virgin reach you from far away or somewhere nearby, is there an echo or some noise, does she speak loudly or quietly, does she whisper, do people hear you when you talk to her, does she speak Croatian, is it a dialect or the standard speech, have you ever touched her body or her clothes, what does it feel like, have you kissed her, have you felt some special smell, etc.

Why do I insist so much on the voice?

- You have described in great detail the colour of her hair, how much she weighs, etc. As for me, I am a sound specialist. I read somewhere that you were describing her appearance to a sculptor for weeks. He showed you samples of colours, various shades, cloths of various texture, and alike, asking you to compare them with those of the Virgin. *Could you do the same for me, for my research on sound?*

She's Got the Look

16 Mirjana Dragičević-Soldo and Vicka Ivanković.

If my research in Međugorje can be considered research at all, my results, that is, the documented testimonies **16**, show "indefiniteness and inconsistency" exclusively when it comes to the attempts at describing the Virgin's voice or compare it to the voices offered on playback. The testimonies were interrelated through a single statement, namely that, unlike the other perceptions, which were very clear and precise, the witnesses could not isolate the sensation of voice in their consciousness from the experience of the Virgin's appearance as such, mixed with emotional excitement. The voice of the Virgin Mary, in this case the carrier of an oral message, could not be attested. Are we thus, in a way, left with the voiceless Virgin?

Does that bring us back to the question why we often mix sensations when we describe someone's voice? Perhaps the *multi-sensational effect*, which occurs when we concentrate exclusively on listening to the mechanically reproduced voice, has the same way, but a different direction?

17 Neurological research by Dr Leron, results in: René Laurentin, "La Vierge; apparaît-elle à Medjugorje," O.E.I.L., Paris, 2002.

The hypothesis of Dr Leron **17** is that the suspension of our sensory attention facilitates the recalling of memories or fantasies or, to put it more simply, that closing down on one side enables us to open up on the other. Is that not the basis of a movement, of dynamics? A movement that makes it possible for the thought to slide down into the abysses of sound without the burden of other senses and to re-create, re-perceive their products in its own, subjective way, through the echo of all our inner concepts, both conscious and unconscious. A movement that draws and fills its energy in the constant dramaturgical circle of desire to use the forms and representations of Reality in order to get closer to or away from its axis, Realisticity, wherever that may be.



Retorika čula u *Feed-u* Kurta Hentschlägera

Tihana Maravić

Prije ulaska u Teatro Piccolo Arsenale (jedan od prostora Venecijanskog Kazališnog Bijenala 2005 kojeg je umjetnički osmislio Romeo Castellucci) potpisujem dokument kojim na vlastitu odgovornost prihvaćam pogledati predstavu koja bi zbog svojih tehničkih karakteristika (dim, stroboskop...) mogla nepovoljno djelovati na osobe krhkog zdravlja ili slabog srca. U trenutku kad je publika zauzela svoja mjesta u mračnoj unutrašnjosti kazališta, profesionalni glas stjuarda (vežite se, polijećemo!) ponavlja obavijest još jednom, podsjećajući nas da još uvijek možemo odustati od iskustva koje je, posebno za Veneciju, pripremio austrijski umjetnik Kurt Hentschläger. Kasnije saznajem kako ovakav početak performancea nije zamišljen kao njegov originalni dio već prisilno nametnut od organizacije bijenala. Ipak, ovaj mi se slučaj učinio sretnim za performance *Feed* ukoliko je povećao neizvjesnost i očekivanja publike, te stvorio atmosferu tajne koja nas uvodi u kazalište kao u pilju gdje će nam, možda, biti ispričana bajka. «Sveta vatra svojstvena bogovima, koju je Prometej poklonio čovjeku, nije razum već njegova metaforična sposobnost»¹. *Feed* je metafora intimnog odnosa čovjeka i tehnologije, problema ljudskih ovisnosti i slobode.

¹ Ernesto Grassi, Maristella Lorch, *Umanesimo e retorica. Il problema della follia*, Mucchi, Modena 1988, str. 116.

Tehnički gledano, *Feed* (performance za matricu stroboskopa i nestvarnih karaktera) autonomni je digitalni sistem. Sve što gledatelj može vidjeti u mraku kazališta jest veliki panoramski ekran u čijem se drhtajućem svijetu kreću, prvo jedna, pa sve više i više, trodimenzionalnih ljudskih figura. One su potaknute na konstantno kretanje postupcima ponašanja ili algoritmima stvorenim putem fizičkog motora u stvarnom vremenu. Dakle pokreti figura nisu animirani manualno nego neprekidno poticani sve do isključenja sistema. Figure šire svoje "vibracije" na fizički prostor izvan ekrana. Intenzitet, položaj i brzina kretanja figura na ekranu određuju zvučni ambijent *Feed*-a. Njihovi pokreti ne kontroliraju samo zvuk nego i svjetlo, stvarajući tako sinestetički odnos slike i zvuka. Dramaturgiju kompozicije diktira broj aktivnih karaktera, njihovo raspoloženje, ponašanje i pokreti te fizički faktori poput gravitacije i vjetrova prisutnih u trodimenzionalnom prostoru u kojem figure žive.

Ulaskom u *Feed*, zapravo smo ušli u sistem koji se sastoji od ekrana sa trodimenzionalnim figurama, stroboskopa, svjetla, zvuka i dima, čijom se međusobnom interaktivnošću sistem hrani i tako postoji. Koja je uloga gledatelja u tom sistemu? Hentschläger je u programu performansa napisao kako su ljudi slobodni ući u sistem i kako će u njemu biti tolerirani, ali samo kao posjetitelji, a ne kao korisnici. Naziv rada asocira na hranjenje, ali i na «feedback» koji se manifestira na tri načina:

1. Feedback unutar elementa ekrana.

Figura je konstantno poticana na pokret. Odguruje se stopalima od poda, sama od sebe odgurivanjem koje se rađa u koljenima ili u zdjelici. Jedna figura odguruje drugu.

2. Feedback među elementima.

Pokreti figura utječu na intenzitet i ritam svjetla i zvuka.

3. Feedback između sistema i gledatelja.

Ovom točkom ne otvara se samo pitanje odnosa umjetničkog rada/umjetnika i gledatelja, već i pitanje retoričnosti *Feed*-a koji nas provocira svojom sinestetičnošću. Umjetnik razmišlja o odnosu čovjeka i tehnologije. Gotovo je opsjednut tim problemom i ima ga potrebu podijeliti s drugima. Ljudska potreba i želja da podijeli neko iskustvo s drugima ukazuje na vjeru u čovjeka, odnosno na njegovu vjeru u društvo i komunikaciju. Mislim da se retorika rađa iz strasti i iz ljepote, ali također i iz ljubavi prema čovjeku. Aristotelova *Retorika* podijeljena je u tri knjige. Prva je posvećena strastima na koje treba djelovati. Poznati talijanist Ezio Raimondi objašnjava kako, pišući o strastima, Aristotel upotrebljava grčku riječ *pathe* koji su latini preveli sa *affectus* i koja se zapravo odnosi na život snaga koje su u čovjeku.² Tradicionalno, umjetnik ili političar retoričkim govorom želi riječju ući u gledateljevu glavu. Hentschläger, zvučnom i vibracijskom slikom, ulazi u gledateljevo tijelo. Meta ovog rada su tijelo i njegove životne snage. Uspio nas je zavesti, a da to nismo ni primjetili, šapćući nam slike, dodirujući nas svjetlom, oblikujući zvukove u našim nozdrvama. Dimom je pomiješao naša osjetila, tamom opustio naša tijela i tiho nas napao.

² Ezio Raimondi, *La retorica d'oggi*, Mulino, Bologna 2002, str. 20.

Teško osvojivi um, prekritičan i prepun predrasuda, predao je ulogu plijena zaboravljenom, napuštenom i nespremnom tijelu. Tko koga zapravo hrani u ovom projektu? Pokreti na ekranu hrane cijeli projekt, a krug se zatvara tako što na kraju publika postaje retorička hrana sistema...?

Feed obiluje retoričkim figurama: osim metaforom, Hentschlägerova zavodnička tehnika služi se i aliteracijom. Prisustvujemo jednom te istom pokretu koji se uvijek iznova ponavlja te neumorno umnožava. To ponavljanje izaziva djetinje veselje i neku vrstu hipnoze ili bar zaćaranosti. Prepuštanje. Prepuštanje stvarima i retoričkom oružju koje je možda i prepoznato, ali kojem se tijelo, malaksalo i naizgled obesnaženo, ipak prepušta pritom uživajući. Nemoguće je ignorirati zastrašujuću moć tehnike s kojom je čovjek danas suočen. Heidegger je 30. listopada 1955. u Messkirchu, u povodu slavljenja 175 godina rođenja kompozitora Conradina Kreutzera, održao govor koji je nazvao *Gelassenheit*³ u kojem govori o odlučujućoj borbi između čovjeka i tehnike u kojoj bi se čovjek mogao naći

³ Martin Heidegger, *Gelassenheit*, Neske Verlag, Pfullingen 1959.

uplašenim i slabim ako umjesto svog (pro)računatog načina razmišljanja ne primjeni refleksivno-meditativno razmišljanje. Dodala bih, i metaforično.

Heidegger još kaže kako se iza vladavine tehnike krije neki skriveni smisao. Ono što se skrivajući pokazuje, Heidegger naziva *tajnom* (*das Geheimnis*), a način na koji je čovjek otvoren prema tom skrivenom smislu tehnike zove *otvorenost prema tajni* (*die Offenheit für das Geheimnis*). Potrebno je dakle *prepuštanje* (*Gelassenheit*); prepustiti se tehnološkom svijetu i biti voljnim slušati njegovu tajnu. Radi se o ljudskom ponašanju koje istovremeno govori i «da» i «ne» tehnici. Heidegger takvo ponašanje zove *napuštanje stvari i prepuštanje stvarima* (*die Gelassenheit zu den Dingen*).

Metafora, sinestezija, klimaks, hiperbola, ponavljanje, pretjerivanje. Preobilje i umnožavanje dima, stroboskopa, zvuka i svjetla. Preobilje golih tijela. Dok promatram splet ovih nagih, gotovo androgenih tijela pada mi na pamet erotičnost antičkih skulptura, a također i onih baroknih. Laokoont s Rodosa, Berninijevi Apolon i Dafna, Pluton i Prozerpina. U vrijeme baroka čovjek je bio viđen kao metafora samoga sebe. Čovjek je bio glumac samoga sebe. Svijet kao kazalište i čovjek kao marioneta podtema je *Feed-a*. Ovaj je rad antropocentričan. U centru baroknog iskustva nalaze se tijelo i njegova čula. U centru *Feed-a* su metafora čovjeka i čula gledatelja. I baroknu skulpturu i *Feed* zanima isto: tijelo u neprekidnom pokretu, pokret iz unutrašnjeg ka vanjskom, iz vanjskog ka unutrašnjem. Tok nije nikada prekinut, sve je povezano. Tijelo koje živi u plinovitoj tekućini ekrana pomoću svojih vibracija zaista izlazi. Ono širi svoju unutrašnju sferu na svijet koji se nalazi vani. Na gledatelja koji kroz retorički prerađeno osjetilno-imaginativno iskustvo ostvaruje slikovitu percepciju stvarnosti u kojoj se sva čula stapaju u jedno, u čovjek-čulo.

Feed je i drama i dijalog i u oba je smisla još jednom antropocentričan. Problem kojim se bavi Hentschläger (odnos između ljudskog postojanja i svijeta) je dramatičan i zato što se radi o unutrašnjem dijalogu čovjeka sa samim sobom te o pokušaju stvarnog dijaloga čovjeka sa čovjekom. Rađa se iz jake ljudske želje da podijeli iskustvo o lijepom i o zastrašujućem. Iz potrebe za pričanjem čovjeka. Golog čovjeka koji predstavlja čovječnost u svoj svojoj krhkosti. Pričanjem protiv zaborava. Iz volje za sudjelovanjem i za izlaskom iz okvira i okova individualizma. U knjizi *Retorika danas*⁴ Raimondi piše kako se retoričnom umjetnošću pokušava objasniti čovjek, njegove reakcije i načini njegova postojanja. Retor nastaje kada pjesnik odluči svrnuti pažnju sa sebe na druge i kada njegova pjesma postaje društvena. Retorika je danas aktivnost čiji je predmet problematičnost čovjeka; ona je mjesto za konfliktne teme, one o kojima je još potrebno razgovarati, one u koje se još potrebno uvjeriti. Raimondi govori o retorici kao mjestu gdje je poželjnije postavljati pitanja nego davati rješenja, i najvažnije, ona je mjesto gdje smo pozvani donositi odluke. Gdje je čovjeku-čulu dana prilika da čuje i da se odluči.

⁴ Ezio Raimondi, *La retorica d'oggi*, Mulino, Bologna 2002.

Č, č, č, č: slovo čujno, čulno, čovječje, odlučujuće. Slovo jesenje, plodno, mesnato i najzad tjelesno. Retorika čula je instrument koji svojim tipkama udara o žice gledatelja. Kao da gledatelj na ulazu u kazalište potpisuje dokument kojim pristaje na erotičnu igru u kojoj će mu partner dimom, zvučnim vibracijama i svjetlosnim efektima dodirivati kožu pod uvjetom da je ni u jednom trenutku fizički ne dotakne. Retorika čula je dakle retorika tijela i retorika kože. Ne kažem da je ovakvom retoričkom igrom zanemarena glava, već i da ona ima svoju kožu, i da nas do razmišljanja umjetnik može voditi i putevima kože. U ovoj zavodničkoj igri, gledateljevo je tijelo plijen kojem je dana mogućnost da postane sparing partner za razgovor s umjetnikom. Nestvarni svijet *Feed-a* potiče nas na razmišljanje o položaju naših stvarnih tijela u nestvarnom svijetu. Na razmišljanje o ponašanju tijela u stvarnosti i u virtualnoj stvarnosti. Gdje je ono življe i autentičnije, u stvarnom ili nestvarnom svijetu? Javlja se sumnja da u stvarnom svijetu tijelo postaje nestvarno. Kao da mu lakše uspijeva biti stvarnim u nestvarnom okruženju. Retorikom čula umjetnik nas navodi da o problemu tijela razmišljamo tijelom.

Godine 1873. u Bazelu, na ljetnom seminaru retorike, Friedrich Nietzsche je svojim studentima govorio: «...retorika je odrasla u narodu koji je još uvijek živio u mitskim slikama i koji još uvijek nije poznao bezuvjetnu potrebu za povjesnom istinom: on je više volio biti uvjeren nego poučen...»⁵. Starogrčki mit posjedovao je magičnu riječ. Pod njegovim se krilom čovjek osjećao sigurnim. Danas, iako je problem i dalje misaoni, ponovno se javlja potreba da ga se obradi slikovitim, metaforičnim i retoričnim jezikom čija je meta tijelo. Bajkovita slika magične moći koja ima snagu i energiju da nas putem tjelesnog impulsa ili živčane reakcije osvoji, zavede i u-vjeri.

⁵ *Darstellung der Antiken Rhetorik*, u Nietzsche Werke II/4 (Vorlesungs-Aufzeichnungen 1871/1872 - 1874/1875), Walter De Gruyter, Berlin – New York 1995.

Rhetoric of the senses in Kurt Hentschläger's *Feed*

Tihana Maravić

Translated from Croatian by Mima Simić

Before entering the Teatro Piccolo Arsenale (one of the spaces of the 2005 International Theatre Festival of the Venice Biennale, artistically conceived by Romeo Castellucci), I sign a document accepting to see the play which could, because of its technical characteristics (smoke, stroboscope), be harmful to those with weak hearts or of fragile health. At the moment when the audience has taken their seats in the dark interior of the theater, the professional voice of a steward ("fasten your seat belts, we are about to take off!") repeats the announcement, reminding us we can still quit the experience designed especially for Venice by Austrian artist Kurt Hentschläger. Later I find out that this performance opening was not conceived as its original part, but rather imposed by the Biennale organizers. However, I regarded this incident a lucky one for a performance such as *Feed*, building up suspense and increasing the audience's expectations, creating a secretive atmosphere leading us into the theater as into a cave where we will, perhaps, be told a fairy tale. "The holy fire, property of gods, which Prometheus bestowed upon humans, is not reason, but rather its metaphorical potential"¹. *Feed* is the metaphor for the intimate relationship between the human and technology, the issues of human dependency and freedom.

¹ Ernesto Grassi, Maristella Lorch, *Umanesimo e retorica. Il problema della follia*, Mucchi, Modena 1988, p. 116.

Speaking in technical terms, *Feed* (a performance for the matrix of stroboscope and unreal characters) is an autonomous digital system. All that the spectator can see in the darkness of the theater is a large panoramic screen with its quivering world, where three-dimensional figures are moving; at first it is only one, but soon many more follow. Through behavioral patterns or algorithms created in real time by the physical engine, these figures are urged to move constantly. The movements of the figures are thus not animated manually, but rather perpetually stimulated until the system shuts down. The figures spread their "vibrations" to the physical space outside the screen. The intensity, position and the figures' speed of movement define the sound ambiance of *Feed*. Their motions are not controlled just by sound but also by light, creating a synesthetic relationship between image and sound. The dramaturgy of the composition is dictated by the number of active characters, their mood, behavior and movement, as well as by the physical factors such as gravity and wind, present in the three-dimensional space which these figures inhabit.

Entering *Feed*, we have actually entered the system composed of a screen with three-dimensional figures, the stroboscope, light, sound and smoke; the system feeds on the interaction of these elements and thus exists. What is the role of the spectator in this system? In the description of the performance, Hentschläger writes that people are free to enter the system and there they will be tolerated, but only as visitors, and not as users. The title of the work evokes feeding, but also *feedback*, which has three expressions here:

1. Feedback of the elements onscreen.

The figure is constantly urged to move. Its feet are pushing away from the ground, away from itself; this pushing starts in the knees or in the pelvis; a figure pushes another figure away.

2. Feedback among the elements.

The figures' movements affect the intensity and rhythm of light and sound.

3. Feedback between the system and the spectators.

This particular point brings up not only the question of the relationship between the work of art/artist and the spectator, but also the question of *Feed's* rhetoric, which provokes us with its synestheticism. The artist ponders the relationship between the human and technology. He is almost obsessed with the issue and has the need to share it with others. The human need and desire to share an experience with others points to the faith a human being has in another human being or, better, his faith in society and communication. I believe that rhetoric is born out of passion and beauty, but also out of love for the human being. Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is divided into three books. The first book is devoted to passions which need to be followed. Famous Italianist Ezio Raimondi explains how Aristotle, writing on passions, uses the Greek word *pathe* which the Latins translated as *affectus* and which actually refers to the life of the forces within the human.² Traditionally, in the language of rhetoric, the artist or the politician desires to enter the spectator's head via the word. Hentschläger enters the spectator's body via sound and the vibratory image. The target of this work is the body and its vital forces. He has managed to seduce us without us even noticing, whispering images, touching us with light, forming sounds in our nostrils. He has mixed our senses with smoke, softened our bodies with darkness and attacked us silently.

² Ezio Raimondi, *La retorica d'oggi*, Mulino, Bologna 2002, p. 20.


The unconquerable mind, too critical and full of prejudice, has given the forgotten, abandoned and unprepared body the role of prey. Who really feeds on whom in this project? The movements on the screen feed the whole project, and the circle is closed when the audience, in the end, becomes the rhetorical food of the system?

Feed does not lack rhetorical figures; apart from the metaphor, Hentschläger's seductive technique also makes use of alliteration. We witness a single movement which is constantly repeated, tirelessly and constantly freshly multiplied. The repetition triggers childlike delight and a kind of hypnosis, or at least enchantment. Abandon. Abandon to things and rhetorical weapons which have perhaps been recognized, but to which the body, limp and seemingly disempowered, nonetheless surrenders. It is impossible to ignore the frightening power of the technology that the human is faced with today. On October 30, 1955 in Messkirch, on the occasion of the 175th anniversary of composer Conradin Kreutzer's birth, Heidegger gave a speech which he named *Gelassenheit*³, in which he talked about the decisive battle between man and technology, where the man will find himself scared and weak unless, instead of employing his calculating way of thinking, he employs the reflective/meditative way. I would also add, the metaphoric way.

³ Martin Heidegger, *Gelassenheit*, Neske Verlag, Pfullingen 1959.

Heidegger also says that there is a hidden meaning behind the dominion of technics. The one which reveals itself exactly through hiding Heidegger calls *the mystery (das Geheimnis)*, and the way the human is open to the hidden meaning of technics he calls *openness to the mystery (die Offenheit für das Geheimnis)*. What is then needed is *releasement (Gelassenheit)* to the world of technology and willingness to listen to its mystery. It is about human behavior which is simultaneously saying "yes" and "no" to technics. Heidegger calls this behavior the *releasement of things and release-ment towards things (die Gelassenheit zu den Dingen)*.

Metaphor, synesthesia, climax, hyperbole, repetition, exaggeration. Overabundance and multiplication of smoke, stroboscope, sound and light. Overabundance of naked bodies. While I observe the tangle of these naked, almost androgynous bodies, I am reminded of the eroticism of antique sculptures and, only a moment later, baroque ones. Laocoön from Rhodos, Bernini's Apollo and Daphne, Pluto and Persephone. In the time of Baroque man was perceived as a metaphor of himself. The man was the actor who played himself. The world as a theater and the man as a puppet is the subtheme of *Feed*. This work is anthropocentric. At the center of the baroque experience is the body and its senses. In the center of *Feed* are the metaphor for man and the audience's senses. The baroque sculpture and *Feed* are interested in the same thing: the body in perpetual motion, movement from the inside to the outside, from the outside to the inside. The flow is uninterrupted, everything is connected. Aided by its vibrations, the body which lives in the gassy fluid of the screen actually comes out. It spreads its inner sphere onto the outside world. Onto the spectator who, through the rhetorically processed sense-imaginative experience, creates a pictographic perception of reality in which all senses become one, the human-sense.



Kurt Hentschläger: *Feed*

Feed is also a drama and a dialogue, and in both senses it is, again, anthropocentric. The issue that Hentschläger deals with (the relationship between human existence and the world) is also dramatic because it is, firstly, about the inner dialogue of man with himself and, second, about the attempt at a real dialogue between a human and another human. It is borne out of the strong human desire to share the experience of the beautiful and the frightening. Out of the human need to talk. The naked human who represents humanity in all its fragility. Talking against oblivion. Talking out of the desire to participate and to break free from the chains and frames of individualism. In his book *Contemporary Rhetoric*⁴, Raimondi writes how the art of rhetoric tries to explain the human, its reactions and the modes of its existence. Rhetor comes into being when the poet tries to divert attention from himself onto another and when his poem becomes societal. Today rhetoric is the activity whose subject is human complexity; it is the space for conflicting themes, those that still need to be discussed, those that still need to be persuaded with. Raimondi talks about rhetoric as a place where it is more desirable to ask questions than to provide solutions and, most of all, it is the place where we are invited to make decisions. Where the human-sense is given the opportunity to hear and make a decision.

L....s....s.... Letters loud, sensual, human, decisive. Letters of the fall; fertile, fleshy and, finally, physical. The rhetoric of the senses is the instrument whose keys hit the audience's strings. It is as if the spectator, at the theatre entrance, signs the document accepting the erotic game in which his partner will be touching his skin with smoke, sound vibrations and light effects, on the condition that he never touches him physically. The rhetoric of the senses is thus the rhetoric of the body and the rhetoric of skin. I am not saying that this rhetorical game ignores the head, but that it also has its own skin, and that the artist can lead us to thinking by ways of skin as well. In this game of seduction, the spectator's body is the prey which was given the opportunity to become a sparring partner for conversation with the artist. The unreal world of *Feed* urges us to think about the position of our real bodies in an unreal world. It urges us to think about the behavior of the body in reality and in virtual reality. Where is it more alive and more authentic, in the real or in the unreal world? One is faced with the suspicion that in the real world the body becomes unreal. As if it finds it easier to be real in unreal surroundings. With the rhetoric of senses the artist urges us to contemplate the issue of the body with the body itself.

In 1873 in Basel, at a summer course in rhetoric, Friedrich Nietzsche told his students: "...Rhetoric developed in the nation which still lived in mythical images and did not know of the unconditional need for historical truth: it wanted to be persuaded rather than taught..."⁵. The ancient Greek myth had a magic word. Under its wing, man felt safe. Today, although the problem is still of a reflective nature, there is the need again to process it with a pictorial, metaphorical and rhetorical language whose target is the body. The fairy tale-like image of the magical power which has the force and the energy to charm, seduce and persuade us via physical impulses or nerve reactions.

⁴ Ezio Raimondi, *La retorica d'oggi*, Mulino, Bologna 2002.

⁵ *Darstellung der Antiken Rhetorik*, in *Nietzsche Werke III/4 (Vorlesungs-Aufzeichnungen 1871/1872 – 1874/1875)*, Walter De Gruyter, Berlin – New York 1995.

Govor dolazi odostraga, a ne odozgo ili odozdo

Nikola Đurić

Prevela s njemačkog Marina Miladinov

Malobrojni su glumci koji mogu uvjerljivo govoriti na pozornici. Malobrojni su izvođači čiji tekstovi ne zvuče kao da su ih naučili napamet. U Njemačkoj se među takve ubrajaju Joseph Bierbichler i Sophie Rois. Oni govore kao da razmišljaju uživo te se čini da im riječi tog trenutka izviru iz glava, a ne iz knjiga. Na filmu to uspijeva Phillipe Noiretu, za kojeg se čini kao da se ne povodi ni za kakvim scenarijem, ili Gene Hackmanu koji uvijek pogađa ton autoritativnog i dobrostivoga generala, kojemu ćemo rado povjeriti svoju sudbinu. Ti ljudi govore tako uvjerljivo zato što su živjeli, zato što se mogu osvrnuti na veliki i osobni repertoar dobrih i loših dana. Njihovo iskustvo progovara iz njih i ta mješavina osobnosti, karizme i pripovijesti navodi gledatelje da im u potpunosti vjeruju.

Osim razuzdanog života postoje, međutim, i druge mogućnosti kako postići da govor na pozornici i u filmu zvuči svježe i uvjerljivo.

Ponajprije, tu je metoda Karla Dirka Tebbea koji je često snimao video spotove za showcase beat le mot. On vježba svoj govor na pozornici s pomoću pisaćeg stroja. Izmisli neku rečenicu i direktno je ukuca u stroj. Time postiže da njegov govor ne postane odviše rasipan i trabunjav, a osim toga rečenice se uvijek čine gramatički točnima. Na pozornici njegov govor postaje preciznim i polaganim sredstvom pripovijedanja. Čini se kao da ga je upravo izmislio i promislio između redaka.

Njemačko-britanska skupina Gob Squad uvela je novi sistem kako bi svoj govor održala svježim. Oni svake večeri mijenjaju uloge, tako da nitko nema priliku dosađivati se nad nekim tekstom ili odviše se uljuljkati u sigurnost. Slično postupaju i Forced Entertainment. Na probama jedan glumac ispriča vlastitu priču, koju zatim na predstavama izvede drugi glumci.

Dariusz Kostyra iz showcasea uvijek malo popije prije izvedbe, budući da se tako mora snažnije koncentrirati na izbor riječi te uslijed takve koncentracije otpadnu suvišne digresije. Zbog toga su njegovi tekstovi precizni i usredotočeni.

Najuzbudljivijim smatram govor Worma Wintera iz norveških Bak-Truppen. On ne može zapamtiti nijedan tekst i zato ponekad naprijed snimi svoje replike te uvečer, pri uigravanju, samo divlje pokreće jezik kao da ih izgovara. Ako ponekad i mora uživo izgovoriti jednu ili dvije rečenice, napiše ih na registarske kartice i svaki put je krajnje uzbudljivo iščekivati hoće li doista uspjeti točno pročitati te rečenice na engleskom.

I ja vrlo teško pamtim tekstove. Osim nekoliko ulomaka iz pjesama koje sam naučio još u školi, ništa mi ne ostaje u glavi. Zato primjenjujem jednu specijalnu metodu pripovijedanja.

Komadi skupine showcase beat le mot uglavnom se zasnivaju na temama, a ne na gotovim tekstovima. U predstavi *Grand Slam* iz 1999. godine radilo se o nezaposlenosti i tenisu. U jednoj knjizi o bijelom sportu pronašao sam priču o bodovanju. Ispočetka je tenis bio gospodski sport i nije se radilo o pobjedi, nego o tome da se loptica što je moguće duže održi u igri. Tek se kasnije počelo brojati. Brojke 15, 30 i 40 označavale su poželjno trajanje razmjenjivanja loptice u minutama. Onome koji nije osvojio nijedan bod pripadala je sva ljubav igre i publike: love. Tu sam priču pričao svake večeri sjedeći na sudačkom stolcu. Nisam znao tekst napamet, nego sam samo znao koju priču želim ispričati. Zato je tekst zvučao u svakoj izvedbi drugačije. Na nekim mjestima morao sam praviti pauze kako bih razmislio na koji bi način trebalo završiti rečenicu te ne bi li priča još mogla dobiti kakav govorni obrat. Upravo te rupe u tekstu činile su cijelu stvar uzbudljivom. Bilo je to kao da gledate hodača po žici koji počinje teturati.

Tekstovi na pozornici trebali bi funkcionirati kao izlet s dobrim starim prijateljem. Zajedno posjećujemo kraj koji nam je nekada mnogo značio. Iako arhitektura i priroda ne odaju mnogo, mi smo ti koji zgradama, spomenicima i drveću pridajemo osobne priče.

Na pozornici se obraćamo reflektorima, razgovaramo sa scenografijom i osluškujemo šum zvučnika.



showcase beat le mot: Alarm Hamburg Shanghai, foto © Helmut Lackinger / Donaufestival



showcase beat le mot: Alarm Hamburg Shanghai, foto © Helmut Lackinger / Donaufestival

Speaking Comes from Behind, Not from Above or from Below

Nikola Đurić

Translated from German by Marina Miladinov

There are very few actors who can speak convincingly on the stage. And there are very few performers whose texts do not sound as if they learned them by heart. In Germany, we have Joseph Bierbichler and Sophie Rois on the good side. They speak as if they invented their text on the spot; their words seem to come straight from their heads instead of textbooks. On film, Phillip Noiret can speak as if he did not follow any script; and Gene Hackman never misses the tone of an authoritative, yet benevolent general, to whom we would gladly entrust our lives. These people speak so convincingly because they have lived, because they can look back to a large and personal repertoire of good and bad days. Their experience speaks out from them and the mixture of personality, charisma, and storytelling makes the spectators believe anything they say.

But apart from a wild life, there are other possibilities to make one's speech sound fresh and convincing on the stage.

For example, there is the method of Karl Dirk Tebbe, who has often shot video clips for Showcase Beat Le Mot. He practices his speech on stage with the help of a typewriter. He invents a sentence and types it directly into the machine. As a result, his speech does not sound too squandering or rambling; besides, his sentences always sound grammatically correct. On stage, his speech turns into an exact and measured instrument of storytelling. It sounds as if he made it up that very moment and thought it over between the lines.

The German-British troupe Gob Squad has introduced a different system in order to keep its speech fresh. They exchange roles every evening, so that none of them gets a chance to become bored with their text or feel too much at home in it. The concept of Forced Entertainment is similar. During the rehearsals, an actor tells his or her own story, which is then retold by other actors in different performances.

Dariusz Kostyra from Showcase always drinks a little before his acts, so that he is forced to concentrate more intensely on his choice of words; thus, all superfluous digressions get sacrificed to that concentration. In this way, his texts turn out exact and to the point.

In my opinion, the most exciting speech is that of Worm Winter from the Norwegian Bak-Truppen. He cannot memorize any text at all, and so he sometimes records his passages beforehand and only moves his tongue wildly to the recording at the evening rehearsals. If he is forced to speak out one or two sentences live, he writes them down on file cards and it is always extremely exciting to see whether he will really succeed in reading them out correctly in English.

I also have great problems with memorizing texts. Except for some passages from poetry, which I learned at school, nothing seems to stick to me. This is why I invented a special method of retelling a story.

The showcase beat le mot productions are mostly based on topics rather than ready-made texts. A piece called Grand Slam from 1999 was about unemployment and tennis. In a book on the white sport, I found a story about the system of points. In the beginning, tennis was a gentlemen's sport and it was not about winning, but about keeping the ball in the game as long as possible. It was only later that they started counting. 15; 30; 40 stood for the duration of the desirable exchange of hits, counted in minutes. The one that made no points, who received all the affection of the game and the audience: love. I told this story over and over, every evening, sitting on an umpire's chair. I did not know the text by heart, I only knew which story I wanted to tell. So the text sounded different in each performance. In some places, I had to make a break in order to reflect about how the sentence should end or whether the story could still have a turn of speech. And it was precisely those gaps in speech that made the whole thing exciting. It was like watching a ropedancer that gets into a sway.


Texts should function on stage in the same way as a trip with a good old friend. You visit a place together that used to mean much to you. Even though the architecture and nature tell you little about it, you know how to attach personal stories to the buildings, monuments, and trees.

On stage, one speaks to the spotlights, talks with the stage set, and listens to the noise of the loudspeakers.

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